▶ 0:23:34This hearing of the subcommittee on military and foreign affairs will come to order. Like to welcome everyone. Uh without objection, the chair may declare a recess at any time. I recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening Thank you for joining us today as we discuss one of the most complex and serious threats to our national security, the unauthorized use of unmanned aerial systems or UAS over US military installations and sensitive sites.
▶ 0:24:01In recent years, we've seen a surge in drone incursions over military installations across the country. In 2024, the Department of Defense stated that there are more than 1 million drones registered in the United States and estimated that there are more than 8,500 drones flown legally across the country every day. I've even seen some of these drone incursions firsthand during my time in the South Air National Guard. However, these incursions are not from hobbyists being blown off course.
▶ 0:24:29The multitude of drones reported flying over bases in the past several years revealed a coordinated effort by our adversaries to collect valuable intelligence and surveillance of some of our most sensitive military equipment. These incursions often are designed to disrupt important trainings and create chaos for a number of reasons. Number one, base commanders have inadequate or non-existent monitoring capabilities. Two, a near total lack of counter drone capabilities.
▶ 0:24:57Uh three, unclear standard operating procedures to guide base commanders responses and decision-making. And finally, four, ambiguous legal authorities both on and off base. This threat is magnified by the complex regulatory and prose prosecutorial framework that was patched together by the previous administration in what I would argue is a poor attempt to address this issue.
▶ 0:25:20Right now, the Department of Defense, Federal Aviation Administration, Intelligence Community, Department of Justice, and Department of Homeland Security are all involved in some aspects of the counter UAS efforts. As a result, there is no agency with primary authority on countering drone incursions, leading to confusion, and more importantly, gaps on how to identify and mitigate this threat. This inter agency uh failure was on full display last winter when hundreds of drones were spotted in the skies above New Jersey and other parts of the Northeast.
▶ 0:25:50After se after after several temporary flight restrictions and mass confusion among state, local, and federal partners, uh the Biden administration provided the public no answers what was happening above them. However, with only a few weeks of the current administration taking uh office, um they revealed that the drones over New Jersey were actually authorized by the FAA. This instance raises multiple questions as to why the previous administration left the American people in the dark for over a month when they knew the simple truth.
▶ 0:26:20Another notable incident occurred at Langley Air Force Base in December of 2023. Uh over 17 days, unidentified drones repeatedly breached our sensitive military airspace. uh one of most America's critical installations. Uh the F-22 Raptor squadrons were moved to alternate bases to lessen exposure and discussions were initiated on installing physical countermeasures. These are not isolated incidents.
▶ 0:26:44In February, the commander of NORAD and Northcom testified to Congress that there were over 350 detections of drones at a 100 different military installations last year alone. Additionally, since 2023, two Chinese nationals have been arrested for illegally flying drones over military installations to conduct surveillance. One of these individuals was caught attempting to flee the US and return to China with sensitive footage he had recorded.
▶ 0:27:10Today, this committee will hear from officials from the Department of Defense on what the Trump administration is doing to help combat this issue and bring an end to these illegal drone incursions. Uh we must demand full accountability, expedited technological upgrades, and enhanced oversight to safeguard our sovereignty and ensure that our military remains unexposed to foreign surveillance and potential threats.
▶ 0:27:33I'm hopeful that our witnesses here today have suggestions on how Congress can help empower the right federal agencies to combat this problem and secure the skies above our military I now recognize ranking member Subramanium for the purpose of making an opening statement. Uh thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this important hearing and thank you to our witnesses for being here today and for your service uh to our country and to making our airspace safe.
▶ 0:28:00Uh it's clear that UAS uh is an issue right now is the future of warfare. from the war in Ukraine to our own military bases in the continental United States, we are seeing real time that uh UAS are redefining how battles are fought and how intelligence is gathered. And uh I believe it's been 350 drones that have been reported in the last year, over a 100 different military installations. That's 350 different potential national security breaches that we know of.
▶ 0:28:29These include highly sensitive sites such as nuclear facilities and major military bases. And that's a huge threat to our national security and the lives of our service members. And unfortunately, you know, our lack of coordinated effective response uh needs to be addressed immediately. And I know everyone here today wants to work on it and and is planning on working on it. And so um we're familiar with this issue in my home state in the Commonwealth of Virginia. In December 2023, service members at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia saw drones hovering over their airspace for 17 days.
▶ 0:28:59And Langley, for those who don't know, is home to key national security assets like the F22 Raptor stealth fighter. And it plays an important role in keeping us safe here in our nation's capital. And so we we also have some important naval assets in that area, too. And you know, these drones demonstrated complicated aerial maneuvers and didn't just broadcast on known frequencies, suggesting that they weren't just a local hobbyist making an innocent mistake.
▶ 0:29:24Um, as far as we can tell in Congress, there was and still is not a cohesive or coordinated plan for for how we're going to deal with this. But maybe we can learn more today about about what what's happening now and what we can do moving forward. Um, you know, our job as the on this committee is to find answers to questions and and I have a lot, you know, who is piloting these drones, for instance, are these criminal actors? Are these foreign adversaries? Are they simply local hobbyists with advanced capabilities? Um, I'm not sure about that, but maybe that's the case.
▶ 0:29:53And what are they doing? Are they gathering intelligence? Are they probing for weaknesses? Are they planning an attack? And and finally, what is our plan for dealing with them safely and effectively? Because these uh UAS are a clear and present danger to our national security. And we need to have a plan uh to counter them. Um, there are several areas I'd like to to focus on today. The first is uh counter drone authorities.
▶ 0:30:16Um, right now the US law allows the Department of Energy, Justice, Defense, and Homeland Security to detect and respond to drone activities in certain situations, such as nuclear facilities, for instance, missile defense assets or other covered facilities. But only around half of all military installations actually fall under this definition of covered facility. Um, which is um why I think this may be something we should look at for change.
