▶ 0:04:29The committee on homeland security subcommittee on transportation maritime security will come to order. Without objection, the chair may declare the subcommittee in recess at any point. Today's hearing it continues the important oversight work we began in February by taking a closer look at the Chinese Communist Party's growing footprint in Cuba and the implica implications for US homeland security. With Beijing ramping up its economic, military, and intelligence operations just 90 miles from our coastline, this is no longer a distant challenge. It's an immediate concern for the security of the American people.
▶ 0:04:59The United States must urgently uh understand the full extent of this threat. Um ensure that the Department of Homeland Security and its inter agency partners are equipped to address it and take a hard look at our broader uh strategic partner throughout the Caribbean and the Western Hemisphere. I now recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. Good morning. Today, the subcommittee convenes to examine an alarming threat developing just 90 miles off our coast.
▶ 0:05:28Mounting evidence suggests that the Chinese Communist Party is expanding its strategic partnership with the totalitarian communist regime in Cuba to build advanced surveillance infrastructure capable of targeting the United States. This collaboration rep represents one of the most brazen intelligence operations ever attempted near the American mainland and places our military operations, commercial activity, and communication squarely in the crosshairs of a hostile foreign power.
▶ 0:05:56Recent satellite imagery and open source analysis suggest the presence of several Chinese funded signals and intelligence facilities across Cuba. The possibility that these sites are capable of monitoring US military operations, commercial shipping, space launches, and sensitive communications is deeply troubling. Southeastern United States is home to some of the most critical assets in our nation's security infrastructure.
▶ 0:06:19From the Space Launch Center at Cape Canaveral to the headquarters of US Southern Command in Miami, uh this region plays a critical role in our defense posture. This region includes my own district uh which has long been on the front lines of threats emerging from the Cuban regime. If the Chinese government is in fact leveraging a growing partnership with Cuba to collect intelligence on our activities, that is a threat that we can no longer ignore. Cuban's government has a long history of working with for foreign adversaries to undermine the United States.
▶ 0:06:49What we are potentially witnessing today is a new and dangerous phase of that cooperation that is fueled by Havana's economic desperation and Beijing strategic ambition. Cuban regime remains a state sponsor of terrorism, harbors fugitives from the US justice system and relentlessly suppresses the rights of its own people. Its growing reliance on foreign authoritarian powers like China only adds to the danger.
▶ 0:07:14Over the past several months, I've taken steps to raise alarms about the malign activities of the communist government of Cuba. In March, I sent a letter to the Department of Homeland Security, requesting an investigation into individuals in the United States suspected of links to Cuban intelligence and the Communist Party. These networks have long operated on US soil and may now be may be be intersecting with China's activities in the region.
▶ 0:07:37Shortly after in April in April, I sent a letter to the Department of Treasury calling for a full suspension of US Cuba travel and remittances with appropriate humanitarian exceptions. We should not be funding a regime that turns around and opens its doors to our greatest adversaries. If reports of rising Chinese activity in Cuba are accurate, then it is no longer just a diplomatic issue. It is direct security risk to the American people. This hearing is the first step in understanding the scope of this threat.
▶ 0:08:06Today, our witnesses will help us assess the potential scale of the threat and what measures the federal government should take to stay ahead of it. We need to be cleareyed about the risks and both swift and unified in our response. The United States cannot afford to overlook the possibility that a hostile foreign power is working handinand with a communist dictatorship in Cuba to employ advanced surveillance capabilities on our doorstep.
▶ 0:08:32It is our responsibility to ensure that the homeland remains secure and not just from what we can see but from what may may be gathering just out of sight. I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee. I look forward to a productive discussion on how the United States can counter the Chinese Communist Party uh and their suspected surveillance efforts in Cuba and prevent our adversaries from gaining a strategic foothold so close to our
▶ 0:09:02I now recognize the ranking member, the gentleoman from New Jersey, Miss McGyver, for her opening statement. Good morning. Thank you, uh, chair. Thank you to our witnesses for joining us today. The threats posed by the People's Republic of China towards the United States requires serious attention as China works aggressively to gain a foothold within the Caribbean.
▶ 0:09:23In Cuba, China has provided almost eight billion dollars in monetary incentives over the past 20 years, seeking to strengthen ties with the country just 90 miles from US shores. China has invested heavily in Cuba's infrastructure, technology, communications, and biotechnology.
▶ 0:09:43Within the transportation and marine time sectors, Cuba has benefited from China's partnership by gaining security equipment for airports, seapports, and facilities. Nuke, a comp company, New Company, a Chinese state-owned company, has provided inspection technology to be installed throughout much of Cuba's transportation networks.
▶ 0:10:06The Department of Homeland Security has accessed that nuke tech screening systems likely have deficiencies in detection capabilities China have have I'm sorry, excuse me. The Department of Homeland Security has assessed that Nuke screening systems likely have deficiencies and detection capabilities and that China could potentially access the systems remotely to gather intelligence on shipping manifests and passenger information.
▶ 0:10:37In 2021, Cuba signed into onto China's Belt and Roll initiative. And now, China is further developing sites in Cuba to collect intelligence on the United States through monitoring through monitoring of ship movements, emails, phone calls, and radio and satellite The knowledge of these sites is not new as US security officials have confirmed awareness of their existence since at least the first Trump
▶ 0:11:07administration. The United States and our partners face tremendous challenges in responding to China's aggression. A solid partnership among the United States and Latin America allies aids in advancing US interests in the region and strengthening our national security. Unfortunately, the Trump administration is actively undermining those efforts by suspending foreign aid and dismantling USAID.
