▶ 0:01:38What we need to do.
▶ 0:06:10Heat. Heat.
▶ 0:07:35Heat. Heat.
▶ 0:11:21Today's hearing will come to order. Pursuant to rule 4B3, members of the House Armed Services Committee who are not members of the subcommittee are allowed to participate in today's hearing and will be recognized after all subcommittee members have had the opportunity to ask questions. The strategic forces subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the policies and programs related to nuclear forces and atomic energy defense activities.
▶ 0:11:46Appearing for the subcommittee, we have Miss Teresa Robbins, the acting administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, Dr. Brandy C. Van, who is currently performing the duties of the assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical, and biological defense programs within the office of the secretary of defense.
▶ 0:12:05Miss Andrea Yaffy, the acting assistant secretary of defense for Space Policy within the Office of Secretary of Defense, Vice Admiral Johnny Wolf, that's not in order, the director of the Navy Strategic Systems Program Office, and Lieutenant General uh Andrew Jabber, the deputy chief of staff for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration for the United States Air Force. Thank you all for being with us today.
▶ 0:12:32While the topline pres numbers of the president's budget request for fiscal year 2026 have been released, programmatic information has not yet been made public. This means our witnesses will be unable to comment on specific levels of funding for individual programs as was the case in last week's hearing on missile defense activities.
▶ 0:12:52Nevertheless, we appreciate you being with us today to testify about our nuclear forces and look forward to hearing from you about how we are sustaining our legacy capabilities and the progress we are making towards modernizing our deterrent. The scale of this challenge cannot be overstated.
▶ 0:13:08As a result of previous decisions to delay and defer modernization, both the Air Force and the Navy find themselves sustaining submarines, missiles, bombers longer than ever before, while simultaneously carrying out major development e efforts to recapitalize each leg of the triad.
▶ 0:13:25The same is true for the National Nuclear Security Administration, which continues to operate in facilities that date all the way back to the Manhattan era, such as the Beta 2 facility at the Y12 National Security Complex in my home state of Tennessee, while also rebuilding its production complex and restoring the nation's ability to build nuclear However, while sustainment and modernization are both necessary and foundational efforts, it is also clear that they are not sufficient to meet
▶ 0:13:55the dynamic new nuclear threat environment. China's nuclear breakout has fundamentally transformed the security Russia's nuclear stop stockpiles continue to grow as well and the return of great power competition has replaced the bipolar postcold war environment of relative geopolitical stability and declining nuclear arsenals with a new tripolar environment that is less stable and more competitive.
▶ 0:14:22This was not the future we antic anticipated when the plan for nuclear modernization was developed. We must adapt to these new challenges and supplement our modernization plans with tailored capabilities to address the changing threat environment. We look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about these issues. And before turning to the ranking member for his opening statement, Dr. Van, it is my understanding that you will be retiring for government from government later this year. So on behalf of the subcommittee, like to thank you for your many years of service.
▶ 0:14:52I now recognizing my good friend, ranking member Mr. Molton for his opening remarks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank you for your leadership of this committee and a bipartisan approach to the challenges that we face. And of course, welcome our panel of distinguished witnesses. Over the past decade, the global strategic landscape has continued to deteriorate. The CCP has is dramatically expanding their nuclear arsenal.
▶ 0:15:16They are ahead of us with new and destabilizing delivery systems like hypersonics, and China has few established nuclear norms of safe behavior. Meanwhile, just this past weekend, war criminal Vladimir Putin threatened to bring his criminal war to a quote logical conclusion with the outcome Russia requires end quote using nuclear weapons. Recent escalation between India and Pakistan raises concern about either side employing its nuclear arsenal.
▶ 0:15:43And all of this calls into question decades of nuclear stability, which makes the work of our witnesses and this subcommittee all the more important. Nuclear deterrence is the bedrock, the most important priority of the Pentagon. So, how are we doing? Well, we've got some problems and here are four major ones. First, I believe, as does a bipartisan majority in Congress, that we must maintain and modernize our nuclear triad. But these programs are dangerously behind and over budget.
▶ 0:16:11Second, NSA and DoD have lost key personnel due to Musk and Doge before they reverse course, and they tried to get people back. morale is terrible and this only makes the work that is already behind even more difficult. Third, even if we get our efforts back on track, all of our modernization plans are based on one major nuclear adversary, not two. So, not only are we behind, we don't even know if what we're building will be sufficient for deterrence.
▶ 0:16:40Fourth, the president's Golden Dome threatens to throw all of this out the window along with a theory of deterrence that has kept us safe since 1945. There's a direct tie between our nuclear deterrence posture and what is being proposed for Golden Dome by President Trump. When President Bush pulled us out of the anti-bballistic missile treaty, a new arms race, both conventional and nuclear, began.
▶ 0:17:00While we developed modest missile defenses to defend against rogue nations, Russia and China, never believing that was our real intent, developed capabilities to evade our systems, including destabilizing weapons like the nuclear tipped torpedo that could take out any coastal city. A space-based nuclear weapon that could wipe out all of low Earth orbit, including Golden Dome, not to mention hypersonics, where we are playing catch-up.
▶ 0:17:26Now, last week, some members of the majority quoted the bipartisan strategic posture commission as rationale for supporting Golden Dome. And I would like to highlight a major caveat that was omitted in their remarks. Everything they said was contingent on the capabilities being determined quote feasible. But you have to go to the footnotes to understand what the commission means by that term because even I have never questioned if the concept is technically feasible.
▶ 0:17:50But on page 134 of the report, it says, "By feasible, the commission means technically and financially sound as well as based on sound policy deliberations." And this is where my concern lies. We have not seen any of the work to determine if this concept is even feasible as defined by the commission. Yet, we are throwing billions of dollars at it already.
▶ 0:18:11The Congressional Budget Office in response to our uh colleagues on the Senate Strategic Forces Subcommittee's bipartisan request just released its updated cost estimate for deploying space-based interceptors. The 20-year cost ranged from 160 to $542 billion. We all know which end of that range will be right. And that hardly seems fiscally sound.
▶ 0:18:33Todd Harrison, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank, recently said, "While the costs have come down and the technology has matured, the physics of space-based interceptors has not changed." This also questions the technical soundness of a system that the Russians could eliminate with the push of one button. Most importantly, multiple witnesses to this subcommittee have admitted that there have not been any significant policy deliberations on what the impact of Golden Dome would have on strategic stability.
▶ 0:19:01Look, it's dangerous when you have a president who doesn't know what he's doing and a Congress that's unwilling to question him. And the stakes are so so much higher with nuclear weapons. There are only two possible explanations for what's going on. One is that America has had deterrence all wrong.
▶ 0:19:19And a guy who's most experienced at bankrupting casinos is so brilliant with deterrence theory that he's corrected something that every nuclear theorist, every Pentagon planner, and every administration, including his first, had wrong. Or perhaps Donald Trump decided he wanted the gold-plated version of something his friend has, so here we are. Which do we think is more likely?
▶ 0:19:43These are important questions and concerns to examine in a serious, thoughtful, intellectually rigorous and bipartisan manner. That's what we have to do because the future of our country, the bedrock of our strategic stability and security, and the lives of our kids could well depend upon it. So, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. And thank the ranking member. We'll now move to opening statements from our witnesses.
▶ 0:20:09I would note that your prepared statements will be made part of the record, but you will each have five minutes to make some opening remarks. Uh, Miss Robbins, let's begin with you, Chairman Deja, Ranking Member Molton, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to provide an update on the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security NNSA performs vital national defense, safety, and security missions that cannot be accomplished anywhere else in the United States government.
▶ 0:20:39With the support of this administration and Congress, NNSA is executing these missions in an increasingly complex and volatile international environment. Over the last year, NNSA continued delivering modernized nuclear weapons while sustaining the current stockpile. Our defense nuclear non-prololiferation programs work to minimize and secure nuclear and radioactive materials around the globe.