▶ 0:30:43Uh, the second is counter drone You know, it's uh not just as simple as shooting him down as we know. U you know, there are um homes and businesses and parks near bases like Langley and um people live there. Children play there. Um shooting down drones could endanger people in these communities, especially if we don't know what payloads the drones may carry. And uh a miss shot could also pose a threat to commercial air traffic as well. And so um you know, we need to find a way to safely counter uh some of these incursions.
▶ 0:31:14And um we have other technologies at our disposal like jamming and disrupting and even taking over unknown or hostile drones. But there's a lot of work to do to develop these capabilities and some of that work actually takes place uh in my district in Northern Virginia. And um you know with that said I I don't know of a silver bullet and so it's going to take a coordinated effort I think at the state, local and federal level. And so we're all going to have to work together because everyone's got different jurisdictions.
▶ 0:31:39And I I'd like to on that front see if we can work together uh um and maybe have some sort of task force in place um so that information is easily gathered and where everyone's up to date on the the latest technology as well as the the best practices. And so this is a very timely hearing on an important issue and I want to work with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle um to come up with a plan to protect our military bases and protect the American people. So I yield back. Thank you for that. I'm pleased to welcome an expert panel of witnesses for today's discussion.
▶ 0:32:10I'd f first like to welcome Rear Admiral uh Paul Spado, the vice director for operations or J3 for the joint chiefs of staff. I'd also like to welcome Mr. Mark Detliffson who is the current acting assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and hemispheric affairs. Uh due to unforeseen circumstances, the FAA is no longer testifying at today's hearing, but they have committed to answering in writing any questions that our members have.
▶ 0:32:35Um if any question, if any member has questions they would like to submit to the FAA following this hearing, please get them to staff for the FAA to answer. Now, we're going to administer the oath to the witnesses. Uh pursuant to committee rule 9G, the witnesses will please stand and raise their right hand. Uh do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. So help you God. Thank you. Please seat uh please take your seat.
▶ 0:33:04Let the record show that the witnesses answered in the Um we appreciate you being here today and look forward to your testimony. Let me remind the witnesses that we will have read your your written statement and it will be uh it will appear in full in the hearing record. Please limit your oral statement to five minutes. As a reminder, please press the button on the microphone in front of you so that it is on and the members can hear you. When you begin to speak, the light in front of you will turn green. After four minutes, the light will turn yellow.
▶ 0:33:32When the red light comes on, your five minutes have expired, and we would ask that you please wrap up. I now recognize Rear Admiral Spadero for his opening Good afternoon, Chairman Timmons, Ranking Member, Submanium, committee members, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today and thank you for your support and your oversight.
▶ 0:33:57Uh, admittedly, several of my opening comments will echo those of the chairman uh and the ranking member. The rapid emergence, proliferation, and employment of unmanned systems has fundamentally changed the way that both professional militaries as well as terrorist organizations conduct warfare.
▶ 0:34:16Over the last few years, we have seen the employment of unmanned systems, in particular unmanned aerial systems in every major conflict from the Russia Ukraine war to Iran's attacks on Israel and attacks against US bases and ships across the Middle East. And most tragically, an Iranian supported militant group successfully employed a one-way attack drone on Tower 22 in Jordan, killing three US service members and wounding 40 on January 27th, 2024.
▶ 0:34:46Here in the homeland, as assistant secretary will note in his opening remarks, the mass drone incursions over Joint Base Langley useless Eustace in December 2023 reminded us that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary. And should our adversary choose to employ drones for surveillance or even attack, we would not be prepared to adequately defend our homeland and only marginally capable to defend our military installations. The incursions over Joint Base Langley Eustace were not the first.
▶ 0:35:17They've not been the last, but they were the longest and the largest series of incursions that we have seen to date. in the comprehensive review of that event as well as in the actions we took in follow-on incursions like those that occurred over plant 42 in Palmdale, California and over Pikatini Arsenal and Naval Weapons Station Earl in New Jersey have resulted in improvements, but more action is needed and the joint force has made counter UAS our priority line of effort.
▶ 0:35:45We are now better prepared to respond to incursions with the designation of commander US Northern Command and Commander US Indo-Pacific Command as the operational synchronizers in their respective areas of responsibility. Last year and within weeks of being assigned this role, General Guio, the commander of US Northern Command, released a comprehensive commander assessment that has served as a roadmap to building the necessary command and control and standard operating procedures to address the drone threat.
▶ 0:36:14Over the last year, we have also invested in education and training uh against this threat. Northcom has been the central driving force for the work being done by several organizations in partnership with industry to deliver the domain awareness and counter UAS systems that we require. And lastly, we are progressing well in our completion of the counter UAS tasks assigned to us in the fiscical year 25 NDAA. We appreciate your continued support and your oversight.
▶ 0:36:43Thank you for the opportunity to be here today and I will now pass to Secretary Divson. Chairman Timmons, Ranking Member Submerman, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today. The events of December 2023 at Joint Base Langley Eustace served to focus and energize DoD's counter small UAS efforts in the homeland.
▶ 0:37:08During the event, DoD struggled to address the incursions in a timely and effective fashion, owing at least in part to challenges within the DoD and our ability to implement a relatively untested inter agency coordination process. To some extent, those challenges from JBLE still exist. However, we have worked since then to improve and refine our processes and coordination efforts, and we have seen improvements in subsequent responses.
▶ 0:37:35I can assure the committee that the department is as frustrated by these events as you are. However, we can't simply focus on looking back and waste precious resources. As a department, we act, we review that action, we adjust, and we move out. Today, I'm here to tell you that we are continuing to move out. I'm confident that we are in a stronger position to defend DoD installations today than we were in December of 2023. We are fighting this threat on three fronts.
▶ 0:38:04Internal process reviews, generating better domain awareness, and clarifying commander authority and legislation. Internally, we must focus on the ability to provide response at the speed of relevance. The designation of US Northcom and US Indopaccom late last year as the counter UAS operational synchronizers and their respective areas of the homeland was an essential step. We've developed more streamlined inter agency coordination consistent with section 13i.