▶ 0:11:34The Trump administration has weakened our national security, allowing China to apply influence within Latin America without competition. In year 2023, USID dedicated $1.8 8 billion dollar in funding to the Western Hemisphere, including funding to support independent Cuba media organizations, providing objective uncensored journalism.
▶ 0:11:59The dismantling of foreign aid programs benefits author authoritarian governments like the Cuban regime by undermining groups working to advance human rights and democratic ideals. To make matters worse, President Trump has seated significant power to an unelected billionaire in Elon Musk, whose deep ties with the PRC are called are calls for great concern.
▶ 0:12:26I am glad there is bipartisan agreement on the need to counter China's aggressive activities in Cuba and Latin America. That said, I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join me in speaking out about how the Trump administration is actively undermining efforts to counter the PRC and advance US interests around the globe. Thank you again for our witnesses joining us today. With that, I yield back. Thank you to the ranking member.
▶ 0:12:52Uh other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements uh may be submitted for the record. I'm pleased to hold a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this critical topic. I ask that our witnesses please rise and raise their right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before the Committee on Homeland Security of the United States House of Representatives will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. So help you God. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in the affirm. Thank you and please be seated.
▶ 0:13:22I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses. Dr. Ryan Berg is the director of the Americas program and the head of the future of Venezuela initiative at the center for strategic and international studies. Dr. Berg specializes in US Latin America relations, strategic competition, defense policy, and transnational organized crime. Previously, he was a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a visiting fellow at Oxford's changing character of war program.
▶ 0:13:50He holds a doctor of philosophy and a master of philosophy in political science, a master of science in global governance from Oxford, as well as a bachelor of arts in government and theology from Georgetown. Andres Martinez Fernandez is the senior policy analyst for Latin America with the Heritage Foundation's Allison Center for the National Security.
▶ 0:14:10In this role, he leads the Heritage Foundation's work on US policy towards Latin America, conducting research and engaging audiences on topics such as economic development, foreign aid, transnational organized crime, and the malign activities of the communist China and other ex uh extra regional actors. Before join joining Heritage, Andress was a leading analyst at a leading global market intelligence firm where he advised top executives from multinational companies on political and macroeconomic risk in Latin America.
▶ 0:14:40He received his master's degree in Latin American studies and international economics from John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and his bachelor's degree is in history from Florida International University, a university which I represent. Leland Lazarus serves as associate director of national security at Florida International University's Jack Dordon Institute of Public Policy.
▶ 0:15:01He's an expert on China Latin American relations and manages a team of researchers and interns that collect data and analysis on US national security and governance in Latin America and the Caribbean. From 2021 to 2022, Leland served as a special assistant and speech writer to the commander of US Southern Command.
▶ 0:15:20Before that, Leland was a State Department foreign service officer, serving as deputy public affairs officer at the US Embassy Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean, consular officer at the US console general in Shanghai, Shangyang, China, and Pickering fellow at US Embassy Beijing and at the China desk in DC. fluent fluent in both Mandarin and Spanish.
▶ 0:15:42He holds a Master of Arts in USChina Foreign Policy from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from Brown University. I want to thank each of our distinguished witnesses for being here today and now recognize Dr. Berg for five minutes to summarize his opening statements. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member MacGyver, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I'm honored to share my views with you on this important topic this morning.
▶ 0:16:09A mere 90 mi off our shores, the United States most most formidable 21st century competitor, the People's Republic of China, has found fertile soil to deploy its arsenal of espionage, digital surveillance, and maritime competition. In many ways, a morbid socialist system in Havana is Beijing's perfect partner for threatening US homeland, especially as a response to US posture in the Indoacific. Mr. Mr.
▶ 0:16:33Chairman, I'm going to focus my oral testimony on China's signals intelligence capabilities while recognizing that the relationship between Beijing and Havana runs much deeper. I know my colleagues on this panel will cover other aspects of the relationship, maritime, telecommunications, and so on, which I'm happy, of course, to discuss in our question period. When Soviet influence diminished on the island following the end of the Cold War, eyes, ears, and antennas stayed. In many ways, China filled the void.
▶ 0:17:00On June 8th, 2023, the Wall Street Journal first reported that Cuba hosted secret Chinese spy bases in return for billions of dollars for the Cuban regime. That same day, the Biden administration's defense department denied the Wall Street Journal's reporting, characterizing the report as quote inaccurate. 3 days later, however, the NSC spokesperson, John Kirby, reversed course and admitted to China's spy bases in Cuba, but said that its presence had existed since 2019 under the first Trump administration, implying that the Biden admin had inherited this challenge.
▶ 0:17:30Around the same time, reports surfaced that China was pursuing the construction of a military training base Cuba. CSIS then published a groundbreaking breaking report called Secret Signals, decoding China's intelligence activities in Cuba. The CSIS team scoured the island using commercially available satellite imagery, identifying four likely sites for signals intelligence collection in that process. This was followed by a Wall Street Journal exclusive confirming its earlier reporting on the spy stations.
▶ 0:18:00CSIS published another updated set of images in December 2024 and has tracked China's progress at these four sites. As part of this hearing, Mr. chairman. Uh we're pleased to release some updated imagery and I think we have a slideshow here for you to see. As you can see on this first slide, Mr. Chairman, CSIS positively identified about four specific facilities as highly likely sites supporting Chinese intelligence operations targeting the US. Three of these sites, Beukall, Wai, and Kalabasar, are located around Havana.
