▶ 0:02:20Committee on Foreign Affairs will come to order. Ask everybody to rise and join me in reciting the pledge of allegiance. I pledge algiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the republic for which it stands. One nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.
▶ 0:02:55As we open this hearing to outline maximum pressure on Iran, I'm going to deliver just a short message before I pass this gavl off to Mr. Lawler who will actually be chairing this hearing as uh he has a keen interest in the issues as all of us do and a firm knowledge in uh everything that we are about to discuss. And because I stole this hearing from him, he was going to do it at the subcommittee level. I thought it would only be right that he chair that uh he chair this committee and so he will be doing that.
▶ 0:03:22U but the message that I wish to deliver is this and it's simply to Ayatollah Kamei and I would deliver this to you. President Trump will work with you to peacefully end your nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program or President Trump will destroy your nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program. You get to choose the remedy. Ayatollah. I now pass the gavl to Mr.
▶ 0:04:01Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The purpose of this hearing is to explore policy options to effectively curtail Iran's illicit revenue streams and address the nexus with Iran's malign activities, particularly relating to its sponsorship of terror proxies and nuclear weapons program. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
▶ 0:04:25Good afternoon and again thank you chairman mass for putting on this hearing and to ranking member Meeks for presiding today. I also want to thank our witnesses for their expertise and their attention to this pressing matter. When President Trump left office over four years ago, the Iranian regime and its terror proxies were on their heels. The Trump administration's maximum pressure policy had devastated Iran's economy and denied the regime access to critical resources.
▶ 0:04:55Diplomatically, Iran was cornered and isolated like never before. The Abraham Accord saw Israel normalize relations with three Arab nations. It was a direct blow to Iran's influence and put the Middle East on a path towards unity against Thrron's aggression. Militarily, the message was unmistakable. The United States would not flinch.
▶ 0:05:17The decisive strike that took out Solomaini, Iran's mastermind of its terror proxies, crushed Iran's confidence and deterred provocations. By 2021, the Middle East stood on the brink of a new era of peace and stability. Iran was contained, its proxies weakened, and the region almost freed from the looming threat of Iranian terror. Enter Joe Biden. President Biden desperately tried to revive a dead nuclear deal with Iran.
▶ 0:05:46Even as the regime continued to expand its nuclear program in violation of its nonp proliferation treaty related obligations, the Biden administration pursued deals that would have provided the regime with sanctions relief while also allowing it to continue to expand its enrichment capabilities, including with support from Russia. And when the Biden administration came up short on a nuclear deal, it pursued a misguided $6 billion giveaway to Iran.
▶ 0:06:14And less than two months later, Hamas, with support from Iran, launched the heinous October 7th terrorist attack on Israel. Under the last administration, we occasionally heard tough language, but that was rarely backed up with concrete action. This lack of resolve embolden emboldened Iran and its proxies, offering them a free hand to escalate attacks against the US and its partners and allies with few if any consequences.
▶ 0:06:41Under the Biden administration, Iran, China, and Russia joined forces to form an unholy alliance aimed at destabilizing the free world. Yet, even as Iranian missiles and drones were targeting Israel, fueling Putin's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, and being used to threaten US service members, the Biden administration did little to prevent the lapse of the UN's missile embargo on Iran in October 23.
▶ 0:07:08As a result, Iran now has a free hand to proliferate its missiles and long range drones unchecked. Joe Biden's foreign policy decisions in the Middle East were illconceived, disorganized, and at times fatal, including for US service members, as we tragically saw at Tower 22 in Jordan. And in the end, he left the world more volatile and less safe than he found it.
▶ 0:07:34It's clear that the Biden administration's blatant refusal to enforce sanctions against Iran contributed to instability across the region and the globe. Under his administration, we witnessed an unprecedented trade in illicit oil between Iran and China, opening a lifeline for the IRGC to fund its malign activities. And it didn't work. Appeasing terrorists does not work.
▶ 0:08:00And that is why I'm pleased that President Trump has sit since put US policy towards Iran back on track, restoring the muchneeded and most effective maximum pressure campaign. Since t since taking office just over two months ago, the Trump administration has made great strides to implement an aggressive and comprehensive Iran policy that restores much needed deterrence.
▶ 0:08:25This is a welcome change from the days of hand ringing we saw under President Biden, whose policy towards Iran was all carrots and no sticks. The strategy now is to execute the maximum pressure campaign and deny the regime every ounce of grace given to them by the Biden administration. As part of this strategy, we must clamp down on the Iranian oil trade. Last year, Iran made over 50 billion from its illicit oil trade, much of which is controlled by its revolutionary guard core.
▶ 0:08:56As part of the maximum pressure, we must fully enforce existing sanctions to stop this illicit oil trade, specifically cutting off Iran's oil trade with China, which accounts for roughly 90% of oil exports. We must also take all available steps to stop Iran from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon. A nuclear Iran is not an option, and the safety of the American people and everything we love is dependent on our success here. One way or another, Iran's nuclear ambitions are finished.
▶ 0:09:26And once Iran loses hope for nuclear capacity, and we've decimated their bank accounts with the halt of the oil trade, they won't be able to fund terror proxies any longer. President Trump's support for Israel in the war against Iranbacked terror is absolute and I hope to see other partners in the region step up their commitment to working with the US and Israel to address this shared threat to ensure Iran no longer threatens our security or that of the free world.
▶ 0:09:56As this hearing will demonstrate, there are a number of measures that can and should be taken and I look forward to exploring that with our witnesses today. uh and seeing the path forward. I now recognize ranking member Meeks for his opening Thank you, Mr. Lawler. I want to thank Chairman Mass for calling this timely hearing and thank you to all of our witnesses for joining us this afternoon.
▶ 0:10:25There is strong bipartisan understanding on this committee regarding the threat posed by the government of Iran, the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism, and how it threatens the United States, Israel, the broader Middle East, and the entire globe.
▶ 0:10:43And with our quality panel, I know we will leave this hearing better informed on various aspects of the Iranian threat, ranging from its illicit nuclear program to support of terrorist proxies. We are living in a dangerous time when it comes to Iran. Over the last year, we've seen Iranian ex proxies attempt to destroy Israel. Hundreds of ballistic missiles and drones launched by Iran threatens Israel, Israeli and Palestinians alike.
▶ 0:11:13The United States armed forces have been targeted in hundreds of Iranian sponsored attacks and Iranian proxy has crippled shipping through the Red Sea and directly targeted the US Navy in international waters. Iranian drones are aiding Vladimir Putin and his illegal and brutal war on Ukraine. And China continues to purchase Iranian oil in the face of US sanctions.
▶ 0:11:38We know based upon public reports though that Iran is now closer than ever to having a nuclear capability. Now during the time of the JCPOA agreement, Iran was verifiably at least a year away from having enough highlyenriched uranium for a single bomb.
▶ 0:12:00But as a result of the Trump's administration, because he was the president before Biden, as a result of him abandoning that agreement, Iran is now only days away from having enough highlyenriched uranium for many bombs.
▶ 0:12:20By every measure, we are less safe today because we left the JCPOA than we were while we were in that agreement. We are now reading press reports that Prime Minister Netanyahu is planning a potential military strike on Iranian nuclear infrastructure as soon as this month. And reporting indicates that Mr. Netanyahu is aggressively lobbying President Trump to support such a strike.
▶ 0:12:50A military strike on Iran is no easy task, not a sure thing, and comes with significant risk of escalating into a destructive regional conflict. It is unlikely to deter Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations for a significant period of time and could have an enormous impact on regional security as well as the United States and global economies.
▶ 0:13:15And you may have noticed that the US economy is already facing troubling volatility as a result of the president's reckless threats of terrorists. Rattling energy markets, disturbing trade routes, and unleashing additional regional instability is not something to be taken lightly. So no military solution will permanently deny the Iran that deny Iran the bomb. Nor will it usher in a democratic Iranian government.
▶ 0:13:46That's fantasy. Like most observers of Iran, I'm acutely certain both the Iranian and American people would be better served by Iranian leadership who respect human rights at home and peace abroad. And I hope we can protect foreign assistance efforts that support the Iranian people from further arbitrary cuts.
▶ 0:14:10We know Iranians do not broadly support their corrupt theor theocratic government that abuses women and minorities and waste Iran's financial resources supporting terrorists that undermine their own security and bring to no benefit and of no benefit to the Iranian people. Despite all these serious challenges, solutions are not impossible. I will always argue that diplomacy must always be kept on the table alongside credible threats.
▶ 0:14:40Diplomacy may not solve all of our challenge with Iran, but direct engagement with Iran has proven successful in lowering tensions and addressing the nuclear program, the main issue of concern. President Trump has right was right to send a letter to Iranian leaders, opening the door to diplomatic engagement. We must encourage this effort and utilize all means of American power to address Iranian threats and to do so in lock step with our allies.
▶ 0:15:09We should be involving our allies and bringing them in closer for this effort, not push them away. We have three excellent witnesses with us today to help think through the challenges before us. This is an excellent panel to assess the threats posed by Iran and help us formulate appropriate responses to keep the United States and our friends and allies safe. So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
▶ 0:15:38Thank you, Ranking Member Meeks. Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic. Mr. Norman T. Rule, non-resident senior adviser, warfare irregular threats and terrorism program, the center for strategic and international studies.
▶ 0:16:01Miss Claire Jungman, chief of staff, United Against Nuclear Iran, and Miss Dana Stru, director of research and Shelley and Michael Kassen, senior fellow, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. This committee recognizes the importance of the issues before us and is grateful to have you here to speak with us today. Your full statements will be made part of the record and I'll ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to five minutes in order to allow more time for member questions.
▶ 0:16:31I now recognize Mr. Rule for his opening statement. Chair Lawler, Ranking Member Meeks, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today. I will make brief comments and with your concurrence submit a statement for the record. For over two decades, Iran has used its nuclear program and regional militias as its primary tools of power projection.
▶ 0:16:56Thrron's role in the deaths of hundreds of Americans and tens of thousands of citizens in the Middle East is routinely acknowledged. Iran's missiles and drones kill Ukrainians and threaten global shipping in the Red Sea. But it has evaded meaningful consequences in part due to Western concerns that it would respond to significant retaliation by undertaking the final steps to acquire a nuclear weapon.
▶ 0:17:21These aggressive policies gradually have become entwined as Iran's malign sword and shield of its foreign policy. Recent seismic changes in the region give us an unprecedented opportunity to deal with these challenges. Despite the intelligence community's assessment that Iran is not undertaking nuclear weaponization, recent reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency are alarming.
▶ 0:17:48Thran has built a nuclear program which has no justifiable civilian purpose. Iran now appears capable of producing its first quantity of 90% enriched uranium sufficient for one nuclear weapon in about a week. Thrron's current stockpile of 60% enriched uranium is sufficient for about seven nuclear weapons.
▶ 0:18:11Assuming use of Iran's entire stock of enriched uranium and centrifuge capacity, some experts believe Iran could produce fistal material sufficient for approximately 10 nuclear weapons in a month. Let those numbers sink in. Thrron has also increased the number and sophistication of its centrifuge cascades, allowing for rapid weaponization when it so chooses.
▶ 0:18:36Iran routinely hampers IAEA efforts to verify its nuclear program, which absent solid intelligence reduces confidence in detecting any diversion of nuclear material or equipment to any possible covert weapons program.
▶ 0:18:53In short, Iran looks like a country building a nuclear weapons program, albeit one yet to make the final steps required because it either fears discovery and the subsequent military consequences or believes its current approach offers diplomatic advantages beyond those found in possession of an actual nuclear weapon. Its long range ballistic missile program appears to be following a similar path.
▶ 0:19:23Turning to Iran, Thrron's proxy network, Israeli and ongoing US military actions have severely weakened its proxies in Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, and Yemen. But these groups survive along with its other partners in the region.
▶ 0:19:40The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps could force aims to revive these groups, including in the Red Sea region, where its strategy involves securing naval access via Sudan, where it likely hopes to establish weapons transipment and militant training centers in East Africa to threaten the Arabian Peninsula, Israel, and the Eastern Mediterranean.
▶ 0:20:04Iran's proxy operations remain vulnerable, however, to pressure on their logistics, finances, and personnel. Diplomatic and economic sanctions are important. Although Europe's actions here have been insufficient, the US needs to make it clear to Iran that if the goods force operates as a terrorist organization, its personnel and logistics will be targeted accordingly, including by our military assets.
▶ 0:20:33Yemen presents an opportunity to demonstrate this decision. Thrron recognizes its unprecedented vulnerability to external military threats, particularly after Israel's October 2024 strikes demonstrated the ineffectiveness of their air defenses. The Israeli strikes and Iran's failed counterattacks also showed the potency of US military technology and our regional partnerships.
▶ 0:21:01Domestically, Iran faces severe economic and political challenges which exceed its policy capabilities. Millions of Iranians have fallen into poverty in recent years. Inflation hovers at 35%. The return of maximum pressure sanctions campaign has accelerated the collapse of Iran's currency against the dollar. The regime now appears to resemble like the late Soviet Union, holding power through coercion and stale ideology.
▶ 0:21:30Between 2002 and 2003, and then between 2013 and 2014, Iran navigated similar Western military threats, regional instability, and domestic discontent by blending belligerent rhetoric with lengthy diplomatic talks designed to soften sanctions. Tan avoided actions which could have sparked a conventional war with the US. This strategy led to the 2015 joint comprehensive plan of action.
▶ 0:21:57This deal committed tyrron to potentially reversible nuclear concessions in exchange for long-term or permanent sanctions relief that it used to sustain the regime and resource its regional militias and missile program. We and our partners must use this period to foster and debate that leads to the abandonment of regional adventurism and a pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your comments and questions. Thank you, Mr. Rule.
▶ 0:22:25I now recognize Miss Jungman for her opening statement. Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Meeks, and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. The topic of this hearing and disrupting Iran's malign behavior is a matter of urgent national security. At the heart of Iran's malign behavior is its oil sector. Despite US sanctions, Iran continues to export over 1.5 million barrels of oil per day, earning tens of billions of dollars annually.
▶ 0:22:53These revenues are not just supporting Iran's economy. They are directly funding terrorism, nuclear escalation, and destabilization. That's because up to half of Iran's oil exports are now controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corpse or IRGC. This means that every barrel of Iranian oil sold on the black market strengthens the IRGC's hand, bankrolling groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, underwriting weapons development and fueling nuclear expansion. We've seen the consequences.
▶ 0:23:23Iranbacked militants have launched attacks across the region, emboldened by the financial c cushion that oil exports have provided. New enforcement actions in late 2024, including designations on nearly 50 tankers and sanctions on Chinese refiners, have started to make an impact. Iran's oil exports have dipped and its access to her hard currency is beginning to tighten, but this campaign must continue and expand.
