▶ 0:01:38like amazing. That's right.
▶ 0:02:28Thank you so much. water. Yes.
▶ 0:16:36It's about time we get this uh show going. Hey, thank you for first of all, thanks to the members that are with us. We had a change of schedule yesterday, so I appreciate those who stay stayed here to do this very important hearing. I want to say right up front, I respect both of our folks who are testifying today. I appreciate you both being here. I've gotten to know you both. I've known Miss Bookout from when she was a colonel and I've enjoyed getting to meet the general and appreciate the job you guys are doing.
▶ 0:17:02So, good morning to everybody that's here and welcome to today's hearing on the Department of Defense's cyber warfare enterprise. Since taking the gavl, many of you have heard me refer to this panel simply as the cyber subcommittee because people know what that is. Not they're not too sure what a CITI is, but we know what a cyber committee is. This is not the reflection of our other core responsibilities, but rather that our oversight of the military's cyber warfare posture is the most operational mission under the sub the subcommittee's jurisdiction. We're at war in the cyber domain.
▶ 0:17:30In just the last two years, the United States has been directly and deliberately attacked by the people's republic of China and other nation states in the cyber domain. Vault typhoon, salt typhoon, flax typhoon, and countless other cyber attacks have taken aim at US transportation, energy, water, telecom communications, and other critical infrastructure. It is time to stop talking about preparing for conflict because we are already in one.
▶ 0:17:57I for one believe that it is now time that we start acting like it. However, recent actions by this administration raised some concerns for me and others on this committee subcommittee where they truly believe it. First is the issue of leadership. A few weeks ago, the cyber commander of US Cyber Command and director of the NSA, the two most important cyber organizations of the United States government were was relieved from command without any explanation. Draw Hawk was the most cyber experienced officer to ever hold this position.
▶ 0:18:25He was highly respected by his people and his peers and feared by our enemies. Removing him from the cyber battlefield in this way served absolutely no national security interest. All this did was help Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea to do what they could not do for themselves. And I don't ask our two folks today to to talk about this. This is not on you. But when the Secretary of Defense comes to the Armed Services Committee, he will have to answer for this.
▶ 0:18:50Secondly, it's a renewed speculation about the separation of the dual hat relationship between Cyber Command and NSA, a construct that proves its value to our national security every minute of every day. This issue has been studied exhaustively, but somehow there are still those who believe they they know better. I spoke to my colleagues on this panel and our friends in the Senate, and on a bipartisan and biccameal basis, the armed services committees plural are strongly opposed to ending this dual hat relationship.
▶ 0:19:18I want to take this opportunity to make very clear to the department's leadership that if they believe that they have allies on this issue who sit on the Pentagon's congressional oversight panels, they do not. Third, I remain concerned about the state of our cyber training and readiness. Joe Hartman's statement noted that the service cyber components only recently attained foundational readiness standards. Foundational readiness has a very specific meaning and the fact that it took us more than a dozen years to reach this point. It's not something to celebrate, though I'm glad we're here now.
▶ 0:19:47To succeed in the cyber domain, we need more far more than foundational readiness. And I'm particularly interested in hearing from both of you what you need to create and sustain a high level of readiness. across the cyber warfare enterprise. I believe a good starting point is to ensure the cyber readiness metrics reported to Congress are meaningful, accurate, and honest. As we discussed with your teams at the last cyber quarterly brief, we don't request these numbers to hear good news, but to understand the ground truth and focus on our finite time and efforts and what we need to improve.
▶ 0:20:17I say all this because our adversaries are clearly not deterred from acting against us. and we're clearly not meeting our potential in developing the cyber capability, capacity, and posture that this that is commensurate with the threat. Over my last eight years on this committee, I've often heard how we are getting better. That may be true, but I spent 15 years, and we should be there by now. I asked both of you here today to help us chart a course to get us there quickly. With that, I want to introduce our witnesses, Miss Lori Buckout and Lieutenant General Joe Hartman.
▶ 0:20:44Miss Buckau and I actually served together when we were in the military just a few years ago dealing with electronic warfare matters and I'm excited to be working with her again in our present role performing the duties of the assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy. Joe Hartman is the acting commander of the US Cyber Command and I've appreciated the great job you've done stepping in. Sir, I now turn to the ranking member uh and my friend Roana for his opening remarks and then we'll hear from our witnesses. And I appreciate the spirit of both sides of the aisle on this. These issues are not Republican and Democrat.