▶ 0:18:31A fourth site, Els Salao, is a previously unreported facility located on the opposite side of the island just east of Santiago Deuba. In response to reporting on the Cuba China Sigant Nexus, high level Cuban Communist Party officials either outright denied any relationship or attempted to disarm our criticism with humor. To coincide with this hearing, Mr. Chairman, we have some updated imagery that we can show you. Next slide, please.
▶ 0:18:56Uh after the publication of our initial reports, construction progress at El Salo, the site by Santiago de Kuba, seems to have ceased according to the image captures dated April 18th, 2025. If you can go to the next slide, please. The CDAA site appears to have been abandoned for the moment as evidenced by hitherto well-trimmed graded areas being taken over by grass. On the next slide, the PRC appears to be enhancing its sigant at a previously identified facility at Behall.
▶ 0:19:25And on the next slide, you can see uh an antenna field from the original CSIS image captures. And on our last slide, Mr. Chairman, you can see the latest CSIS image captures shows those antennas have been removed to make way for a large CDA CDAA site very similar to the one that was originally visible at El Salo. The Behook Call facility is very, very active as evidenced by multiple image captures in this process. So, as you can see, Mr. Chairman, our adversaries are at our doorstep.
▶ 0:19:56I want to use the rest of the time remaining to mention some brief recommendations for the committee to consider. First, I think a classified briefing to every member of Congress should be given uh given the significance of these developments to US national security. Second, the US should consider strategic declassification of images in its possession.
▶ 0:20:16Given that Elsalo appears to have been abandoned after the CSIS publication of its report, we may reasonably believe that transparency efforts and public criticism do have the potential to derail some of the PRC's ambitions. Third, develop and articulate red lines.
▶ 0:20:32It may be difficult to displace some of these existing facilities from the island, but the United States should be crystal clear that the permanent installation of offensive military capabilities in Cuba or the basing of PLA combat assets would be seen as a significant escalation and a red line for the United States. An inability to deter SIGN facilities should not be interpreted by Havana as a green light for China. Fourth, I think we need to harden sensitive infrastructure against sigin collection by China.
▶ 0:20:59The SISA should spearhead an effort to review which companies and facilities in the area are most vulnerable to intelligence gathering operations. And lastly, Mr. Chairman, I think we need to enlist neighbors and allies. These facilities do not just snoop on the United States. CDA's collect information omnidirectionally, meaning that other countries in the Caribbean, including those that Mr. that Secretary of State Marco Rubio met on his recent successful trip to the Caribbean, are also implicated. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield and I look forward to the committee's questions. Thank you, Dr. Berg.
▶ 0:21:29And I recognize Mr. Martinez Fernandez for five minutes to summarize his opening statements. Thank you, uh, Chairman Himenez, Remember Macyver. Uh, I appreciate the invitation and apologize for my tardiness. Uh, my name is Andres Martinez. I run the Latin America Portfolio, the Heritage Foundation. Uh and uh since its inception, the Cuban dictatorship has repeatedly proven itself to be a willing partner and staging ground for anti-American extra hemispheric powers.
▶ 0:21:59Today, Havana offers itself as a partner for a new patron, the Chinese Communist Party. Reporting by CSIS and other organizations have once again unmasked the malign nature of the Beijing Havana nexus, particularly the growing footprint of Chinese intelligence gathering facilities in Cuba.
▶ 0:22:18China's accelerating espionage partnership with Cuba poses a major threat for US and hemispheric security, bringing together Beijing's resources and technology with Havana's troubling capacity to penetrate US agencies and security institutions. The growth of China's spying footprint in Cuba is also indicative of Beijing's broader mallay presence in the Americas.
▶ 0:22:42While economic engagement has led the way for China's advance in much of Latin America and the Caribbean, Beijing's influence has spread quickly into the political, clandestine, and military spheres. China's broader influence has also allowed it to expand its regional intelligence ca uh gathering capacities beyond Cuba, including in democratic nations.
▶ 0:23:04Indeed, Beijing has even secured unusually sprawling embassies in the Caribbean uh such as in Antigua and Bahamas and beyond with sites that are widely considered to be active intelligence centers for China. In Argentina and else Elsewhere in South America, Beijing has also established deep space monitoring facilities with worrying military implications.
▶ 0:23:27China's strategic focus around dual use and critical infrastructure in the Americas highlights the intrinsic military and security nature of Chinese he China's hemispheric encroachment. Chinese infrastructure projects across Latin America and the Caribbean offer Beijing crucial vectors for espionage and disruptive operations in and around the US.
▶ 0:23:51Control over ports and other infrastructure can even be leveraged to impede the movement of US warships, military resources, or directly target US assets and supply chains. Beijing's inroads in the Caribbean may be the most concerning aspect of its hemispheric encroachment. Geographic proximity to the United States and around crucial US maritime routes make the Caribbean of outsiz strategic importance for the United States.
▶ 0:24:19China appears to recognize this strategic importance given the relative attention and engagement Beijing has given to the region both economically and politically. As with Pacific island nations, Beijing seeks to consolidate its influence over strategically important island chains in the Caribbean. The end goal of this effort is apparently counterbalancing the US presence in Asia and empowering China to destabilize the US through asymmetric means.
▶ 0:24:47As Beijing grows increasingly belligerent against Taiwan and US forces in the Indoacific, the US must assume that China will operationalize its presence and influence in Latin America and the Caribbean against the United States. China's gains in the Caribbean and beyond pose an urgent challenge for US national security.
▶ 0:25:07The Trump administration is clearly moved to confront the hemispheric vulnerability posed by China and its partnership with the communist uh dictatorship in Cuba among other actors. Confronting these threats requires rallying pressure against Beijing and Havana while bolstering partnerships with regional democracies across economic, political, and security spheres.