▶ 0:21:07NNSA's naval reactors program, which celebrated its 75th anniversary last year, continues to ensure the US Navy's competitive warfighting edge and secure the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad with unmatched submarine technology. I am proud to report on some of NNSA's recent accomplishments and activities in support of our national security.
▶ 0:21:31NNSA is executing an expanded program of record to meet existing and emerging Department of Defense requirements. We are simultaneously delivering seven major stockpile modernization programs which are at different stages of design, engineering and production.
▶ 0:21:49The modernization program programs cover all three legs of the nuclear triad and introduce new options and capabilities for the president to strengthen deterrence in response to an everchanging threat environment. Meeting a significant milestone, the first war reserve diamondstamped plutonium pit for W87-1 warhead was produced at Los Alamos National Laboratory in October.
▶ 0:22:17Last December, the B-61 Mod2 life extension program completed the last production unit. The successful execution of this program saw the consolidation of multiple B61 variants with updated non-nuclear components and improved safety, reliability, and accuracy that will extend its service life for at least 20 years.
▶ 0:22:40Additionally, NNSA anticipates achieving the first production unit for the B61 mod 13 later this month, almost a full year ahead of schedule. The W88 Alt 370 maintained 100% ontime deliveries to the US Navy and is scheduled to complete production by the end of the fiscal year 2025.
▶ 0:23:04The W80-4 program remains aligned with the Air Force schedule for the long range standoff missile and will we expect a first production unit in 2027. The W87-1 is currently scheduled to begin production in the early 2030s. The W93 remains on track for production starting in the mid 2030s. In response to congressional direction, NNSA stood up a slickum in program office.
▶ 0:23:32Last year, a warhead down selection decision for slickmen was recently considered by the nuclear weapons council and we have identified the W80 family as the most warhead. In the coming year, NNSA will continue to coordinate closely with the Department of Defense to ensure that the pace of our stockpile modernization efforts align with the platform delivery schedules.
▶ 0:23:55Recognizing that deterrence is not static, NNSA must also design new materials, processes, and systems for future stockpile needs, certify new and modified components, and systems as they enter the stockpile, and continue to assess the stockpile's current condition annually. Our world-class science and technology capabilities allow us to perform this work and ensure our stockpile is safe, secure, reliable, and effective without requiring underground nuclear explosive testing.
▶ 0:24:25As Secretary Wright has said, AI is the next Manhattan project. The enterprise is taking decisive action to leverage advantages offered by AI in service to the nuclear deterrence and non-prololiferation missions. Last year, Lawrence Liverour National Laboratory installed ElCapitan, our first exoscale computing system for national security.
▶ 0:24:46With the ability to perform 2.79 quintilion calculations per second at peak performance, it has been benchmarked as the world's fastest supercomput and is currently running classified full 3D nuclear weapons simulations in support of nuclear stockpile stewardship activities. As NNSA's workload increases, the enterprise continues to advance extensive infrastructure modernization efforts required to meet today's needs and provide enduring flexible and resilient capabilities.
▶ 0:25:16We look forward to talking to you more about those infrastructure modernization activities. Thank you, Mr. Robbins. Uh Dr. Van, you're recognized. Chairman Dejar, Ranking Member Molton, and the distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for uh allowing me to testify before you here today. And sir, thank you for your kind words.
▶ 0:25:39Um it's my pleasure to join my colleagues to discuss the matters relating to our US nuclear deterrent which underpins all of our national defense priorities. And as President Trump and Secretary Hegsth have stated, the United States will achieve peace through strength by rebuilding our mil military and reestablishing deterrence. And nuclear weapons provides a unique deterrence effect that no other element of the US military power can replace. And our nation must continue to field flexible in a modern deterrent.
▶ 0:26:09These capabilities are critical to the continued safety and security of our American people and our allies and partners both now and in the future. And the department continues to prioritize nuclear modernization and sustainment of the three legs of the triad as well as our nuclear command and control systems and our supplemental capabilities for the program of record. Additionally, the department supports the effort of the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration to recapitalize, sustain, and operate that nuclear enterprise.
▶ 0:26:40The president's 26 topline budget request of a trillion dollars for the Department of Defense includes a prioritization for our nuclear modernization efforts as well as our sustainment efforts. The Department of Defense remains staunchly committed to the viability of our US nuclear deterrent in response to an unprecedented security environment with multiple nuclear challenggers who have not followed our lead as a responsible nuclear power. And our nation will soon encounter a fundamentally different global setting than it has ever experienced.
▶ 0:27:10And the DoD is acutely aware of the significant challenges that we face and recognizes that action needs to take place. And the decisions that we make as a nation today will have profound ramifications for decades to come.
▶ 0:27:24I do want to acknowledge the creation of the assistant secretary of defense for nuclear deterrence chemical and biological defense policy and programs referred to in the department as the ASD NDCBD who will ultimately be at the forefront of the DoD's efforts to sustain and modernize that nuclear deterrent. This new position not only will serve as a key point of accountability to Secretary Hegsth, but also to Congress on this critical national security mission.
▶ 0:27:51And in addition to serving as a senior adviser to the secretary of defense and the deputy secretary on broad range of issues associated with both our nuclear deterrent as well as our chem biod defense programs. It will also serve as the staff director director for our nuclear weapons council or the NWC a key coordination position across this nuclear enterprise.
▶ 0:28:11Today we face an unprecedented strategic environment with China and Russia modernizing and diversifying their nuclear forces at breathtaking pace and the Democratic uh People's Republic of Korea continuing its uh to demonstrate its ability to execute strategic attack.
▶ 0:28:28They are increasing our level of coordination and cooperation which re uh raises the possibility of simultaneous conflicts with multiple nuclear armed adversaries and our adversaries have thus far given no indication of arms control interest. And with the expiration of the new start treaty in February 26, the United States may face a historical moment in the nuclear era without a major nuclear arms limitation agreement in place.
▶ 0:28:54And while the evolving geopolitical environment remains at the forefront of our minds, we also recognize uh that our adversaries aren't our only challenge, right? We're faced with unprecedented set of crosscutting risks. We're simultaneously sustaining the current nuclear stockpile and trying to modernize uh at a scale that we haven't seen in over 40 years.
▶ 0:29:15And these risks that we find reside not only in our industrial base but also with our workforce in supply chain security and even in cyber security threats that are requiring action in the near term in order to make lasting effects uh across the deterrent.
▶ 0:29:31So in response to this, the department continues to uh to determine and implement necessary actions to address that risk as we acknowledge uh that the nuclear modernization program of record is necessary but may be insufficient for the realities of the security environment we will face in the future.
▶ 0:29:49And we recognize that we must be flexible, efficient, and adaptable to that evolving geopolitical landscape in order to defend our uh homeland and provide options to the secretary and to the president to bolster that deterrence. The department is focused on mitigating those potential risks and ensuring that there's no gaps in our capabilities uh from that transition of our legacy forces to our modern systems. Um and there are bound to be challenges with the complexity of the system that we have. However, the department remains really committed to delivering.
▶ 0:30:20The nuclear weapons council is acutely aware of this challenge and is working to uh discuss, enact, and identify, mitigate risks to ensure that we continue to have a safe, secure, credible, and effective nuclear deterrent in today and into the future. I just want to thank the members of the committee for its long-standing uh support of this mission. And I would like to acknowledge uh my colleagues at this table as well as the folks within the nuclear enterprise who uh are tirelessly working this issue dayto day.
▶ 0:30:50Thank you so much. Thank you Dr. Van and back again uh before our committee since last week. Here we're ready for round two from Miss Thank you. I'm glad to be back. Um Chairman Dejle, Ranking Member Molton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on the Department of Defense's nuclear forces and atomic energy defense activities. I'm honored to appear alongside my distinguished colleagues. The strategic threats to the nation continue to mount.
▶ 0:31:21China, Russia, and North Korea are fielding more advanced missiles with greater ranges and in greater numbers to provide the means for strategic level attack against the homeland, including nuclear and non-uclear options. They are rapidly modernizing, expanding, and diversifying their nuclear forces, incorporating advances in warhead delivery systems, and the supporting command and control systems. Iran, meanwhile, continues to engage in concerning behavior related to enrichment and the pursuit of nuclear capable missiles.