▶ 0:21:14They're American issues and we're working together uh for for our country. With that, I yield to the ranking member. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your leadership. Let me uh reaffirm what you said about keeping our cyber uh command and NSA together. That is a bipartisan position. That is a position that we have discussed uh many times now. uh and uh people on this side of the aisle support you in that.
▶ 0:21:44Uh it's by ca camal, it's bipartisan and uh you know I just want to make that clear because it keeps coming up and I said where is it coming coming from? Uh because the the support in the congress is is very strong uh for keeping the uh those two departments together. I also appreciate uh your candidness about uh the questions you raised on General Hawk's uh dismissal. General Hawk was an extraordinary public servant.
▶ 0:22:14Uh he uh would often brief us and brief this committee. He had dedicated his entire life uh to the military and to public service. And we uh are uh we should have answers. We need we we expect answers.
▶ 0:22:31I understand that the two witnesses here today uh aren't in a position to give those answers because they're not the ones who made the decision to dismiss him, but we need to hear from the Secretary of Defense why he was dismissed, what the rationale was, why are why have seven generals been dismissed, it's not a political matter.
▶ 0:22:50I mean, when you have people like you have here, Lieutenant uh General Hartman, who we met with I met with yesterday and Miss Buck who've dedicated years to the country, 15, 20, 30 years. You can't just fire them without explanation. I mean, that that is not the way we treat people who dedicate their life in service to this country. So, I u appreciate actually uh Mr. Hartman, you're stepping up. I know it's not easy.
▶ 0:23:18you're answering the nation's call and I appreciate it and I appreciate Miss Buckout you're uh willing to to serve. You will have uh this committee's cooperation in helping you succeed in your roles and I look forward to hearing your testimony. Thank you. Which who would like to start off? Miss Buckup. Okay, I yield to you. Thank you. the talk button.
▶ 0:23:49This is why he is the commander of cyber command. Um, Chairman Bacon, ranking member Kana, members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to be here today and discuss the Department of Defense cyber posture. It is an honor to share the stage with Lieutenant General Hartman. I cannot succeed without a strong partnership with US Cyber Command and I value the strong ongoing relationship between our organizations. one guided by the president's vision of peace through strength.
▶ 0:24:17I am deeply grateful for the opportunity to serve as the deputy assistant secretary of defense dazd for cyber policy and I'm currently performing the duties of the assistant secretary of defense asd for cyber policy. I come to this role after more than 40 years in communications, intelligence and cyber. I am proud to once again be serving my country under secretary hexath. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you and the subcommittee to achieve your goals.
▶ 0:24:45The president has nominated Miss Katherine Sutton to serve as the ASD for cyber policy, and I look forward to supporting her as a dazzy for cyber policy should she be confirmed. The United States faces a strategic environment of heightened complexity and risk. The environment is defined by the vulnerability of our homeland to the evolving capabilities of nearpeer competition and other adversaries adversaries who pose alarming threats across both kinetic and non-kinetic spheres.
▶ 0:25:14Cyerspace, a domain essential for global connectivity, communications and innovation, has also become a contested battle space. A particular concern is the increasing willingness of adversaries to use cyber capabilities not only for espionage but also to gain access and preposition for disruptive actions in cyerspace and to threaten critical infrastructure and services that underpin our society.
▶ 0:25:41The People's Republic of China poses an extensive cyber workforce and supporting ecosystem that contributes to the Chinese Communist Party's malicious cyber activities. Through activities like Vault and Salt Typhoon, PRC has shown themselves to be a dangerous risk to our homeland. The Secretary has defected DoD to prioritize resources towards the most lethal and effective capabilities required for the joint force to defend the homeland and deter China.
▶ 0:26:09And this is a strategic imperative in which cyerspace plays a foundational role. The Russian Federation continues to pose a significant cyber threat to the United States as well and to our allies and partners. Russia's cyber operations are often integrated with its broader geopolitical objectives, aiming to sew discord and project power on the global stage. The Kremlin views cyerspace as an essential tool for advancing its strategic aims in challenging United States national interests.
▶ 0:26:39Other threat actors such as the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remain capable adversaries and malicious actors in cyerspace. for-profit criminals and transnational criminal organizations, which might be referred to later as TCOs, target US critical infrastructure for ransomware, and take advantage of the speed and anonymity of cryptocurrencies, to hide and launder illicit gains.
▶ 0:27:07Within this complex and varied threat environment, the office of the assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy provides guidance and oversight for DoD cyerspace activities as well as the imple implementation of plans related to cyber forces capabilities and their employment.