▶ 0:25:31The United States should bolster its security cooperation and capacities, in particular within Latin America and the Caribbean, prioritizing initiatives that mitigate risks posed to vital infrastructure and vulnerabilities. At the same time, the US should leverage its underappreciated territorial presence in the Caribbean. US territories, particularly uh including Puerto Rico, can be better used to counterbalance Chinese and Cuban malign activities in the Caribbean and across Latin America.
▶ 0:26:01Bolstering a US Coast Guard presence uh capacities in Puerto Rico, for example, will support US security in the broader Caribbean region amid these growing threats. US territories can also be used as force multipliers in bolstering broader US economic engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean through targeted measures that offset regional dependence on China. Thank you very much for the time and I look forward to your questions.
▶ 0:26:31Uh thank you Mr. Martinez Fernandez. Now recognize Mr. Lazarus for five minutes to summarize uh his opening statements. Himenez, Ranking Member MacGyver, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the privilege to speak today. My name is Leland Lazarus. I'm the associate director of Florida International University's Gordon Institute for Public Policy and non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council's Global China Hub.
▶ 0:26:59I come to you today not just as a researcher but as someone who has observed this threat evolve firsthand. First from my time as a Fulbright scholar studying the Chinese diaspora in Panama to serving as a State Department foreign service officer in China and the Caribbean to serving as a special assistant and speech writer to two combatant commanders at US Southern So, let me be clear. Cuba is not just an outpost of Chinese influence.
▶ 0:27:30It's a strategic beach head. As my colleagues have uh said time and time again, just 90 miles off Florida, where I live, where I reside, the Chinese Communist Party is executing a 21st century playbook of espionage, port infrastructure, space surveillance, and authoritarianism. And Havana is the perfect laboratory for China.
▶ 0:27:54China has built signals intelligence outposts aimed at Florida as the CSIS report has shown, but it has also installed airport scanners and surveillance equipment using Chinese firms like Nuke. As ranking member MacGyver had mentioned, it's a state-owned company sanctioned by the US for ties to the Chinese military.
▶ 0:28:14Nuke systems are deployed across Cuban airports, seapports, and customs facilities, giving Beijing privileged access to sensitive data flows right on doorstep. But what's happening in Cuba is just one chapter in a much larger story. Next week, on May 13th, Beijing will host the China Seac Summit with nearly every country in Latin America and the Caribbean represented in Beijing.
▶ 0:28:44It's a reminder that China has a long-term strategy for this hemisphere built on patient investment, diplomatic cultivation, and evolving security ties. The US, unfortunately, by contrast, still too often operates from a crisis to crisis mindset in this region and has yet to provide an affirmative long-term agenda for the region at large.
▶ 0:29:07The Chinese military and military scholars um call countries like Cuba strategic support points or Janu Mandarin to sustain their far seas naval posture. They don't need permanent bases. They need leverage and Cuba gives them exactly that. It's close, politically reliable, and already outfitted with Chinese tech.
▶ 0:29:33When the US sends warships through the Taiwan Straits, Chinese academics now reply with references to their own right to operate near Florida. That's strategic reciprocity, Beijing style. You touch our waters, we have the right to touch yours. China also aspires to build its space program to expand its global space domain awareness.
▶ 0:29:59But space is also crucial for signals intelligence and Cuba is a prime location for China to target the US. That's why we at Florida International University um has created the Chinese activities in Latin America dashboard in order to track and expose China's moves in almost real time. It maps everything.
▶ 0:30:20Um, and I mean everything from dual use ports and signals intelligence listening stations to companies like Nuke that quietly expand China's operational footprint across the region. Our dashboard that we built is really built for you all US policy makers to make the best decisions uh about our greatest competitor. But it's also a warning. China's not just coming to Latin America and the Caribbean. It's already here and it's here to stay.
▶ 0:30:51Members of the subcommittee, we cannot win a global competition with China if we lose sight of our own hemisphere. Strategic neglect is not just dangerous. It is a gift we give to Beijing. We must meet this challenge together with our allies and partners to make America and the Americas safer, stronger, and more prosperous. Thank you, and I look forward to your Thank you, Mr. Lazarus.
▶ 0:31:18Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their five minutes of questioning, and I'll recognize myself for five minutes of questioning. I'll start out with a comment in that uh the United States for far too long uh both Republican and Democrat administrations have not paid close enough attention to what's happening in our own hemisphere. And it's allowed China to make the inroads that it has. Uh and now we're just waking up to the fact.
▶ 0:31:43So this this hearing is part of that to try to awaken the American people and the administration to the fact that we need to pay play pay close attention to what's happening in our own neighborhood. Um and so with that um this this is an open question. Um it's my it's my estimation that the Cuban regime itself is actually in it one of the most weakest positions that it has been in the in the in the past 60 years. Do you share do any of you share that opinion or do you disagree with that opinion?
▶ 0:32:13I'll start with you uh Miss Dr. Thanks for the question, chairman. I do share that opinion. I think the Cuban regime is incredibly weak at this point in time and uh uh we've seen that not just in protests from the island, but in rolling blackouts that occur seemingly on a monthly basis, sometimes weekly basis. Mr. Chairman, Mr. uh Mr. Fernandez, uh Mr. Fernandez, yes, I agree. I think uh economically, politically as well uh the Cuban regime is in a period of vulnerability.