▶ 0:23:47The goal should be to drive Iran's oil revenues as close to zero as possible, cutting off the financial oxygen that allows the regime to operate abroad and repress at home. Beyond oil, Iran is increasingly turning to other illicit revenue streams, cryptomining and laundering, shadow banking networks, dollar smuggling from Iraq, and barter trade with Russia and Syria.
▶ 0:24:09These activities are harder to track but deeply In total, we estimate Iran has generated over a hundred billion in oil revenue since 2021 and additional billions through crypto and smuggling networks. These funds have empowered its proxies and enable enabled nuclear brinksmanship, but sanctions can still work. When properly enforced, they limit Iran's budget, disrupt its ability to pay militias, and increase the costs of escalation. To that end, I offer a few recommendations.
▶ 0:24:39First, continue aggressive enforcement against Iran's ghost fleet and shipping facilitators. Sanction every vessel, registry, insurer, captain, and port that helps move Iranian oil. Second, target for target foreign enablers, especially in China and Malaysia who knowingly buy or store Iranian crude. Third, expand maritime interdictions and use AI tools to identify suspicious tanker behavior in real time.
▶ 0:25:06Each vessel seized directly cuts into Iran's revenue and deters further evasion. Fourth, establish a multilateral task force modeled on the Russian sanctions coordination effort to enable real-time intelligence sharing on Iranian oil smuggling, front companies, and crypto laundering. Unified action will help close off evasion pathways faster and more effectively. Fifth, strengthen crypto enforcement by tracing wallets linked to Iran and sanctioning mining operations.
▶ 0:25:35And finally, Congress should ensure that secondary sanctions remain a powerful deterrent, holding accountable any foreign entity that track transacts with the IRGC or its proxies. In closing, the United States must send a clear message. Iran cannot continue to fund terrorism, threaten its neighbors, and defy nuclear commitments without consequences. We must remain united, vigilant, and unyielding in our pursuit of financial pressure because cutting off the money is our best tool to constrain Iran's most dangerous activities.
▶ 0:26:06Thank you. Thank you, Miss Jungman. I now recognize Miss Stru for her opening statement. Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Meeks, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. Let me associate myself with Mr. Rule. The Iranian regime is on its back foot.
▶ 0:26:27The pillars of its security strategy, the nuclear weapons program, the network of terrorists and proxies, and the conventional missile and drone arsenal are more vulnerable today than at any time in the history of the regime, making 2025 a decisive year.
▶ 0:26:44In the aftermath of Hamas's attack, Israel with US support dismantled Iran's proxy network in Gaza, Lebanon, and elsewhere, disrupting the regime's ability to project power through asymmetric capabilities. In Syria, Tehran lost its regional strategic partner with the ouster of Bashar al-Assad, who permitted the use of Syrian territory for Iranian terror.
▶ 0:27:09From the validation of a US-led regional air defense coalition in April of last year to Israel's defeat of a largecale ballistic missile attack last October, we now know that Iran's complex conventional attacks and missile threats can be defeated. Israel strikes inside Iran targeted key missile production facilities and degraded its strategic air defense systems. In addition, the regime is under economic and social pressure.
▶ 0:27:39The sanctions architecture from the 2019 maximum pressure campaign remains in place and has been strengthened. The window is open for the US to work with its partners and advance opportunities in a region no longer held back by Iran's nefarious influence. To emphasize, this is a window of opportunity. How the US proceeds in the coming months will determine whether a more stable and secure region emerges from the post October 7th environment.
▶ 0:28:09In the coming months, the administration should test Thrron's willingness to reach a diplomatic agreement while also preparing to set the nuclear weapons program back through military means. A good deal, as National Security Adviser Waltz emphasized, would be one that permanently blocks Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon rather than just delaying its capability.
▶ 0:28:31Yet, the time window to test Iran's openness to negotiate is short, partly due to the looming October expiration of remaining UN Security Council restrictions and also because of Iran's current exposure to military strikes. Policymakers should assume that Russia and China will help Iran rebuild its military capacity and air defenses. Moscow and Beijing are already supporting Tehran diplomatically.
▶ 0:28:57So Washington will need to prepare for a complex negotiation in which these powers do not contribute to a diplomatic process like they did as part of the P5+1. The following steps will strengthen the US hand as it pursues a negotiated settlement. The administration can incentivize Iran to negotiate by articulating how sanctions relief would be structured if Iran dismantles its nuclear weapons program.
▶ 0:29:22The administration must keep its military options open by m by maintaining a robust US military posture in the region, strengthening regional air and missile defense capabilities and reinforcing America's commitment to deterring Iranian aggression against Israel and Arab allies. Congress can begin the process to conditionally authorize the use of military force against Iran's nuclear program if the regime proves unwilling to quickly take sufficient steps.
▶ 0:29:50Consultations with allies and partners, particularly in the Middle East and Europe, will ensure a unified approach to countering Iran, reinforce the legitimacy of any negotiated settlement, and maintain pressure on Tehran. This will be crucial to blunting spoiler policies from Russia and China. Engaging regional leaders is also essential for preventing Iran from reconstituting its threat network. Providing military assistance and intelligence sharing to partners will enhance their ability to counter Iran.
▶ 0:30:21Restoring assistance to emerging leaders while pressing for reforms, particularly in Lebanon and Syria can further incentivize cooperation, ensuring they remain resilient against malign Iranian influence. In Yemen, the administration should ensure that its current air campaign exclusively targets military assets of the Houthis and mitigates civilian harm while seeking ways to support the Ameny people.
▶ 0:30:48Increasing maritime and overland interdiction efforts will prevent Iran from resupplying the Houthis. Additionally, working closely with the Saudis and Amiradis on a political process aimed at ending Yemen civil war will create a pathway for peace and stability. In conclusion, real opportunities exist to block Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapons capability and consolidate military gains against its destabilizing activities.
▶ 0:31:14To press the advantage, the US must be prepared to bring more to the table. Military forcing sanctions are critical elements of strategy, but insufficient on their own. The United States must lean into diplomacy as well, testing the possibility of a negotiated settlement while supporting new leaders across the region that oppose Tehran's interest in rebuilding its axis of resistance. Thank you. Thank you, M. Thank you, M. Stru. I now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning.
▶ 0:31:44Last year, two of my bills that became law targeted Iran's oil trade. The ship act gave the president the authority to sanction foreign ports and refineries that process illicit Iranian oil. And the chi Iran China energy sanction sanctions act allowed for sanctions against Chinese financial institutions that process transactions involving Iranian oil. And I'm currently working on legislation that further expands sanctions authority.
▶ 0:32:13The Iran Enhanced Sanctions Act. Anyone or any entity that knowingly facilitates the Iranian oil trade will be found and cut off until they are no longer doing so. Mr. Jungman, just over a week ago, the president sanctioned the L King refinery in China under the ship act authorities. Have we seen any uh impact since this recent designation?
▶ 0:32:38And do you believe this designation and the Trump administration's clear intent to enforce more of these types of sanctions may deter other refineries from continuing to accept Iranian oil? Uh Chairman Lawler, thank you for your question and thank you for your work on the ship act and and associated um associated acts.
▶ 0:32:58I do think that the first I mean the first designations here on this refinery um it's still a little bit too soon to see an impact given that it was only a you know a week or so ago. Um but we need more of these. One refinery designated doesn't have a big impact. Iran's going to move its oil to be offloaded at another refinery. We need to continue the pressure. We need to continue the designations on the refineries. Um, and it shouldn't be peace meal.
▶ 0:33:28It needs to all happen at once in order to really cut the lifeline. Last week, uh, reporting indicated that US naval forces stopped a group of oil tankers in the Gulf. Uh, while originally thought to be of Iraqi origin, they were found to be using forged Iraqi documents and the tankers were Iranian. uh this instance really raises the larger issue of this being a consistent problem in the Gulf.
▶ 0:33:56So what do you believe we are doing now to stop vessels from obscuring their origin? Uh and how are our allies and strategic partner countries like Iraq uh helping us and what more can be done? Unfortunately, I don't think our strategic partners are doing enough here. I think we need to have more diplomatic engagement with them and encourage them to um try to stop these associated activities.
▶ 0:34:20We see Malaysia, Singapore, Iraq, Oman, these are all serving as hubs for Iran to blend its oil, rebrand its oil um and and again continue the lifeline of the oil to be uh exported. So we need to continue pressure on them and encourage more diplomatic efforts from them. Mr. rule.
▶ 0:34:41You mentioned in your opening statement that it's important to demonstrate the credibility of a US military offensive should Iran undertake nuclear weaponization in the future. What alternatives to diplomacy would you recommend in attempting to constrain Iran's nuclear program? And what other factors need to be considered before any decision is made to pursue one of these?
▶ 0:35:06Diplomacy of course should remain our primary route and the president has appropriately made this uh uh the forefront of his approach to the Iranians and engagement with our partners. Uh the Iranians must understand if they complete the final steps that we will take that military u uh final approach as well. There needs to be more action done to prevent Iran from acquiring the material they need to complete those last steps.
▶ 0:35:33And we need to make sure that our partners who are providing that equipment, uh, the Chinese, maybe Europeans, shipping lines are punished severely as they move that material. But in the end of the day, Iran has pretty much everything it needs to complete those last steps for its nuclear program. Unfortunately, the can has been kicked down the road for many years, and we're we're at the end of the road.
▶ 0:35:57So it's up to the Iranians to take those last steps and they either come to a deal where they must face nuclear reaction, nuclear response, military response. So given given that the can has been kicked down the road, what factors in your estimation need to be considered before any decision is made to pursue a non-diplomatic uh response? The location of the nuclear material.
▶ 0:36:24The IIA has lost track of some aspects of Iran's program because Iran no longer provides full access to its uh production of centrifuge uh equipment. Uh we need to make sure we understand exactly where all Iran's sites are located so that Iran simply doesn't reproduce uh its program in an alternative facility.
▶ 0:36:46And in the end, even if there is a military strike, sir, we've got to make sure the Iranians understand that our intent in the long term is to prevent reconstruction or simply we're going to be going in and repeating the process. Uh so it's got to be an international approach that says with the US and its partners, we are not going to tolerate Iran building a nuclear weapon. Thank you. I now recognize ranking member Meeks for five Thank you. Uh Mr.
▶ 0:37:15Stroll, let me just go to you first and thank you for your service to to our country. You know, I said in my opening remarks that u there's more to be done uh to try to bring Iran and the US to the table to negotiate the core issues of uh uh concern here which is Iran's nuclear program um because of that tough environment.
▶ 0:37:38But I also believe that, you know, when I look at it thus far, Iran's response is has been that they reject direct talks with the United States, but has left the door open to multilateral diplomacy. And what was important for me at the time of negotiating the JCPA OA was that it was a multi-ateral agreement.
▶ 0:38:06There was things that were going on and negotiated that our allies wanted. That's how we got the agreement because we figured it wouldn't be just us by ourselves. So, as Mr. Rule just said, getting them in so that we could box Iran in because it's not just the United States, it's the United States and our allies. Well, which I think is important.
▶ 0:38:28And then also I think some uh has been gone from the United States when we unilaterally pulled out and the other allies stayed in and wanted to work something together. So there's a lack of trust that then develops you know uh in that regards on both sides.
▶ 0:38:51So, how do you think we could build some confidence with our adversary Iran so that we can begin negotiations and how do we bring back a diplomatic track with our allies so we're not by ourselves? I think Mr. Rule just talked about how significant and important that is. How do you think that we can do that? Thank you so much for this question.
▶ 0:39:19Uh I couldn't agree with you more that we have seen in the past Iran has been willing to negotiate when it it feels isolation coupled with economic pressure and the threat of military force. Right now we have tremendous sanctions pressure and I believe there is a credible threat of military force on the table and there is a unil unilateral offer to negotiate from President Trump. But what is missing is this multilateral element.
▶ 0:39:49So first of all, there is an eagerness in some of our our previous partners from the P5 plus one, specifically in Europe, to begin coordinating with Washington as soon as possible ahead of this deadline in October later this year when the remaining restrictions on Iran's nuclear program expire. our European allies and they are still our allies are uh very interested in negotiate in aligning with us in order to have a unified front uh approaching Iran.
▶ 0:40:17Secondly, we have been uh using uh and relying on partners in the Middle East to pass messages to Iran uh and receive messages from Iran. And I think that's very important. But our partners in the Middle East also need to have confidence that if the Iranians lash out and and threaten them or use military force against them like we saw in the 2015 ecake situation that Washington is going to have their back and be willing to put security guarantees on the table and support their defense just as the United
▶ 0:40:47States has done for Israel in supporting its defense. So one is clarifying um our commitment to our partners' defense. two is making a meaningful and genuine effort to include them and consult with them on these talks that will also strengthen ne any negotiation on the other side. Thank you. And I address this to um to you again Miss Stroll and Mr.
▶ 0:41:09rule of you know hopefully we'll have time to hit both of you you know could you maybe um tell us about the challenges uh that it would be uh and uh and setting back the Iranian nuclear program militarily you know what what would there be any challenges are there challenges there Mr. Rule Miss Stroll I'll try to do 20 seconds and hand it over to Mr. rule.
▶ 0:41:36So the the greatest challenge is that you cannot bomb away knowledge. Iran has mastered the cycle of nuclear fuel enrichment and we know based on uh intelligence community reporting in an unclassified manner that they are undertaking the activities to position themselves to go across the threshold and weaponize should the sup should the supreme leader make the decision to do so. So we are at a perilous moment. Their nuclear program is geographically diverse.
▶ 0:42:05Some of it is above ground. Some of it is buried deeply underground. This means it's not a one night military campaign. We are talking about a serious campaign to set back a program in order to then buy time to negotiate or figure out what steps would happen on the other side of military action. It's a serious piece of business. I think my time is expired. Thank you to the ranking member.
▶ 0:42:34I now recognize for five minutes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for being here today. What what an important topic uh as we uh face the threat from Iran. And to me, uh the regime in Thran is very clear. uh they believe death to Israel, death to America.
▶ 0:42:54Uh they believe that by developing a nuclear capability that would be as essential to Israel, it'd be as essential to the United States, particularly as they develop an ICBM capability which could only have one purpose, and that is to deliver a nuclear attack on the American people. And so over and over again, I'm so grateful for the leadership of Donald Trump to let the dictatorship in Thran know that they should not develop a nuclear capability and a nuclear bomb.
▶ 0:43:25Uh and it should not be developed. And then we need to get to uh if it's ever determined they're not u there must be actual verification, not some charade of determining whether uh it's been stopped or not.
▶ 0:43:38And so I have absolute faith and I'm really grateful for chairman mass to bring up indeed uh that we need to make do all we can to stop the financing of the dictatorship uh with uh it being revealed that 90% of the uh oil and gas being pro uh sold goes to the Chinese Communist Party. Uh let's connect the dots.
