▶ 0:00:00poses a significant cyber threat with its efforts to compromise sensitive targets for intelligence collection and to preposition access to US critical infrastructure. In addition to Beijing and Moscow, Tehran has demonstrated an increasingly uh increasing willingness to carry out aggressive cyber operations to the security of US networks and data.
▶ 0:00:24Furthermore, Pyongyang's cyber program pres uh presents a highly capable and maturing threat, including an approach to launder and cash out cryptocurrency from the United States and other victims to fund its nefarious activities. As cyber becomes a growing battlefield for criminal networks and a malign actors, the State Department must be ready to meet the challenge. The US is not facing these real and growing threats alone.
▶ 0:00:54Through cooperation with our allies and our partners, the US will continue to work to combat malign cyber activities from the PRC, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Since the recent establishment of CDP, it's played a role in the US response to a major ransomware campaign in Costa Rica that disrupted critical services.
▶ 0:01:16In particular, CDP alongside other federal partners worked to strengthen Costa Rica's cyber defenses against attacks from malicious actors threatening the security of both our countries. It has also worked to identify strategic opportunities to leverage partner resources to further US strategic objectives through subcable projects in the Pacific Islands.
▶ 0:01:38Such efforts ensure that the Pacific Islands rem rely on trusted primarily American businesses for their internet connectivity while also countering the PRC's influence in the strategically important region. On the other hand, the Department of State agreement on a cyber crime UN treaty that conflicted with CDP policy lead and recommendations begs the question of the actual authority wielded by CDP.
▶ 0:02:06This hearing should lead us toward conclusions on how to improve CDP efficiency and effectiveness in this vital area of national interest and security. As we move through this reauthorization process, the experience and insights uh from today's witnesses will help inform this subcommittee on the State Department's cyber diplomacy role in addressing these increasingly important challenges. I look forward to hearing your testimony and recommendations.
▶ 0:02:36The chair now recognizes the ranking member, the gentleman from Massachusetts, uh, Mr. Keading, for any statement he may have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, uh, and to our witnesses for being here today. For years, bipartisan members of this committee have recognized the necessity for the State Department to take on the important task of cyber diplomacy. In 2021, the Biden administration announced the creation of the Bureau of Cyerspace and Digital Policy, CDP, with bipartisan support.
▶ 0:03:06And the Department of State Authorization Act of 2022 authorized the CDP Bureau into statute, an important step in recognizing the need for a robust and comprehensive approach to cyber diplom cyber diplomacy. With the CDP Bureau established in statute, it's worked in conjunction with this committee to lead the State Department's diplomatic cyerspace and cyber security efforts encompassing both hard security and economic policy.
▶ 0:03:35As our adversaries, Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, each take different approaches to undermining US actions in cyerspace, bolstering US cyber capabilities through a strong CDP bureau is more important than ever. The CDP bureau has worked to advance US interest in cyerspace across multiple lines of effort.
▶ 0:03:57For example, following the 2022 ransomware attack in Costa Rica by a Russian linked cyber crime group, the CDP bureau provided swift, decisive support to Costa Ricans and their authorities to bolster the country's digital defenses and resiliency. This emergency support was critical to ensure that a partner in our own hemisphere was able to effectively respond to an unprecedented attack.
▶ 0:04:22Similarly, the State Department worked to strengthen Ukraine's cyber defenses in the midst of Russia's full-scale illegal invasion of the country through the digital connectivity cyber security partnership program, a joint venture by the Department of USA. These are just a few examples of the CDP CDP bureau's important work to bolster our allies and partners while promoting American values and security in cyerspace.
▶ 0:04:51While I re really appreciate the opportunity to talk about an important bureau which has long maintained bipartisan support, it's unfortunately clear that neither this majority nor the Trump administration has any interest or intent to engage constructively on a reauthorization of the State Department. Last week, Secretary Rubio unveiled a proposed reorganization plan for the State Department without any meaningful consultation with Congress.
▶ 0:05:18Reorganization would decimate the department's cyber policy tools by splitting it in half. CDP's economic structures would be moved under the economic family of the bureau and CDP's hard security offices being would be placed in a new emerging threats bureau. This move will create exactly the duplication and the waste this administration says it seeks to avoid.
▶ 0:05:43Even more concerning, it deprioritizes a crosscutting issue that needs to be tackled holistically uh and at the highest levels. Our witnesses here today and many experts in the field have all pointed out the importance of capacity building in cyerspace and maintaining and recruiting the skills required for a qualified cyber diplomacy Unfortunately, rather than invest in capacity building in places like Costa Rica and Ukraine, the Trump administration has slashed the US
▶ 0:06:13foreign assistance budget and illegally eliminated USAD, a chief implement of the capacity building programs. At the same time, GAO and Miss Love Grayers uh they found out that a nonpartisan report uh that while CDP is currently staffed and fully operational, it needs to train existing staff and hire more people to meet its growth plans.
▶ 0:06:39Rather than seeking to recruit and train staff, the Trump administration has attacked and politicized the federal workforce, leaving a legacy of destruction and indeed distrust. Finally, rather than listen to the advice of experts, consult with industy professionals and engage with the State Department, this committee has effectively served as a rubber stamp for the administration's destructive actions.
▶ 0:07:01Miss Fixler, you concluded in an article on March 17th that capacity building programs, including those implemented by USAD, are not merely altruistic endeavors. They advance critical US interest.
▶ 0:07:17Miss Love Greer, your nonpartisan 2024 GAO report concluded that the State Department provides foreign assistance to strengthen partner capacity and to promote cyber norms to achieve US cyber objectives. Mr. Never.
▶ 0:07:35Your testimony points out that a wellplaced cyber security foreign assistance project can make all the difference in leveling the playing field for our companies and private investments in countries that still deeply respect US tech leadership.
▶ 0:07:50Yet rather than invite administration witnesses here from the CDP bureau to testify on the effectiveness of the bureau's programming or implement the advice of experts like our witnesses here today, the chair uh of the full committee and many of my major uh majority colleagues have already wholeheartedly excuse me wholeheartedly endorsed the administration's reorganization plans.
▶ 0:08:12This is a a troubling abdication of the oversight responsibilities of this committee and an elimination of the article one authority of this Congress. While I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses here today, I would strongly urge my majority colleagues to listen to what they have to say, work to reauthorize the State Department in a way that serves the interests of the American public, and move uh this important issue to the forefront. I yield balance of my time.