▶ 0:32:44I think also um increasingly uh hemispheric uh as well as US political consensus is moving uh towards a recognition of the the malign nature of the Cuban dictatorship. uh as past uh attempts however um uh poorly conceived at engagement as uh we have seen from the US have fallen flatly and been rebuffed.
▶ 0:33:09Uh and uh the Cuban dictatorship has at the same time uh again as as we have discussed acted as an active partner for uh enemies of the United States within our hemisphere. Mr. Lazarus, do you share that opinion that the Cuban regime is at the one of the weakest points in the last 60 years? Sir, I'd absolutely agree. Um, inflation is almost 30% uh for the Cuban regime.
▶ 0:33:32Um, there's been an increased outflow of um, you know, refugees coming out of uh, Cuba and there's been an increase in Cuban officials traveling to Beijing trying to get more investment. Uh, I understand that now China is Cuba's either largest or second largest trading partner, accounting for roughly 30% of Cuba's imports and exports.
▶ 0:33:52So I think that uh uh Cuba's decreasing uh economic situation is allowing it to become even more and more dependent economically and increasingly uh security and political standpoint on China. Now I'd like to discuss you off with with the three of you offline and how we can accelerate Cuba's Cuba dictatorship their demise so we can turn Cuba from a a platform and a base for for China and and make it actually a friend of the United States. And I think we're close to that. also think ch that Cuba is the head of the snake.
▶ 0:34:21When we talk about all the unrest that's happening in our hemisphere in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba is the head of the snake. Um, and we need to do everything in our power to set the Cuban people free, but also turn Cuba from an enemy into a friend. Now, let's talk about Cuba and the threat and the Chinese threat in in Cuba. Um, the Russians have been operating there for years, decades. Um, is are the Chinese supplanting the Russians or are they adding to the Russian threat? I'm happy to take that, Mr.
▶ 0:34:51Chairman. I think that they are they're both supplanting but also adding to there's still a residual Russian presence of course in Cuba. We saw uh last year um at the tail end of the Biden administration how the Russians sailed a vessel through the Florida Strait ported uh both in Cuba and and in Havana. Importantly, before porting in Cuba uh displayed one of its Zirkon hypersonic missiles uh in the Atlantic. Uh but I would say in terms of the presence, Mr.
▶ 0:35:17chairman, the Chinese have supplanted them in terms of the more important partner and quite literally some of these sites that we've showed were former Russian sites that are now occupied we believe by by the Chinese and they've added to the capabilities when you more modern uh infrastructure etc. That's correct. Okay. And so, you know, maybe some some of my colleagues would be, you know, surprised to know that not only is it Russia and China, but also Iran uh is is here and North Korea is also here. Uh and so we need to also stand up to those threats.
▶ 0:35:46um the the training range that's just uh outside of Florida. It's the largest training range that we have. It's only the only training range range that actually can simulate battle in the Taiwan Straits. Um what kind of a threat do do these facilities pose to uh those ranges and what kind of intelligence could the Chinese get from uh surveying those those ranges in in relation to our tactics etc. of how we may operate in the Taiwan Straits.
▶ 0:36:17Mr. Chairman, the first slide that I showed in my my presentation showed just the number of facilities in your home state that are within easily within range of these facilities. Um, it's my understanding that military communications is of course encrypted and and protected in certain ways. But if it's uh scooped up by some of this equipment, then it is available for the Chinese to try to crack uh that that communication.
▶ 0:36:39And so that's why one of my recommendations is doing an exercise to harden facilities and figure out what our vulnerabilities are um so that we can make sure that we we protect uh those those very vulnerable secrets both on the commercial side and on the military side. Mr. Chairman, thank you. My my five minutes are up and I recognize the ranking member, the gentleoman from New Jersey, Mrs. Mcyber for 5 minutes. Thank you uh Mr. Chairman. Um Mr. Lazarus, uh thank you once again for joining us today.
▶ 0:37:05Um in your testimony you discussed how China will be hosting a summit uh with Latin America and Caribbean states next week. Uh China and Cuba also both belong to the BRICS uh group along with Brazil, Russia, India and a total of 23 countries. Bricks has become a serious political force as the nations belonging to bricks now account for almost 30% of the world's GDP. 40% of the oil production and almost half the world's population.
▶ 0:37:36We have seen what Trump's repeated tariff threats are doing to the economy both at home and globally while eroding trust in the US dollar. Trump's foreign policies are only making groups like the bricks more powerful as our geopolitical rivals work to fill the void um that President Trump has created with this America last policies. Mr.
▶ 0:37:58Lazarus, as America recedes from the world stage, how are bricks and other multinational groups exerting power and Well, ranking member, thank you uh so much for the question. Um you're absolutely right. I mean Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa when taken together uh they represent more than 30% of global GDP.
▶ 0:38:20Um and they've really been uh using this multilateral institution in order to create alternative financial institutions to the westernbuilt ones uh built right after World War II. So you think the new development bank or uh the BRICS bank that could fund uh various projects in the developing world.
▶ 0:38:39Um there's talk about them creating a bricks currency that could mean that they can settle um trade accounts not using the US dollar which could potentially weaken the US dollar's dominance in the globe. Um but it it goes to a larger narrative that the Chinese uh and our other uh adversaries try to use in the global south which is that the United States doesn't necessarily care about the global south.
▶ 0:39:04All they care about is um uh realist um ideology. Especially in this uh region in Latin America and the Caribbean, there is this narrative that the Chinese uh try to say which is that the United States only wants to impose the Monroe Doctrine 2.0.
▶ 0:39:22Uh, and I am concerned that um certain things um certain policies um could really allow the Chinese to continue to spread that narrative um in Latin America and the Caribbean. Thank you for that. Uh just a followup. Um in your opinion, do you think China ultimately stands to benefit from the pause and foreign aid underneath the Trump administration?