▶ 0:44:02uh and then we connect another dot and I was very grateful for President Donald Trump over the weekend to identify the dots uh that are connected between uh war criminal Putin and the sale of oil to maintain his dictatorship and the call for secondary sanctions. uh and that these would be secondary sanctions um that would be against allies of the United not against but working with allies of the United States that they should be part of sanctions.
▶ 0:44:32So over and over again we're in a situation uh as we face the malign influence the topic today uh it we we have a circumstance that's so clear to me and that is that we're involved in a war we did not choose and that is dictators with rule of gun invading democracies with rule of law. It began February 24, 2022 with the invasion of Ukraine.
▶ 0:44:55Then October 7, 2023, uh work the puppets of uh Iran, Hamas invading uh Israel. And then uh over and over again, we just need to be um working together. And with that in mind, I uh would like uh each of you, but in particular, Mr. uh ruled the um uh issue of uh sanctions. What more sanctions can we have?
▶ 0:45:23And I want you to know that uh that many of my colleagues here that we've introduced a number of bills today, the maximum uh support act uh bipartisan with Congressman Jimmy Petta. We also have the Free from Free Iraq from Iran Act. I had two of my sons serve uh in Iraq to liberate uh Iraq. We didn't mean for it to be liberated for Iran to come in with militias to control the country. And so that needs to be achieved.
▶ 0:45:49And then I'm really grateful that we've got legislation pending and I need people really smart like Congressman Heisinga to be part of this. And that is the um address the network of Hezbollah here in the Western Hemisphere working with drug cartels. With all of that, what can we do in terms of sanctions to help the people of Iran, not the dictatorship? A superb question, sir.
▶ 0:46:15Very quickly, s any any legislation should ensure that we as loudly and as clearly say that the Iranian people can obtain food and medicine from the United States and elsewhere because their own government's corruption and inefficiency prevents them from doing so. to include during COVID where over a billion dollars of corruption cost them medicine that they so desperately needed.
▶ 0:46:42I would say that when anything that could be done to defy the deny the goods force resources because that goes directly to terrorism, terrorism in the homeland and supporting proxies overseas who are attempting to kill Americans and uh uh individuals in the region is important. Thank you. And uh Miss Jungman uh indeed uh the tanker tracking is so important uh and uh we're talking about uh ghost ships of uh war Putin.
▶ 0:47:12We're talking about refineries uh of the Chinese Communist Party uh over and over again. So how is this being um processed? And again, President Trump's made every effort and has made clear he's going to act. Uh thank you for the question. And I think it's important to remember that the revenue Iran accumulates from its oil sales is not revenue going back to the people of Iran. This revenue is going to into the regime into the regime's pockets.
▶ 0:47:39Um, and I think it's also important to remember that the maritime industry is a a large industry. There's a number of western touch points that these vessels have that can be sanctioned or you can threaten sanctions on. For example, the classification societies. Essentially, every vessel needs to have a safety certificate which is given from a classification society to ensure that it's safe to sail the seas. Without that classification certificate, a vessel cannot sail into a port.
▶ 0:48:05We have yet to see any sanctions on these classification societies, um, flag registries as well and insurance companies. And, uh, my time is up. I yield back with, hey, thank you for your insight. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. I now recognize for five minutes the gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman.
▶ 0:48:25What we learned early this century is that just an American leader pounding the table as several did and say this country will not be allowed to have nuclear weapons is not exactly effective. That's why I was here for saw several presidents make that declaration with regard to North Korea and North now North Korea has scores of nuclear weapons.
▶ 0:48:50the uh I'm going to ask our witnesses to give a us a answer in writing about North Korea because 20 years ago North Korea provided not nuclear weapons to Syria but the technology to build them. The reason for that is North Korea didn't have a surplus of nuclear weapons at the time. Didn't want to give up their nuclear weapons. They but they're happy to have Syria have nuclear weapons and to make some money off of it.
▶ 0:49:17So, I'd like uh each of our witnesses for the record to detail ideas on what we do to prevent Iran from buying a nuclear weapon from North Korea, which today does not have a surplus of money and does have a surplus of nuclear weapons. And in particular, I'd like you to address what steps we could take to force China to agree, at least privately, that no plane would be allowed to go directly from N from uh North Korea to Iran without stopping for inspection.
▶ 0:49:47I might add that I discussed this with President Obama in the Oval Office long ago and was unable to and while he pointed out to me that we intercept certain ships leaving North Korea, uh he was unwilling to uh take action to prevent direct plane flights. Um at least he didn't think it was a good idea at the time.
▶ 0:50:10The uh MASA act named after Masa Ameni uh who was brutally murdered murdered by the Iranian regime directed the administration to make targeted sanctions determinations on senior officials in the Iranian regime. Uh Ms. uh uh what can the administration do to better utilize those authorities uh and go after particular individuals responsible for human rights uh uh deprivations in Iran?
▶ 0:50:42Well, the thank you for that question, Congressman. The administration should certainly make use of the authorities granted to it by Congress in the MASA act uh and continue to shine a light uh and impose any particular individuals you'd want to name today. I don't I don't have particular individuals I don't I'd add them for the record. I'll ask our other witnesses to do that. But I'll point out our other witnesses have pointed out that you can't bomb knowledge away that even an agreement with Iran is valid only so long as they adhere to it.
▶ 0:51:13Nothing will permanently prevent the Islamic Republic of Iran from having a nuclear weapon except the permanent end to the Islamic Republic of Iran and the creation of a truly democratic uh Iranian government. Uh I I I am therefore shocked that the administration has cut eliminated all the democracy and civil society programs that I ran.
▶ 0:51:40all of our support for grassroots political movements, uh, all of our support for independent media. Now, I know that USID spent a few tens of thousands of dollars doing stupid things that don't reflect American values and certainly don't reflect our strategic needs. But we saw just yesterday the Chinese were rescuing people in Myanmar and we did not have the capacity to save a single life in Myanmar.
▶ 0:52:09Uh we sent some people uh recently long after I think all the survivors would have been deceased to go scout out the situation. That's what happens when you lose US ID. Um Miss Stro, I'd like you to focus just on the Trump years. It's 2017 to 2021. Uh during those four years, did Iran increase its missile capacity? Yes or no? Yes.
▶ 0:52:36During those four years, did Iran uh expand its uh stockpile of enriched uranium? Yes. During those years, did Iran increase its capacity to refine uranium through banks of centrifuges? Yes. So, well, I hope that Trump 2.0 works better. Um, I would also uh com uh Ms. Jugman, you brought the importance of cryptocurrency.
▶ 0:53:06Uh I point out that our sanctions that got us the in in 2015 were pretty much based on our power to control international currency because it was all dollars. The crypto enthusiasts and the leaders in that industry have said they want to take that away from the United States because they think it's illegitimate for America to have that power.
▶ 0:53:28Uh do you think that uh we should give up uh the power that we get from having the uh the uh dollar being the world's reserve currency? No, I don't think we should give up that power, but I do think that um there needs to be stronger regulations and monitoring of what's being done on the My time is expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I now recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, for 5 minutes. very much. Mr.
▶ 0:53:58Chairman, let me just ask two basic questions. You know, despite presenting itself as a US partner, Azabaijan under Alav and I've met with him twice in Baku and raised human rights issues with him and recently obviously he committed genocide against the people of Negron Carabach. Uh he signed a cooperation agreement with both Iran and Russia, including a significant gas swap deal with Thrron.
▶ 0:54:22these actions in my opinion directly benefit the two regimes and the US that the US is actively working to counter and I'm wondering what your thoughts might be on that. Secondly, if I could um Rob Mali you know we know that the office of inspector general and I read the report it's it was a good report about the fact that the state department did not follow uh its own um uh clearance guidelines.
▶ 0:54:47Uh but the bigger issue is having someone who was seemingly uh very much in favor of Thyron's policies in such a strategic position to special envoy does raise the question what damage might have been done has been done and might even carry forward right into today especially as to thyron's perceptions of what we're all about and do you do you think the FBI will ever get to the bottom of it and if you could speak to that as well.
▶ 0:55:14Uh but those two questions if you could in order to restrict Iran's uh access to funds and to apply the appropriate diplomatic and economic uh pressures it is critical that Iran not have the capacity to undertake economic deals such as it conducted with Azaraijan with anyone. As M.
▶ 0:55:36Stroll correctly stated Iran is under the greatest pressure when it faces multilateral economic and diplomatic isolation and that must be absolute. Whenever there are are exceptions to that, Iran benefits and that weakens uh the pressure on on on Iran itself. Um uh regarding Mr. Mali, I it's out of my level of of competence and I would defer to the Federal Bureau of Investigation or or or others. Thank you. Would any of you want to comment on either of those two issues?
▶ 0:56:06I would simply uh note that in uh the Biden administration and again in this administration uh there is an aligned objective of pursuing negotiations first for a verifiable deal that blocks all Iran's pathways towards a nuclear weapon and I think it underscores the importance of an independent and strong inspector general in the state department as well as an FBI who is allowed to conduct uh credible and important investigations.
▶ 0:56:33Claire, do any of you have any sense as to when the FBI may uh reveal where it is in terms of this investigation? It seems like Mali just fell off the face of the earth. Uh and to have someone of his special envoy uh in such a strategic position seems to me it would undermine what this country was all about in our dealings with Iran. Would you agree with that? At nobody. Okay.
▶ 0:57:02Uh I do hope that we will follow up on the Azerbaijan connection. Uh again uh there were I've met with a number of people who have political prisoners sitting in his horrible jails. He is so brazen that in the past he put a stringer who was an Azarbaijani woman into jail. Gave her an over sevenyear prison sentence and she worked for Radio Free Europe. So I actually convened a hearing and had the head of Radio for Europe come and testify about how horrible it was and what was her crime.
▶ 0:57:30She pointed out how corrupt ali is and now we have a situation again where where he's getting into deals with a country uh that needs hard currency extremely hard. We know that Xi Jinping and the Communist Party they enable dictatorship and and bad actors everywhere. But this man who gets a free pass in this town uh and that is Ali needs to be called out. I thank you. Yield back.
▶ 0:58:01Thank you, Mr. Smith. I now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Keading, for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, M. Stroll mentioned how important our allies are to us in this regard, even though we did move away from them and left many of them hanging, pulling out of the JCPOA. But I want to just comment on on that first.
▶ 0:58:26Uh last year our allies did participate with a Iran proxy the Houthis in an attack with fighter jets uh with shipbased cruise missiles uh with targets like you know Houthi missile launchers air defense systems radar weapon systems we work together the UK participated in this Canada participated in this Australia and the Netherlands participated ated in
▶ 0:58:56this. Well, what's happened to our allies now uh with the Trump administration's latest uh actions and talks deliberately irritating and this really takes a great deal of effort our allies Canada uh wanting to make that the 51st state and bullying them with tariffs uh without negotiating the way you would with an ally. How does Canada respond?
▶ 0:59:23Well, Canada responded just last month with a $4.2 billion investment uh in cutting edge radar with Australia despite our geographic location in the Western Hemisphere with Australia. And they're partaking with other European countries right now in alternative military buildup discrete from the United States because of these actions.
▶ 0:59:49Denmark uh is part of NATO and how are they reacting when they say they will take uh Greenland by force if necessary. Portugal a NATO country is and other NATO countries they're reconsidering buying Fu 35s because their fear of the US control over the parts and software. These are our allies.
▶ 1:00:16These are people that are instrumental to our success worldwide, but also in the Middle East. And let's talk about the leaked signal chat that was there.
▶ 1:00:29Our vice president saying, "I just hate bailing out Europe again." And what about our secretary of defense saying, "I fully share your loathing of European pathetic. And what about Steven Miller in that chat? They had a lot to say and our allies were listening.
▶ 1:00:54He said, "We have to make it clear to Egypt and Europe what we expect in return. We also need to figure out how to enforce that requirement. If they don't remunate remun, I'm sorry, remunate, then what? If the US successfully restores freedom of navigation at a great cost, there needs to be further economic gain extracted from them in return. That's the signal chat.
▶ 1:01:25Those are the other actions and I could go on. How can we really expect our allies to trust us on such an important issue is Iran and dealing with their malign influence throughout the Middle East if this is what they're getting in return. And we've already seen as I've shown some actions on their part where they're moving away from us because they can't us. Mr.
▶ 1:01:51Tru, are we weaker without our allies side by side with us? Thank you for that question. Certainly, one of the core elements of American strength and its ability to accomplish its national security interests has been our unmatched network of allies and partners across multiple theaters. Any objective that we want to make the American people safer uh and our country safer is better done in coordination with allies and partners.
▶ 1:02:21Part of the reason we need to put an effort to align diplomatically, share burdens and resources upfront is because there may need be a time when we ask our allies and partners to do something that is not easy or inconvenient like they did it after 9/11 in joining with us. Absolutely. Under article 5. Absolutely sir. So as we think through all of our different objectives in the Middle East, we have seen our European allies stand up as well as our partners in the Middle East. The air defense coalition last April was a good example.
▶ 1:02:52France's leadership in Lebanon is another example. The European coordination in Syria is another example. And absolutely the both defensive presence in the Red Sea uh to defend against Houthi attacks and the offensive military strikes over the past year are great examples of our allies and partners putting skin in the game. Thank you. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Keading. I now recognize for five minutes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
▶ 1:03:22Ladies and gentlemen, appreciate your time here today. Why don't we just get real about this conversation for once? Iran is a Iran is a country that is run by a criminal terrorist regime. That's what Iran is. We're talking about having negotiations with them and so on and so forth. I guess we we've got to, you know, but North Korea is a criminal essentially terrorist regime when you look at what it does to its own citizens.
▶ 1:03:50It doesn't because it can't afford to export its terrorism, but Iran does and has continued to do so. And even with the fact notwithstanding that 80% of Hezbollah's drones and missiles have been taken out, Assad's regime is Tran's missile factories have been devastated. The Houthis are finally under some real fire.
▶ 1:04:16Iran still exists and we're talking like there's some Now, let me ask you, you guys are the experts. Mr. Rule, is Iran going to give up its nuclear program? Have they ever shown any interest whatsoever? But before I before you answer that question, is there any question in anybody's mind on the panel that their nuclear program is specifically for weapons utiliz? It's a weapons program. It's not for power or any or medical researcher.
▶ 1:04:44It's for it's for aggressive military action. Is there any question about that? Is there any dissension from that? Frankly sir, the the question is the Iran I think the best way of putting putting is Iran has a civilian nuclear program and is has kept open the option for a military uh why why did they need to enrich so much for a civilian program? Not only do they not need to enrich, it's a great question.
▶ 1:05:10They are now focusing the enrichment aspect of their entire nuclear program on nonivilian enrichment. So they need to enrich between 3 and 5%. It's a weapons program civilian. They're enriching its 60% which is only military grade. In essence, they're shaping their entire civilian nuclear program to make it look as if they're aiming for a military program. It has no civilian use. This this array, this architecture they're creating.