▶ 0:38:32We are also conducting a comprehensive review as requested in the FY25 NDAA section 925 and where necessary consolidating and updating DoD policy. This is an effort long overdue and it provides us with direction and momentum.
▶ 0:38:49Lastly, working with our inter agency partners like our colleagues from the FAA, we have enabled DoD to sponsor facilities which provide a critical mission to DoD but are not directly DoD facilities or assets. Second, generating better domain awareness is essential to developing an understanding of what is flying in our airspace and how to separate the negligent from the nefarious. This is the fundamental issue we saw at Langley in New Jersey.
▶ 0:39:16DoD is working through venues like the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, the JRACK, to rapidly acquire the right equipment and to give commanders better tools to understand the operating environment and the ability to effectively conduct non-kinetic and kinetic mitigations. Commander US Northcom phrased it this way in his posture hearing in February. You can't defeat what you can't see.
▶ 0:39:38On the legislative front, we continue to engage with members of Congress to seek modest but important refinements to DoD's counter UAS authorities under section 13I. Our legislative proposal is intended to allow the department to protect additional locations and missions, add greater stability for long-term planning and resource allocation within the department, and facilitate improved understanding and cooperation among the US inter agency and local partners.
▶ 0:40:08Ultimately, I believe we need to address all these issues with end users in mind. Our installation commanders and the security personnel charged with the duties to protect our installations, our operations, and ultimately our personnel. Lastly, the president of the United States has issued several executive orders directing the Department of Defense to take all appropriate and lawful measures to ensure the complete operational control of the border.
▶ 0:40:34The department in turn is responding by preparing the path for employment of counter SUAS activities along the border both in support of DoD interest and in support of DHS as the lead federal agency. As the operational environment, legislation and threats evolve, policy must adapt to ensure DoD's ability to continue to advance our national defense objectives remains. Mr. Chairman, ranking member Subarman and distinguished members of the committee.
▶ 0:41:02In conclusion, the homeland face continues to face increased and evolving threats from UAS. To address these challenges requires a whole of government approach and a unified effort. We must modernize ability to assess the threat, determines its weaknesses, and acquire and deploy countermeasures. Thank you for the support of Congress and for your continued commitment and support of the Department of Defense. I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
▶ 0:41:30Um I now recognize myself for five minutes. Uh Rear Admiral Spado, how many drone incursions have taken place over US military installations over the past two years? We got the number last time we had a briefing of 350, but have they grown or what's what's the current data you're willing to share? Yeah, so the exact number I I'd be happy to share in a in a classified setting. Uh but I can tell you that it has grown. I'm actually curious. Why did we get the 350 number in an unclassified setting?
▶ 0:42:00That was one of the questions I had. It's a great question, sir. Okay. Yeah, fair enough. Um, all right. Well, let's do this. Can you discuss procedures that DoD has in place for a base commander when the base commander gets reports of an unauthorized uh drone incursion? Yeah. So, currently there is a standard operating procedure that's been published by the commander of US Northern Command. So each base has been provided uh that standard operating procedure.
▶ 0:42:29The expectation that they will respond in accordance um with the when was that pro when did when did when was that created? Uh it was just published here recently within the last month. Uh it was finalized and published. So what percent of base commanders have any technology to actually track uh drones as opposed to just oo I saw a drone and then you report it. Yeah. So the capabilities at each base is varied. Again, the specifics for the for the individual locations um would be better in a in a classified setting.
▶ 0:42:58Um but it is not comprehensive. I can tell you that it is not sufficient and again again varies from base to base from from very little to somewhat more comprehensive. Is that something that Congress can help with uh authorizations and appropriations to get additional resources? because I think that I I I would feel that most bases should have the at the at the very least the ability to track whether they have countermeasures a different thing. But is that something that you all need? You need additional money. Yes sir. Absolutely.
▶ 0:43:28I think the the development fielding the acquisition distribution of domain awareness sensors is the critical first step. It's not the only thing. Uh obviously we need a a method to exert command and control so that we can build a common operating picture because it will take layers of different sensors um because one one sensor uh may be better against certain UAVs and certain flight profiles and you may have to rely on different sensors to to round out the picture.
▶ 0:43:55So being able to fuse all that together to get the complete picture will be necessary and then as you mentioned getting to a point where we can actually respond that that's an entirely next investment that needs to be made. Uh so so yes, we do need more sensors. Uh we're addressing the shortfall right now with the fielding of flyaway kits. Uh so these will be kits that will be available for bases that have very limited uh capability to detect on their own and build domain awareness.
▶ 0:44:21And should they have an incursion that they're unable uh to resolve, they would they would solicit the help from commander US Northern Command and this flyaway kit as well as expertise and additional resources that would be required would be immediately deployed to that location. So, I guess resources are probably fairly easy and y'all are going to work on telling us what you actually need from a from a technology perspective, but the other side is the authorities.
▶ 0:44:44So, I mean, does a base commander have clear authorities what they can and can't do relative to whether the drone is in their airspace or just outside their airspace? And is that as big or bigger of a problem? So all of our installations have the authority that's afforded them under the standing rules of engagement and the standing rules for the use of force.
▶ 0:45:05Um you know in that um in those rules if they are can established that there's hostile intent or hostile act uh then they they not only have the authority but they they have the absolute right and responsibility to respond appropriately to protect themselves uh forces as well as DoD um property. So those those are standing rules that they have. Now being able to discern hostile intent and hostile act as referred to in in the opening comments may be very challenging.
▶ 0:45:34Is this negligent uh activity being conducted by uh someone just flying a drone irresponsibly whether that is a recreational uh enthusiast or it is someone that's using a drone for commercial aspects. So it can be a challenge here in the homeland to determine that. So, a base commander has the authority to, for example, arrest a Chinese national that's a quarter mile off base. He does not have the authority to detain someone that is off base.