▶ 0:39:49Well, we're seeing already um on a global scale that um China has already stepped up its foreign aid in countries like Cambodia, Nepal. Uh as I mentioned, next week they're going to be hosting the uh fourth ministerial of the China Seac Summit.
▶ 0:40:06Uh and I expect that um after that summit there's going to be a joint action plan between China and SEALC on China increasing um exports of renewable energy and electric vehicles and solar panels. Um, and again, it's another way for China to project itself as a a reliable partner uh at a time where other countries are perceiving potentially the US is um uh tariffing other other countries.
▶ 0:40:37Um, and it's also a way for China to project itself as the defender of globalization and free trade going forward. That is a concern. Thank you so much, Mr. Lazarus. With that, I yield back. me. Gentle woman yields. I now recognize a gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane, for five minutes. Thank you guys for coming today to talk about this uh and very very important topic.
▶ 0:41:04Um, so just to get this straight, we have the Chinese partnering with Cuba, both communist countries and Cuba's not but what roughly 90 miles from the United States. Um, are we able to discern through these satellite imagery, human intel, and signal intel what the capabilities of this te technology located on Cuba, the island of Cuba? Dr.
▶ 0:41:31chairman, we're able to to speculate about it, but again, this was used this was discovered using commercially available satellite technology that we have the capability of using. I'm sure and this is why I recommended a classified briefing for you all. Um, on the high side, my guess is that there's a lot more analysis available on capabilities and vulnerabilities. Do we have the ability to jam and block uh the surveillance technologies located on the island of Cuba? Dr.
▶ 0:42:00Uh, Congressman, it's my understanding that we do have some of that capability. I'm not sure if it is being deployed. Um, and also, as I mentioned, some of the communications that are sensitive in nature are also uh encrypted, but I'm happy to to talk to you sort of offline or answer questions further after this hearing about those types of capabilities. Thank you. Mr. Lazarus, uh, you mentioned that the Chinese could use these bases to project digital authoritarianism. I believe that was the word you used. Can you expand on that?
▶ 0:42:30Absolutely, Congressman. Um, well, first and foremost, uh, Huawei and ZTE provide the digital backbone for um, Exa, the, uh, Cuban telecommunications company. Uh we saw in July of 2021 when there was the large massive protests in uh Cuba against the regime that the regime was able to really shut down uh the protesters communications uh so that they couldn't necessarily collaborate with each other as easily as they as they otherwise
▶ 0:43:00would. Uh and our assessment was that they were able to rely on uh the technology of Huawei and ZTE in order to shut that down. Um uh there's also again the idea of of uh of Nuketech being in various seapports uh airports in in Cuba. And uh Nuketech is a state-owned enterprise.
▶ 0:43:24uh it was it is a subsidiary is a subsidiary of Shing Hua University's Tongfang which uh na China's national nuclear corporation has a 21% stake in uh in newk and uh it provides all kinds of uh port scanning equipment and the concern is that all the kind of information whether it be biometric whether it be commercial whether it be uh sensitive uh data about supply chain routes and and cargo flows,
▶ 0:43:54all that information can go uh back to Beijing and that would constitute a national security threat for the United States. Thank you. Uh Dr. Berg, is it true that a Chinese national was arrested in January of this year in Miami's airport for conducting espionage Congressman, I'll have to get back to you on that. I'm I'm not aware of that uh that particular Yeah, I'd like to enter this into the record. Uh Mr. chairman. This is a article.
▶ 0:44:23Chinese national targeted and federal spy investigation arrested at Miami International Airport. According to the article, he had uh transmitted 47 pages. Um there were schematics, graphs, diagrams related to nuclear weapons. Uh Mr. Lazarus, I want to come back. Without objection. Thank you, sir. Mr. Lazarus, I want to come back to you. Do you believe the chi the Chinese are engaged in unrestricted warfare with the United States i.e.
▶ 0:44:51economic warfare attacks on critical infrastructure, espionage, IP theft, etc. Congressman, um the we've seen evidence time and time again uh whether it be the uh FBI under former director Christopher Ray uh talking about how uh China base hackers, whether it be Salt Typhoon, Vault Typhoon have um infiltrated critical infrastructure throughout the United
▶ 0:45:21States. uh and that would of course be a a national security uh concern and that they are potentially prepositioning if there is ever a conflict with the United States uh say over the straits of Taiwan or the South China Sea that the Chinese could collaborate could retaliate by uh shutting down some of that critical infrastructure.
▶ 0:45:41The concern is that many of the same tactics, some of the same companies that uh are concerned uh here in the United States are also operating in Latin America and the Caribbean. Thank you. I yield back. Gentleman yields back. And I recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Kennedy. Sorry, he left. Okay. And I recognize the the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. chairman and thank our witnesses for being here today.
▶ 0:46:12I'm deeply concerned about the long-term consequences of the Trump Musk administration's systemic dismantling of USID, foreign aid, and other international development programs. Actions that have significantly weakened America's global influence, especially on our own hemisphere. In the past several months, critical US investments in diplomacy and development have been slashed. frozen are redirected to serve narrow political goals.
▶ 0:46:42This isn't just bad policy. It was a strategic mistake that has had real consequences on our national security and regional stability in Latin America. These decisions have been nothing short of a gift to authoritarian regimes in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. By retreating from our role as a champion of democracy and development, we left a vacuum that autocrats have rushed to fill.