▶ 1:05:39That doesn't mean they've decided to make a bomb. And we've heard dire the DNI gabard say they're not doing this. But facts are facts in that Maybe I should have added they are a lying criminal terrorist regime, right? They lie about things.
▶ 1:05:55They use diplomacy to their advantage because the rest of the, you know, to the to the point of the JCPOA, the rest of the world, our allies, followed President Obama, who didn't want to see Iran, a nuclear Iran during his term, but didn't mind seeing one 15 years later when he was no longer the president. It didn't stop their nuclear production, their military nuclear capability. It just delayed it. That's all it did. Nobody here wants to acknowledge it.
▶ 1:06:22But my to my other point, have they ever shown any interest whatsoever in getting rid of this nuclear program for whatever way you want to describe it? No. And in fact, it is it is extremely their red lines have been not giving up industrial enrichment, not uh closing any facilities, and not giving up on R&D. And it's very unlikely they will give up any of those red lines without significant pressure and the threat of military action.
▶ 1:06:50Unfortunately, Miss Jungman, you disagree with that. I do not disagree. Agree. I do not disagree. Okay. So, what are we talking about here? We're talking about like we can have some conversation that's going to get them to give it up even while we all know in the room they ain't giving it up, right, Mr. Jungman? They got what 300 ghost ships running around selling their oil which is sanctioned but they sell it to the Chinese and whoever they want. And where does that does that money go to the people of Iran?
▶ 1:07:20That's Look, there are probably wonderful I'm sure there are wonderful people in Iran that don't want to live under this yoke of terrorism. But the money is not going to them, is it? It's going to who? No. The the the money from Iran's oil goes right back to back to its terrorist proxies. Yeah. It's terrorist proxies. the goods force probably to their nuclear weapons program. Ladies and gentlemen, we're we're all we're doing is delaying the inevitable, right?
▶ 1:07:47Iran like we're acting like we can talk our way out of having this cancer get worse by just having the cancer kind of settle down for a little bit. There's a cancer in the Middle East. There's a cancer on the globe. The name in this case is Iran and the leadership in in Iran. That's the cancer. We better get real about what we're talking about because they're not going to give it up willingly no matter what the negotiation is.
▶ 1:08:15And I just wish that we'd quit fooling around and acting like the IAEA is going to tell us something. I mean, they wouldn't even allow an American inspector on the team. They wouldn't allow inspectors to visit military sites. Who are we kidding here? I'm sorry I didn't have any questions before I yield. Thank you, Mr. Perry. I now recognize for five minutes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Castro. Uh, thank you, Chairman. Thank you all for your testimony today. Uh, Mr.
▶ 1:08:44Stroll, in your testimony, you recommend that the Congress quote strengthen the administration's hand by beginning the process to conditionally authorize the use of military force against Iran's nuclear program if the regime proves unwilling to take sufficient steps to ensure that it will not acquire nuclear weapons. Uh, and I guess that recommendation gives me some concern based on history. This was the same argument made uh to justify voting for the Iraq war in 2002.
▶ 1:09:14In debates in the Congress, they argued that a show of resolve by Congress by preemptively authorizing the use of military force against Iraq would strengthen the Bush administration's hand in negotiations and force Saddam Hussein to come to the table. Uh what ensued with the Iraq war was one of the biggest mistakes that our country has made in decades. And uh I don't think any of us or most of us at least want to repeat that same mistake. And I'm concerned with everything going on now that we could with Iran.
▶ 1:09:43The American people are not looking to get into another protracted war in the Middle East. I think most folks would agree with that. I'm also skeptical that the votes are that the votes are there for such a war. Skept skeptical that the votes are there. In February 2020, bipartisan majorities in the House and Senate voted to end hostilities with Iran after the strike on Solommani.
▶ 1:10:05During the congressional debates on the repeal of the 2002 Iraq AUMF, some Republicans attempted to ensure that the law could still be used to strike Iranianbacked proxies. In response, a bipartisan majority in the Senate, including with the crucial support of now Vice President JD Vance, voted 60 to 36 to stop those efforts. And so my question is, would you say that we should strengthen the administration's negotiating hand by preemptively authorizing the use of military force against Iran?
▶ 1:10:33Do you trust Donald Trump and his administration with that responsibility at this time? Thank you so much for this question and I think it's a very important point. So the words I chose were begin the process to conditionally authorize and I think those two clauses are important in the point I'm making. One is begin the process. That is because I don't think that this decision should be left in the hands of any president without advice and consent and consultation with Congress.
▶ 1:11:00and conditionally because I'm not recommending preemptive authorization. I am uh recommending that by members of Congress having debate about the conditions and circumstances under which it would approve use of military force, it will send a signal of bipartisan consensus and commitment that that credible military option remains on the table should negotiations fail. And I want to be very clear that my recommendation uh associated with Mr.
▶ 1:11:29rule is that we should pursue negotiations first because no military action will eliminate the knowledge and the entire program overnight. Uh and so I guess what would what would the per your recommendation what would that trigger be? When do you start down that road?
▶ 1:11:47First, I think um the uh intelligence community should be providing regular updates to members of Congress uh in a closed and classified atmosphere on exactly what the steps are that the intelligence community understands Iran to be taking. Um and secondly, I think there should be consultations about exactly what is being contemplated when we talk about military strikes on Iran.
▶ 1:12:10uh would you require that we go through a JCPOA type negotiation before uh going down that I think that testing the the the diplomatic waters with the regime either in a multilateral context in the indirect negotiations that appear to be contemplated at this moment.
▶ 1:12:30Either way, a negotiated settlement is by far um more easier to verify uh in implementation in blocking Iran's pathways to a nuclear weapon than military force, which on the other side, we don't know what regime decision-making would be. We don't know what Iranian decision-m would be, and we don't know what the the war looks like on the other side of that. And this is why I think there's such serious issues that merit congressional input. Thank you.
▶ 1:12:59and and also for the other witnesses you just for the record as we're having this discussion uh do you believe that we should do a preemptive AUMF I associate myself with M Stroll's comments we should have a thoughtful process in which Congress plays its rightful role as an institution but the Iranians must understand that endless negotiations aren't the only uh strategy of the United States thank you let me check in with you.
▶ 1:13:29Yes. And I I agree with Mr. Stroll and Mr. Rule. Thank you. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Castro. I now recognize for five minutes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Heisenga. Uh thank you, Mr. Chairman. And uh during the last Congress, I actually led a letter with several of my colleagues on this committee uh underscoring the urgency of suspending the activity of the Iranian ghost armada. And Miss Youngman, you were uh been part of a couple of those conversations, I think.
▶ 1:13:57Uh dispatched from Iran, these vehicles f illicit oil and petroleum products to bolster the human rights abuses and terrorist acts perpetrated by the Iranian regime. It's their funding source. Uh these foreignowned and flagged uh ships operate undetected within the Ghost Armada and violate maritime law by obsiscating their positioning, thus circumventing US and frankly world enforcement.
▶ 1:14:22Uh, at the time of my letter in 2023, the Armada was made up of 364 vessels with 47% of them being flagged by the Panama Panama Maritime Authority. That's 171 vessels approximately. As a vessel has now grown, uh, I would argue thanks to a lack of action in the last administration about enforcement. It's your sanctions are only as strong as the enforcement that you're willing to put behind it. By the way, I serve on the financial services committee.
▶ 1:14:52I'm the vice chair of that committee. I've been working on this. That is the origin of many of those sanctions is that committee. Um the the latest report indicates indicates it's now grown to 521 vessels. Um with 17% of those flagged by Panama, which is about 88. So it's been cut in half on Panama. Uh I'm kind of curious. I'll start with you, Miss Youngman.
▶ 1:15:15Um, you've worked on this issue uh by closely tracking these vessels and engaging in the transportation of illicit Iranian oil. Um, how should the United States deal with countries that continue to flag vessels uh that are listed on the Department of Treasury's specially designated national and blocked persons or SDN list? And where have those other uh where have those other vessels been Thank you for your question and thank you for your work on this topic.
▶ 1:15:43Um it's a a matter of uh great importance given that the revenue Iran accumulates from these oil sales is going back to to its nuclear program and and terrorist activities. Um if we looked a year ago, like you said, Panama was flagging a significant amount of the ghost fleet and that number has dropped drastically.
▶ 1:16:02um which is showing that diplomatic efforts and negotiations with I would argue exposure exposure sunlight discussion like essentially naming and shaming calling them out for for enabling this activity um has an impact and so I think Panama's taken a significant step but we'd of course of of course like to see that 17% down to 0%. Um where are they getting flagged? So that's a new problem that's come up.
▶ 1:16:29Unfortunately, as a result of Panama deflging these vessels, we're seeing Iran set up these false registries in Gana, Komaros, um uh um Esotini even, and shall we say maybe um less well-known maritime powers. Sure. Yes. But because they don't they don't have that kind of typically that kind of flagging capability or that kind of fleet coming out.
▶ 1:16:54Well, and I think it's important to note that they're not necessarily legitimate flag registries under these countries. They are companies set up in most likely in Dubai or in India that are really run by Iran and providing these registrations to these members. We're going fast on time, but this is important stuff. I I need to jump to uh Arsenio Dominguez uh from uh the Republic of Panama, who was elected as the four-year term and secretary general of the International Maritime Organization IMO.
▶ 1:17:23Um they are the UN agency tasked with establishing quote the authority for the safety, security, environmental performance of international shipping. Um how can he possibly effectively lead the IMO while representing a nation that knowingly greenlights uh this this kind of transportation of Iranian oil against international sanctions?
▶ 1:17:45That's a great question and I think the IMO has done little to nothing on this topic and there should be and could be a lot more from them to Okay, I've got a lot that I'm gonna have to follow up with and and some written questions as well, but let's touch on the the the teapot refineries and and deterring those um and their willingness to accept Iranian oil. Um has there been an impact since President Trump designated one of those uh teapot refineries last week?
▶ 1:18:12Unfortunately, it's still too soon to see an impact from that and designating one refinery has little to no impact as Iran will just move its oil to other refineries. So, there needs to be a more comprehensive approach on targeting and sanctioning them. And and as I've said, sanctions are only as good as the weakest link in the sanctions chain. And uh that's been a huge problem. Um we need robust multinational buyin from allies and partners including Europe.
▶ 1:18:39I I had recently had a conversation with the uh uh the ambassador from the EU who happens to be Lithuanian. She understands this ghost fleet also with Russia and what's what's been happening there. Do you sense that there's any uh appetite any of you in Europe uh to push back on Iran's illicit trade with China uh whether it be illicit oil or or not?
▶ 1:19:03I don't think I can speak for the Europeans, but I think that um you know, we're finally starting to wake up to see that China is the only one benefiting here. China's getting the cheap oil while everybody else is paying real prices. Um and because they sell it at a discount with that, I know I'm over time, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. And I'll be writing some questions as well to everybody. Thank you. Thank you, M. Thank you, Mr. Heisinga.
▶ 1:19:27I now recognize for five minutes the gentlewoman and ranking member of the Middle East and North Africa subcommittee, Miss Sherilis McCormack of Florida. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. As we've heard today, the United States combined with our partners and allies in the region must take all necessary measures to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapons and to halt its support for terrorism.
▶ 1:19:50One of the main tools to help curb Iran's development of nuclear weapons and its continued funding of its terrorist proxies is sanctions. That is why I was proud to introduce bipartisan legislation with Congressman Lawler, who's the chairman for the Middle East, to strengthen sanctions on foreign entities enabling Iran's illicit oil trade.
▶ 1:20:10Over the past few years, we have witnessed growing alignment between Iran, Russia, and China, presenting a significant challenge to United States national security and global stability. M. Dru, what steps did the Biden administration take to combat these alliances? Thank you for that question. Um, a variety of different uh elements.
▶ 1:20:33The first is to lean into strengthening our unmatched network of allies and partners in order to uh uh increase uh Russia's isolation in the European theater, China's isolation in the Indo-Pacific theater and Iranian isolation in the Middle East. We worked with all of our longtime allies and partners across those uh different theaters. Number two uh was to highlight and expose the ways in which this axis um of upheaval is uh supporting itself.
▶ 1:21:03counter to the interests of our allies and partners. Iranian drones killing Ukrainians uh via Russia, Iranian support to Russian defense industry, Russia's uh provision of more sophisticated defense technology to China, Chinese purchase of Iranian oil at a discount. I could go on and on with these examples. We should also talk about North Korean foot soldiers fighting on behalf of Russia in Ukraine.
▶ 1:21:26All of this suggests an emerging access that is working to challenge the uh current uh international global order that benefits and keeps Americans safe. There was also a successive rounds of sanctions to break and diminish the different ways in which they're strengthening and again um provision of security support, assistance, military aid and intelligence to our allies and partners so that they understand exactly what the negative strategic impact is of this emerging access to their and our security.
▶ 1:21:56What additional measures can you would you recommend be implemented to prevent Russia and China from aiding Iran in evading sanctions? Uh well, first of all, we need to continue to sanction those activities. Uh and the sanctioning not only cuts off and disincentivizes it from a financial perspective, but it also shines a light on and exposes that nefarious activity. Um clearly though, I would say that it seems uh the Chinese government doesn't really care if it gets exposed.
▶ 1:22:25Uh and neither does President Putin of Russia. So, we're going to have to find more ways to disincentivize uh this behavior. And a lot of that is making sure that Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran feel the consequences of this cooperation, not just from Washington, but from European capitals and Middle East capitals. Red carpet should not be rolled out for the leaders of these countries.
▶ 1:22:48Uh sanctions, loopholes in certain uh economic environments should not be allowed uh for these illicit networks and more has to be done to impose consequences and cost. Well, I want to turn our attention for a moment to Syria. We know that the fall of the Assad regime was a major blow to Iran's influence in Syria. However, what America does next is critical to the future of the country. M. Stru, do you believe America's current policy in Syria is positioned well to further undermine Iran?
▶ 1:23:19Right now we have a transitional government in Damascus uh under the leadership of interim president Ahmed al-Shara and he is saying that he is committed to fighting ISIS in Syria and has told Iran that they will not be allowed to use Syrian territory the way they did under Bashar al-Assad. And he is also looking to impose consequences on Russia and deny it use of that naval base that's on on the Mediterranean. All of these are interests that align with the US security objectives.
▶ 1:23:50Um, as well as having a secure, unified Syria under the control of one government. But right now, US policy is not geared towards seizing these opportunities, we need to find ways to support the Syrian people through some measured sanctions relief uh, benchmarked against performance of the Shara government. And before I run out of time, I just wanted to ask you this last question. Do you believe that dismantling the USAD in Syria as helpful or harmful to US interests in Syria?
▶ 1:24:20I believe that it's harmful. I think what Syrian people will remember is uh an American flag or the USID stamp on emergency food assistance, stabilization assistance, clean water, baby formula, and the US actually putting skin in the game to demonstrate that we care about the lives and the livelihoods of Syrian people. And by taking this precious uh element of American power off the table, we undermine our own ability to achieve achieve our interests in Syria. Thank you. I yield back.