▶ 0:27:24Invested with the authorities of the principal cyber advisor to the secretary of defense, the ASD for cyber policy is charged with oversight of US cyber commands service-like responsibilities. Our strategic aims focus on Secretary Hegs's three priorities: homeland defense, lethality, war fighting. To that end, we are concentrating our efforts in three key areas. Reestablishing deterrence and securing the homeland.
▶ 0:27:53Our foremost priority is to protect and defend the American homeland against aggression in cyerspace. We ensure our cyerspace operations forces have the resources, authorities, and strategic direction they need to contribute to deterrence and if necessary defend against and defeat cyber threats from abroad. Restoring the warrior ethos. Our people remain our most important asset in cyerspace.
▶ 0:28:18Recruiting, retaining, developing, and rewarding the highly skilled individuals on the front line of cyber operations is paramount. To maintain our advantage in the face of evolving cyber threats, we must prioritize recruiting, training, and retaining the most talented individuals to achieve mastery in the cyber domain. Rebuilding our military, we continue to evolve our capabilities against technologically sophisticated threats.
▶ 0:28:44In many cases, we can capitalize on advanced lowerc cost solutions from the private sector. DoD is enhancing its acquisition pathways to improve the ways we buy software, including through new partnerships with non-traditional suppliers. Mr. Bugout, are you near the end because we just hit our five minutes? Oh my goodness. Yes, sir. In conclusion, I remain grateful for congressional support. This support is essential to mission success. We look forward to demonstrating the tangible outcomes of support for this posture review.
▶ 0:29:13We're deeply grateful for the support of Congress. Look forward to working with you in the future. Thank you so much. Thank you. Yes, sir. Joe Good morning, Chairman Baking, uh, Ranking Member Connor, distinguished members of the subcommittee. It's an honor to be here representing the men and women of United States Cyber Command. I appreciate the opportunity to testify alongside Miss Buckout. I also want to acknowledge Chief Master Sergeant Kenneth Bruce, the CyberCom senior enlisted leader who's seated behind me.
▶ 0:29:43The role of a senior enlisted leader is critical to our mission accomplishment. Our senior enlisted leaders are committed to increasing readiness, focusing the force on lethality, and providing candid professional counsel to their commanders on all matters impacting the force. Chief Bruce is the epitome of a senior enlisted leader. He represents our professional non-commission officer corps, our nation's proven advantage against our adversaries.
▶ 0:30:11I recognize Chief Bruce for more than just his exemplary service and leadership. His impact on the future cyber force is equally as important. Chief Bruce alongside the dedicated men and women of United States Cyber Command is instrumental in our in our success. Our people are our most valuable asset. The professionals at CyberCom are at the forefront defending our networks and countering threats every day.
▶ 0:30:41Their innovation and perseverance are essential to maintaining our nation's advantage in cyerspace. Cyber Command's n uh mission is straightforward. We defend the nation from cyber threats. We protect the Department of Defense's networks and we support the joint force. We are dedicated to ensuring the department's mission advantage and providing options across the conflict continuum to the president and the secretary.
▶ 0:31:08The secretary of defense has directed us to be more agile, responsive and lethal. Achieving our assigned objectives requires a force equipped with a strong war ethos and the means to meet our national objectives. Deterrence is central to our strategy in cyerspace and we are focused on maintaining a credible capability that dissuades adversaries from targeting our critical infrastructure.
▶ 0:31:31In 2024, we executed over 6,000 successful operations, roughly 25% more than in 2023, and we are on pace to surpass that number in 2025. Our operations continue to grow in scale, speed, and complexity. Through the service-like authorities granted by Congress, we are strengthening the cyber mission force. CyberCom works with the services to manage our talent and improve retention.
▶ 0:31:59We have improved the quality of our training, providing new challenging opportunities for our operators. and the authority to conduct the development and acquisition of cyber operation capabilities has an outsiz impact on the cyber mission force. Lastly, enhanced budget control streamlines a process that previously required months of staffing and coordination, empowering CyberCom to maintain our operational advantage in a dynamic environment.
▶ 0:32:25In fiscal year 24, CyberCom responsibly managed over $2.5 billion, tightening the alignment of authorities and accountability for cyerspace operations. These are all things we're doing now. With your support in Congress, we will continue to do more. True excellence requires a world-class workforce. CyberCom is collaborating throughout the department to develop, pilot, and implement tools such as artificial intelligence and other opportunities to invest in our workforce.
▶ 0:32:55A world-class workforce requires world-class training, facilities, and capabilities to excel thrive. With leadership and assistance from Congress and the department, we are well positioned to achieve worldclass results. Our work is far from finished, but with your continued partnership, I'm confident we will succeed in defending our nation. CyberCom will rise to the challenge, outpacing our adversaries, securing our interest, and protecting our future.