▶ 0:47:12With China taking the lead instead of supporting reformers and pro-democratic uh movements, we left them underresourced and isolated. While desperates like Nicolas Madora tightened their grip. Foreign aid is not a charity. It's a wise investment in stability, security, and American values.
▶ 0:47:35When we help communities thrive and support democratic institutions, we make it harder for authoritarianism, corruption, and extremism to take root. Cutting these programs undermines regional security, and contributes to the very conditions, violence, poverty, and political repression that drive migration to our southern border.
▶ 0:48:00Rebuilding USAD and reaffirming our commitment to global development is not just morally right, is strategically necessary. America must lead again, not just with the might of our military, but the strength of our our values and the reach of our engagement. Uh, Dr.
▶ 0:48:18Berg, given the maritime shipping is heavily dominated by Chinese vessels, including those coming in and out of US ports, what kind of insight does that give the Chinese into maritime traffic in the US, and how could China use this information to our Thanks for the question, Congressman.
▶ 0:48:36And I think we've seen multiple instances in which uh the Chinese have used uh ports as dual use infrastructure not just to have the PLA Navy make port calls in some of the deep water ports but all of that data that information that is contained in a port is important for uh for the Chinese. The comingings and goings and chip of ships cargo manifests with what frequency this is all very important if we're talking about building safe and secure supply chains as well.
▶ 0:49:04I had the privilege of being before this committee in February when we were talking about the very issue of ports and this issue also came up then uh specifically with reference to the Panama Canal, the two Hong Kong based uh ports that are at the strategic approaches to the canal. Also a critical issue. Congressman, in your testimony, you recommended enlisting neighbors like P uh Bahamas, Dominican Republic, and Jamaica to combat intelligence gathering from China and Cuba. How can federal international development system programs help achieve this goal?
▶ 0:49:36Congressman, I would advocate that we build on Secretary of State Rubio's very successful visit to the Caribbean uh in recent weeks. I think it's important that the Secretary of State has already taken two trips to the region uh in just over two and a half months of of his time uh in office. Um, and I think those countries once made aware of the extent of of Cuba's espionage activities and therefore their vulnerabilities will be quite willing to uh to partner with us. It's in their interest, just as it's in ours, not to have Cuba snooping on their signals intelligence.
▶ 0:50:06Thank you. Mr. Lazarus, how can China use it investments in Cuba to disrupt shipping routes that lead to major US ports like the port of New Orleans or the port of Southeast Louisiana in my home state? Well, I understand that those those two ports in the United States represent about 20% uh a little more than 20% of cargo entering to the US.
▶ 0:50:28And the concern is that um whether it be a nuke tech, whether it be a China harbor engineering company because chi China Harbor and China Communication Construction Corporation uh also have key projects uh in in Cuba. those companies that have direct ties to the People's Liberation Army can uh gather information about US port operations, um cargo flows, potentially see our supply chain vulnerabilities.
▶ 0:50:58They can also uh use those areas as a way to um issue cyber attacks or um or cyber disruptions uh in and around the the the port operations. and they could of of course create uh plausible deniability which is of course an MMO that they've been doing for for quite some time as well. Thank you uh Mr. Chairman I yield. Gentleman yields and I recognize the gentleoman from South Carolina, Miss Biggs. Thank you, Mr.
▶ 0:51:28Chairman, and thank you to our guest today for um highlighting these important aspects of our topic today. So, I have personally um been to Key West and involved in military training there. So, this topic really does catch my attention. Also, I would like to say that I'm excited about our current administration.
▶ 0:51:50the the ideas of increasing our innovation and rebuilding our military and strengthening our defense for the very purpose of this uh US intelligence officials, military strategists and regional experts have drawn parallels between China's current activity and the cold war era use of Cuba by the Soviet Union as a forward surveillance outpost.
▶ 0:52:18Yet the tools of today, especially in digital surveillance, constitute a sophisticated threat of a different order. So my first question is for Mr. Fernandez. Are China's activities in Cuba more reminiscent of cold war style strategic encirclement or are they more aligned with a new model of digital influence and persistent surveillance?
▶ 0:52:48Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. Um, I think that there are uh many aspects of of China's engagement in Cuba that are reminiscent of uh the cold war era engagement by the Soviet Union. Um, and they they align primarily with um or often with military and geostrategic aims for for those reasons.
▶ 0:53:10I think, you know, certainly we're seeing an increased leveraging of uh modern technologies as well as the uh more deep economic uh ties that China has globally uh as compared to maybe the Soviet Union uh as part of what's being leveraged um in in Latin America and the Caribbean and with Cuba to create this kind of broader surveillance uh and operational infrastructure for China.
▶ 0:53:39Um and uh that that raises many concerns because we we uh obviously we saw the the consequences and the the risks during the cold war of this u this presence from hostile extra hemispheric actors um just 90 miles off of our our shores.
▶ 0:54:00uh and we're seeing that I think at a at a new level as I said because of these new uh and and in some ways expanded capacities uh that the Chinese government can can employ because of its resources because of its uh capacities. Thank you. So my next question is for Berg.
▶ 0:54:23Could China's posture in Cuba serve as a springboard for influencing or disrupting US diplomatic or military efforts outside the region such as in the Indo-Pacific? Well, Congresswoman, thank you for the the question. I think it's it's critical. Um, we hope this never happens.
▶ 0:54:45But if there is a conflict in a different theater of the world, let's say there's a conflict in the Indoacific, the United States, if it is to to come, for example, to Taiwan's aid, will need to shift forces from the Atlantic uh to the Pacific. China's ability to disrupt that process could be done uh through its uh activities uh in Cuba or as we heard at the February hearing of this very committee through some of those controls of the of the ports at the strategic approaches to the Panama Canal.