▶ 0:31:51These developments pose an increasing threat to the United States and our allies and partners. The nation's nuclear forces and supporting infrastructure remain the foundation of deterrence and defense against the growing threats to the homeland and our interests abroad. We continue to affirm and support the full scope modernization of US nuclear forces and nuclear command control and communication capabilities as well as the modernization of the complimentary defense industrial base and the department of energy's nuclear production enterprise.
▶ 0:32:21The United States must deliver the nuclear modernization program of record while continuing to sustain legacy systems to avoid a deterrent shortfall and mitigate risk. The United States is also committed to investing in extended deterrence and assurance by fielding flexible nuclear forces suited for regional deterrence and working with allies and partners to provide concrete non-nuclear capabilities to support US deterrence operations.
▶ 0:32:45To that end, the president's FY26 budget request for DoD will, among other things, prioritize investments to modernize the nation's nuclear deterrent alongside efforts to defend the homeland, deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific, and revitalize the US defense industrial base. However, we recognize that the current nuclear modernization program was conceived at a time where we did not contemplate a world with multiple nuclear challengers who are uninterested in arms control.
▶ 0:33:12The multiple nuclear challenger or problem that we confront places demands on our deterrence and defense posture that no US presidential administration has had to face since the first nuclear weapon was developed. While each challenger presents individualized risks to the United States, the simultaneity and growing collaboration between challenggers forces us to think in new ways about what it what it takes to maintain stable deterrence, provide extended deterrence to our allies, deter opportunistic aggression in the event deterrence fails against any
▶ 0:33:43one challenger, and manage increasingly complex escalation dynamics. In assessing how to address the evolving security environment, it may be necessary to adapt current US force capability, posture, composition, or size. The department will continuously evaluate whether adjustments should be made and when appropriate, make recommendations to the president.
▶ 0:34:04The department is firmly committed to making the necessary policies and investments in our nuclear forces to deter our adversaries and if deterrence fails to achieve our presidential objectives. The mission requires sufficient and consistent funding and support. Thank you for your dedication to our mission and our service members, including your support for the nuclear deterrent in the reconciliation process. And thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you, Miss Yappy. Uh now we'll turn to General Jabber.
▶ 0:34:38Chairman Deja, ranking member Molton, members of the House Armed Services Subcommittee for Strategic Forces. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today along with my teammates across the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, the airmen and guardians of the Department of the Air Force work tirelessly to ensure the United States maintains the nuclear deterrent our nation demands. Their unwavering professionalism to restore deterrence and rebuild US nuclear forces ensures the foundation of our national security remains strong.
▶ 0:35:06I'd like to take this opportunity to thank the Congress for its sustained support to ensure that the US nuclear enterprise has the resources to meet all current and future challenges. Our mission to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent is as vital today as it was at the dawn of the nuclear age. The United States, our allies, and partners confront an unprecedented strategic environment.
▶ 0:35:30China is rapidly expanding its nuclear and conventional forces as part of a broader project to reshape the Indoacific and the international order. China is projected to have over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, effectively adding the entire nuclear stockpile of the next largest existing power every few years. The nuclear activities of Russia, North Korea, and Iran further complicate deterrence. Now, I want to emphasize this security landscape is not simply a return to the Cold War.
▶ 0:35:58Instead, the emergence of multiple nuclear threats represents a new and fundamentally different strategic environment, one that has never been seen before. In this emerging world, sustaining a credible nuclear deterrent remains a top Department of the Air Force priority mission. US nuclear forces underpin our national security. Each element of the triad provides unique and complimentary attributes.
▶ 0:36:21Collectively, the triad offers the president flexibility and resilience to deter our nuclear challengers, assure allies and partners, and should deterrence fail, achieve the president's objectives. To prepare for this challenge, the departments of defense and the air force are undertaking a full scope recapization of current systems and supporting infrastructure to deliver modern and effective deterrence capabilities.
▶ 0:36:46Our program of record includes the B-21 and B-52 bombers, the longrange standoff weapon, the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile system, nuclear certification for the F-35, construction of advanced weapons generation facilities, and nuclear command control and communications. This is a once in a generation effort that cuts across every aspect of the nuclear enterprise.
▶ 0:37:07As we modernize, it is imperative that we continue to sustain current systems to ensure there is no gap in our nation's strategic deterrence Your continued support of this year'slong effort is critical to our ability to restore deterrence and rebuild our military for the challenges of the 21st century. A strong, credible nuclear force is not an option. It is a necessity. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today and I look forward to your questions. Thank you, General Admiral Wolf. You're recognized.
▶ 0:37:35Chairman Dejarlay, Ranking Member Molton, and distinguished members of this committee. It is an honor to be here and a privilege to continue representing the service members, civilians, and families of the Navy's strategic systems programs. I'd like to thank this committee and Congress for its continued support in providing us with the resources required to execute our assigned mission. I have submitted my posture statement for the record.
▶ 0:38:00I'll begin by assuring you that the Navy's nuclear forces, the bedrock of our national security, are safe, secure, effective, and credible. As the Navy command that provides cost-effective, safe and secure seabbased strategic deterrent solutions, strategic systems programs is entrusted to provide cradletograve life cycle support to three critical programs.
▶ 0:38:24the Trident 2 D5 strategic weapon system, Navy hypersonics, the conventional prime strut program, strike program, and the nuclear armed sea launch cruise missile nuclear programs. These are three of our highest priority acquisition programs, and with your support, they ensure the Navy is delivering peace through strength.
▶ 0:38:45Strategic systems programs ensures the highest levels of readiness and modernization for the Trident strategic weapons systems which underlies our national strategy to deter any adversary who threatens the United States, our allies or our interest. The US nuclear triad's most survivable leg is provided by this seabbased strategic deterrent.
▶ 0:39:07The ballistic missile submarine force represents a substantial portion of our nation's deployed nuclear warheads, providing an unyielding foundation for assured response against any adversary. The Navy's strategic deterrent stands at a critical juncture. To maintain our advantage in the face of evolving threats, we must prioritize the modernization of our nuclear infrastructure and industrial base.
▶ 0:39:33A strong domestic industrial base is the foundation of a credible deterrent. Using resources authorized by this committee, Strategic Systems Programs is actively working to revitalize this vital national asset, ensuring the timely production and delivery of critical strategic weapons systems components while fostering American jobs and technological superiority. Our modernization needs cannot succeed without investing in research and development.
▶ 0:40:02the critical skills for our workforce and the facilities needed to produce, sustain, and certify our nuclear systems. Our infrastructure is also at an inflection point. Existing facilities are reaching their 30-year recapapitalization windows as we enter into a once- in a generational transition of both the Trident Strategic Weapons System and the Ballistic Missile Submarine Platform.
▶ 0:40:27In accordance with the fiscal year 2024 NDAA, Navy established a slick amend program office at strategic assistance programs in March of 2024. Over the past year, strategic assistance programs has focused on standing up this program office and conducting the assessments needed to deliver a weapon system that meets warfighter needs. The Slickamin program is focused on achieving a milestone decision in FY26 and continuing program assessments to bite down technical and programmatic risk.
▶ 0:40:57Executing this program requires careful balancing of resources to ensure existing critical Navy and Air Force programs of record are not adversely impacted. Strategic systems program's mission strategic deterrence is critical to this nation. It is the foundation of the national defense strategy and is a top priority of the department of defense.
▶ 0:41:20Based on the success of the trident program, strategic systems programs has also been tasked with rapidly developing and producing the Navy's first hypersonic weapon system, conventional prompt strike, along with the Army's long range hypersonic weapon system.
▶ 0:41:35In order to accomplish our mission, Strategic Systems Programs relies on a relatively small number of trained, skilled employees, and it is critical that my command is able to appropriately staff its workforce with these highly specialized technical experts. People are as fundamental to our nuclear deterrent as the strategic weapons systems itself.