▶ 0:08:39Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for record. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic. Miss Annie Fixler, director of center of on uh cyber and technology at the foundation for defense of democracies. Uh Miss Leticia Love Grayer, director of international affairs and trade at the USGAO. And Mr.
▶ 0:09:06Theodore Nimmerof, co-founder and vice president for data and compliance at Verific AI. Uh, this committee recognizes the importance of the issues before us and is grateful to have you here to speak with us today. Thank you. Your full statements will be made part of the record and I'll ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to five minutes in order to allow time for member questions. I now recognize Miss Fixler for your opening statement.
▶ 0:09:35Chairman Self, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished members of the committee on behalf of Did you check your mic or get closer to it? Closer. Sorry. Pull it. Pull it close to you. Try it. Um, chairman self, ranking member Keating and distinguished members of the committee.
▶ 0:09:53On behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, thank you for inviting me to testify For years, on a bipartisan basis, members of this committee pushed the State Department to better organize itself to defend US national security in cyerspace. Two and a half years after creating the Bureau of Cyerspace and Digital Policy, this committee must assess its performance, expand its successes, and address its shortcomings.
▶ 0:10:17This hearing is particularly timely given the department's proposed reorganization, which appears to put its cyber security efforts at risk and contradict congressional guidance to integrate cyber security and digital economy efforts. In my written testimony, I describe the successes the bureau has been able to achieve because of this integration. I'd like to take this opportunity to summarize the threat we face and the role state's cyber bureau should play.
▶ 0:10:43Every day, malicious cyber operators sitting in remote corners of the world attack our critical infrastructure across energy, transportation, and communication systems. China has prepositioned destructive capabilities. Beijing is prepared to use crippling cyber attacks to induce societal panic and interfere with our ability to project power. During the Biden administration, we issued stern warnings, but failed to deter Chinese aggression.
▶ 0:11:12Trump administration officials and members of Congress have rightfully articulated that our nation needs to go on the offense and punish those who use cyerspace to do us harm. And we need better defense to deny our adversaries objectives. The Cyber Bureau plays a critical role in both. Over the course of its short tenure, it has demonstrated it understands these priorities and can execute the mission.
▶ 0:11:41Congress tasked the bureau with managing a unique cyber assistance fund because lawmakers recognized it took far too long for us to respond to incidents overseas that might cascade and hit our homeland. Now, in as little as two days, the bureau can airdrop expertise into partner countries.
▶ 0:12:00The department bolsters allied law enforcement capabilities to investigate cyber crime and prosecute the offenders and convinces those same allies and partners to join us when we call out bad behavior. The first step to getting our allies and partners to impose costs on China is for them to agree that a cyber attack has occurred and that Beijing is blame. The bureau helps allies and partners proactively build cyber resilience.
▶ 0:12:29On this, our strategic priorities are clear. We need the countries that we fight with and through to have resilient infrastructure. Resilience buys America time to deploy a range of policy responses. Had Ukraine succumbed to Russian cyber attacks, Washington could not have provided the lethal aid that has helped Keev substantially degrade the military capabilities of a leading adversary.
▶ 0:12:58Last summer, FDD led a tabletop exercise in Taiwan, exploring Chinese cyber enabled economic warfare against the island. In the game, the thing that gave Beijing the greatest pause was not US countermeasures, but an assessment that Taiwan could withstand the attack. If China believed that Taiwan could survive, it would refrain from attacking in the first place, lest Taiwan's strengths reveal the CCP's limits. Resilience has a deterrent power all its own.
▶ 0:13:29But building the resilience of allies and partners will be a Cisophian task if the telecommunications infrastructure underpinning all of it is built by China. The US military does not have operational security if Beijing is listening on the line. In the CHIPS act, Congress tasked and funded efforts at state to secure information communications technology. The Cyber Bureau is wisely using its portion on undersea cables in the Indoacific.
▶ 0:13:59When Congress created the bureau, lawmakers rightfully articulated that its head must be the principal cyber security policy official in the department. It also needs permanent staff billets so that the funding Congress appropriates is spent wisely efficiently. There is a battle underway in cyerspace. Without a robust cyber bureau, we will not win. Thank you for inviting me to testify today. I look forward to your questions.
▶ 0:14:32Thank you, Miss Fixler. I now recognize Miss Love Greer for your opening Welcome. Chairman Self, Ranking Member Keading, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on the Bureau of Cyerspace and Digital Policy known as CDP.
▶ 0:14:50As international trade, communication, and critical infrastructure grow more dependent on cyerspace and digital technology, there's an opportunity to advance US interest in this digital ecosystem, but also an increase in foreign cyber threats.
▶ 0:15:06Foreign governments and non-state actors are increasingly using cyerspace as a platform to target critical infrastructure and our citizens, undermine democracies and institution international institutions and undercut global competition by stealing ideas when they cannot create them. These are among the reasons that GAO has identified information security as a high-risisk issue.
▶ 0:15:28In April 2022, state established CDP to lead US government's international efforts to advance our interest in cyerspace, which state defines as cyber diplomacy. Its overarching objectives included building coalitions, strengthening capacity, and reinforcing norms in cyerspace. State uses two main tools to implement this cyber diplo diplomacy mission.
▶ 0:15:51diplomatic engagement and leadership in multilateral and bilateral fora and foreign assistance that provides training and technical assistance to our international partners. Examples of diplomatic efforts include engaging with the European Union to develop shared principles in the 6G wireless network and supporting the negotiation process of the UN cyber crime convention which appropriately, if appropriately ratified, would facilitate international cooperation to combat cyber crime.
▶ 0:16:20As Congress considers states reauthorization, my statement today is intended to help inform the discussion about their cyber diplomacy efforts and is based primarily on the reports that we have issued between September 2020 and January 2024 related to those efforts. State cyber diplomacy efforts have evolved between 2011 and the present.
▶ 0:16:39Between 2011 and 2018, state established the office of the coordinator of cyber issues to lead global diplomatic engagement and developed an international cyerspace policy strategy document among other efforts. In January 2019, members of Congress introduced the cyber diplomacy act of 2019, which would have established a new office to lead states international cyerspace efforts and consolidate a range of crosscutting cyber issues.