▶ 0:55:14There are multiple important critical kind of choke points in this hemisphere that would be a part of that surge, that transition of forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific theaters. Um, where China's presence in the Caribbean, as my colleagues have pointed out, would be incredibly important. So, they would have the ability, in my opinion, to to attempt at least to block some of that shifting of of force from Atlantic to Pacific. Congresswoman, thank you so much. And I yield back. Gentleoman yields.
▶ 0:55:43I now recognize a gentleman from New York, Mr. Garbarino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Berg, China's stateowned techn tech companies like Huawei and ZT have played a key role in building Cuba's digital infrastructure. These companies are known to have deep ties to China's military and intelligence services, and their equipment has been flagged globally for creating backd doors enabling surveillance.
▶ 0:56:08How likely is it that these Chinese-built networks are enabling Beijing to conduct sustained cyber operations or espionage targeting US government or commercial entities either directly or by proxy through Cuban servers? Congresswoman, I think it's Congressman, excuse me. I think it's very likely that that's what they're attempting. Excuse me. That's okay. I've been called worse. Excuse me again, Congressman. I think it's very likely uh that that is what's happening.
▶ 0:56:36Cuba is offering China some of the best real estate that it can possibly have 90 miles off off US shores. And we've seen in multiple other instances how Chinese stateowned enterprises like Huawei NCT have provided a backdoor uh in other contexts such as spying on the African Union and other other organizations. So I see no reason to believe why we shouldn't believe that they're trying to do the same against the United States, their principal competitor in 21st century.
▶ 0:57:04Has there been credible analysis or confirmation that Chinese intelligence has used Huawei or ZT connected infrastructure in Cuba to intercept sensitive US communications or conduct cyber? I mean, we believe they are, but has there been any analysis or confirmation? Congressman, not on the open source side. What we've collected here is the facilities that we think are likely the Chinese are using. Um, and we've done this in conjunction with some of the public reporting that's been done.
▶ 0:57:29Uh, in fact, drawing back to your previous question on Huawei NCT, Politico and and Wall Street Journal, the two who were first to report on this, um, felt that there was a high degree of confidence that some of these facilities were in fact being used by the PRC because our intelligence agencies, again, this was reported in the open source, were tracking individuals from Huawei and ZTE coming and going at some of these these facilities. But I think the answer to your question is more likely to be found on on the high side.
▶ 0:57:55Uh which is again why I've recommended in my testimony that all members of Congress should be able to get access to a classified briefing on this topic. Thank you very much. Uh Mr. Martinez Fernandez, the deeper China's tech infrastructure is embedded in Cuban society, the harder it becomes unwind. I mean it's true for anywhere. I mean just look at London. Uh Huawei technologies all over uh all over London. Um, so this creates a long-term dependency that goes far beyond hardware itself.
▶ 0:58:24What strategic leverage does China gain over Cuba by controlling the architecture of its digital ecosystem? Thank you for the question. I I think it's it's crucial. It's a it's a central part of China's strategy.
▶ 0:58:39um you know in Cuba uh there's I think a more more willing partner that doesn't necessarily require this uh uh the same level of active um pressuring or or malign um influence but uh certainly building up uh capacities over critical infrastructure such as telecommunications for China uh puts uh countries like Cuba uh and uh democratic nations across the Americas is uh
▶ 0:59:10at a significant dependence on the Chinese Communist Party. Uh and that's the the kind of thing that uh I think is a significant vulnerability uh particularly in uh in the case of of conflict.
▶ 0:59:23But as as we move we've seen elsewhere the the realm of of economic and infrastructure um uh capacities and influence being leveraged beyond uh beyond that sphere into going into the political into the uh even the military where uh this this capacity is then used to push governments to make decisions uh that are more favorable to the Chinese Communist Party.
▶ 0:59:49Uh so it does create uh significant questions particularly for the longer term if we uh are are um blessed with seeing a a shift in Cuba uh as far as a return to democracy. Uh these will be challenges that uh a a future Cuban government will have to confront. You you mentioned actually in your answer about how this could be in in conflict. what how could they leverage these vulnerabilities in in a regional uh conflict or confrontation involving the US?
▶ 1:00:20Well, I I think as far as telecommunications uh this this feeds into the presence in in telecommunication infrastructure, this feeds into a broader intelligence capacity for for China uh which is substantial as we've discussed going uh into signals intelligence uh uh even into uh deep space monitoring.
▶ 1:00:41We also see um uh a worrying buildup around critical infrastructure, maritime routes um where the the capacity for disruptive action and subversion uh is is substantial uh and and could uh frankly uh the US economy and and aspects of uh of of US military planning even uh limiting the capacity for example of of uh transit for uh US military resources and warships.
▶ 1:01:10across, for example, the Panama Canal or or other key points. So, it's it's substantial. Um I I ran out of time, so I yield back. Thank you. Gentleman yields back. Um this hearing that's uh kind of what's our appetite and and I think we're going to take uh Dr.
▶ 1:01:30B's your your advice and we need to go into a classified setting to uh to look at at the depth of this this issue and and how serious it is to American security um and and get us some folks that uh that can give it to us in a classified setting. And so um I want to thank the the witnesses for for their their time and and u and their testimony. Members of the subcommittee may have additional questions for the witnesses and we would ask the witnesses to respond to these in writing.
▶ 1:02:00Pursuant to committee rule 7E, the hearing report will be open for 10 days. And without objection, uh the subcommittee stands