▶ 0:33:25Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions today. Hey, Joe Hartman, it's not lost on us that the other combatant commands are preparing for war every day, but cyber command, we are in cyber warfare every day as we speak. We're being attacked by China, Russia every day. Miss Beck, my first question is to you. The current administration inherited the Cyber Comm 2.0 effort. Can you share the latest updates about where Cyber Comm 2.0 effort stands as well as any changes the administration may be considering?
▶ 0:33:55Thank you. Thank you, sir. We think that uh 2.0 was a uh was a great effort to improve our workforce management and retention. uh we have taken another relook and decided that uh we think it needs even more work. We consider cyerspace as importantly as you do. We really appreciate your continued emphasis on that matter. So we have decided to do a deeper look and make it a better product. Thank you.
▶ 0:34:23One follow-up question and piggybacking on comments that Mike Waltz has made earlier, but something that I've also positioned out there. Are we looking at rescoping our rules of engagement? I mean, we're being attacked every day, but we have more limited rules of engagement. What's your perspective on this? I know that the I I don't want to get ahead of the secretary and the president, but I know that we're always reooking the better ways to counter our adversaries in cyerspace.
▶ 0:34:52And our challenge, of course, is uh keeping up policy with the pace of technology and the pace of our adversaries. I would say that we're always looking for better ways for our cyber forces uh to address the enemy across the globe and I would defer to General Hartman if he has any additional comments to that. Chairman, thanks for the question. Um I would offer that on a daily basis we are actively engaged with our adversary.
▶ 0:35:20Um as the adversary changes, we adjust our tactics, techniques and procedures. Uh I acknowledge that we need to get faster. uh we need to get better. Uh there is certainly an authorities and policy piece that we will continue to ga engage with the administration uh and with Congress on. There is a capability piece that it's my job to continue to push uh and ensure that we are as capable and as lethal uh as possible.
▶ 0:35:46Uh and I would welcome the opportunity in the close session to discuss this with you more. Thank you. I got a qu followup question for you, John Hartman. But we were looking at all the general officers, all the services, trying to get a feel for just how much depth we have in the cyber uh career field and really only spot one general officer that has extensive cyber experience before they became a general officer. So our question, are we doing enough to develop our cyber leadership here?
▶ 0:36:15It seems like we're low on cyber, but we got a lot of depth in air, surface warfare, infantry, space, but in the cyber area, there seems to be a Uh chairman, thanks thanks for your question. You know, experience takes a number of different things, right? There's education. Uh I think across the services, we have done a good job of integrating cyber into the curriculum. You know, really from the basic level up through uh the general officer ranks.
▶ 0:36:44I I attended a course called Pinnacle at the threear level six weeks ago. uh and certainly a significant amount of our uh curriculum and discussion was about advanced capabilities like artificial intelligence and and how does the department leverage that. Um I think we have done a good job at the general officer level. My uh deputy right now is a surface warfare officer in the United States Navy. Uh my chief of staff is an entry officer.
▶ 0:37:10But I do agree with you that we have to integrate officers into cyber organizations and cyber command at really every echelon of their career. And and so we build officers that not only uh have the experience that that we need in order to lead in cyber but also lead their organizations fully taking advantage of what cyber can offer them. One final question. What would you say is your top one or two priorities right now for Cyber Command?
▶ 0:37:40Chairman, our top priority remains talent management uh and ensuring that we can build mastery in the force. Uh that mastery is required to defend the homeland. Uh that mastery is required in order to outpace China and we will remain laser focused on that. Thank you. With that, I yield to the ranking member. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
▶ 0:38:02Miss Buck, uh, with some of the cuts at the State Department and US A which support our allies, uh, what are what is the department doing to, uh, mitigate those shortfalls and what support do you need? I'm not aware of the particular cuts and uh, their interface with DoD.
▶ 0:38:30I can say that in my job I remain focused on ensuring that our cyber forces uh are ready to lean forward in any way possible and prepared to do so. And are you still working with allies in doing that? Yes sir. Absolutely we are allies around the globe and we continue to work and strengthen our allies and their cyber security postures. Thank you. Uh question for both both of you.
▶ 0:38:59what is the current state of the workforce in terms of uh recruitment, retention uh and readiness? I will start with that that that remains a focus at the Department of Defense and of course as a secretary as well. He understands the criticality of cyber forces. Uh we understand them as critical to all operations and plans we have ongoing uh in the globe as technology advances and as our adversaries advance.