▶ 0:17:05Later that year, state uh notified Congress of its intent to establish a bureau that was more narrowly focused on cyber security. In September 2020 and January 2021, we assess state's efforts to establish the cyber bureau. We found that it had not involved other federal agencies that contribute to international cyber diplomacy in the development of its plans and recommended that it do so.
▶ 0:17:28We also found that state had not demonstrated that it had used data and evidence to develop its proposal for establishing the bureau and therefore lacked assurance that its proposal would effectively set priorities and allocate resources to achieve those goals. We recommended that it do so. In response, state consulted other key federal agencies in its planning and collected data and evidence to inform its approach, which resulted in changes to the final plan for the bureau.
▶ 0:17:54Once the bureau was established, we examined how it was structured to accomplish its goals. CDB contains four units, including the office of the coordinator for digital freedom, international information and communications policy, international cyerspace security, and a strategies program and communications unit. The new consolidated bureau and the appointment of a Senate confirmed ambassador at large to lead it elevated cyber issues and states diplomatic engagements. The ambassador engaged with various other country's senior leaders on advancing cyber goals.
▶ 0:18:25As an example, in August 2023, the ambassador headed the US delegation to the G20 digital economy ministerial meeting where he highlighted US views and priorities on digital economy topics. In addition, we reported that CDP status as a bureau provided senior level support, resources, and involvement that did not exist before. Although states efforts to promote cyber diplomacy have evolved, challenges remained.
▶ 0:18:52Among them, clearly defining CDP's roles and responsibilities across overlapping issuers with other inter, intra, and inter agencies that conduct work in cyber diplomacy, especially given the breadth of cyber issues, as well as ensuring that the bureau had sufficient expertise to carry out its goals. These are among the challenges that the bureau will still need to effectively navigate to lead cyber diplomacy in the future.
▶ 0:19:17Especially a state considers streamlining its functions and addressing any new priorities of the administration. Chairman self, ranking member Keading, and members of the subcommittee. This concludes my oral statement. I would be happy to take questions at this time. Uh thank you, Miss Love Greer. I now recognize Mr. Nimmerof for his opening statement. Chairman Self, Ranking Member Keading, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
▶ 0:19:46My remarks are drawn from my written testimony and offered in my personal capacity. This this subcommittee is reviewing the Cyber Diplomacy Act at a critical time. American leadership in key technologies, especially AI, positions us to shape the global technological ecosystem in ways that align with our values and benefit US national and economic security. But our vision is contested as my colleagues here have really uh effectively outlined.
▶ 0:20:13China poses the greatest and most comprehensive challenge to US leadership, leveraging both economic and security tools to advance its goals. Russia, Iran, and North Korea also pose significant threats, and ransomware op actors operating with impunity from Russian territory routinely disrupt our businesses, our hospitals, and our schools. Through the Cyber Diplomacy Act, this committee has helped ensure the State Department is better prepared to meet these challenges.
▶ 0:20:41A key strength of Congress's vision was to integrate national security, economic, and human rights equities in CDP. This has increased efficiency and reduced redundancy within the department and unlocked opportunities to face the challenge posed by China in particular in more comprehensive and strategic ways. But we can always do better.
▶ 0:21:02I recommend going forward focusing on four First, CDP should take further steps to organize itself around a full stack approach to cyber and digital diplomacy. Whether our adversaries gain access to critical systems through hacking or by selling untrusted undersea cables, data centers or 5G, it all harms our national security and the department needs to think about this altogether.
▶ 0:21:30A full stack approach enables us to see the full picture and leverage engagements at one layer to have influence at others. For example, the way that our cyber support to Costa Rica uh which has been cited several times already has since 2022 opened the door to deeper cooperation with the country on telecom issues. Second, CDP should continue to lead efforts to deter adversaries that behave irresponsibility irresponsibly. Cyber deterrence is not like nuclear deterrence.
▶ 0:21:59It requires a dynamic and constant effort warning adversaries about activities we won't accept and then swiftly preferably with allies responding to activities that cross our lines with by imposing meaningful consequences.
▶ 0:22:15This effort started in the first Trump administration uh with coordinated international responses to incidents like Russia's 2017 notetia cyber attack and it continued in the Biden administration with actions like our response to Iran's brazen 2022 cyber attack against Albania attempting to coersse a NATO ally.
▶ 0:22:35Third, CDP should continue to take on a more operational role, especially in incident response and by using diplomatic channels to support whole of government count adversary disruption campaigns. These activities fill clear gaps in inter agency capabilities that I saw when I was at NSC working on on issues around Ukraine and others.
▶ 0:22:58I want to particularly highlight the potential for CDP's recently piloted Falcon capability which allows state to rapidly deploy private sector incident responders to countries in need. Finally, I want to emphasize the importance of foreign assistance and finance. We are in a global tech competition with China. We need every tool possible to level the playing field for our companies against China's subsidies and hardball tactics and a well-placed cyber assistance project or a welltimed loan can make all the difference.
▶ 0:23:27CDP needs funding to provide specialized foreign assistance where it's most needed and it should be empowered to build a coordinated full stack investment strategy across the inter agency including with institutions like the development finance corporation. This subcommittee has been will be reauthorizing the cyber diplomacy act alongside the administration's recently announced plans to reorganize the department. I offer four key questions to consider as you decide on the way ahead.
▶ 0:23:53First, does the proposed restructuring enable the type of integrated approach I've discussed today? Second, does it maintain the requisite attention, authority, and responsibility of the department's most senior leaders, the ones who can make this a priority in state's regionally oriented work? Third, does it sustain and ideally accelerate efforts to build a technology savvy workforce? And fourth, does the proposed budget provide the resources required for this critical mission set?
▶ 0:24:21I want to thank the subcommittee for its continuing leadership and I look forward to your questions. Uh thank you Mr. Nimrov. I now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning. A series of questions. Miss Fixler, you said uh Taiwan survived the attack. What did you mean when you say survive the attack? Is that physical or is that cyber? What are you referring to? Sure.
▶ 0:24:49So in the tabletop exercise we did, it was a series of economic and cyber attacks that were testing this the societal resilience of Taiwan to withstand Chinese aggression and withstand uh efforts to coers its policy to agree to a reunification with the mainland. Um so it was a societal and cyber resilience.