▶ 0:45:59He would have to coordinate with local law enforcement to apprehend someone that is operating a drone outside of the base. Now, I I know um Secretary Dillison will talk about 13i authorities, which is is is something that we really do want to talk about today um because I think it's important. But under 13i authorities there there's some additional room to respond for a covered facility.
▶ 0:46:23Merely the presence of that drone conducting unauthorized surveillance or suspected of conducting authorized surveillance or interfering with operations as you referred to in your opening statement about the interference with F-22 operations that would meet the standard for response rather than having to determine hostile intent or hostile act. Thank you for that. My time is expired. I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Mr. Submanion for 5 minutes. Uh, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
▶ 0:46:49Um, I wanted to go back to something I mentioned a couple times, which is um what is a covered facility and a not covered facility? And Real Admiral Spadero, if you're a not not a covered facility, um, what does that mean? Like, does that um mean does that impair your ability to respond?
▶ 0:47:09And what do covered facilities have that non-covered ones And so if you're if you're not covered, you you can request to be covered, but you'd have to meet the criteria to become a covered facility. And that that is one of the one of the problems uh with the 130i authorization is meeting the criteria for covered. An example of this would be Luke Air Force Base where F-35 training takes place for roughly 3/4 of those that fly F-35s. Uh and it is not a covered facility because training facilities are not covered.
▶ 0:47:39So it would be problematic to actually get approval for Luke Air Force Base to be a 13i. Now, as I mentioned earlier, under 130i, if a drone is um conducting unauthorized surveillance or suspected even of conducting authorized surveillance, then the base commander would be able to respond to that. Unauthorized surveillance may or may not meet the criteria of hostile intent, which would give you the authority to respond under the standing rules of engagement and the standing rules for the use of force.
▶ 0:48:07So it it relieves some of the burden on that base commander to determine that there is an imminent threat. He if this is interfering with our operations, if this is giving a potential adversary a look at our base and our sensitive activities, then we have the authority to respond. And um mentioned before having to reach out to local jurisdictions. If someone's operating uh UAS outside of a basin, what kind of coordination is currently being done with state and local jurisdictions?
▶ 0:48:36Is it sort of ad hoc or is this is there like a process in place right now and does federal law limit the extent of engagement with state and local and how can we make that better? Yeah, thank you for that question. So each base commander um one of his imperatives is to build relationships with the local community. That would include law enforcement agencies. It is covered extensively in all of the base commander uh courses.
▶ 0:48:59So their part of their training and their education program before they assume command is is is building how to build those relationships, the importance, what the limitations of those are. So each individual base commander is is responsible. There are additional lessons learned and protocols uh and best practices about how to engage law enforcement on this particular threat. But those occur at our bases and and did occur at Joint Base Langley Eustus.
▶ 0:49:24They had a very uh very tight relationship with local law enforcement um with sheriffs, police departments uh as well as other federal agencies, law enforcement agencies that that have um capability in that area. And they did respond uh in concert together to try to apprehend individuals that were responsible for that drone activity over the base.
▶ 0:49:46um so that it does occur uh and uh it is very important and um as far as um technology and and mitigation um what what um I don't know maybe we need this is the right forum for this but broadly do you think there's technology gaps currently and um do you think that there's progress being made towards kind of filling those gaps and what can we do both in Congress as well as private industry to help kind of fill the gaps And
▶ 0:50:16when it comes to technology um for trying to address um both kinetic and non-kinetic solutions, yeah, in general the the technology to to field systems um has far outpaced the the technology to defeat those systems. It's a much wider broader deeper market um for for drone application for commercial and recreational purposes.
▶ 0:50:38So hence that that technology has evolved very quickly from radiocrolled drones to now fully autonomous drones that may or may not even rely on reception of a GPS signal which would make it very challenging to intercept. So on the counter drone activity you know you have to come back to agencies that would that would be interested in that like department of defense, department of homeland security, FBI uh you know law enforcement agencies.
▶ 0:51:04So we have to partner and we have to create that demand with an industry to get technology back on pace to counter this everinccreasing emergence of drone Do you feel like we have the personnel right now to and the expertise in the in the country to to be able to to do this? Um I think we've seen a good response. I'll defer to to Secretary Dillison.
▶ 0:51:30can he can talk about um DIU and other organizations that that have really made a solid partnership with industry to to uh to advance this technology. Thank you, Admiral. Yes, there's several different organizations within the DoD that are looking at this issue and moving out rapidly to acquire new capabilities such as the JRACK, the joint counter UAS office and DIU. all of those. This is a a focus area and one of their primary lines of effort.
▶ 0:52:01Thank you. I yield back. Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from from Virginia, Mr. Maguire, for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses. Uh, Admiral, thanks for your service. Um, are you I want to yes or no from both of you. Are you aware of the August 2020 advisory? It's an advisory on the application of federal laws to the application and use of technologies to detect and mitigate unmanned aircraft systems. Are you two aware of that? Yeah. No, sir.
▶ 0:52:31I'm not specifically aware of that. If and when appropriate, I have a copy and I'd like to admit that into the record. Without objection, so ordered. So, I believe that's the source of a lot of the problems that we have in the military. We have something called paralysis by analysis. Obviously, the commanders at Langley and other bases have seen drones and they failed to act because and I believe the source of those problems is this August 2020 advisory. And I think I have a solution for it. I was recently at the southern border where I met with Tom Hman.
▶ 0:53:00I met with Border Patrol, ICE agents, mayors, sheriffs, business owners, 10th Mountain Division folks that are protecting our border from San Diego all the way to Texas. And I asked them, um, are you seeing drones come across the southern border and surveying our troops? And the answer was yes. And I said, is 13i working for you right now? And I I know what they said, but Admiral, what do you think? Is 13i right now working for us? So they don't have 13i.