▶ 1:24:50Thank you. I now recognize myself for five minutes. Uh Jungman, you talk about the sophisticated and deceptive techniques that the Iranian regime is utilizing to evade oil sanctions, including through foreign front companies. Iran also remains heavily dependent on China to sustain its illicit oil trade which is like 90% of Iran's oil exports go to China primarily independent teapot refineries.
▶ 1:25:20So you note that uh Chinese purchase of uh Iranian oil increased by over 20% last year despite the US sanctions. So in your perspective, how successful has the US been in identifying these teapot refineries and uh front companies? Thank you for your question. I think it's important to remember that until end of 2024, we saw an administration that was essentially doing lacks sanctions enforcement.
▶ 1:25:50As a result of that, Iran was able to build up its uh revenues and in turn is despite these sanctions is easily able to replace the vessels that are designated and until there's a comprehensive designation across the entire ghost fleet, these vessels will continue to export Iranian oil to China.
▶ 1:26:10When looking at the refineries themselves, I think that it was a great first step from this administration to designate the uh refineries we saw sanctioned I guess two weeks ago. But unfortunately, designation on one refinery has little to no impact. There has to be a comprehensive holistic approach on all of the refineries that are taking on Iranian. You talk about uh the realistic short-term action that the US can take to close that loophole. it.
▶ 1:26:39What about the long-term actions? Short-term and long-term uh actions that we can take to close that loophole. Sure. Um I think that there needs to be negoti in addition with sanctions, there has to be negotiation or a diplomatic approach and I think if there's any president that will be able to figure out what to hold over China's head, it will be this president. Thank you. Mr.
▶ 1:27:01Um, one of the recommendations you provide in your testimony to counter the Iranian regime's malign activities is to continue investing in the regional military uh economic and commercial partnerships because in your uh testimony in quote, regional economic and social success is as essential to our security interests as their military strength. End quote.
▶ 1:27:25So what role do joint security exercises or intelligence sharing activities with our allies play in disrupting the Iran's illicit activities? Thank you, Congresswoman. The uh relationships we have with our Gulf partners uh and uh other regional partners played a uh profound role in the defense of Israel during Iran's ballistic missile attack on Israel.
▶ 1:27:49We saw years of SenCom's investment in those relationships come to fruition in the smooth air defense of the entire region and thousands of lives, hundreds of thousands of lives were saved as a result of that. But this is a a broader uh target set because the Iranians are moving, as I say, in the Red Sea basin. They're moving in the Persian Gulf area. They're moving in throughout the Arabian Peninsula. And these relationships require a tremendous investment by the sententcom team as well as our department of defense as a whole.
▶ 1:28:20Thank you, Mr. Jman. Let me come back to you. Uh you talk about the IRGC's efforts to diversify its uh revenue streams including through cryptocurrency uh and how it offers Iran a way to bypass financial oversight and quietly move funds across the borders.
▶ 1:28:37So in your perspective, how extensively is the IRGC using cryptocurrency to evade Uh we saw around I think it was eight bill eight billion dollars of uh transactions from Iran using cryptocurrency. Um and I think that this is an area they're obviously tapping into as sanctions, you know, are coming out.
▶ 1:29:02Um so they're they're moving their money there because it's harder to track and I think that it's an area that um sanctions could be enforced stronger. You so could you talk about some of the policy changes that you think is necessary to improve that effectiveness of sanctions and also what risk do Iran's cryptocurrency and front company activities pose to global financial integrity? I will uh this is not my area of expertise but I'm happy to follow up with a a written response there. All right.
▶ 1:29:31Well, thank you so much. Um, you know, I I I asked that because, you know, I want to see if these tactics could set a precedent for other rogue actors or states and uh I think uh we've been pretty clear on uh the reason why we need a digital assets framework to coordinate with our allies to address those uh crypto crime. So, thank you so much for your testimony and I yield back. Uh let's see who is next.
▶ 1:30:00Um, Representative Stanton, I recognize you for five minutes. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Iran has built a network of proxies across the Middle East, sewing chaos and instability in the region for decades. It has funded, trained, and armed Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Hoodis and various militia groups to target Israel and other regional rivals, all while keeping Tran out of the direct conflict. The human cost of Iran's offensive is undeniable.
▶ 1:30:26On October 7th, 2023, 1300 Israelis were murdered by Hamas terrorists and attacks by these proxy militia have injured or killed American troops. Over the last 18 months, Iran has continue to support its proxies as they send ballistic missiles and drones at Israeli targets and at American service members. But Iran's axis of resistance is waning. Right now, we are at a critical and fragile moment for the region.
▶ 1:30:52Iranian proxies are weakened and new leadership in Lebanon and Syria are refusing to bow to Thran's influence. The US acting in partnership with our allies has an opportunity to end Iran's malign influence and to protect our ally Israel and expand the Abraham Accords and change the trajectory of the region for decades to come.
▶ 1:31:12But we can only take advantage of this moment if we maintain a focus on democracy building, work with it, work with and support our allies in the region, and fully enforce the US sanctions regime. In a completely self-defeating move, the Trump administration has eliminated impactful programs that support the rule of law, protect human rights, and counter misinformation. Limiting US foreign aid and programs is a gift to our adversaries, Iran, but also to China and Russia.
▶ 1:31:40International investments are an essential instrument of US foreign policy and US national security policy and has been for decades under Republican and Democratic administrations. Now, there are still some active aid programs in the region and we need to make sure those resources get delivered efficiently to the people that need it. Mr. Rule, what can the US do to support foreign aid delivery while also preventing Iranian malign activity?
▶ 1:32:09the the best expertise on foreign aid delivery in the region are regional partners themselves. They know the neighborhood. They know the players. They know where corruption exists. They know the needs of their people. And building relationships with these actors themselves will allow us to know how best to deliver and where are the impact can be the greatest. And this goes to the previous question by one of your colleagues.
▶ 1:32:34If we have relationships with our reliable partners in the region and we extract utility from that in many different areas to include foreign aid, we can build uh soft power impact as well as our military impact. To de to successfully deter Iran and our global adversaries, we should be leveraging our allies and our partners. President Trump's go it alone foreign policy strategy is shortsighted and self-defeating.
▶ 1:32:59He started trade wars with our neighbors and angering our friends, even causing South Korea and Japan to restart trade discussions with China for the first time in 5 years. And Vice President JD Vance in public speeches and embarrassingly in leaked signal chats has spit in the eye of our European allies. Europe is the second largest arms supplier to Israel. The UK critically stepped in to shoot down missiles fired at Iran uh by Iran, excuse me, at Israel in last October's escalation.
▶ 1:33:29And France helped broker the critical Lebanon Israel ceasefire. They are vital to achieving Middle Eastern peace and supporting democratic goals in the region. In addition to those values, Europe's presence and our presence in the Middle East contribute to stronger global trade and business, another vital component of keeping stability.
▶ 1:33:49Uh, also for uh for MR, excuse me, has how has Europe worked to secure the Red Sea global shipping lanes and how should we work with them to better stop Hoodi attacks in the Red Sea? Thank you for the question. The Europeans have both participated in a US-led defensive uh coalition called Prosperity Guardian, which has kept uh the um critical choke points in the Southern Red Sea open.
▶ 1:34:14Some European partners as well as others in other theaters uh also participated with us in multilateral offensive strikes last year to take Houthi capabilities off the table in Yemen and the Europeans maintain their own separate defensive coalition as well in the Red Sea. Thank you. The final question is for Miss Jungman uh about China uh and they're unfortunately working with Iran. What is China's role in helping to Iran avoid oil sanctions?
▶ 1:34:42China plays a a large role in enabling Iran to accumulate this revenue. They purchased 90 p 90% of Iranian oil is going to China. Um is serves as the lifeline for Iran's revenue and uh extremist activity. All right. Thank you very much uh for those answers and I will yield back the rest of my Thank you. I recognize Representative Davidson of Ohio for five minutes. Uh thank you chairwoman. Uh thanks to our colleagues for hosting this hearing. Thanks to our witnesses.
▶ 1:35:12Appreciate your testimony today. Um, you know, first, Iran and their despotic regime, uh, have just horrible human rights abuses. They've been a force really for terror and instability in the Middle East for a long time. The 107 attacks by Hamas were a profoundly evil act by a network of terror groups, all linked to Iran. maximum pressure against these groups and their Iranian sponsors is more than warranted.
▶ 1:35:42And I applaud the Trump administration for doing just that. The second truth about the situation that we are in is that a full-blown ground war in in Iran is simply not in America. It's not our war to fight. Uh as we turn towards strategic competition with China, we cannot afford to continue to be blogged down in the Middle East.
▶ 1:36:05for the United States and economy of force strategy in the Middle East makes sense uh so that we can address American interests while minimizing the American investment there. This allows us to focus on other strategic threats and more immediate security risks to our own country.
▶ 1:36:22As our committee's state department authorization uh process moves forward, I look forward to engaging on pressing issues for the arms export control act and aumf reform so that Congress is active in confir confronting the rapidly evolving security environment in the world. Mr. rule. Uh, thank you for your testimony today.
▶ 1:36:44And I personally worry about an overly broad reading of the 2001 AUMF providing a blank check for virtually any war in the Middle East without Congress really having sometimes even knowledge, but certainly input in it. Failure to update the 2001 AUMF represents an abdication of congressional war powers.
▶ 1:37:05So as we confront really needed security challenges with Houthy proxies for example uh who are disrupting uh sea traffic and posing a threat not just in the in the oceans to our navy and others. What's the what's the actual underlying authorization today? Congressman, it's a complicated question and uh I'm going to evade some of that because I'm not an expert.
▶ 1:37:34But I will say this, Congress needs to start now as Mr. stated with a process to understand what role should be played to develop specific authorities because the goods force needs to be taken apart in the region because a nuclear deal that simply provides funding for the goods force to reestablish its proxy network to the region just repeats this entire uh system of violence that and and we face the same situation over and over again.
▶ 1:38:04So we really do need to understand the prospect of military action against Iran and its and its personnel and its architecture at present and Congress needs to play its role in that. Yeah, thank you for that. That's exactly what I what I've tried to do for a long time since I've been here really since the summer of 2016. Updating the 2001 AUMF has been darn near impossible. Frankly, for people like me that wanted to do it, we were blocked from even being on this committee.
▶ 1:38:30uh blocked from uh anybody that really wanted reform couldn't get on the committee of jurisdiction. And then when you tried to do it through appropriations, oh, you know, you're supposed to do it through the committee of jurisdiction. Um and and yet and now, even after uh the Afghan war has wound down, long after we've formally left uh Iraq, uh we still keep the 2001 AUMF. Does anyone believe that the Houthis or Hamas, let's just say Hamas, are are they affiliates of al-Qaeda?
▶ 1:38:58I mean, that's the underlying uh situation. They're they're terrorists in that sense, but they're not coordinating. They share some similar enemies, but they're not really covered by the 2001 AUMF. So, I think it is urgent that we update them. And, you know, I definitely appreciate y'all's effort to call that out.
▶ 1:39:17But Miss Youngman, in your testimony, you bemoan the existence of cryptocurrency uh to some extent saying that the pseudonymous nature of blockchain transactions makes enforcement challenging. However, you admit that it only makes up about 8 billion dollars in transaction. In reality, uh you know, I'm the chairman of uh national security and elicit finance. We just had a hearing earlier today where people trying to trace the money actually like cryptocurrency because it's on a public blockchain.
▶ 1:39:48So, it's easier to follow the money. U it still presents challenges for on and off ramps, but when it's on a blockchain, uh it's easier to detect. So, you know, what proportion of Iran's uh illicit finance is really crypto versus conventional In the grand scheme, the 8 billion is not that significant.
▶ 1:40:09when you look at um you know 50 billion that was made in oil revenues last year or 135 billion in oil revenue that was made between 2021 and 2024. So I think that there needs to be stricter enforcement and watt oversight on the blockchain and the crypto um transactions, but it doesn't necessarily need to be. Thank you for that. My time's expired and I yield. Thank you. I now recognize Representative Moscowitz from Florida for five minutes.
▶ 1:40:38Uh thank you Madam Chairman uh chairwoman uh I want to thank Chairman Lawler and Chairman Mass for bringing uh bringing this hearing. You know I I have supported for months now giving the Iranians a period of time to end their nuclear program peacefully or that the United States should end it for them. Um, I've worked with Chairman Lawler on that in the last Congress dealing with Iranian oil.
▶ 1:41:05And in this Congress, Senator Lindsey Graham and I filed a resolution to get a sense of Congress on just that issue. Iran is weaker now than they've been in a very long time, weaker in the region because of Israel's efforts against Hamas and Hezbollah, uh, this administration's intervention on the Houthis. Um, now is the time. There's no question now is the time to try to bring this to a peaceful solution, right?
▶ 1:41:33And that's really up to the Iranians to choose what path they they want to go. But I I also have to recognize that we're in the third month of the administration. A and for three months now, the administration has treated Canada and Greenland and Europe and Ukraine and PBS and NPR and the Associated Press worse than they've talked and treated Iran.
▶ 1:42:00I mean, 3 months in, they've just noticed all of a sudden that perhaps we should turn our attention to Iran instead of these distractions of, oh, we're going to get Gaza or Canada is going to be the 51st state or oh, Greenland. I mean, this is this is the opportunity and it's an opportunity, quite frankly, for the administration that's been very partisan over the last three months to do something on a bipartisan basis. Um, but I'm also deeply worried about the vice president.
▶ 1:42:28If we look at the text messages on signal for signalgate, the vice president seems to be against striking the Houthis. Well, if he's against striking the Houthies, then I mean, where is he going to be on striking Iran if they don't choose a peaceful solution? Obviously, he's the vice president. The president makes the final decision.
▶ 1:42:52But if you look at that conversation, a deputy chief of staff had to weigh in from the White House putting the vice president in his place, saying the president was clear on his direction. And and so let me ask a question.
▶ 1:43:08Based on what you've seen, we've all seen publicly in that signal uh this this isolationist trend that's going on in some you know circles of the Republican party. Uh Miss Jugman, are you concerned that we may miss an opportunity to really curtail Iran's nuclear program?
▶ 1:43:33Because again, if you look at what the vice president was saying with the Houthis, right, he he clearly did not want to do the strike that the president ordered. Thank you for that question. I think it is important to look at the efforts that the administration has done over the last 3 months, which includes designations on Iran, its ghost fleet, and a refinery in Yeah, but those are meaningless.
▶ 1:43:58the Biden administration and I was critical of the Biden administration of these designations and non- enforcement of certain things. I mean that I was very critical when the Biden administration did not enforce the bill that Mike Lawler and I passed dealing with Iranian oil. And so, you know, we can sign executive orders for maximum pressure, but really it, you know, this president is not shy. He's not shy. He tells us how he feels at all times. Okay?