▶ 0:25:11Um, and if the CCP judged that Taiwan could survive the pressure campaign, um, it might actually refrain, might not go kinetic. Yeah. Okay. Um, I want to read something to you. Uh, yesterday, probably everyone in this room was aware of the eur the three nation outage in Europe. I got back from Europe a week ago, Saturday. Uh, so this is from the Seaman's security advisory just to show you how important this issue is.
▶ 0:25:42The point of origin for the blackout possibly originated, when they say possibly, they're they're not definitively saying something, but I believe that they believe this, possibly originated in a high voltage substation in the Basque region of northern Spain, specifically near Balboa at the substation that they named.
▶ 0:26:01Uh the potential method of sabotage was a sophistic sophisticated cyber attack targeted targeting the substation's system injecting malware that overloaded transformers and triggered a cascading failure across the European grid. The malware exploited a known vulnerability in the seaman system and they they listed that.
▶ 0:26:24So, um, Miss Fixler, you in your testimony, you mentioned the need for partners and allies to be cyber resilient. Uh when I was in Europe, I talked to both polit politicals in Europe and to our US military and they made the US military from the sackur on down said that we need to be aware that their infrastructure to include cyber needs
▶ 0:26:54to support our war plans. Can you elaborate on what you said about uh their vulnerable infrastructure impacts our national security? Sure. Uh thank you so much for the question. Um so we recently at FDD issued a report looking at military mobility specifically the way that uh US military forces rely on civilian critical infrastructure to move men and material uh in the United States.
▶ 0:27:19That is true as well overseas and we intend to look more closely at the infrastructure in our NATO allies and how it must be secure so that our uh troops have secure transportation infrastructure uh telecommunications infrastructure because all of our forces rely not not on uh infrastructure owned and operated exclusively by the defense department but by civilian-owned infrastructure. So that infrastructure must be resilient to secure our forces overseas.
▶ 0:27:48Thank you, Miss Love Grayer. In what ways has the CDP worked with other agencies to advance cyber diplomacy? How does that impact national interest, defense interest? And uh where is the coordination point and who holds the big stick, I'll call it, in this area, cyber diplomacy. Thank you for that question. I I actually have sever several examples, but I want to use one that connects to what you just mentioned.
▶ 0:28:12So the DoD has an operation called Hunt forward where they uh assist our partner countries by assessing their vulnerabilities in their cyber systems. CDP partners with them by going in afterwards and actually providing the technical assistance and capacity building needed to address the vulnerabilities that they have identified. And so again, if we're uh partners with those countries and we're working with them closely, we may even have uh our own troops in those countries, it's important to not only identify the vulnerabilities, but to help them to address it.
▶ 0:28:42Um in terms of the coordination, there's various ways that CDP coordinates that that we found in our audit. Uh there's informal regular meetings between the heads of uh corporations and the agencies and with private sector corporations, but also there's formal inter agency agreements. So CDP at the time that we uh conducted our audit had 11 different agreements with different uh agencies such as DoD, Department of Commerce, the FCC, DHS, uh USAD and others.
▶ 0:29:11And these inter agency agreements allowed them to partner with these other agencies who have specific capabilities and skill sets that could be used to provide uh again technical assistance and capacity building to other countries. Who has the big stick at the moment? That depends on um I would say depending on what you call the big stick. I think who has the mandate for cyber diplomacy is CDP. Sometimes it's the other agencies who might have the technical expertise or even the funding. Uh CDP does provide foreign assistance funding.
▶ 0:29:41Um but in other cases they may just partner. So uh CDP has the mandate and there are a number of other players who have different types of capabil capabilities that they bring to the table. Very good. I now recognize ranking member Keading for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think when we use terms like cyber diplomacy and other terms like that, it really doesn't give effect to the real threat that we have. It sounds uh something that wouldn't be like a direct kinetic attack or something that we had.
▶ 0:30:11But, you know, cyber unlike other kinds of warfare or other kinds of threats, uh there's no barriers there. There's no wall that can be built. There's no ocean that stands between uh these threats they're global and they have to be approached globally. Uh and as so we really rely on our allies uh in this area even more in some respects than we would through conventional kind of threats that we deal with.
▶ 0:30:37So, how important it is is it to have us uh make sure we are working in these areas, making sure we're funding the cuts to USID and and the other things that could have an effect on our ability to work with our allies because if we're working, America alone will just not work uh when it comes to cyber. So, how great a threat is that? What what should we be looking for? Mr. Nimro, thank you.
▶ 0:31:08It's I think it's a it's a long old saying that cyber security is a team sport uh both within the inter agency uh and with our allies and partners. Uh and the the key thing is to be able to work with allies and partners at different levels of cyber capacity and cyber capability.
▶ 0:31:24So in in NATO for example uh we we work across the board to try to raise the level of cyber uh hygiene and cyber capability and then uh with particular countries particularly those that are foreign assistance eligible foreign assistance is a fantastic lever uh to to be able to uh help them uh help themselves and I think that's the key piece of this. Albania is a NATO ally.
▶ 0:31:48Albania was targeted by Iran uh by a major cyber attack uh that I think really implicated alliancewide issues uh and having foreign assistance as a way to get them to raise their capability was an important way of achieving our policy goals and to make the alliance safer and I think readiness is a really clear uh imperative here too because timing is so important.
▶ 0:32:10uh Miss Vickler, you mentioned uh how quickly the response has to be uh and and that's critical to being able to deal with this and it has to be in place ahead of time. So, another question I have in our own internal own domestic workforce that's there to to support this. I'm concerned with a lot of these cuts that are going on and the effects on the workforce and the expertise that could be walking out the door here.
▶ 0:32:35How important is it to have a workforce that's already trained, experienced, in place, and uh what would happen if the through reorganization or cuts that that was reduced and we lost that? H how uh much of a threat would that create? Um I I would just say that thank you for the question. Um recruiting and retaining uh technical talent is a persistent problem in the federal government across the federal government. Um and at least part of it is a pipeline problem.
▶ 0:33:04Um, we need a lot more STEM graduates. We need a lot more folks focused uh and pursuing cyber security degrees. Um, not all of them need to be four-year degrees. Uh, associates degrees are great. On the job training is great. Apprenticeships are great.