▶ 0:53:31Um, that that's the first piece, and we are we're working to resolve that. So, for instance, in the the National Defense Series have just been established as an NX um uh does not have 13I. I just I just I'm going to get to a point. Yeah. And how about do you have an opinion on 13i right now as of today? Yes, Congressman.
▶ 0:53:52If if we can get 13i implemented in these areas where a joint task force southwest border is operating, it should enable the commanders on the ground to have those expanded authorities that allow them to interdict and mitigate uh these UAS threats. And I know you said you're working with Congress on legislation. So I'd like to talk to you about an idea on a piece of legislation. It may be something that involves judiciary and FAA, but let me run this across you. So, we currently have troops on the border facing the cartels and our critical infrastructure.
▶ 0:54:23Now, of course, we've got Langley Air Force Base and other critical infrastructure as well. And of course, we've got uh bad actors that are next have bought land next to our military bases. And and they're surveilling us on a daily basis. And it's only a matter of time until we have our next 911 911 uh terrorist attack. The problem is bureaucracy prevents action, but this time we know about it and we can fix it. And right now with 130i, the way it's proposed, you have to be observed or attacked and then asked for permission. And that takes delays.
▶ 0:54:53I've got an idea that might speed that up. 18 USC US code 32 is treating remote control airplanes is what I call a drone. So 18 USC32 is treating remote control airplanes or drones as if they're passenger airplanes and they're not.
▶ 0:55:11Um basically um the problem is the government has created a complex statutes to let a few act bad actors possibly take action if you jump through a thousand hoops 13i. This is not good enough. We owe it to our military and our citizens to fix this. The United States provides better protection from UAS to Saudi Arabia than we do to our own citizens.
▶ 0:55:34And so my idea for a bill is you change the word from aircraft to manned aircraft because I think every commander is afraid that if I shoot down a remote control airplane or a drone, I'm going to be no one's going to back me up. I think I remember hearing the Langley uh commander say, "Are you guys going to back me up? Are you guys going to back me up?" And no one answered. That may not be 100% true, but Admiral, do you have any comments on that idea? Yeah, this is the the burden of command.
▶ 0:56:01Um, and you need to understand that if there is something that is assessed as a threat to your forces or your installation, then again, you not only have the authority, but the responsibility to act. I would counter that they have authority right now on the southwest border to engage UAS. Uh, we have in the last few days alone reaffirmed that under the standing rules of engagement, the standing rules of use of force, when you take in the totality of the facts and the circumstances at the time, you have the authority.
▶ 0:56:28We know that cartels have used UAS for unauthorized surveillance to assess our troop size, our movements to solicit and enable um attacks from other vectors. We know that they have used drones in Connecticut attacks against Mexican. I just I just returned from the southern border and I asked the commander from Texas to San Diego if he has authority to shoot down drones that he's looking at that's looking at his troops and he still is not sure. I just left the southern border and I think it goes back to that advisory.
▶ 0:56:59That advisory has created a stigma and I think that we can mitigate or overcome that if we just change the word from aircraft to manned aircraft and then they won't have such a huge penalty if they shoot down a drone. And certainly if someone wants to prosecute somebody for shooting down private property, there are plenty of laws on the books for that. Well, with that uh I have no further questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Thank you. Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, for 5 minutes. Thank you very much, Mr.
▶ 0:57:28Chairman, and I want to thank the witnesses for helping the committee with his work. Um, I I do have to say that I would prefer that we were reviewing the facts of of the signal chats um that were conducted by U. Secretary Hegth and and uh the the Trump leadership team in order to get to the bottom of that.
▶ 0:57:49Um, however, I will I will at a later date in full committee uh enter a resolution of inquiry to ask the administration to provide in information to this committee to the oversight committee regarding how that happened. Um, it was bad enough by the last time we were here.
▶ 0:58:11Um, we just knew that that the initial signal chat had happened and that inadvertently they had included the editor of The Atlantic uh who was not not approved for for clearance.
▶ 0:58:27um and that the that the chat included uh specific information about those those attacks uh against Yemen uh and and which which could have put our sons and daughters in uniform at grave Now that was then. Now, we know that this this chat also went to Secretary Hegith's brother, his sister.
▶ 0:58:57I don't think his mom was in on it. She's about only one in the family who wasn't in on it. And then uh the the the the family attorney uh was in on it as well. So, so that's a whole set of of people who were not authorized to be on that that chat again that disclosed, you know, classified information and and actionable intelligence about an impending US attack in Yemen.
▶ 0:59:25Um so and then beyond that now we find out that Secretary Hegsith is using his Gmail uh account and uh using a phone that was listed on his uh sports betting uh app and available to the public. So this just keeps getting worse.
▶ 0:59:50Uh I I know that is not the fault of these witnesses and uh they probably cannot uh uh illuminate the circumstances. Uh but I will be filing that resolution of inquiry asking for the White House to provide that information because that that is important. It's not not partisan politics. It's just what the oversight committee should be doing to keep uh military personnel safe like what we're doing here.
▶ 1:00:19We're we're we're having a hearing on drones, you know, being flown in the area of of you know, US bases and and that presents a danger to our sons and daughters. Well, so does so does you know using a nonsecure platform to discuss uh actionable intelligence against our enemy who has anti-aircraft and anti- naval vessel capability.
▶ 1:00:47That that's really important too and that presents a a clear and present danger. Uh, I know that there were reports from in the press that the White House said that was childish. That was childish that that that M. Secretary Hegsith did that. I agree with that assessment.
▶ 1:01:07I think it was totally immature and it and it demonstrates an unfitness and and a lack of seriousness about protecting our sons and daughters in uniform. You know, we all nominate young men and women from our district to the military academy at West Point and and to the Naval Academy.
▶ 1:01:30And dear God, you can't you can't, you know, put a family in that position, put one of our our best and brightest in that position and then leak information to our enemies while while they're going into battle. Um, okay. So this committee, myself included, uh investigated an attack uh 2020 attack by al-Shabaab uh at uh Manda Bay in Kenya. Uh that was a drone attack.