▶ 1:44:23And so, you know, it just just last week all of a sudden we turned our attention to Iran, which I'm happy about. Better late than never. But there's something going on in this administration that you should all wake up to that there is a wing led by the vice president uh that didn't want to strike the Houthies and probably doesn't want to curtail Iran's nuclear program. How you going to deal with that?
▶ 1:44:53I don't see that from Treasury right now. Um I do think that there are efforts being made and I think you know looking at the questions we've received. There is an you know there's bipartisan consensus to go after Iran and the vice president alone we we have to be clear right we because Democrats have made this mistake when you draw a red line and then you don't do it you we see problems. That's what happened in Syria under the Obama administration. So President Trump has drawn a red line. He has said either we're going to end it peacefully, which I hope we do.
▶ 1:45:23We want we all want that, or the ad or the United States is going to end it. That's been said now and that's what we have to hold the president to. I yield back. Thank you. I now recognize Representative Isa of California for five minutes. Thank you. I'm going to pick up where my colleague just left off. Better late than never. Has it been 75 days or is it 72?
▶ 1:45:48I wouldn't call this late in all due respect, but let's contrast it with the previous four years. What was the economic position of Iran on the day that President Trump left office? They were a lot weaker than they are today. Were they shipping a couple hundred thousand barrels a day, not a million and a half barrels a day? That's correct.
▶ 1:46:10So during the four years of the Biden administration, perhaps in plain sight while other things were being discussed, JCPOA, Iran's nuclear and so on, they went up by more than a million barrels a day times $75, right? And most of it was sold to China. Correct. So the last administration allowed China to enrich Iran during those four years.
▶ 1:46:37Is it accurate to say that that money a great deal of it ended up in the hands of Hamas, the Houthis, and Hezbollah? That's correct. Okay. So, I want to I want to go to the go forward and I know my colleague has left, but 70 72 days is the beginning of an administration.
▶ 1:47:00Over the next three years, if maximum pressure includes taking ghost ships off the high seas, do you believe it's possible to reverse that million or a million two of additional oil and bring Iran economically back to where they were four years ago? I do, but I don't think taking the ghost fleet off alone will do that.
▶ 1:47:24I I'm saying I'm including that because most of that million barrels plus is shipped through ghost ships. Correct. Yes. Okay. So as part of a maximum effort recognizing that Israel may strike in its own best interest between now and the end of October when nuclear nuclear legitimacy uh according to the last administration goes forward as part of a package sanction economic sanctions as we know
▶ 1:47:54are not working uh because people are cheating on them. The number one cheater is China. As the president uses his pressure with China and tariffs, should he include reducing the the purchases of clandestant oil from China and Russia as part of a deal with China? Would that be helpful? Additionally, the same thing goes for our European allies who either directly or indirectly buy that sanctioned oil.
▶ 1:48:25Absolutely. I think that's a great place to start and hopefully would have an impact. Now, just before I spoke, we heard about uh the so-called reluctance of uh the vice president to strike the Houthis. In fact, isn't that one of the more major proactive strikes that's occurred in the last several years? Correct. And that particular strike, as I understand it, was an offensive strike to take out capability, not simply a retaliatory for a place from which they were fired.
▶ 1:48:56I'm going to defer to Mr. Rule on that, but he's got more expertise in that area. They are the most significant strikes we've conducted against the Houthis. They're not only uh taking out uh uh uh degrading the Houthi weapons capability, but taking out Houthi leadership, and they're starting to impact on the Houthi leadership. decision-m uh structure itself.
▶ 1:49:17So, Hamas, Hezbollah, and uh the Houthis, the three most powerful arms of the of Iran, in addition to the the oil that gives them money, if those activities continue at the pace they've been going over the last, some of it more than 75 days because of of Israel's efforts with Hamas and Hezbollah.
▶ 1:49:42But if those three tentacles of Hama of uh Iran are taken out over the next three years, if the clandestine oil is reduced to let's just say the about where it was four years earlier, do you believe we can avoid allout war with Iran but bring Iran back to a situation in which they must deal or be unable to function uh because of economic disaster?
▶ 1:50:17If we can also ensure that the goods force does not have a logistics line into the region, we can avoid a war based on activities such as Hamas and Houthi actions in the Red Sea. Uh there will be some who will say that Iran could be uh encouraged to build a nuclear weapon if it thinks it can get away with it and we won't attack. So the president would also have to say if we see you building a nuclear weapon we're going to have to use uh and I'll just close with with one statement. Many people have talked about the nuclear capability.
▶ 1:50:48But is it fair to say that the ability to build a nuke only allows you to blow yourself up if you don't have the ability to launch it? And that is isn't that part of the administration's responsibility along with allies is to make sure that they do not have the ability to launch a nuclear war. Gentleman's time is up and the witnesses may uh respond in writing if you would choose to do so. Is that okay? Thank you. Yes. Uh let me now recognize Mr. Oluski of Maryland for five minutes.
▶ 1:51:17Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and thank you to our witnesses for your time and your testimony today. Um, I'll just open by saying how much I firmly believe with a lot of what was said. Um, and how important it is for the US to use all of the tools at our disposal to dismantle Iran's support for regional terrorism and its nuclear ambition. So, thank you for your comments on that.
▶ 1:51:37We know that a strong Iranian sanctions regime, which I support and this administration has imposed, is critical to limit the revenue that Iran uses to fund its military and terror proxies in the region. However, we cannot forget about the other national security tools at our disposal, including uh both diplomacy and development and that the US has to comprehensively counter the regime's malign activities and hold them accountable for human rights violations.
▶ 1:52:04The use of force should be an option, but it should also be our last resort option. Again, we need a comprehensive toolbox to prevent Iran from becoming nuclear equipped and to address the root causes of these abuses. Um, I support a zero tolerance approach for attacks by Iran's proxies on the United States and our interests.
▶ 1:52:26Uh, but again, I also believe that any US action must also be taken in accordance with the law and in ways that protects classified information and civilians overseas. Uh, it's also worth noting and reiterating that this administration's gutting of foreign assistance programs will only weaken that response. There was a program implemented by a nonprofit back in my home state of Maryland that supported religious and minorities in northern Iraq in part not to join Iranbacked militias.
▶ 1:52:56This project supported thousands of young Yazinis and Christians in a youth employment project to provide financial incentives not to join these armed groups. In its absence, we risk migration and radicalization, including to these Iranbacked proxy groups. Um, we know this program, unfortunately, is not a one-off. Programs to strengthen local capacity and support ethnic and religious minorities in Yemen, Gaza, and Lebanon, where Iranbacked militias continue to hold military and political influence, were cut.
▶ 1:53:26Iranian media even praised the pause because it would halt US support for pro-democracy activists in the country. Other media compared it to a cold shower for the regime's opponents and joked that the US was abandoning its allies like disposable tissues. Quote unquote. Uh M. Stroll, can you talk about how these s soft power programs like those administered by USAD and the State Department play an important role in America's response to Iran's activities around the world?
▶ 1:53:55How will Iran and their proxies be emboldened by these cuts? Thank you so much for this question. When we think about all of the different areas where Iran's threat network has been degraded, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, to some extent Iraq, right now Yemen, what we need to think about is the other side of combat operations. And that's not just humanitarian aid. It's stabilization, reconstruction.
▶ 1:54:22societies and communities need to have something on the other side in order to build up their resilience to resist what the Iranians are going to do which is try to rebuild their illicit networks for arming funding training both fighters and then weapon shipments drug shipments etc. So we have to give those communities resources to build up their resilience and we have to give the emerging leaders of these nent governments the opportunity to deliver for their people. And there I'm specifically talking about Lebanon and Syria.
▶ 1:54:53So the pause and dismantling of USAD is not just about the humanitarian aid being taken off the table. It's the non-humanitarian aid, the destabilization assistance, and then it's the decades of US investment in developing our technical expertise, our national security practitioners, our development and technical assistance providers who understand that reconstruction and stabilization on the other side of conflict is inherently a political task, not a military task.
▶ 1:55:23Thank Thank you so much for that response. Um, and I'll just close without an additional question recognizing that my time is winding down. Uh, but just reiterating what my colleague Representative Keading honed in earlier and just advancing my concern uh, Madam Chair uh, about the reckless use of um, platforms that are not secure and in the sharing of very sensitive data. It is not a way to conduct military operations nor diplomatic operations nor to impose sanctions.
▶ 1:55:51And so I'm deeply concerned about the actions of some of our most highest ranking officials and the fact there's been no accountability. And with that, I'll yield back. I'll yield back. Thank you. Thank you. Let me now recognize Mr. Bear from Indiana for five minutes. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank our witnesses for being here today. The expertise you share with us is very beneficial and very helpful. But I'm going to touch on a couple of three other areas that are of interest to me.
▶ 1:56:18uh the first one being uh what role do you think that the western technology is playing in sustaining Iran and by extension Russia's ability to produce lethal weapons like the Shahiad 136 we have seen Iran use uh dualuse technology that is obtained uh from Europe uh even the United States u uh through uh sanctions busting uh uh
▶ 1:56:49to import this within its drone system uh and to even use this within drones that it has sent to Russia for use against Ukraine. Um this is something that the US law enforcement has worked against successfully in some cases for years. Uh Iran has a robust sanctions busting program in this regard. Uh and Iran will continue to uh uh use this system to acquire technology that he can't produce at home. Mr.
▶ 1:57:18Jungle, I'm going to tackle this from a little bit of a different angle and I think it's an area that hasn't had a lot of attention, but um you know, we've talked a lot today about the dark fleet and the ghost fleet. There's western technology that's used on these vessels. Every ship essentially has some western component on it. Um that's an area that could be uh looked at closer. I would associate myself specifically with Mr. Rule.
▶ 1:57:46The threat is the dual use technology. So part of this is about uh sanctions and shining a light in exposure. It's also about education initiatives with the commercial sector so they understand the risk of both the legitimate uses of some of this technology and then the illegitimate and illicit ways in which an a regime like Iran might use it.
▶ 1:58:09The next part of that is um what steps can be taken uh to prevent Iran from procuring that critical technology and M. Jungle, you kind of started on that conversation. So, please start. Sure. Um I think as I've previously mentioned there's still a number of of western entities that are um involved in the maritime industry and and these vessels such as the classification societies, the flag states and the insurance companies.
▶ 1:58:38Um you know it's not enough to just designate the vessels themselves. They does the vessel will move to a new owner, a new uh company and so on. So there needs to be a more comprehensive approach to targeting these vessels and the their associated networks. Mr. rule.
▶ 1:58:59We need to ensure that law enforcement partners in Europe and Asia are working closely with the United States and our uh Gulf partners to uh identify uh import uh actors in Iran who are attempting to uh bring in dual use technology for Iran's uh uh military and security services. Thank you, M. I have nothing to add.
▶ 1:59:27I think my colleagues did a great job answering the It's a good answer. Uh, one other area, uh, do you believe that the United States and its allies are focused enough on preventing the rebuilding of the Iranian proxy groups? And what more could we do if that's true?
▶ 1:59:51If there is a nuclear deal that provides Iran with sanctions relief that allows the goods force to rebuild Hamas, Hezbollah, and the and the Houthis over time, we recreate the very world we have worked so hard to dismantle today. It is critical that any new nuclear deal simply does not allow the goods force to do this. And this therefore becomes a problem set.
▶ 2:00:17Do we come up with a a an approach that as the international community compel Iran to in essence change the nature of the goods force to turn it into a counterterrorism element which is something every country should have and not an element that has the job of creating militias and terrorists. Until Iran does this, it is a terrorist Thank you. Very nice.
▶ 2:00:42See, I only got 26 seconds left and uh so I'm sorry to the other two, but I yield back. Thank you. Let me now recognize uh Representative Schneider of Illinois for five minutes. Uh thank you, Madam Chair, and uh again, I want to thank the witnesses uh for for joining us here. So, I I keep this next to my desk. It is the JCPOA from 10 years ago. It's tabbed and marked and highlighted.
▶ 2:01:09uh I 10 years ago I studied it closely because so much was at stake. Iran was on the precipice of a nuclear weapon and the world came together and at that time as we all recall it was the E3 um plus three uh it was a P5+1 whatever you called it but it was United States our European allies uh UK, France and Germany and China and Russia as you discussed earlier. What was available to us then is not available to us now.
▶ 2:01:38And I had issues with the JCPOA a decade ago because while it may have temporarily block temporarily blocked Iran's pathways to a nuclear weapon, it didn't permanently close them. It left it to where we are today. And um we meet today at I I really believe is a crossroad as you've touched on. Um over the past year, we've seen Iran's strategic position almost turn 180 degrees. Its proxies are diminished.
▶ 2:02:07its air defenses are are weakened. At the same time, again, as was mentioned, Iran's breakout time is almost to the goal line. Um, it it's it's measured in weeks, maybe even days. And and we all know a nuclear armed Iran would transform the strategic map of of the Middle East once again. It would not only endanger our allies, including Israel, it would trigger trigger all likelihood regional arms race.
▶ 2:02:34It would embolden the terrorist proxies and it would undercut the global non-prololiferation regime. Now, we know this moment didn't come out of nowhere. Iran's been working on a nuclear weapon for more than a generation. We can talk about the decision uh to invade Iraq and then empower Iran. We can talk about the JCPOA uh which was a problem.
▶ 2:02:55I think at the end of the day, the decision to pull out of the JCPOA without a strategy of how to move forward and make sure that Iran couldn't get closer to a weapon left us at the point we are in today. Iran literally at the goal line and that is the challenge we have now. Part of the problem I think in pulling out of the JCPOA was there wasn't a plan that uh it was more about uh the headlines than about making actual progress. uh it was not very serious.
▶ 2:03:25This has been a challenge that I've seen with the administration uh first term of the Trump administration and today with the return of the administration perhaps even greater the dismantling of USAD, the freezing of aid to camps like Alhal where ISIS remnants remain active. The whiplash of threats followed by back channel talks with Hamas. All of it suggests a governing style that is far more impulsive, theatrical, and dangerously untethered from strategy.
▶ 2:03:52I wish we could trust that this renewed maximum pre pressure approach being discussed was grounded in facts, deliberation, and inter agency coordination. I wish I believe that President Trump had read the briefings, sought out desending views or agonized over the details of a strike plan, but I don't have that confidence and I'm very concerned about where we are right now. Syria policy means aligning sanctions, intelligence, and diplomacy.
▶ 2:04:18It means working with allies to close loopholes, not just naming problems, but resourcing, developing solutions. It means being honest about what air air strikes can and cannot accomplish and about what it takes to truly dismantle Iran's nuclear weapons program. We know this challenge won't get easier with time. As been discussed earlier, Iran's nuclear program isn't just a bargaining chip.