▶ 0:33:18Um and so I am particularly heartened by some of the efforts in this Congress to focus on uh cyber workforce including things like the pivot act, focusing on uh providing a faster way for uh community college graduates to get into the federal government uh with cyber degrees um because we need a lot of cyber professionals in our government to focus on cyber security and the intersection between cyber security and national security. And I just add a few thoughts to this.
▶ 0:33:47One of the concerns that we that we had after we conducted our review on CDP is that they did need to recruit a specific type of official. They needed someone who had not just technical capability but also diplomacy skills and competing for that. As we spoke with the former ambassador of CDP, he noted it's very hard to compete with the private sector for individuals who can uh harness both of those skill sets.
▶ 0:34:13And so having the the staff if once you get them on board keeping them and and helping them to grow and understand the issues is important but also having staff who can really cover this the range. There's a broad spectrum of issues that are involved in cyber diplomacy. Yeah. With 30 seconds left too. Uh Mr. Nimroof mentioned AI and and the this is just going to accentuate and geometrically affect our ability to respond in any timely fashion.
▶ 0:34:38And one of my concerns is with the reorganization there could be siloing of different uh functions and the whole point of CDP is to bring it all together and perhaps in any kind of written responses that you might have since my time is running out. you could uh really comment in greater detail on the threat of that siloing and how we we should be looking at reorganization so that there's not greater uh difficulty in being able to respond to these really critical threats.
▶ 0:35:08I yield back. Uh I now repres uh recognize uh Mr. Davidson for five minutes. Uh thank you chairman. Thanks to our witnesses for your testimony and your preparation for this hearing. Uh, Miss Fixler, you argued in a March 17th op-ed that cuts USID harm our cyber assistance to allies and partners. Um, I mean, by definition, if we don't give them money, we're harming the assistance. Uh, but are they really harmed?
▶ 0:35:37And I guess to what extent do we want to preserve it? I think you make the case that this could and should be consolidated under CDP. um what's the appropriate amount and kind of cyber assistance that the United States should be distributing? Uh sure, thank you for the question.
▶ 0:35:53Um so I think one of the things that CDP has demonstrated it's good at is using a little bit of US foreign assistance, marrying that with uh assistance from US partners and allies and private sector investment. So, I'll talk about the undersea cables uh area because that I think is where that shines. Um, US technology companies, communications companies are making major investments in undersea cables.
▶ 0:36:22They're interested in connecting major population centers because that makes sense from a um market perspective. um when CDP is able to get involved, it can use a little bit of foreign assistance, um find US partners and allies who are interested in the issue and then combine that with the private sector investment so that we look at it from a strategic perspective and we don't just focus on the market but also on where it matters for US military capabilities uh particularly in the south um the Indoacific um but
▶ 0:36:52that is applicable in other areas as well. Yeah, thank you for a very concrete uh illustration and as you talk about blending public sector work to try to foster some private sector investment. One of the big things that we're trying to do as a Congress really as a country but we need a law uh that that my other subcommittee my as chairman of national security elicit finance we're working on outbound investment. So I wonder Mr.
▶ 0:37:15Nimroof as you think about uh AI in particular one of the most rapidly changing tech sectors and you think about cyber and other factors what kinds of things ought we to consider within cyber security I think the real tension um comes between one approach that says well we don't want American companies investing in AI outside of America uh or maybe a more concrete example that uses you know kind of the financial services treasury thing and saying here is specifically who we don't want
▶ 0:37:45you investing with. What are the trade-offs there and what's your Thank you. So there is a hot AI competition uh happening right now uh among companies and among countries uh and we have to think very strategically about that.
▶ 0:38:03cyber security comes into it uh in a lot of different places um but critically uh in this area in protecting the the hard one IP uh that our companies produce uh in developing AI models uh and so I think it is important to be thoughtful uh when one's building one is building data centers anywhere whether it's here in the United States or elsewhere how do we build uh in the right cyber security systems uh in order to protect uh and protect our assets from others who might try to steal them for advantage, you know,
▶ 0:38:33say nation states that might use their intelligence services to steal American intellectual property. Absolutely. Like China. Like China. Like China. All right. Yeah. So that's exactly what we're trying to cut off. And of course, they don't say, "Hey, we're with the Chinese intelligence service. They set up companies and they use it to steal it." And that's why we really want to go with a sanctionsoriented approach, I think, where you go named individuals and named companies that basically create a burn list and uh and we keep it going. So we'll see where that goes, but hopefully we'll get that done.
▶ 0:39:01You know, one of the trade-offs there is always civil liberties. So, we find people that say, you know, uh, we're really concerned about freedom of speech. Congress, of course, isn't, according to the First Amendment, supposed to make any laws abridging the freedom of speech. Um, what can our committee do, uh, by working with CDP? Because that was the claim that they were just combating misinformation and disinformation when SISA was, frankly, it seemed pretty irian.
▶ 0:39:26I mean, a lot of my constituents had a lot of concerns about an American big government agency saying what an American citizen is saying is somehow foreign misinformation. How do we get right? Fundamentally, the first amendment uh is uh kind of has to be at the bedrock of everything that we do.
▶ 0:39:47I we do have a challenge that adversaries seek to use the openness of our system to exploit and and uh and disrupt uh or or um or cause uh to advance their agenda. Uh that's got to be a part of the consideration. Uh CDP's focus primarily has been on promoting freedom of expression and digital freedom abroad uh and on in particular uh safeguarding uh our networks and other people's networks from cyber threats. Yeah, I think that's the proper focus.
▶ 0:40:15I think SISA definitely got it wrong and frankly some of these agencies that were created to defend America were weaponized against American citizens. We want to make sure that we prevent that from happening and maybe the best way to do that is to hold some of those former officials accountable. Thanks. My time's expired and I yield back. I now recognize Representative Ammo. Mr. Ammo. Thank you, Chairman South, and thank you to our witnesses for being here.
▶ 0:40:40Look, it's no secret that digital technologies are quickly evolving, bringing with them greater connectivity uh and new and emerging threats. And these threats are not unique to the United States. They transcend borders and affect our allies across the world. Uh they require close collaboration and global solutions.
▶ 0:41:00And starting under the first Trump administration, there was bipartisan consensus that America needed a crosscutting bureau reporting directly to senior state department leadership that could coordinate the various elements of cyerspace, digital technologies, and global digital governance. The Bureau of Cyberpace and Digital Policy, and I know we we we're all uh associated with the acronym CDP, uh now was born in in 2022.