▶ 1:02:01Uh several recent base attacks overseas in fact have involved the use of drones. Uh so Admiral uh how how has our profile you know countering counter measures against drones? How has that changed since those initial attacks back in 2020 that that resulted in in US casualties?
▶ 1:02:23Yeah, so since that time we fielded a number of new systems uh across um a variety of of the spectrum um electromagnetic as well as electrooptical and infrared sensors to to build our domain awareness. We've also fielded a number of kinetic uh systems that that shoot interceptors or use some sort of munition. Um and they are they're deployed at our most vulnerable uh and most likely to be attacked facilities overseas.
▶ 1:02:49That is where the bulk of our counter UAS capability is actually located is overseas. Um and and hence the the problem here in the homeland is we have very we have very limited and sparse and and distributed capability across you know the multitude of installations we have. Thank you Admiral. Thank you for your courtesy, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Thank you. I now recognize a gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Biggs, for five minutes. Thank Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to briefly comment about the previous uh questioner.
▶ 1:03:17Uh once again, uh going with the woke media uh story and uh not bothering to mention the success of the strikes which restored freedom of navigation, protected shipping lanes, kept Americans um nor did he bother to mention that the the uh encrypted service that was being used was one recommended by the previous uh by DHS guidance but my questions with regard to this this topic
▶ 1:03:48um is is for both of you and you can just these are just this is the context so can can we do we have the uh technology to to um discover that there is UAVs in our in the neighborhood of our bases. Yes, Congressman, we do. Okay. And um can we track can if a UAV UAV is there, can we track it? We have the technology to track it.
▶ 1:04:19Yes, Congressman. Okay. And then you could interdict it if you chose to at every base. We have different options for interdiction congressmen across a spectrum for the commander to use their best judgment. But but you could interdict if you chose if you so chose. And you and you have authorities under 13i perhaps depending on on uh the the commanding chain there, right? I mean you could make that point, right?
▶ 1:04:47depending upon the installation and whether it's a covered installation, congressman, you would have the 13i uh additional authorities, but as uh the admirals has said, there's always the ability to respond if there's hostile intent for that base commander. Well, you have to determine hostile intent, and that's the problem, right? Um uh Admiral Spado, could you explain how unauthorized drone activity, even when it's caused by recreational or commercial users, diverts critical security resources away from responding to legitimate national security threats, please? Yeah, Congressman, thank you for your question.
▶ 1:05:18If we go back to New Jersey and and um you know that activity once the the FAA put the temporary flight restrictions in place and there was you know very broad and comprehensive coverage of that by the media. Many of you spoke about it. Uh many of the members of Congress talked about the anxiety that was building uh in the community due to the the high level of sightings. Once that word got out, that public messaging about responsible drone use, once the word got out about the flight restrictions, we saw a rapid decline in the number of sightings.
▶ 1:05:48The drone activity essentially went away. Um, and we don't want it to get to the point we have to do that every time. If we can message to the public that responsible commercial and recreational application of your drone is an imperative to prevent diverting our attention and our resources both from investment, training, and response. um we're going to be better at defending the homeland, but if we have to continually be aware of negligent drones flying into our base, it is going to divert attention.
▶ 1:06:16That's not to say that we don't need to address this threat because as was brought up by this committee and we agree with our adversary has um demonstrated that they will use this type of activity for unauthorized surveillance for espionage. Yeah.
▶ 1:06:31And let's let's add to that for a second and that is the coupling of AI which is moving rapidly forward um and providing autonomous navigation obstacle avoidance um deep learning computer vision uh uh easier to become weaponized real-time image recognition target identification.
▶ 1:06:52So I would like briefly if you could um either one of you want to talk about um the threat of AI going to coupled with drone technology to become an increasing actually exponentially increased threat to our national Congressman, uh it's a great question. Thank you for that.
▶ 1:07:19On the policy side, we need to make sure that our regulations internally at the DoD are streamlined to the extent that we stay at pace with the threat that we face outside the fence line of our installations. We need to make sure that we are giving the commanders on the ground clarity on what they have for authority and providing them the capabilities to counter those threats.
▶ 1:07:40Now I think the admiral can speak better as far as what is actually being developed at this time and how far ahead we are in counter UAS technologies but as far as the policy purview is concerned I know from the secretary of defense front office down we need to give the war fighter every capability they need to keep our uh service members safe.
▶ 1:08:01I I know that I'm not going to have time to hear your answer, Admiral Sari, but with regard to the policy, I would ask that you work with the chairman of the subcommittee on on policies that need to be rewritten perhaps through legislation that we can do to facilitate uh defending against this this combination of of uh AI and and drone technology which is advancing very rapidly. And Mr.
▶ 1:08:25chairman to that extent I have some uh uh unanimous consent requests if possible. So yeah the first one is autonomous ascent how AI is reshaping the future of the UAV industry. Uh another piece m mystery drones swarmed a US military base for 17 days and next one what we know about the Langley Air Force B uh base drone incident. Without objection so ordered. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from Texas Mr. Cloud for five minutes.
▶ 1:08:55Thank you, chairman. Thank you for uh bringing up this very important topic that's very timely. Uh and thank you, thank you, Admiral, especially for your service and those in uniform behind you for what you do to protect uh and serve our country.
▶ 1:09:09Uh it it occurs to me that we're we're discussing this issue, but it seems to me like it's it's as much a system of some of the bigger issues we've seen at the Pentagon uh in regarding our stance just on the world stage uh in the sense that you know I I wish we were talking today about how advanced we are and how forward thinking we've thought about this uh and that we've invested in these new technologies uh and that we're leading the world in it.
▶ 1:09:38um and when we look at drones and drone incursions. But yet for me, you know, I've I've considered that funding our defense is our number one constitutional duty uh in Congress. My biggest concerns have been that sometimes we are funding legacy systems that are outdated as opposed to investing into where the puck is going, so to speak.