▶ 2:04:43It's a shield from behind which tan wages war through proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. And that's why I was proud last Congress to join with then Chairman McCall to introduce HRES 559, declaring it the policy of the United States that a nuclear Islamic Republic of Iran is not acceptable under any circumstances. So with that, let me turn to you, Miss Stroll. You've spoken previously about the need for a regional architecture.
▶ 2:05:11Can you speak how seriously you think our Gulf partners view the risk of a nuclear Iran and whether they believe the US is still or US does have have it all a coherent plan to stop it? I think uh thank you so much for that question Congressman. Many of our Gulf partners uh are hedging because they are uncertain as to what US commitments are and whether or not US commitments to the region and to their defense will be enduring.
▶ 2:05:37So almost every uh US partner in the Gulf has pursued their own ruproma with the Iranian regime, exchanging ambassadors, maintaining economic relations uh as well as very consistent diplomatic engagement back and forth. Um we are using some of these channels uh for uh the passing of messages.
▶ 2:05:59But the bottom line is if there is going to be uh military strikes used against Iran, we're going to need the support of our partners in the Gulf, we're going to need flexibility with the bases we have where US forces are present. And we are and if we are going to achieve a negotiated settlement, Iran is going to need to hear from our partners in the Middle East that they are as serious about getting to a negotiated settlement that blocks all Iranian pathways to a nuclear weapon as Washington is.
▶ 2:06:29And those are some of the I think security commitments both to their self-defense and to our long-term commitment in developing this regional architecture that could benefit from clarification at this moment in time. Thank you. I've gone over time. I appreciate the extension. I yield back. Uh now recognize Mr. Kaine, uh Representative Kane from New Jersey for five minutes. Um thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thank you to our witnesses for being here today. Uh Mr.
▶ 2:06:57Rule, what type of support is Russia providing to Iran's nuclear program? And what role is Russian state-owned energy giant Rosatam playing in supporting Iran's nuclear ambitions? Russia's role in the joint comprehensive plan of action was uh limited to uh support for the Busher uh civilian nuclear power plant on Iran's uh southwest coast.
▶ 2:07:27um the development of that plant. Uh there were discussions on the perhaps building of other nuclear power plants in country and part of the deal under JCPOA was that in essence uh Iran would send spent nuclear fuel to Russia in exchange for fresh nuclear fuel. Now that of course stopped when uh Iran ceased to uh do this. I think the most important question is is Russia providing Iran with capabilities to allow it to move closer to a nuclear weapon.
▶ 2:07:58Now there is no public information of which I am aware that that is occurring. Um um and uh it is also uh a fact however that Russia uh does have a presence in country through Busher and that were we to have a multilateral negotiation with Iran on its nuclear program, Russia would uh be a prominent part because of that element.
▶ 2:08:21China as well because of China's role with the Iraq power plant uh its former plut plutonium plant which is due to come online in 2026. And what types of support is Russia currently providing Iran's proxies? And what does Russia hope to gain from its outreach to the Houthis? And what might trigger the Kremlin to step this support up or decrease it?
▶ 2:08:46There have been reports that Russia has attempted to provide weapons to the Houthis and that uh diplomatic pressure from regional um actors have uh prevented this and Russia may have told these actors that the purpose of this support was to uh complicate the lives of Western um uh powers who were supporting Ukraine. There has also been some reporting of Russian weaponry that has found its way to Hezbollah.
▶ 2:09:14Although the evidence of Russia's direct engagement with Hezbollah is uh uh is more tenuous. Uh and Russia has of course provided intelligence engagement with its counterparts in Iran on how to uh uh defeat uh western intelligence. So in your view, what therefore does the Iranian regime hope to gain from its increasingly cozy relationship with the Kremlin and what threat does that pose to US national security priorities?
▶ 2:09:44Although Russia is a sometimes competitor uh with Iran, it is a malign uh actor any its support with uh uh uh it has blocked all uh pressure on uh uh Iran at the United Nations. So for example, regarding Yemen, Iran is Russia has made sure that there has been no significant investigation of Iran's support for the Houthis at the United Nations for many years. So the Russia's support for Iran is significant. It is malign.
▶ 2:10:13It is pervasive and it impacts the global economy. Are are there points of friction within that parallel relationship that the US could effectively exploit? I'm not aware of many, but Dana, do you have anything you'd like to add on that?
▶ 2:10:32I think the bottom line here is that uh Russia and Iran share the objective of challenging the United States, our influence, and our investment in the current global and international order. And that strategic in convergence is stronger than any wedge we might want to drive between the two. Thank you all for your for your testimony here today. and I yield back. Thank you. I now recognize Representative Ammo from Rhode Island for five minutes.
▶ 2:11:02Thank you, uh, Madame Chair and thank you to our witnesses for being here. I know it's been a little while, uh, that you've been sitting there and, um, uh, Miss Sh, good to see you again. The last time we were here was last April, and I discussed with you the growing cooperation between, uh, Ayatollah Kamini and and Vladimir Putin. And back then we saw Iran transfer drones to Russia.
▶ 2:11:28The the same uh Iranian drones uh which were turned on Israel uh were used by Putin to attack Ukraine. One year later, Putin's drones are still taking the lives of innocent civilians. And the ties between Russia and Iran have grown stronger.
▶ 2:11:47Earlier this year, Russia and Iran signed a 20-year strategic partnership treaty with a military cooperation agreement, and the duo has expanded to include a third, Xi Jinping, China. In March, warships from all three countries conducted joint naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman, the strategic quarter for more than one quarter of the world's seaborn oil.
▶ 2:12:12That same week, China hosted Russia uh and Iranian diplomats to discuss Iran's nuclear program. So, in the aftermath of Trump 1.0 and the withdrawal of of commitments to contain Iran by uh leaving the the JCPOA, Iran is continued in its acceleration uh of its development of its nuclear program.
▶ 2:12:36Now, as we uh are in Trump 2.0, I know uh as President Trump continues our surrender on the global stage as we've seen in the last 70 plus days, China is racing to fill that vacuum. Uh Xi is strengthening Iran's hands thanks to retreat. The annual threat assessment of the US intelligence community released last month found that China, Russia, and Iran were three of the largest foreign threats to the United States.
▶ 2:13:07Mrol, what actions should President Trump continue from the Biden administration to deter this growing alliance and ensure that Russia and China do not continue to help Iran evade sanctions. Thank you so much for that question, Congressman. Good to see you as well.
▶ 2:13:24Um what we've seen since last year is continued coordination and strategic convergence across Russia, Iran, China, and sometimes North Korea. So it's diplomatic uh protection um of of Iran at the UN Security Council and across many international institutions. It's not just exchanging lessons learned on how to evade sanctions.
▶ 2:13:52It's also deeper economic cooperation working on how to dd dollararize their economies, how to increase banking transactions between these different capitals to make themselves uh uh less exposed to US sanctions. It's increasing exchanges in sophisticated defense technology. It's the military exercises as you note. And then it's even trading and exchanging lessons learned on how to exert domestic control inside their countries, suppress human rights uh and popular protests.
▶ 2:14:22Uh not to mention nuclear cooperation. So all of this requires a whole of government approach from the administration. It is investing in our unmatched network of allies and partners in order to counter this axis. It is restoring US the elements of US soft power, US aid, investing in our diplomats in order to counter the diplomatic actions of these uh different malign actors.
▶ 2:14:47Uh it is strengthening our foreign military sales processes, our own military exercises, um our own defense and security cooperation in order to counter that and also making sure that we continue to have um the most professional US military in the world because partners and allies should want to do military exercises with us, not with Russia or China.
▶ 2:15:10And m with my remaining time, what can we do or what changes can we make to disrupt the growing ties between um you know a lot of those points that you just referenced was how we engage uh with our partners and our our allies. But what can we do to disrupt the close ties between Iran, Russia, and China as this connection grows even stronger in their opposition to us?
▶ 2:15:34We're going to have to disincentivize the uh interest of those leaders and in those capitals to deepen their coordination with each other to make it less attractive to do that and for them to perceive that the consequences of that deeper coordination that runs counter to US interests will be more painful than pursuing this course.
▶ 2:15:57And again, it means uh demonstrated resolve uh to maintain US military partnerships to invest and provide security as assurances um and support for the defense of our allies and partners so that they're working with us and not hedging towards this other access and it is fielding a strong diplomatic core and a strong uh network of development professionals. Thank you. Uh I yield back. Thank you. At this time I recognize myself.
▶ 2:16:23I am unfortunate that uh my colleague left with his JCPOA binder as that would have been very helpful. We've got a small chair in the back that's a little bit wobbly and that's about the only thing you could have put under it to actually stabilize it since it did nothing to stabilize her on. Um Mr. You really loved the quick fire rapid fire stuff when it came to the Biden administration. I kind of want to follow suit here if you will and I want to make this quick. Uh did oil exportation increase under the Biden administration?
▶ 2:16:52sanctions enforcement is an area that could have been improved. Did it increase under the Biden administration? Uh, Chinese purchases of discounted Iranian oil increased under the previous administration. Did Biden delist the Houthi rebels? Yes. Did that disrupt 12% of global trade through the Red Sea? The Dellisting itself was not the cause of the disruption of the global. The increase in actual attacks as a result of dellisting the Houthis increase the amount of disruption of global trade through the Red Sea resulting in 12% of global trade being disrupted.
▶ 2:17:22Iranian provision of support to the Houthies is part of the reason. Did the unfreezing of assets and the increase of oil trade give more money to Iran to be able to fund proxy militias? I can't speak to the exact fungibility of the fun. I actually thought that was your job. Did the currency of the Iran, the real go up in value versus the dollar during the time the Biden administration was in place? My colleague would be better positioned on that. I'll allow you to answer. Uh, yes. Yes, it did.
▶ 2:17:49Because under Max pressure, it's at about a million real to the dollar, something they haven't seen in a long time. So, I noticed that you had a lot of really quick rapidfire things on the previous administration, but not a whole lot when it came to the increase in maximum pressure that's actually resulted in the Iranian regime reducing the amount of attacks they have right now. Wasn't it uh the Biden administration who actually requested the IDF in Israel to launch themselves into a ceasefire for I can't speak to the specifics of that.
▶ 2:18:18What the answer is yes. And had they done that, we wouldn't have eliminated Hassan Rala of Hezbollah. We would not have eliminated Senoir. We would not have eliminated many of the actual terrorist organization leads that has basically been put in place and enforced to grow stronger as a result of the weakness that the administration had shown. Look what we have today. We talk all the time about how Russia is were so weak on Russia, but was it not the Trump administration actually removed us from the failed INF treaty?
▶ 2:18:47Something that no other administration was willing to do before. Was it not the JCPOA that both General Secretary Bon Kimmoon and Gutierrez said had been violated when Iran was still shipping mid-range ballistic missiles to the Houthis when they were launching against Saudi This is preposterous to even assume that the Biden administration had done anything to prevent the enrichment of nuclear or that the JCPOA or Jake Sullivan or any of the others had done anything that would have weakened the regime.
▶ 2:19:18And I want to be very clear there is a difference and I think it's important to always point out the differentiation in this. There is a difference in the regime and the Iranian people. The Iranian people want a free Iran. I can tell you that those who are bravely protesting in the streets, those who are continuing to try and risk their lives every single day like Masa did to say enough is enough shouldn't be lumped in.
▶ 2:19:43So when our colleagues very recklessly just says Iran, I think that that's a very bis big misnomel and I want to correct that for the record. I want to go into sanction Do you feel, Miss Youngman, that sanctions were enforced under the Biden administration? Not until late 2024. And do you feel that Iran is at a stronger or weaker position right now than they were previously?
▶ 2:20:12As a result of the sanctions that have been rolled out over the last few months and at the end of 2024, they are weaker, but not as weak as they could have been if sanctions were fully enforced under the Biden administration. Completely agreed.
▶ 2:20:25And what I noticed from Iran is that not only are they concerned about this administration more so than the last, they've actually moved and relocated their service to air missiles around Quam, around Natans, around Esarhan because they know that unlike the Obama Biden drawn red line, that this administration has actually proven to take real enforcement. Do you think, Mr.
▶ 2:20:47Norman that if we actually not actually hurting or impacting or having a lot of collateral damage as you would if you hit cities like Tyrron or others but went after the nuclear facilities that it would send a direct message to the regime that we will not continue to play weak with them.
▶ 2:21:02It certainly would send a a powerful message to the regime that we would take we that we would not play weak with And I think that that's really what this administration has proven both in the first administration and now is that we're not going to continue to play weak with our adversaries. The China, Russia, Iran, North Korea geopolitical alignment has grown stronger on the previous regime.
▶ 2:21:23And it's President Trump and this administration who's continued to try and make the necessary steps to enforce sanctions to guarantee that we relist the Houthis to stop the n land of the sea of navigation from being disrupted and to actually for once and for all actually see that the Iranian people have support from the United States to overthrow a regime who has been dictatorship tyrannical and continue to do this but only build and bold themselves under the Biden administration.
▶ 2:21:47With that, I will now recognize if it pops up here, and I'm not sure that they're updating it. There we go. We will recognize the gentle lady from Pennsylvania, Miss Dean. There we go. I'm going to slide down one.
▶ 2:22:20Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Bear with me and let's restart the clock, please. Restarted the clock. Thank you very much. Uh, I thank Chairman Mast and Ranking Member Meeks for holding this hearing and I thank all of you. Your expertise, your passion, and your your intellect around these issues is very valuable to us in these incredibly challenging times.
▶ 2:22:41Uh going back to the JCPOA in 2015, the P5+1 uh the EU and Iran agreed to the JPOA JCPOA choosing diplomacy over aggression uh to ensure that Iran's nuclear program would be peaceful constrained.
▶ 2:23:00The JCPOA was a historic deal in ensuring verification and compliance and the IAEA had pre previously warned that its failure would be a loss for nuclear verification and multilateralism.
▶ 2:23:15Unfortunately, in 2018, even though the IAEA verified that Iran was implementing its nuclear related commitments, President Trump in my mind recklessly withdrew uh the United States from the JPCOA and without a plan, as my colleague Mr. Schneider spoke about. Mr. Rule, I'd like to go back to the very beginning of your testimony. It is stunning testimony that I think bears repeating.
▶ 2:23:44you said uh in page one and page two first the IAEA notes that Iran continues to expand its production of 60% enriched uranium. Is that correct? That is correct ma'am. You say Iran appears capable of producing its first quantity of 90% enriched uranium. Can you speak to that? What what leads us to know that?
▶ 2:24:09that is based on uh I the international atomic energy ay's uh uh access to Iran's nuclear program at present which is limited but it still uh takes place and when when you use the expression as experts do uh they would have uh the possibility of 90% enriched uranium sufficient for one nuclear weapon in about a week what does that about a week mean to the layman like me well it means that they have centrifuges which spin gas and basically produce produce
▶ 2:24:40ur highlyenriched uranium that would then be be have to be shaped into a a warhead that could then be used as a weapon. This is the first stage of that. So this is before the warhead construction starts. So we're not they don't have a weapon, they just have the material that would begin the process towards a weapon. So they don't have a bomb, but they have the file material that would then begin the process for a weapon.