▶ 0:41:57As the 14th director of strategic systems programs, I have absolute faith and confidence in the safety, security, effectiveness, and credibility of our Navy's strategic deterrent due to the proficiency and the professionalism of the dedicated service members and civilians who have made strategic deterrence their life's work and committed themselves to our mission.
▶ 0:42:21Weii with continued congressional support and stable ontime funding, the Navy will continue to effectively defend our nation and preserve peace for future generations. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. Thank you, Admiral, and thank all our witnesses for their testimony. We'll now turn to member questioning. I'll begin by recognizing myself for 5 minutes.
▶ 0:42:42Um, Admiral Wolf, uh, you gave quite a bit of description on the Slickham program, but would you mind going into some more detail and updating us on the progress you're making with the Slickimum program? And also, are there any changes uh we could make here in Congress that would allow you to go even faster? Yes, sir. So, as I said, we've stood up the program office. We are looking at what the options available are. Um, my colleague talked about the warhead gown selection, which was a major milestone that we needed to achieve, and we're we're on track for that.
▶ 0:43:11um we continue to do all of the things that to understand what it's going to take us to get to a milestone decision next year. So all of that is in the works. What we're starting to realize is based on particularly what um IndopayCom and Stratcom are are asking for, we're looking to understand if there's any additional acquisition flexibilities that we can get to be able to more rapidly move through the acquisition process to deliver a capability not just on time, but to accelerate it to continue provide the war fighter the things that we're looking for.
▶ 0:43:43And and can you elaborate just a little bit on what that capability brings to the table for us? Yes, sir. It brings another option to our decision makers to deter our adversaries. Um it it is it is an underlay for uh our triad and certainly it brings a regional weapon and a deterrent that we just don't have today. Thank you Miss Robbins. U NNSA has proven it can deploy capabilities rapidly to meet the war fighter needs.
▶ 0:44:10The W76-2 and the B61-13 are examples of this. Has NSA looked at institutionalizing this type of approach and establishing a dedicated rapid acquisition pathway for developing and deploying tailored capabilities? Thank you. Uh chairman, yes, NNSA is looking at that.
▶ 0:44:31We believe it would be beneficial to have the capability to rapidly develop and deploy uh new systems for the war fighter and for the commander of strategic command and the president. Um, we are looking at, as you noted, with the W76-2 and the B6113, we were able to turn those from uh to first production unit in less than two years.
▶ 0:44:56And uh we we are looking to be able to stand up the capability to do that with um new systems. So the W76-2 and the B6113 used our existing production line and uh qualified components. We would like to create the capability to do that with new components and a and and and a production line that's not already in in the works. Okay.
▶ 0:45:26And thank you. And Dr. van. Is this something the Nuclear Weapons Council has looked at and would this help address emergent deterrence challenges? Excuse me. Yes, sir. The uh the NWC is actually actively focused on looking at ways to try to tailor our joint acquisition guidelines that help enable some of these rapid capabilities in response to emergent needs.
▶ 0:45:46Uh the NWC acknowledges that business as usual is not going to survive uh suffice in today's environment and is committed to trying to break through acquisition barriers whether they're within the department of defense or across the nuclear enterprise. Okay. And can you update us on the progress implementing section 1621 of the FY25 defense authorization bill? Yes sir. So uh thank you for the acknowledgement of this position.
▶ 0:46:10The department is taking the implementation of uh the 1621 language uh very seriously and of course has requested some additional time to ensure that the secretary of defense and some other additional administration leadership have the opportunity to review all of the options and ultimately ensure that this position is empowered to meet them both the letter and the spirit of the law. All right and thank you. I think this is something that needs to be carried out expeditiously. Uh I will now turn to our ranking member Mr. Molton for questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
▶ 0:46:40And I'll begin exactly where you did um with with Flickabend. And uh Vice Armor Wolf, appreciate the conversations that we have had about this and the Navy's evolving position on the program in general. But I know that one of the great concerns that the Navy continues to have is the impact the attack submarine force uh including impact on operations, the new requirements for training and the new infrastructure required to support uh the operations of of carrying nuclear weapons.
▶ 0:47:07So can you share how the Navy's working with Stratcom and the combatant commanders to shape concepts of operation and reduce the impact to a fleet that's already Yes sir. So a as you said that really is between the combatant commanders and the fleet um that concept of operations of how we're going to operate that part of what you said and we've had as you said we've had discussions about what's the impact to to the SSN fleet and how do we minimize that.
▶ 0:47:33That's part of what we've been trying to do over this last year is to really understand what is that range of options where we can work with the command and commander and the war fighter to get a concept of operations that allows us to minimize that impact. Part of what we are trying to design based on that is to just get at that. And in in this environment that's about all we can talk about.
▶ 0:47:54we continue down that path to understand um how to deploy a capability um that's going to meet the combatant commander and minimize that impact. Great. Thank you very much. And as I noted in my opening statement, I have serious concerns uh that the administration is not treating the enormously consequential decisions uh regarding deterrence uh strategy and policy with the rigor that they deserve. So a couple questions on that point.
▶ 0:48:21Lieutenant General Gabbara and Vice Admiral Wolf, you're both career experts on nuclear deterrence. Have either of you spoken with the White House regarding nuclear deterrence, particularly the implications of potential changes to policy that might impact our nuclear deterrence, sir. I'll go ahead and start. So, I personally have not done so. It would not be typical for me to do so based on the position I am in. would expect that advice to go from the combatant commanders and the joint chiefs to the president.
▶ 0:48:51It's also not typical to suddenly change 70 years of policy on a whim. So I thought they might ask uh Admiral Wolf. Sir, um I I would give the same answer as a general. I have not had any personal discussions that something we'd work through policy and through OSD. Thank you. Dr. Van, Miss Afy, have you had any discussions about nuclear deterrence policy with the White House? So sir, I can say that we I have not personally had any conversations at this point, but that would normally go through policy.
▶ 0:49:21So the policy office certainly when the golden doio came out had a number of conversations with the white house to understand intent and make sure that the architecture recommendations were in line with the policy intent. We expect ongoing conversations on the deterrence elements. What what do what do you understand to be the new deterrence policy? How is this going to work and how are our adversaries going to respond? Since that how that's how deterrence works, your adversary gets a vote. That's right, sir.
▶ 0:49:48The guidance and certainly the intent of the Golden Dome is to strengthen our deterrence by denial approach to deterrence strategy to make sure that the adversary does not believe that they can affect their objectives through a cruise or a missile attack, cruise ballistic hypersonic attack on the United States. It's meant to send the signal we will not take that attack. We also of course continue a deterrence through cost and position strategy with our nuclear triad.
▶ 0:50:10Even though you admitted last week in the hearing that Golden Dome will not protect against several of the novel delivery systems like the nuclear tip torpedo, it's not designed to to stop a nuclear tip torpedo coming into Los Angeles Harbor for example, right? The priority is on aerial threats and missiles, right? So we so we're sort of accepting that even though we we we claim deterrence by denial, we know that several adversary weapons can get through.
▶ 0:50:36I mean this is where the deterrence through cost imposition strategy comes in is to make sure that the adversary understands that the range of attacks may face to cost that they are not prepared to bear. Well that's back to the old the theory of deterrence. Right. Correct. I mean I don't think anybody's walked away from the theory of deterrence through cost imposition. It's added to with deterrence through denial through the golden dome. Yeah. Except if you factor in what they might do in response. Have there been any discussions about that?
▶ 0:50:59There have certainly been discussions and as you noted in your opening statement, China and Russia have continued to pursue a breadth of capabilities despite our prior missile defense not being oriented toward them. Yeah. Uh well, I hope we have I hope these conversations uh continue and they are actually backed up by not just uh not just ideas but by numbers. Uh because the CBO numbers that just came out were quite concerning.
▶ 0:51:26I don't have time to get to this because I want to respect the the time for other members, but there are a lot of concerns that both the chairman and I have raised uh with implications for our workforce, the cuts from Musk and Doge and the implications for morale and so I'll send a couple questions for the record uh for you to respond on that front. We know how important people are to this process. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yeah, thank the ranking member. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Bacon. Very, very Thank you, Mr. chairman and thank you ranking member.