▶ 1:10:01Uh and and while the funding for this is in lots of buckets, my analysis looking through a bunch, it seems like we're spending 22 billion dollarsish uh in the last budget on fighter jets uh and maybe a billion dollars on drone and counter drone technology together. um may be off a bit because again it's in a lot of different pockets.
▶ 1:10:28But it's it's that that concerns me in the sense of you know we're talking about military incursions over our base and we're talking about one drone coming and what we can or can't do about it. I think from from the American taxpayer who's sitting at home going we're spending 100 billion $800 billion roughly on defense and we can't shoot a drone down. It's just a frustrating experience because we want to think that we can do that.
▶ 1:10:52Um, so as has been mentioned, us needing to do our job to make sure that you have the capabilities to do it. But I would also wonder how much of this is a little bit of a reactive stance uh in command being more concerned about CIA, so to speak, as opposed to protecting the assets and the intelligence and the information uh that is available on on that base.
▶ 1:11:18Um, you mentioned that you recently developed the SOP, I guess about a month ago. Um, that was news to me. Could Could we get a copy of that sent to this committee? Yes, sir. I don't see a problem with that. I'll I'll coordinate with Commander, US Northern Command. Okay. That that would be um much appreciated.
▶ 1:11:43And you know, we we all remember the the what I would call Biden's balloon blunder uh where we had this balloon come across. We sat here and watched it for for days. I was went to a meteorologist at one of the local news stations and he was tracking it and predicting where it was going to go and yet we were watching it go over bases uh and not doing anything about it.
▶ 1:12:06H how much is this is just not the will to act versus legitimately you being prohibited legally from doing things. There's a difference between not having a clear authority and being prohibited from doing something I guess is what I'm trying to Yes, Congressman. That's a great question. For us on the policy side, we seek to clarify the authorities for base commanders so that they understand exactly what they are able to do.
▶ 1:12:35And and as you pointed out, sometimes there may be a little bit confusion because of how the language uh is is given out or guidance is pushed down to the lower levels. During our review of counter UAS policies as prescribed in section 925 of the FY25 NDA a we've gone back and we've reviewed all of our counter UAS documentation. For example, section 13I it was at about 130 pages.
▶ 1:13:04We've cut that down to 20 pages now. So we're looking to streamline our processes as much as possible so commanders understand what they have for authorities. That's certainly very helpful. And I guess, you know, if I could convey kind of the angst to the the American people, we we're looking at this and thinking, okay, there's drone incursion into the United States, you know, there's bad actors within our borders now who have the ability to even attack infrastructure.
▶ 1:13:29I we're talking about military bases, but it could be electric power lines, could be pipelines, it could be anything at this point. And we seem very like we're approaching this from a very bureaucratic standpoint as opposed to something that literally could be a problem next week. Um and and I'm wondering what we can do and what we can help you do in the sense of the sense of urgency that could be needed.
▶ 1:13:53Uh you know we we again we have bad actors even at at state level within our borders because you know we had open borders for the last four years. Uh so the terrorist activity that's now in our country bad actors from other state that that don't have the best interest of our country in mind are here uh with this kind of capability and what can we do to speed up this process so that it's handled with the urgency as opposed to kind of like this curious bureaucratic
▶ 1:14:24question that needs to be That's a question. What can we do like to to speed it up both from DoD and from Congress's standpoint to support what you need? Thank you for the question, Congressman. We have a legislative proposal working through the Pentagon right now focused on three areas where we could improve section 13i. In the department's opinion, uh we don't want this provision to sunset. We want to make sure that the authorities continue forward.
▶ 1:14:53Uh there is an expiration date on 13i authorities next year. Uh we also want to expand the locations and missions covered under 13i. As uh we've discussed today, the the bases are not all covered. Not all installations qualify as one of the nine mission areas under 13i. So we'd like to expand that to cover all uh installations.
▶ 1:15:17And then we'd also like to facilitate data sharing because right now data sharing from the DoD side is limited only in the pursuit of a legal case against a particular individual or group. We're not able to share data with our inter agency partners to improve our tactics, techniques or procedures.
▶ 1:15:39And to your point, Congressman, earlier about driving cost efficiencies, being able to share data to produce better technology would help us be more efficient with taxpayer money. Thank you for that. The the gentleman's time's expired. Um, chair now recognizes the general lady from Florida, Miss Luna, for 5 minutes. Thank you, chairman. Here's what every American needs to know that's watching this currently. In 2024 alone, 350 drones were detected flying over our military installations. Over 100 to be exact.
▶ 1:16:07And that came straight out of the mouth of General Gregory Gilllet, commander of NORAD and US Northern Command. These were not just toys. These were intelligence gathering, signal jamming, and potentially weaponized drones. These incourage uh incursions happened while the Biden administration sat on their hands, allowing bureaucracy and inter agency dysfunction to run the show. I see a lot of military here right now. You guys all know that bureaucracy many times can be our worst enemy. Now that President Trump is back in office, thank God, we finally have strong leadership again.
▶ 1:16:35But cleaning up Biden's national security blunder is no small task. Our military installations are still extremely vulnerable. Um as her as hearing just sitting here from other um some of my colleagues, we have the CCP, Iranian proxies, Mexican cartels. They all know this. We are here today to fix that. And let me be crystal clear, as I'm sure many of you would agree. If you are flying unauthorized drones over military inst installations, you should expect it to be shot down. Don't expect Uncle Sam to pay for either.
▶ 1:17:04My opinion is play stupid games, win stupid prizes. Now, Admiral Spendro, I've heard directly from General Gilllet on in February 350 drones, incursions over 100 military installations in one year. I know that this is not your fault directly, but this is a mass uh massive security gap and utter failure. Under current authorities, what is preventing base commanders from neutralizing these immediately? In my opinion, going out there with a shotgun and shooting these things down. Well, thank you, ma'am, for the question.