▶ 0:41:27And its mission I think is one to to come back to and just you know underscore uh to ensure an open secure and reliable uh internet necessity to promote democratic values like privacy, freedom of expression and access to information and CDP made our foreign cyber policy more efficient and streamlined our cyber diplomacy.
▶ 0:41:50But Secretary Rubio's uh new reorganization plan for the State Department breaks CDP and I think it's important to to highlight these changes, separating uh its economic functions uh and and moving cyber security into the new emerging threats branch. This plan undermines the core reason CDP was created. Again, streamlining international cyber policy. It is not efficient to create overlapping and redundant mandates.
▶ 0:42:20It is not efficient to jeopardize how CDP coordinates cyber policy with the Department of Defense, Homeland Security, and the intelligence community. And it is not efficient to jeopardize the essential work that CDP does alongside the Cyber Security uh and Infrastructure Security Agency or SIZA. Um because we know that CDP manages programs for SIZA that provide training and resources to protect targeted countries from cyber attacks.
▶ 0:42:47And given that CISA already faces drastic cuts to their programs thanks to the the actions of President Trump and Elon Musk, ending coordination with CDP could cause tremendous harm in keeping Americans safe. And so, Miss Love Grayer, how does CDP coordinate with CISA to ensure that we have a comprehensive strategy for cyber diplomacy?
▶ 0:43:10And how would uh the plan on the table from Secretary Rubio uh split up uh that that splits up CDP affect their collaboration with agencies like SISA? uh in the past we found that CDP and particular the ambassador at large who led them led it uh coordinated very closely with CISA with the office of the national cyber director to ensure that our domestic policy and our foreign policy our foreign facing policy aligned so that our views our uh perspectives our policy interests and
▶ 0:43:40our values would be represented in uh the foreign policy that we had as we faced and engaged with other multilateral organizations. So there was a lot of coordination there. At the same time, uh the views and the interest and the issues that the ambassador heard out in the world, he would bring back to our leaders here and on the domestic side to ensure that we could learn from that as well, that we were using that to inform our own strategies and our own protections at home. So that collaboration we found to be pretty important in terms of where they sat.
▶ 0:44:10It was very important that the ambassador did report directly to the deputy secretary because they had he had more direct influence and uh the ability to get leadership support on major decisions. Uh that coordination um sat above all the other uh bureaus and so there was a higher level of um gravitas that was given to CDP and being able to garner resources and support across the department is what we found.
▶ 0:44:38So that uh breaking that up could look different in the future. Yeah. And no better time to elevate uh and and make sure the gravitas of that coordination is central while the threats uh grow by the day. Uh before I I wrap up here last week back at home in Rhode Island, uh I joined uh Rhode Island College to recognize their designation as a national security agency uh center of academic excellence.
▶ 0:45:04uh and during that time uh we spent together we discussed the need for a well-trained and stable cyber security workforce uh and a pipeline uh and one of the things that uh you know I certainly would welcome your responses and writing as my time wraps up we have seen this disdain from the president for public service and federal workers and and fire and employees and so you know I want to ask a different version of what uh the ranking member asked previously just to assess the
▶ 0:45:35the the firing and how it has uh of workers and how it's affected our future ability to attract and I know that might require you to speculate a little bit but clearly there is an impact a lasting impact that the termination of employees uh you know for no reason will have on this cyber security workforce. It'll make us less safe and you know I welcome your thoughts on that in the future. With that I yield back. Uh thank you.
▶ 0:46:03Before I introduce our next speaker, uh the ranking member has asked for a comment. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since, as you're aware, since our last hearing, we had a discussion and you uh expressed that you intend to continue a manner of introduction of a member that at a minimum is not becoming of this committee.
▶ 0:46:27Uh, I hope you reconsider, but I want to make clear my objection to the harmful, wrong-minded language of the chairman's introduction. It's the wrong way to treat dulyeleed members of Congress. It's the wrong way to treat a colleague. It's the wrong way to treat any individual. The chairman knows uh suggested to both maintain dignity and respect the committee while continuing our committee's focus on policy issues that the chairman simply address members by their title.
▶ 0:46:56if he representative, but the chairman has said to me that he can't do that because it's just not him. Representative McBride, on the other hand, has publicly indicated that she wants to focus on committee policy hand. Representative McBride has identified who she is. The chairman has identified who he is.
▶ 0:47:22and I think it's something to reflect on each time her introduction is disrespectfully invoked. I yield back. Uh with that, in order I find myself in the position in order to maintain the parliamentary integrity of this hearing with uh being the lone majority member here. Uh I would like to recognize Representative McBride. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. Thank you. That means a lot.
▶ 0:47:51And thank you, Ranking Member Keading, for your friendship and your support. Thank you so much to our witnesses for joining us today for your perseverance uh through uh a hearing. Cyber diplomacy has never been more important to American national security interests and it will continue to grow in its significance in the years to come. This is why the administration's proposal to reorganize the Bureau of Cyerspace and Digital Policy deserves serious consideration and scrutiny.
▶ 0:48:20And today we should be asking ourselves, does the proposal by the administration make America safer, stronger, and more prosperous? Unfortunately, in just 100 days, the Trump administration has attempted to undertake massive and disruptive changes in how our nation conducts our diplomacy, throwing our entire national diplomatic ecosystem into upheaval.
▶ 0:48:40While serious and thoughtful reforms on how the US can best defend our interests abroad should always be welcome, far too many of this administration's actions have been rushed, misinformed, and often downright incoherent. America's diplomatic and soft power is one of our most valuable assets, and Congress's role is to ensure our foreign policy continues to align with our national interests. I've promised I'd work with anyone who's willing to work with me to deliver for Delawareians. So, I'm looking forward to learning more about this administration's plans.
▶ 0:49:11My first question is for you, Mr. Nearroof. As emerging technologies transform global digital infrastructure, how can CDP stay ahead of the curve and what resources or capabilities do you think CDP needs to stay competitive? Thank you for the question. I'm going to come back to the the the idea of of looking at this from a full stack approach.