▶ 0:51:55Strategic deterrence is job one, most important mission we have. I know the last 20 years we were focused on Iraq and Afghanistan. So we diverted some resources there. So we have catching up to do and I think that's why the reconciliation bill is positioned the way it is at least for the military part because we got to catch up and take care of our troops. My first question is to Dr. Van perhaps General Jabar and Admiral Wolf but it's about nuclear command and control and particularly survivability.
▶ 0:52:21You know, for 29 years, we flew an airborne command post 24/7. Always a plane airborne with a general. And if the White House was hit, the Pentagon was hit, StraCom was hit, there's a command authority airborne that could take command of our nuclear resources and respond. It was all about nuclear deterrence. Russia and China needed to know, Soviet Union at the time actually, that no matter what they did, we could respond back. We stopped doing that in the early 90s. Then we moved the mission to the Navy at Tinker.
▶ 0:52:49And now we're hearing that the Navy's wants to move adjust that airplane to attack them C130 and walking away from the looking glass portion of this mission. So we have a we have a need still I believe and it's more critical now than ever because we can be hit within 15 minutes from China and Russia. And so that means survivable nodes are more they're more important than they ever were. So Dr. Mr. Van, what's your vision for the future of the Looking Glass mission?
▶ 0:53:20Yes sir. Um, thank you for asking the question. Of course, uh, the nuclear command control and communications is is absolutely critical. It is the fourth leg of the triad as it were. Um, and you would know uh, better than even I do on on how important that really is. Uh so recently there was a meeting held inside the department with the uh NLCS uh looking at that that mission uh and supporting uh transfer of that mission to the air force.
▶ 0:53:48So I'll I'll ask General Jabber to to kind of add into this. My understanding is that's now going to a JRock Council discussion and if supported it will be officially transferred over to the Air Force and stood up as as a mission sent. So, General Jabber, I don't know if you have anything else, Congressman. Thank you for the question. So, just to uh clarify, we have not the department has not backed away from that mission at all. We do that 247 365.
▶ 0:54:14I personally have 58 missions on Avancap, the airborne command post to do that mission and those crews are very proud of what they do and they continue. The Navy has moved out on the C130 model for their Taco mission which has opened the question of the airborne command post mission and which service does that and which service does not. And so that's what Dr. Van was referring to in terms of the joint requirements oversight council will take that on.
▶ 0:54:40They'll make the best decision on who is the best service to do that and then if if the Air Force is that service then we will move out on on that program. The commitment of the Navy has been that they are going to continue that mission until properly relieved.
▶ 0:54:52And right and so the last thing I'll say on that is the Air Force as you know has moved out in establishing the 95th wing which is our new command and control wing to take to get after this uh not just nuclear command and control but exquisite forms of command and control uh throughout our department that need to have uh full-time uh attention. It's not an additional duty of an officer. There needs to be a wing commander that is looking at this every day. Thank you. Thank you. Yes sir. I I think what General Guerr said just right.
▶ 0:55:19As a matter of fact, on Monday we had our Navy nuclear deter mission oversight council and this particular topic came up and the Navy is looking at how do they continue to meet um the things they're being asked to do until that ultimate decision is made and and and those uh responsibilities move. What I'm hearing though the mission is still vitally important. We'll have to find a way to transition it. Another thing I want to just state my position, but most people know it. Doing a 15minute alert I don't think works anymore.
▶ 0:55:49We did 29 years of 24/7 airborne and granted we got the the peace dividend when the Soviet Union fell and I think it was smart what we did in the early 1990s, but now we're back well I think back to the future. We got Russia is more as threatening as ever and China is going to match our our force in nuclear weapons and a 15-minute response time I don't think's adequate with the weapons that are here now but also the future weapons that we're looking at.
▶ 0:56:17So I hope we're going to look at some kind of 247 capability that ensures that we have a command mode that cannot be targeted and again we never want to use it but it's for deterrence. I was going to ask General uh for you to give us some success stories on the Sentinel, but I'm out of time, so maybe I'll come back later. Thank you. I yield. Thank the gentleman. The chair and I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much, uh, Mr.
▶ 0:56:46Chairman, and thank you to all the witnesses for being here today. Uh, Dr. Van, thank you for your service. I wish you the best in your next chapter. Uh but I gotta start um if I get my my thoughts here by uh sharing taking this opportunity to uh that Secretary Pete Hzv's actions over the past several months have led to a complete
▶ 0:57:17lack of confidence, a lack of confidence in his ability to be the Secretary of Defense by many members on this subcommittee. I don't even want to imagine a world in which he shared secrets US about our nuclear weapons details or plans in an unclassified chat room. I have called on Secretary Hedgeh to resign and I hope he'll heed that advice.
▶ 0:57:45With that, let me start by saying I read an article yesterday with the headline, Air Force now expects Sentinel ICBM will predominantly need silos. It is my understanding the Air Force came up with this requirement on its own 10 years ago. I think one of the first details to iron out when designing a next generation of silo-based ICBM systems would be determining how these missiles would be launched.
▶ 0:58:15General Gabara, can you speak to why it took the Air Force 10 years to realize new silos would be required for the Sentinel and how does this affect the cost and timeline? Uh, sir, thank you for the question. I I appreciate the opportunity to to speak to it.
▶ 0:58:34So, the initial Sentinel program that uh came came under review last year was designed to utilize the existing silos that exist today that were built in the early 60s and then uh the Minute Man 3 missile which is what we have on alert today was put into that infrastructure from the early 60s. uh there was an attempt and an assumption that reusing silos would be the most cost-effective way of of going.
▶ 0:59:04As we went through reviews last year as part of the reertification of the program as we determined it was essential to national security um there was a an effort made to look at all the areas that we may need to restructure to be the most cost-effective as possible.
▶ 0:59:22What you're seeing in the news recently is in in my view a positive inter interaction in that restructure in that we have determined that it is more cost-effective and more timely to go with new silos in most cases predominantly new silos than it is to put the uh the money and time into refurbing old silos. So this is just one example of the effort to restructure that our air force has been going through over the last nine months.
▶ 0:59:48And the cost factor Uh, Congressman, we believe this is more cost-effective than the original plan of reusing the silos. Thank you. As Sentinel's timeline continues to slip, maintaining Minutemen 3 is increasingly important to our national security. General Gabbara, what steps is the Air Force taking to ensure the Minutemen remains viable until replacement is ready? Sir, thank you for the question.
▶ 1:00:16So absolutely the the the issue of nuclear forces is that our nuclear forces need to be just as good on their last alert, last patrol, last sorty as they were on their first. There absolutely has to be safe, secure, effective, reliable uh forces. The reality is the Minute Man 3 is going to be on alert longer than we originally anticipated it being on alert and so we have to get after that. We have added uh monies into the sustainment for our for our missile forces and the surrounding infrastructure.
▶ 1:00:46Uh that has been looked at through our OSD teammates as well and they agree that adequate dollars have been spent on that. Uh we have also added engineering support into the program office to get after what are those unknown unknowns. So I could I could talk to this subcommittee with charts and charts of the various widgets that need to be replaced and the efforts we're getting after to do that. Uh but it's the unknown unknowns that will that will of course get after it.
▶ 1:01:11Um and so we are we're working hard to identify those early and and that's uh that's where we are on Minute Man right now. We continue to test the Minute Man system uh through uh periodic shots out of Vandenberg as as you know from your district. Um members of this subcommittee, some members of the subcommittee have have witnessed that personally. I took some of you to witness that last February.
▶ 1:01:35We do that periodically and that is very critical to ensure that you can do everything you want in in PowerPoint but at the end of the day it's important to test to make sure these things will will stay safe, secure and effective. Thank you. I'm out of time. I have a few more questions that I'll submit for the record. Thank you. Thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes a gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Uh thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the witnesses for being here. Admiral Wolf, it's good to see you again.