▶ 1:17:34Um I I wish it were as simple as shooting it with a shotgun. Um but it's not. U depending on elevation, but what's stopping it? Is it still the bureaucratic red tape and signoffs? Because in my opinion, if you're flying something like this that can collect jam communications, maybe carry explosives, collect surveillance on classified systems, I don't think that you should have to be required to make a phone call. I think that if you see it, you should shoot it down. Yes. under 130i, unauthorized surveillance would meet um the standard for engagement.
▶ 1:18:02If it were interfering with your operations, it would meet the standard for engagement. If you're not a 13i, then again, back to the rules of engagement and establishing hostile intent or hostile act. Um but you may get there. So just the presence of that drone over your base may meet hostile intent or hostile act. There is not a set of circumstances I can tell you in every case and go down a checklist. Okay, you met it. go ahead and shoot.
▶ 1:18:27Sir, I I mean I think you might agree if you are flying a drone in any capacity, I don't care if it's civilian or not, over military installation, I don't even think you should have to go to a checklist. I think that it should automatically be taken down. Yeah. And that's the the preference to to invoke 13i is to relieve that burden because we do agree that unauthorized um access to our bases poses a threat. Even if there aren't sensitive activities, it does provide surveillance of our force posture, our weak points, our vulnerabilities.
▶ 1:18:54um you know, descriptions, geographic uh details of the base, all of the information, right? They can gather intelligence piece by piece by any means necessary. So, we we do we do want 130i protection because we'd like to relieve that burden. Now, engagement still needs to meet the standard, the responsible standard. You have to do a collateral damage assessment before you can engage. Well, I have a feeling with this administration and uh the the members on this panel, I think that you'll probably get there. So, help is on the way in that regard. Uh, Mr.
▶ 1:19:24Diddlesson, hopefully I said that okay. Um, do you believe that foreign adversaries like China and Iran exploit the jurisdictional chaos under the previous administration to increase their drone activity over US territories? Uh, yes, Congresswoman. I think our adversaries take advantage of every weakness that we have in our system and they're constantly probing trying to find an entry point. Okay. Well, let me just be uh crystal clear for the record. If you fly a drone over an American military base, it should be blown out of the sky.
▶ 1:19:53I don't think that this is a controversial perspective to have. No phone calls, no paperwork, no permission slips. But under the Biden message, I think it was more or less the message of fly wherever you want. We'll kind of deal with it later. But be crystal clear under this administration, the message is FAFO. For decorum sakes, we won't interpret that, but just mess around, find out. You guys all know what that means. We have the technology. We have the capability. But what we had lacked up until now is the courage to act without apology apology. Um, this isn't about drones. It's about deterrence.
▶ 1:20:23It's about restoring the kind of unapologetic strength that keeps our enemies at bay and our war fighters safe. I yield my time. Thank you guys so much for being here today. You guys look great in uniform. And you do too, ladies. Thank you. Um, in closing, I want to thank our witnesses once again for their testimony today. I now re uh yield to ranking member Superman for closing remarks. Uh, thank you, Mr. Chair.
▶ 1:20:43I think um I'll keep it brief that I um I think we have some good ideas that we can maybe turn into legislation um and we can hopefully make sure that we empower um bases uh to both have the right technologies to address this as well as to make sure more military installations are covered under statute potentially make sure there's better coordination with state and local and federal and uh and um make sure that overall we have a
▶ 1:21:13workforce and the capacity to be able to address these challenges. So, I'm glad we are all on the same page on that front and I look forward to working on this together. Thank you. I yield back. Thank you. I now recognize myself for closing remarks. It it seems that we're a bit paralyzed here in Congress to deal with emerging technology. I've been working on cyber security legislation for the last six plus years and it has to go through the bill that we need.
▶ 1:21:42A comprehensive bill would have to go through at least 10 maybe more um committees of jurisdiction to get it right in the House and probably another five plus in the Senate. and we are just unable to do what we need to do to to address real national security issues in the in the realm of cyber security. And I'm I fear that it's going to take some tragedy to cause us to to act in that capacity uh on cyber security.
▶ 1:22:11I don't think drones are much different um both because of the complexity the challenges that we face from a legislative perspective whether it is um authorizing appropriating the the the money to purchase the necessary technology to monitor to um then engage with and disarm drones that are um posing a threat or whether it's the authority side to address the the legal concerns that are very real.
▶ 1:22:40And it it's probably not going to get done in one bill. It's going to probably be a number of bills. And you know, there's going to be a lot of interest surrounding how we do it. Um, you know, as I think about this issue, the the Chinese New Year drone um was one of the most amazing things I've ever seen.
▶ 1:23:01And it it also was very tr troubling that display of um I mean I guess it was a an AI enabled drone swarm that was basically providing entertainment but while it was very entertaining it's also terrifying and I I I think that the the capabilities of our adversaries and seeing how war has evolved in Ukraine and how the Russians and the um Ukraine military are largely relying on drones.
▶ 1:23:30I mean there's there's a huge portion of that conflict is is being used as technology as opposed to traditional warfare. So we've got to get moving on this. We have to enhance our capacity. We have to um Congress has to act. Uh but a lot of this is is the private sector getting up to speed.
▶ 1:23:51A lot of this is um our our our our defense department telling us exactly what they need and we don't have time to um waste. We've spent enormous amounts of resources to make sure that we have a a 24/7 365 air alert mission for fighter jets to be deployed. And I'm not sure how good that capacity is right now considering that a couple dozen drones could severely impede our ability to get to get jets off the ground.
▶ 1:24:21So, I mean, this is a huge huge challenge and we need to act um before it is too late. I appreciate y'all taking the time to come here today. Hey, it seems that we are moving in the right direction and I appreciate uh your work to help get us where we need to be and I look forward to working with my friend uh the ranking member to to craft some legislation and I will uh with that I will yield back. Thank you again for being here today.
▶ 1:24:49Um without objection all members have five legislative days within which to submit materials and additional written questions for the witnesses which will be forwarded to the witnesses. If there is no further business, without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank you.