▶ 2:25:07What stages were they at prior to President Trump removing the United States from JCPOA? What were the numbers then? They had a very very tiny amount of uh uh enriched uranium at a level that was much much reduced to this. It was about below 5%. They had a very small number of centrifuges.
▶ 2:25:31Um and I but I should also say ma'am that when President Trump uh uh left JCPOA they did not significantly increase their centrifuge production until um frankly uh diplomatic uh talks began under the Biden administration and it wasn't because of the Biden administration itself. It was just because the Iranians just uh decided to expand their program even when diplomacy was offered.
▶ 2:25:55And then you said uh let me see here second you said Iran continues to increase the number and sophistication of its centrifuge cascades. Can you speak to that a little bit? Yes. In essence the centrifuges have u the the more advanced the centrifuge is the greater its efficiency the faster it can produce highlyenriched uranium. And uh what that means is the the faster it can produce the fistal material for a weapon.
▶ 2:26:23And uh the faster it can produce something means the fewer number of centrifuges which means the footprint is smaller. It means the smaller the installation can be meaning the easier easier you can hide it. So in essence, Iran's nuclear architecture right now appears to be designed to produce the highest enrich in in uh uranium the in the fastest way possible and not the lowest in enriched uranium in the nor in just an average of speed possible.
▶ 2:26:53So it's not producing enriched uranium in a way that you would expect for a civilian nuclear program. It is also producing this enriched uranium in centrifuge cascades in facilities that are deeply buried that looks as if they're designed to survive a military attack. That is all very Very suspicious. I see my time is up. Uh where does this leave our partners, our former partners in the JCPOA? If you could answer that.
▶ 2:27:20Well, the Europeans have been attempting to revive negotiations for some time without success. In part because the Iranians themselves refused to cooperate with negotiations as they refused to cooperate under the Biden administration, which is why then the secretary, the secretary of state and the Biden administration called the negotiations uh to an end. I thank you very much all of you. I'm sorry I wasn't able to get to everybody. Uh thank you. I yield back. Thank you. At this time, we recognize our good friend from Texas, Mr. yourself for 5 minutes.
▶ 2:27:50Uh, thank you, Mr. Chairman. In 2015, President Obama flew a plane with $400 million in cash to the Ayatollah and released billions more. In 2021, President Biden rescended President Trump's maximum pressure campaign, as we've heard. They went from like four billion, I think, in reserves to somewhere around a hundred billion today, perhaps more.
▶ 2:28:13uh we have suffered through multiple uh inept leadership uh in terms of Iran and now we have a strong commander-in-chief who sees maximum pressure However, as a article one branch of government, Congress must have jurisdiction over sanctions. Some say so over the sanctions for Iran for any future administration.
▶ 2:28:38That's why I have reintroduced the Iran Sanctions Relief Review Act, which passed the House last session. But my bill will give us a seat at the table and the American people a voice and view. We must strengthen Congress's hand to protect future generations from emergency existential threats to our nation's survival and the Iranian uh nuclear weapon might do that. We have a duty to do that. So I want to start with you, Mr. rule.
▶ 2:29:08Uh what is the center of gravity of the Iranian nuclear program? Is it the warhead? Is it the guidance system? Is it the missile itself? Is it the facilities? Uh is it the potential for software from your years in the CIA? What what is the center of gravity? It's a broad federated program that exists in many locations across the broad geography.
▶ 2:29:32Um for many years the uh uh center would have been the development of file material but as we've just discussed that is produced at a number of locations at a very advanced rate at present. So uh understanding their number of centrifuges their production rate of highlyenriched uranium is is the most important of uh aspect of the program at present.
▶ 2:29:54So, so you think they can quickly uh link the material with a guidance system with a missile because they've never tested this? No, I No, no, no, sir. I didn't say that. In fact, it's unlikely they would be able to do so uh quickly or efficiently in my view. Uh they've not done that. And the time it would take for them to do that depends upon amount of testing, how how how quickly and securely they'd wish to do that. And the metallurgy to shape a warhead.
▶ 2:30:22And by the way, that's not that's also saying they decide they wouldn't put it into a gravity bomb into an airplane or some other system to deliver it or or sneak it into a port somewhere or sneak it into a port, sir. So, but if we're But at this point, it's the creation of file material in the enrichment program. Interesting. I would have said it would been the building of an actual warhead on a missile.
▶ 2:30:45But anyway, uh, Miss Youngman, uh, we know that the Ayatollah, uh, stopped the program supposedly in early 2000s. He's now what, 86, 87 years old. Uh, do you think that they may be doing something behind his back, seeing that his days are numbered? Is what are the chances that is happening that somebody surreptitiously is moving the nuclear program forward?
▶ 2:31:14Unfortunately, that's not my area of expertise. I'm going to defer to my colleagues on the question. Mr. Rule, I think you've been nominated. Minimal. Minimal. Minimal. It's not how the country works. It's a very small circle of people and it's extremely unlikely something like that would happen without his knowledge. Okay. Very good. So, regime change, I've heard that discussed here.
▶ 2:31:40I I think that's a horrible concept because we haven't defeated a nation for for decades now. Uh but we do know that there have been several uprisings in Iran and they are put down brutally. So how in the world do we encourage the people of Iran to actually go through the pain to change the the the regime? Is that possible?
▶ 2:32:05because we we're assuming some external force, US or somebody else will have to make this happen because if if we do have a successor to the Ayatollah standing in the wings, how do we encourage them to do this themselves? the the people of Iran know need to know that America stands with them, but we need to be very careful and cautious as to how we do this because people are risking their lives.
▶ 2:32:35They're they're they will pay a terrific price uh uh in the prisons of Iran uh at the hands of Iran's extraordinarily cruel security forces uh when they're when they're punished. And we need to be very careful that we don't we we we we aren't too cavalier about how this is handled. It's up to the people of Iran to determine their future.
▶ 2:32:55And as they do take steps to to to to change that future, they need to know that we will uh support them and perhaps even provide safe haven uh if they need if they need security uh if if if if in such a situation. But we just need to be careful on on how we move forward because when if if they're uh if there is a situation where they're caught in the hands of Iran security, they will be handled very roughly.
▶ 2:33:25Thank you. I yield back. Thank you. At this time, we recognize Representative Delaware, Rep. McBride. Thank you, Mr. Acting Chairman. Thank you very much to our witnesses for uh your perseverance with us today. Around the world, we are watching a clash unfold between democratic values and authoritarian oppression.
▶ 2:33:49From Europe to the Middle East to this very continent, this is the story of our moment. Democracy versus authoritarianism. Iran sits at the center of a growing alliance of authoritarianism, an access that includes not only hostile nation states like Russia and China, but also a network of terrorist organizations and armed militias across the Middle East.
▶ 2:34:14Iran props up groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, using them as tools to destabilize democracies and challenge US interests. This is a part of Iran's global strategy to expand authoritarian influence and erode the norms of international law and human rights.
▶ 2:34:32And while we sit here warning of Iranian malign activities, President Trump's national security team has been carelessly handling classified and mission sensitive information about the Houthis in open. The problem isn't just that they mistakenly added a reporter to a text chain.
▶ 2:34:54The bigger problem is that these officials, some of the most surveiled people on the planet, were communicating in a way that allowed that mistake to even happen. How many signal chats contain sensitive or classified material material right now? How many have occurred over the last several months? reporters may not have been able to see them, but Iran, Russia, and China very easily could.
▶ 2:35:19It is entirely possible that Iran or one of its partners was following along on the signal chat that we know about. And because of that, it is a miracle. It is a miracle that we are not mourning dead American troops right now. Had there been uh retaliation waiting in response because of that breach, that could have handed the Houthis and Iran a major victory. That's not just embarrassing. It was dangerous.
▶ 2:35:49As Hamas is weakened and Iran looks to recalibrate its strategy, we must ensure that Iran does not have additional proxies to fall back on. I'm proud to co-lead the bipartisan biccamealable biccameal accountability for terrorist perpetrators of October 7th act introduced by my colleagues representatives Sherman and Lawler which would finally sanction the popular resistance committees a brutal terrorist organization in Gaza and an active participant in the horrific attacks in Israel on
▶ 2:36:19October 7th. These terrorists have carried out attacks against Americans, Israelis, and Palestinians for decades, and their deep ties to Hamas make them a credible candidate for Iran if they are looking to increase support for other proxies in the region. So, Mr. Rule, my question for you is despite having been responsible for American civilians being murdered since 2003, the Popular Resistance Committees has never been sanctioned.
▶ 2:36:45As Iran adjusts its strategy in response to the weakening of its primary pro proxies, how should the US government and our allies monitor and preempt the rise of new or lesserk known Iranianbacked groups that could fill a vacuum? Superb question. And I go back to a previous statement. As long as the goods force exists as a as an organization created to sponsor militias and terrorists, we we will see more and more of this.
▶ 2:37:12There are goods force training camps in Iran designed to to to train multinational uh terrorists to in essence go out and train become train the trainer individuals. Some of the best training Iran provides to the Houthis to Hezbollah and others is provided within Iran itself. Until Iran is compelled to change the goods force itself, we are fated to deal with this issue.
▶ 2:37:39So I would encourage legislation that insists that our partners in Europe and the region con do what they can to constrain Iran's could from from the goods forces activity. Until this happens, we are fated to watch this movie play again and again. Thank you. Um, and quickly, M.
▶ 2:37:58Stroll, given Iran's strategy of using proxies to destabilize fragile democracies and suppress civil society from Lebanon to Iraq, how can the US more effectively support democratic institutions and counteract the malign influence of these authoritarianbacked the uh ability of societies and communities to be resilient in the face of what the Iranians will try to do which is reconstitute uh their their threat network is to empower
▶ 2:38:28our diplomats and our development assistance professionals. So that would particularly be the US agency for international development and to allow our diplomats to do what they do best which is political uh and diplomatic engagement. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you. I to remind uh just for clarification, Rep. McBride that those sitting in the chair are chairman or chairwoman. There's no acting. And so I would assume that we know the difference between real and acting.
▶ 2:38:56And at this time, I'll recognize the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Shre. Thank you, Mr. Gentleman and the chair. Uh I appreciate the testimony from the witnesses. Uh I know it's been a long afternoon. I appreciate that.
▶ 2:39:12Um, Miss Jungman, uh, nearly three hours ago, uh, as as we opened up, uh, you discussed the establishment of a global maritime no do, uh, list, uh, as a as a means of, um, uh, curtailing, uh, this shadow fleet. Um, what might the US do to encourage other countries uh to uphold this new no do list at their ports?
▶ 2:39:43Thank you for bringing that up. Um, and thank you for the question. I think it's important to recognize again that there are western entities touching the vessels involved in this activity. Whether that's the classification society, the flag state um classification societies for example have offices here in the US or the flag states that um you know provide the the the flags to these vessels.
▶ 2:40:07we can um essentially say none of their vessels would be able to sail into to the US. Um for example, if that's Panama or Comos or Cook Islands, if we said if you're going to continue to flag these vessels, your vessels will not be able to come to the US.
▶ 2:40:24So, um I think there's a number of different ways that we can encourage them, but essentially then the the the thought behind the no sale list or, you know, kind of monitored off a no-fly list, um is that that san, you know, the enforcement of sanctions can take time and having this list of vessels that are involved in this type of activity would send a warning and hopefully deter them from offloading their oil at different areas. So, in a way that deterrence would be secondhand.
▶ 2:40:52Um we they can't uh uh those vessels on the no dock list directly at foreign ports, but we could get to the the the bad actor states by prohibiting their docking into our ports. Is that a fair characterization? All right. Well, thank you. Thank you, sir. I yield back. Thank you so much. At this time, we recognize the gentle lady from South Carolina, Rep. Bixs.
▶ 2:41:23Thank you, sir, and thank you to our witnesses for being here today. So, the denuclearization of Iran remains a cornerstone of US policy, and it's critical to ensuring regional stability and global security given Iran's history of pursuing nuclear capabilities that threaten its neighbors and the international community.
▶ 2:41:45The Obama administration's Iran nuclear deal, the JCPOA, notably failed to achieve this goal as it allowed Iran to retain significant nuclear infrastructure and did not mandate the verifiable dismantlement of its nuclear weapons program.
▶ 2:42:04Moreover, the Obama administration sought to obligate the United States to remove key sanctions on Iran, notably those with section 1245 of fiscal year 2012 NDAA, which enforced significant financial and oil restrictions. the Obama administration's agreement bulldown to a trade which simply stated temporary nuclear restriction in exchange for permanent sanctions relief.
▶ 2:42:34Yet these efforts fell well short of the denuclearization standard ma mandated by the CISADA, a bill signed into law by President Obama which explicitly requires Iran to cease the pursuit, acquisition, and development of nuclear weapons and to dismantle its nuclear program as one of a number of conditions terminating significant US sanctions.
▶ 2:43:01The law's mandate is clear and indisputable, and the Obama administration's agreement fell significantly significantly short, raising serious concerns about its effectiveness and security implications for the United States and for our allies. Only strict adherence to the law will ensure the permanent removal of nuclear threat from Iran. So my question is simple. to each of our witnesses.
▶ 2:43:31I just want to know does anyone disagree with this fundamental principle and I'll start with Mr. And I'm sorry ma'am could you could you give the question simply please? I just want to know if if you disagree or agree with this fundamental principle of what what I just stated about what the Obama how we fell short and and how it affects us now.
▶ 2:44:03You are correct ma'am. the uh um the JCPOA provided uh uh permanent sanctions relief and permanent relief of a number of restrictions in return for u uh in many cases uh uh temporary or finite uh uh uh restrictions on Iran's nuclear program and uh with a government uh of malign individuals who sponsored proxies uh did a number of uh
▶ 2:44:33of of of oppressive activities against their own people and led us to the current state where we where we are today and and if I can go just a little further in essence the problem with JCPOA is it's it's become an issue about us and when it should be an issue about Iran okay this was Iran's chance to turn a new chapter in its history and it didn't and it's Iran's fault okay and and that's that's the issue issue here so yes ma'am thank I would agree with the comments made by
▶ 2:45:05I would also agree and I think it's even more important that whatever deal is contemplated and negotiated this year has to be much stronger than the JCPOA particularly because of the perilous advances in Iran's nuclear program today. Absolutely. I believe that's why our past is so important to pay attention to as we move forward. And thank you to our witnesses and I yield back my time. Thank you so much. I want to thank our witnesses for their valuable testimony and the members for their questions.
▶ 2:45:35The member of the committees may have some additional questions for the witnesses and we may ask you to respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rules, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record subject to the link limitations. Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.