▶ 1:02:03and I uh would like to ask you some questions about the Slick amen program. Uh do you agree the most important operational requirement for SlickMan is to provide the president a credible response option after a nuclear event and if employed by the president how important is it that SlickMan missile survives an enemy's missile defense system? Well certainly sir any system that we provide in the Navy has to be survivable that is the whole reason why the Navy is in the deterrent business. So um I agree with those statements sir. Okay. Thank you.
▶ 1:02:32Has that importance been given to you from the Navy as a formal requirement for the Slickman development? Uh yes sir, we've got that in in addition to a whole bunch of other requirements, but yes sir. Thank you. Excellent. Uh when Secretary Hegsth asked how it would make the Slicken program go fast, he responded competition. Uh will you develop the SlickMan missile system through open Sir, that is based on the current program of record. Yes, we've actually already done an industry day.
▶ 1:02:57We're already looking at how we get um multiple vendors into this to understand what the concepts are and what the the viability of those concepts will be and that's what's actually going to help get us informed to a milestone decision next year. Okay, good. Um underwater launch testing is crit critical to both uh CPS and Silicon. Uh that testing will take place at Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane in my district. How soon would you like to see that testing occur?
▶ 1:03:25Well, sir, um, as as you know, since it's in your district, um, we'd like to have that facility ready to go as rapidly as we can. And of course, we talk about using that facility for sea launch cruise missile, but it was originally envisioned that it was going to be for conventional prompt strike hypersonic. So, um, in if in the effort to be lean and efficient, we're going to look at that to be a multi-use facility. And so, as we continue to push both of these programs forward, um, that facility will become more critical for us to be able to do that testing. Okay. Thank you.
▶ 1:03:53Uh, do you believe do you think you have the resources you need to perform testing when required? Yes, sir, I do. Okay. Uh, I've heard reports of the desires to field something sooner than 2034. Is it your understanding the currently appropriated funds and those considered by this committee in the in the proposed reconciliation bill are for the AAT 1 program as established by Congress? I do, sir, but that's why I'm also asking and looking for discussions on additional flexibility to be able to have us do multiple things at the same time. Excellent.
▶ 1:04:22That's that's what I was hoping you'd say. Uh can you well if can you conf confirm that if you decide to pursue any early capability that such an effort would not interfere with developing the missiles needed for the slick men program of record in IOC? Yes sir. Thank you. In terms of managing your command, do you have the facilities and people needed to run all three of your major programs? We are in a we are in a buildup right now of the workforce, sir.
▶ 1:04:48Um to your point, um if you look at what this program has taken on in the last four to five years, uh we need to grow our workforce within NSAP to be able to meet the demand signal for all three of those critical programs. Okay. Thank you. Um are you aware of the production challenges facing our current intermediate range missile programs both in terms of capacity and lead times? Yes, sir. I am. Okay. Um do you believe you can meet the 2034 IOC timeline established by Congress based on the current plan we have? Yes, sir. I do. Perfect. All right.
▶ 1:05:18Thank you, Miss Robinson. Um, I'm very interested in the potential for small nuclear reactors to fully power our military installations. My understanding is there's an urgent need for uh halo uh to support the advanced reactor industry in the US for US energy dominance. Halo can be made from down bleeding a small portion of NSS NNSA highlyenriched uranium stock piles.
▶ 1:05:42uh what is your view on whether that's a viable method to increase halo supply to support our administration's goals of of rapidly deploying advanced reactors without impacting our other nuclear uh programs. Thank you for the question sir. Uh we have been providing some down blended um or down blended at um we have been providing some highlyenriched uraniums for down blending to Halo.
▶ 1:06:06Um we have done pretty much um at this point what we can with the materials that we have in hand to do um we are going to need as a nation the ability to enrich uranium uh to be able to power these small modular reactors and advanced reactors. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I I yield back my time. And gentlemen yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Whitesides. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
▶ 1:06:31Uh let me start by saying that um I think uh we are all feel like very lucky that we have professionals like yourselves um working on these issues. So my gratitude to you all for your service to the country. Um this hearing is especially timely. Uh the committee and the offices that you all head are dealing with the dramatically changing strategic environment. That's one of the reasons why uh I felt the $189 million cut to the NNSA's non-prololiferation budget in the CR was so concerning.
▶ 1:07:02Uh now, in my opinion, is precisely the wrong time to be cutting that programming. Compounding the problem, uh we add the 177 NNSA employees that were summarily fired in Now, reports indicate that as many as 500 more might be on the chopping block between Russia, North Korea, Iran.
▶ 1:07:24I'm at a loss to explain or understand how cutting non-prolol proliferation, nuclear security, and inspections serves any of our national security interests. Miss Robbins, um I hate to do this, but I'd like to ask you some questions about the personnel process through which the NSA security inspectors were evaluated for firing. If you don't know the answer, you can give an approximation or come back for the record. Uh, can you confirm the total number who were fired in February and the total number currently subject to termination?
▶ 1:07:57Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. On February 13, 177 probationary employees were terminated. On February the 14th, 150 of those employees were offer the termination was rescended and they did return to Um, thank you. That answered my next question. Um, h so it sounds like a few have declined to be rehired.
▶ 1:08:26How many of those? So, um the offer the rescention was for 150 on February 14th following the California judges um order, the remaining 27 probationary employees were offered to return to employment, three declined. So, out of the 177 that were terminated on February the 13th, only three have not returned. Thank you. Can you describe for me the process of the firings?
▶ 1:08:56Were you able to advocate for waiverss? Were any granted? And what advocacy before the action did you conduct within the administration? Um the the actions happened very quickly. Um the um I had asked if there was an opportunity to consider national security as being excluded from actions that were happening at the time.
▶ 1:09:21Um I there was nothing provided to give me a national security waiver exemption. Um I proceeded with the terminations as directed and um with the following day uh the secretary did resend um the terminations directed me to resend the terminations for 150 employees. Thank you so much.
▶ 1:09:46Um, I just want to underline that point that the initial take of the Doge team did not give an opportunity for national security to be considered. I find that remarkable. Um, anyway, turning my attention to uh, General, I appreciated our conversation earlier today and I wanted to give you an opportunity to talk about the full range of modernization that's that's happening now. If you wouldn't be spot about a minute and 20 left, so you have a minute to to do that. Congressman, thank you very much.
▶ 1:10:14And there are a lot of exciting things happening in nuclear uh modernization right now. So a minute is going to go quick, but I would just say that there is an entire spectrum of things we're doing. So if you look from uh the one end of the spectrum, the LRSO missile in conjunction with the WD-4 that the NNSA is working on on time on budget successful flight test this year with a new flight test imminent and doing very well.
▶ 1:10:39Um B-21 bomber on time on budget uh exquisite sixth generation capability best uh air vehicle in the planet earth. Uh if you look at our B6112 B6113 my NNSA uh teammate has already kind of talked about the success of that early or on time depending on which one you're talking about. As we go to the Mark 21A program which will have the WD71 warhead in it. Uh we've had successful flight tests on time on budget.
▶ 1:11:09That is a weapon that will go on Sentinel and so there will be a question as the Sentinel timing goes to the timing of the Mark 21A. We have refflowed that program so that we can do maximum testing on other rockets while we come up with the Sentinel as well. And uh and then I'm happy to talk at at further or in a different setting on the Sentinel as we're running out of time. Thank you, sir. Thank you, sir. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen yields. The chair now recognize the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Crank, for 5 minutes. Thank you, Mr.
▶ 1:11:39Chairman, and uh good afternoon. Thanks to all of you for being here. In my mind, uh the rapid modernization of our nuclear forces should be one of our highest national security priorities. Unfortunately, some essential nuclear S&T technologies have been deprioritized in the past. And the good news is that new commercial efforts have emerged that may be able to assist the department in making up lost time.
▶ 1:12:05Um, Admiral Wolf, at a high level, can you share why strategic systems programs is interested uh in re-entry capabilities and what programs these efforts support? Yes, sir. Certainly re-entry programs, not just for the Navy, but for the Air Force as well. All of those technologies are absolutely critical when you look at what what these weapons do. Um certainly for the Navy because of the W93 Mark 7, that's our new development program that we've got. Um we we need those new technologies.