▶ 0:49:36uh this isn't a matter of us competing with one technology but thinking about how we are working to promote a trusted technology ecosystem around the world uh undersea cables older technology like undersea cables uh then data centers uh um and and then uh 5G networks that's going to shape a lot of what then gets rolled out in terms of AI in different countries as well uh and we're we have stiff competition from models like deepseek that are open source and Uh and
▶ 0:50:06so a key piece in my view of what our strategy needs to be is thinking about how are we building that entire stack uh to enable our technology to get out there and then how are we using cyber security uh and our remarkable capabilities as a government and a society and our private sector uh to secure all of those pieces so that we can trust that our uh information and our um ideas can be used safely and without uh causing harm to our national security. Thank you.
▶ 0:50:35Um, Miss Love Grayer, how does the Trump administration's shuttering of US foreign assistance at large impact the ability of the CDP bureau to effectively conduct outreach to allies and partners? What impact do you think the cessation of cyber related foreign assistance has on CBD CDP's ability to carry out its mission? We haven't yet assessed the effect of these changes um especially since they're not formalized.
▶ 0:51:01But I will say we do have a request to look at the congressional request to look at the impact of foreign assistance changes including to the workforce. And so we plan to do that soon. Thank you very much. And and I want to reiterate the uh comments of my colleague representative AMO and and the ranking member earlier about the ranking member made earlier about the importance for us to provide a respectful, predictable, sustainable career option for public servants across the federal government.
▶ 0:51:30And this is an area that obviously requires specific training, specific skills, um, which makes it that much more difficult to recruit for and retain in, especially when competing with the private sector. And I think it's important as we have these conversations to recognize the importance of protecting our federal workforce and treating them with respect um, as we seek to fill these positions and have the the best and brightest working in this critical capacity. So, thank you very much. And, Mr. Mr.
▶ 0:51:59Chairman, I yield back. Uh, thank you. I recognize myself for five minutes. Um, we are leading on this CDP reauthorization. I've got uh several questions. We have, and for everyone's information here, we have a non-governmental uh organiz witnesses here because we don't have a lot of people confirmed yet. Uh, so that's why we have you and I appreciate y'all filling in the gaps while we can.
▶ 0:52:28So, a couple of uh first of all for you, Miss Fixler, undersea cable routing because we've seen undersea cables being torn up in several different theaters of the world. Is this an area that we ought to be engaging with our allies because uh um is there any way to protect the undersea cables or route them which would help national security? Sure. Um thank you for the question. Undersea cables are a critical issue.
▶ 0:52:56Um and it is both the physical resilience and the cyber resilience of that infrastructure and um the ownership and operation of that infrastructure. Um China and Russia have demonstrated they are interested in uh disrupting that infrastructure and China has also demonstrated that in interested in owning and operating that infrastructure so that it can route um and control the flow of communications.
▶ 0:53:20Um, so it is it is concerning when when our adversaries are trying to disrupt the infrastructure and when they're trying to control the infrastructure. Okay. Thank you. I I just want to get to the specifics here. We're talking about cyber security professionals. Give me a range of first of all, what level do we need in the CDP and what would be a range of salaries? Who wants to tackle that? Looking at Miss Love Grayer, I think. Well, I think I'll tackle part of this question.
▶ 0:53:49Um we are talking about cyber security but also beyond cyber security there are a range of cyber issues and technical capacities that are needed and you need diplomacy skills as well. One of the things we heard from CDP after uh our review is that they had trained about 250 diplomats on cyber issues. So there's some internal training that you can do as well as hiring and I think we need to use both capabilities. So what about a salary range?
▶ 0:54:14if she wants to that because this we're competing with a with a growth industry here. I can I can start. Um the one other point piece I would emphasize I I'm a lawyer by training. Uh I sorry I'm sorry. Yes.
▶ 0:54:34Um um and I think what I learned in legal cyber practice has also been true in diplomatic cyber practice, which is that you take the old skills and you apply it to a new technology. And so that's a lot of what CDP does really well. It brings in diplomatic whizzes who can learn the technology and apply it and it brings in tech wizes who can learn the the diplomacy and do that too. Uh salary is a problem. I I mean we operate on the the normal GS15 scale so there's no special cyber pay uh at the state department.
▶ 0:55:04Uh and I do think that is an issue that you have uh colleagues who can No, I'm asking what are we competing against in the private sector? Hundreds of thousands of dollars. Uh okay. I do want to get to uh because several mentions have been made of the new org chart. I want to just hear briefly. I've got less than two minutes here. Let's go down the line. What do you recommend?
▶ 0:55:27I think part of it was in your written uh testimonies, part of was in your verbal testimonies, but I want to hear specifically what do you recommend for CDP uh in the reauthorization? Quickly, I'll jump in. Um, I think Congress had it right when it on a bipartisan basis, you created the cyber bureau and you understood the the importance of the integration between the different components of the cyber mission, the cyber security mission, the digital economy mission, the emerging threats mission, all of those work handinand.
▶ 0:55:58Um, and so seeing that integration remain, I think is a wise decision Congress previously made. Um, and so I look forward to Congress continuing to weigh in on that. But but now it's directly underneath the deputy secretary. It's probably not going to stay under the deputy secretary. Um yes or maybe I mean it's it's you're going to reauthorize it. Um thank you for the question though. Um I think the integration of the bureau is where I would focus.
▶ 0:56:25Um whether that the the head the head of that bureau needs to have the authority in crosscutting authorities. Um but whether exactly where you position the bureau I think may be less important than the integration of the different capabilities within the bureau. Okay. Thank you. Actually really agree with this point. I think the integration is really critical even as we uh interface with other governments who are structured differently. However, I do think that where it sits is plays an important role as well.
▶ 0:56:51Um because depending on where it sits, it may have to compete with resource or compete with others uh for resources. And it also needs uh the ability to have the leader uh communicate with the the se most senior leaders at state in order to make some pretty important decisions. And so I would consider where it's placed. It also says something about what the focus is. If it's in the E bureau versus the T bureau, uh sends a signal about what the focus of the bureau will be or the E family versus the T family sends a signal. out of time but quickly.
▶ 0:57:21Mr. I very much agree with the point about maintaining integration. There's no perfect answer. If you're going to put it try to put it under E or T. I think you need to make sure that the whoever is it's reporting to cares about the whole mission. Um and uh and that senior leaders at the top of the department, the deputy secretary are still going to be representing all the equities at deputies committee meetings and diplomatic engagements. Thank you. I recognize a ranking member.