▶ 1:12:36We need to understand that manufacturing capability, all of those things that are going to go into us being able to deliver an entirely new capability uh in the mid30s. And then how will the department and SSP take advantage of uh higher cadence commercial re-entry capabilities and opportunities to increase testing? Yes, sir. So, we're we're looking at every opportunity with commercial industry. And it's not just what we're doing on the on the nuclear side, but it's also on the hypersonic side as well.
▶ 1:13:04We have a program in the DoD called Mach TV, um, where we're using commercial industry rockets to allow us to get more rapid testing at a at a quicker pace, more cost-effective to be able to develop some of these technologies. Maybe not a full-up system like what the general and I ultimately deliver, but but representative technologies that we need to go into those systems. It allows us to use all these new capabilities to develop those quicker to prove that they're going to give us what we need.
▶ 1:13:34Okay. Uh and General, thank you. First of all, thanks for coming by the office and visiting earlier today. I enjoyed our discussion. I had a question for you on B-52 uh modernization. Um obviously I think cons concerning to all of us obviously that the B-52H um the Air Force plans to fly it until 2050.
▶ 1:13:58Um but it's going to take pretty significant upgrades uh to achieve that um talk about I guess the Air Force investments for FY25 include a total of just over a billion dollars in research and development then 194 million in procurement uh for the B-52 uh modernization program. Can you talk about that and the importance of it? Yes sir, absolutely. Thank you for the question.
▶ 1:14:26So the decision to go forward with the B-52 was a decision made several years ago in that we needed a high low mix of capability. So it would not be cost-effective to the American taxpayer to all have all high-end exquisite things when many missions could be done with, you know, the proverbial old truck that's paid for and we just need to do some upgrades to it. And and I don't mean to make light of the upgrades.
▶ 1:14:49They're significant, but a a modernized B-52J is roughly a third as much cost as a as a brand new exquisite bomber. To do the B-52J program, we we need new engines. We need a new radar. We're going to install some new nuclear command and control radios as those age out and uh put new crypto technology on them, which is which is fleetwide for all aircraft need that. Uh so those are at various stages uh of development.
▶ 1:15:19The uh engines themselves that required a little bit of redesign on the inlet as uh we did computer modeling. That redesign has been done. It's currently in wind tunnel testing and we believe that we'll have a milestone decision later this year on that. Uh the radar has uh seen some cost growth uh to it. Uh we currently have been working through that to get that back uh a little bit more favorable to us. And then the nuclear command and control radio.
▶ 1:15:46Of the two, one is going on the airplane uh with no problems. The other one has been a little bit more delayed than I would like to see. But but overall uh that kind of family of upgrades will happen um as much in parallel as we can do, but they are different programs that are all going on the airplane. Again, this is something that while we are upgrading these airplanes, they are also operating in bomber task forces around the world. So, there's a bomber task force of B-52s going on as we speak.
▶ 1:16:15Uh, and so these are these are things that we have to keep operating while we're upgrading at the same time. Thank you for the question, sir. Yes. Well, and I see that I'm out of time, but thank you. Thanks to all of you for being here and uh thanks for what you continue to do for our country. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. The gentleman yields. The chair now recognizes a gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Bell, for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and ranking member. Uh thank you all for being here today.
▶ 1:16:43Um General, good to see you again. Um good speaking to you. I enjoyed the conversation. Appreciate your time. Um we discussed the importance of ensuring continued investment and procurement for these vital programs.
▶ 1:16:59The last thing we all want is to be slowed down in our effort to modernize and fall behind our From your perspective, what specific actions can we do here in Congress to strengthen our defense industrial base and ensure the timely delivery and production of advanced systems, weapons, and technologies so we can stay ahead of pacing threats such as China?
▶ 1:17:30Congressman, thank you for the question. And so I I think clearly the the best thing we can do is provide stable uh stable laws, NDAs and and appropriations as best we can so that industry can react to that because they're they're not going to react as well as they could if we're constantly shifting around. And so uh so that that's that. In terms of the flexibilities, we do appreciate uh flexible uh uses of money as we've seen in kind of the rec reconciliation bill.
▶ 1:17:59There's there's good opportunities there. And then the just the support of the Congress which has been unwavering in nuclear deterrence uh space. I think all of us would agree that we've been very happy with and and appreciative of the of the near unonymity of the Congress and the importance of of this In your written testimony, you mentioned the growing alignment among China, Russian, Iran, and North Korea.
▶ 1:18:24How concerned should we be about operational or strategic coordination among these nuclear armed or nuclear states? So sir, so clearly these countries are talking and they're collaborating. Uh what I would say is we don't need to be scared. We do need to be prepared.
▶ 1:18:46We need to work as fast as we can to ensure our modernization programs come into to the field as soon as possible and we need to ensure the systems that we the legacy systems we have maintained safe, secure, reliable and effective until until we can do that handoff. And I'm not sure if Miss Yaffy has anything to add to that. Sir, I just echo that we remain very concerned about increased cooperation to include on missile cooperation between Russia and North Korea, for example.
▶ 1:19:13We're watching it very closely, but this is a dynamic that we need to take into account as part of the overall multiple nuclear challenge or strategic situation that we face. Thank you. Um, your provided testimony, General, also highlights Iran's increased uranium enrichment and its continued development of ballistic missiles, uh, missile capabilities, including potential ICBM range systems.
▶ 1:19:37Given these advancements in Iran's destabilizing regional activities, how is the Department of the Air Force preparing to address the potential emergence of Iran as a nuclear armed state and what implications would this have for US deterrent strategy and force posture in the Middle East? Sir, thank you for the question. And so the the the president has made it clear that that it is United States policy that Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon.
▶ 1:20:07And I'll pass that to my policy teammate in just a second. In terms of the Department of the Air Force and what we're doing, we are a back to basics military organization that needs to be uh lethal and ready to support the president's goals.
▶ 1:20:21And and our view of that is if we keep that deterrent posture as strong as possible that that will give the president and the executive branch as much flexibility as possible to do what they need to do in in a negotiation state and over to Thank you. Preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon is absolutely of paramount importance to the United States. The president has expressed his preference to negotiate a solution.
▶ 1:20:45The job of the Department of Defense is to provide cred credible options to support a whole of government strategy to deny Iran a nuclear weapon. Thank you. and um um Emer Wolf, your submitted testimony highlights the vital and close com cooperation that has existed and continues to exist between the United States and the United Kingdom on nuclear deterrence through agreements such as the Polaris sales agreement and the mutual defense agreement.
▶ 1:21:13From your perspective, how vital is this partnership to the strength and credibility of our own seabbased deterrent? And are there any current challenges political, industrial or logistical that could impact our ability to sustain this cooperation effectively into the next generation of strategic systems? Yes sir. Thanks for the question. So we work very closely with the United Kingdom on my side under the player of sales agreement. Um I think it's absolutely vital that we continue um that partnership.
▶ 1:21:41Certainly what we do under the player sales agreement. Not only do they have benefit, we do as well. Um if you look at the cost share that they've got in many of the areas where um where we are working together um there's mutual benefit for all. I think that's about my time. I yield back. Gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, for five minutes. And thank you very much, Dr. Chairman Deslet. Uh and I want to wish Dr. Van well.
▶ 1:22:08I'm so happy to see University of South Carolina graduates be so strong and be so competent and capable. So thank you. uh and uh congratulations on your uh 2023 meritorious presidential rank award and then your background working at Nefron. Uh my goodness, you um with the Bill and Lou Kennedy uh you have worked with real superstars. So I wish you well for the future and uh anyway that uh we can work with in the future, please let me know.
▶ 1:22:36And with that in mind too, we uh uh truly are uh thanking each of you for being here. And the world uh sadly is in a conflict we didn't choose between dictators with rule of gun invading democracies with rule of law. And indeed Russia and war criminal Putin and Chinese Communist Party continue to expand and modernize their nuclear arsenals.
▶ 1:23:03uh and we uh know uh clearly that war criminal Putin is trying to recreate the failed Soviet Union and with that it's mass murder in Ukraine but it was also the annexation of Bellarus denying Sedlana Leia Leva the actual president to be able to be elected. Uh we know that they never left um troops in uh transistory of Malddova.
▶ 1:23:29you know the uh annexation practically of South Oescasia of the Republic of Georgia and the rigging of the elections in Georgia where Salomi Zorilli should have been elected president but over and over again we've just got to understand um that uh we're in a very uh uh I I think um critical situation. I'm just so happy for your leadership.
▶ 1:23:57Additionally, we know that North Korea is committed to increasing their nuclear warrant head stockpile and they are continuing their efforts at launching ICBMs to intimidate uh our allies of Japan and Korea and uh and indeed the United States. And then we have the uh regime in Thran which is uh making every step to produce nuclear weapons.
▶ 1:24:24And we know and I support very much uh President Donald Trump's understanding uh that Iran must not ever have a nuclear weapon. Uh we know that they never stopped developing an ICBM uh development and that there's only one reason for an ICBM. It's not for space research. It's truly to um ultimately uh provide their goal of death to Israel, death to America.
▶ 1:24:50And with that in mind, we must have a deterrent to preserve and maintain peace through strength. And Miss Robbins, again, thank you for your service. I'm so grateful to represent the Savannah Riverside, so I know firsthand of your good work and what it means to all of us. And with that in mind, and I'm the only serving member of Congress who actually worked there. And with that in mind, I know firsthand how capable the people are there. And I'm grateful to the local communities of vacant and Barnwall that host the site.
▶ 1:25:20And I'm also grateful uh that uh it's by state uh because uh next door Georgia uh with Congressman Rick Allen, we all support the Savannah Riverite and uh we've discussed before here the importance of plutonium pit production, a two-sight solution, and it was a genius for somebody to come up with that to have a um two-sight solution.
▶ 1:25:43And would you agree that modernizing our plutonium pits and bringing facilities such as the Savannah River plutonium production facility online as soon as possible is vital to national security? Yes, sir. The Savannah River plutonium production facility plays a key role in restoring our pit production capability which is essential for our nuclear deterrent modernization and and the deterrence is so critical.
▶ 1:26:10And then amazingly enough, Carson Corbal, uh I appreciate that General Jabber, he uh has jumped ahead in regard to the missile silos and uh uh it's hard to imagine Republicans and Democrats can work together and uh including uh even Seth Molton and John Garamandi.
▶ 1:26:31Uh with that in mind, um uh I my time's really up, but I want to thank uh Admiral Wolf uh for your service and uh indeed the industrial base, we need to be working together to have it to have it developed and so however we can and hey it is bipartisan and with Dr. desile working with um our colleagues on the on the left of of the das um we uh can achieve um the deterrence for peace through strength.
▶ 1:27:01Thank you. I yield back. I thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Garendi. I I'm curious what is deterrence? What are we deterring and who and then what does it take to deter?
▶ 1:27:27Seems to me that's the fundamental each and every one of you used that in your testimony. But I'm not so sure that we've ever come to a conclusion or even understanding of deterrence. My guess is that each of you has a different definition of it and a different way in which it could achieved if in fact you were to define it.
▶ 1:27:57I'm going to let it go at that. But it comes back to me that we really need to decide what these nuclear weapons are for and then we can go about deciding what we need to use them for. But right now it's kind of like whatever we might imagine.
▶ 1:28:21But this is a different weapon whether it's deployed in a LSRO on a B-52 or a Slickum or a Sentinel or Man or a Trident. What is deterrence? I think we need to think long and hard about that.
▶ 1:28:43The nuclear commission didn't deal with that other than to say we need a lot of everything to deter. I yield back. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Hammed, for 5 minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As we speak, Russia and China are rapidly expanding and modernizing their nuclear forces.
▶ 1:29:12This includes building new missiles, new hypersonic weapons, and even exploring nuclear weapons in space. Now, these threats are not theoretical. They're very real and directly aimed at us. Now, we know the threats we face, but we don't know is if and when we are attacked, as America will have an adequate response. Now, our country cannot be complacent when lives are at risk. And that is why President Trump's Golden Dome initiative is so important. Now, for the first time in decades, we are prioritizing the safety of the American people. The Golden Dome will protect us from the threats from above.
▶ 1:29:42It is bold, ambitious, and exactly the deterrent our country needs. Now, we are here today to ensure America leads, not lags, so our enemies know that if they even consider threatening our homeland, they will fail. Now, my first question is to Miss Robbins. You say that AI is accelerating some of our timelines, echoing what Secretary Wright's words that quote, "AI is the next Manhattan project." Now, how do we count our enemy's use of AI? Thank you sir for that question.
▶ 1:30:11One of the ways that we can do that is by getting there faster and using it to drive efficiencies and advancements in our programs. First uh one of the ways that we are using it is to identify new materials. Um using it um if we use it on our weapons program we can identify new systems faster. Um we can um reconcile data faster.
▶ 1:30:37We are currently using it in our stockpile modernization for verification that components meet quality requirements. So this gives us more reliability in those quality inspection inspections and it also completes those more efficiently. Very good. And you also mentioned that China and Russia dominate the field of nuclear reactor construction and that they've designed 48 out of the 52 of the world's reactors being built since 2017.
▶ 1:31:06Now that that's pretty shocking to hear that our enemies are building 90% of the world's new reactors. Um would you agree that this is a national security risk and what is our current plan looking at Yes, thank you. There's a couple of avenues. Uh one as Secretary Wright has been advancing uh new nuclear in the US and enabling US companies to expand their capabilities globally.
▶ 1:31:32That's key as well as ensuring that we have the materials that we need. Um, another is our nuclear non-prololiferation program engages with US companies to design safeguards in to new reactor designs. So that ensures protection of our materials if we were to put to to deploy reactors globally and even within the United States.
▶ 1:32:03Thank you, Miss Robbins. My next question is to you Dr. Van. You expressed grave concerns about Russia's interest in the deployment of nuclear weapons in space which would float in orbit waiting to be detonated. Now the consequences of that as we all know would be catastrophic. Now, what are the risks that hostile actors could detonate a nuke in orbit and how do you think this uh how do you think we should respond to this emerging threat? Yeah.
▶ 1:32:26So, um as General Jabber mentioned earlier, I think the the key for for the Department of Defense is to be prepared, right? To understand what the potential risks uh and and optionalities that our adversaries hold. work across our our nuclear enterprise, understand those risks and then develop uh countermeasures or deterrence measures in order to defend.
▶ 1:32:48That is uh absolutely critical to work those types of decisions through uh our policy colleagues as they set and establish what our nuclear policies are and then across the uh acquisition and execution enterprise in order to develop the capabilities as directed uh for for our nuclear deterrent. Thank you, doctor. Now, General, your testimony warns about the dangerous synergy of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as an emerging anti-western coalition that could put us in a simultaneous conflicts with two or more nuclear armed powers.
▶ 1:33:17Now, how can we expand our alliances to reestablish Sir, thank you for the question. And so, you know, the discussion of uh what alliances we have, what partners we have is a national level decision. And I would say in general we continue to be the partner of choice with across the world.
▶ 1:33:38As you look at, as an example, if you look at our bomber task forces that your United States Air Force operates, we've operated with roughly a quarter of the world's air forces over the last year to 18 months because everyone wants to be part of a team that is a successful uh can can give lethality if necessary, but is un understanding the uh the freedoms associated with western way of thought. And I don't know if you have anything to add on that.
▶ 1:34:07I would say our extended deterrence partnerships remain essential and certainly assuring our allies and partners is a fundamental role of our nuclear weapons. And my time is expired. Thank you. Seeing no further members uh for questioning, this will conclude the open portion of this hearing. We will adjourn and move into the close session. Uh marring a quick comfort break. We'll see you all soon. Meeting is adjourned. Hearing