▶ 0:57:49Um, Miss Fixler mentioned the the tabletop exercise that occurred. I'm just curious as part of that u since I'm also on the armed services committee. We're boosting our undersea autonomous uh uh vehicles uh and we've been doing it every year because of threats like this. Did you was any of that considered? I know it's not strictly cyber, but we've been talking about the integrity of under uh you know undersea cables. Yeah. Um thank you for the question.
▶ 0:58:17I'm happy to provide uh more information about the exercise that we conducted. Um we have an afteraction report. I'm happy to share that with the committee. Um the exercise looked at a number of different uh attacks that China could conduct. Some of them were cyber related, some of them were sort of more in the economic realm. Um and they they looked also at undersea cables, mostly the disruption um and the need to be able to quickly uh repair that uh infrastructure.
▶ 0:58:47Well, the uh the other thing is uh I remember my time in homeland security how we were trying to deal with cyber threats and the importance of dealing with the private sector because many of the countries that are represented as well as our own that's done on the private side and has enormous impact to our safety and economy. Uh and the same is true for other countries that we're trying to uh make more resilient and make sure we're not affected by things that affect them.
▶ 0:59:12Uh so uh when you're looking at uh that situation and you're dealing with the private side, can you explain advantages there might be with the fact that we can deal with other countries to deal with their own private sector instances in terms of getting that kind of cooperation particularly in uh revealing a cyber attack. You know just minutes make a difference in the ability to contain that. Perhaps you anyone might want to address that. It was particularly breathtaking.
▶ 0:59:41I thought uh to see the scale and speed and agility of the private sector in in the in the days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Uh they're able to move at a speed uh I wish governments could move at. Uh and so they're a critical partner uh wherever you're operating. Um I found that foreign assistance is a part of it, but but another part of it is maintaining a shared situational awareness.
▶ 1:00:06uh and the reporting that that you referred to that they often issue is really an early warning often uh of incidents that we need to respond to quickly and so they're a critical partner. Great. Thank you. I notice we have another member who's come for a first line of questioning so I will yield back. Uh I now recognize uh Miss Kim for coming. Thank you chairman self. Thank you. I want to thank our witnesses for being here today.
▶ 1:00:33uh you know let me go right into uh questions like how can uh private sector's uh technological expertise such as that uh from organizations like verif uh AI uh be leveraged to enhance the resilience of uh allied infrastructure against state sponsored cyber attacks. Thank you.
▶ 1:00:58I I think I think it's a crit critical thing that every uh country and government needs to recognize uh that this has to be a public private partnership and that governments need to rely uh and use private sector capabilities uh to secure their networks. We've made important strides uh within the US government. For example, moving to cloud uh as a as a place to store our data uh in order to help help take cyber security out of the hands of individual offices and place it higher up.
▶ 1:01:29Um we've also found that when incidents happen, private sector is often the most agile in investigating and remediating. And so it's very important as we talk to our allies and partners to make sure that they're thinking about this as a team sport as well working with their own companies or working with capable US uh cyber security providers in order to uh provide these kinds of services and I would just add yeah as well um CDP uh maintains
▶ 1:01:59some of those relationships. Um its incident response capability the foreign assistance funding that you all authorize to focus on rapid response um and rapid deployment of resources that is a partnership with private sector companies.
▶ 1:02:13It's not deploying US government personnel but it it's a relationship with private sector cyber security incident response I'd add just one note which is um CDP's foreign assistance also sometimes makes it capable or makes the environment possible for private sector companies to come in and that we saw that with Costa Rica because they changed their environment based on CDP assistance.
▶ 1:02:37Intel felt more secure in being able to go in and make a $1.2 2 billion dollar investment that they probably would not have made if Costa Rica had not changed many of its cyber norms and policies as a result of its um its interactions and engagement with CDP.
▶ 1:02:53You know, uh Miss Fixler, um from your perspective, how should the uh CDP bureau foster such partnerships to enhance uh cyber security and alli infrastructure and what challenges must be addressed to ensure effective cooperation across the borders? Thank you for the question. Um I'll focus specifically on the challenge. I think there's a challenge uh to think about things strategically.
▶ 1:03:19Um uh when it comes to critical infrastructure, everything is critical, but frankly there are things that are more critical. Um and we need to focus on that systemically important infrastructure in our own country and abroad to think about what do we most need to protect against. So if we can think about that strategically um I think that is a challenge but a real opportunity for us to to do better.
▶ 1:03:43Miss uh love Greer uh can you provide uh which offices uh go found to have over overlapped with uh CDP and how the bureau works to ensure clear delineation between responsibilities with other offices that have uh cyber equities within state.
▶ 1:04:02We found that the Bureau of um democracy and human rights and labor DRL as well as INL uh which focuses on uh international law enforcement both of those bureaus also have equities in cyber diplomacy. Uh DRL in particular works on freedom internet freedom issues and they engage in multilateral forum. They provide foreign assistance.
▶ 1:04:24Um INL works on combating cyber crime and they also lead a lot of the foreign assistance uh initiatives with other foreign governments as well as uh multilateral diplomacy efforts. So coordination between uh all three of them are important. We found that they do have uh regular meetings and conversations but they were still facing challenges defining who should take the lead on certain initiatives given the uh expertise that already exists in these other bureaus. Talking about that.
▶ 1:04:53So uh can you talk about the steps that CDP can take to mitigate risk of uh the overlap or redundancy that you're talking about in existing cyber security efforts across the federal agencies and how has CDP improved collaboration with key partners like DHS DOJ DoD and Treasury within the department.
▶ 1:05:15Um, one of the things they I believe they have started to do and they can continue to do is ensure that there is constant communication between all the bureaus and they are well aware of which partners they're working with and where the focus ought to be for each one of them. There is still some overlap in the missions and I think there could be greater delineation between who's taking the lead on certain issues if they're not going to be uh consolidated in any in any kind of way.
▶ 1:05:39In terms of the inter agency, currently they have formal inter agency agreements with uh several uh agencies, DHS, DoD, FCC, Department of Commerce. Those do seem to be working well because they outline the parameters of those relationships and who's taking the lead. Thank you, Chairman. I have that. I thank the witnesses for their testimony and the members for their questions.
▶ 1:06:04The members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions for you and we would ask you to respond to those in writing. Pursuant to committee rules, all members may have five days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record subject to the length of limitations. Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. Thank you very much.