▶ 0:39:27Uh for particulars of the workforce, I would defer to General Hartman. Uh ranking member, if I could first just comment on allies and partners if uh that's okay. You know, in the six weeks I've been in this acting position, I have met with uh 11 different uh counterparts from allied and partner nations to include all of our five eyes partners. Uh the majority of our our partners focused on the Arctic.
▶ 0:39:52Uh I I do believe we continue to have a very positive relationship uh and we'll continue to work constructively with them to counter the the threats that we face together. Uh from a from a workforce standpoint, you know, we uh operate uh in a domain that was built uh by private organizations across the globe. Uh the the challenge and competition that we have for talent uh is significant.
▶ 0:40:18uh but we offer an opportunity to uh execute exquisite operations in support of national security that you simply don't get on the outside world. Uh our uh general assessments remain very positive. Uh our retention for really our key work roles and in cybercom we always highlight that's interactive onnet operators aka nation state hackers.
▶ 0:40:46It's exploitation analysts which are really uh those uh key members of a team that understand uh the the networks that we're we're operating against and it's really the people that write the code that we need to integrate into a platform in order to execute operations. Working with the services we we have been able to manage those key billets uh in a way that keeps them in the workforce and that generally has yielded very good retention results.
▶ 0:41:14But in order to be successful, uh, we also require access to talent across the workforce. Think linguists, think intel analysts, think planners. Um, and we've got to do a better job working with the services to ensure that we can keep those experts in our formation for a longer period of time. I appreciate the answer. And how is the hiring freeze affecting uh our professionals here? I mean, uh, do you think that it's hurting?
▶ 0:41:41And can we would you recommend that we have an exemption uh for uh cyber command for the hiring freeze? Ranking member, certainly we are working with the department uh to address the impact of the hiring freeze. We're we're hiring a highly technical workforce uh oftentimes with investments over a number of years in order to create the skill sets that we're looking for.
▶ 0:42:09So we are working with the department and uh we are hopeful that that freeze will be lifted soon. Miss Vot, last uh question for you on the hiring freeze. Thank you sir. Um we also have been examining that we have a cyber accepted uh that we collaborate with on the DoD CIO and we are working through options now to uh to see how many folks we can bring in under that umbrella.
▶ 0:42:39Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, sir. Dr. McCormack, you are recognized. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you for both being here today and a busy Friday right before we get out of town. Uh, Lieutenant General, I appreciate you stopping by the office yesterday. We had a very candid conversation about Cyber 2.0 and its uh, organization.
▶ 0:43:02And one of the things that we mentioned and you just kind of alluded to, Miss Buck, that we're essentially moving on from the traditional cyber 2.0. We're going to revamp that. Correct. Yes, sir. That is the plan. Okay. Um, one of the things that confused me about our conversation on reflecting on it, uh, we had a we had a great conversation about three different ways we could do this as a single column, single command, kind of like we did with Space Force.
▶ 0:43:28uh either keeping it in silos like we do right now with the militaries or tucking it back under uh SOCOM. Is that correct, Lieutenant General? Congressman, our uh OPT that uh evaluated based on I I would ask the gentleman to not use acronyms because most people don't know what that means. Okay.
▶ 0:43:50uh Congressman, we had a requirement from Congress uh NDA section 1533 to to analyze the force presentation model for the cyber force. Um we developed a operational planning team uh from cybercom and across the department of defense in order to look at three models. So so I got to be concise here because I have three and a half minutes. Okay. So I need you to keep your your uh this is not our typical brief. We got to be quick for me.
▶ 0:44:20So, congressman, we analyze three models. Status quo. Yeah. A SOCOM like model and the creation of a cyber force. Which one's your preference? Uh, our preference was the SOCOM like model. The problem I have with that one and and this this goes to the point of what I was worried about.
▶ 0:44:40Um if we talk about what SOCOM is and the different services, the the special operations capable people, the operations, uh there there's a difference between operational command and tactical command. Correct. Correct. Okay. I I just wanted to make sure that when we talk about SOCOM responsible for building a special operations forces, but geographical component commanders have operational command over them. Correct. That's correct. Okay.
▶ 0:45:11This seems to to fly in the face of what cybercom would be both building the forces and employing them in that kind of model. Do you have something to say on that, Miss Buck? Okay. So, the different services of special operations uh or SOF operations are each unique and perform different missions like SEALs versus joint tactical attack controllers. You talked about cyber cam uh managing common training requirements so that regardless of uniform everyone is trained to operate as interchangeable. Correct.
▶ 0:45:41That is Okay. And am I incorrect in understanding there's purposeful no service specialization when you do that? Is that correct? That is correct. Okay. So this is where I don't really understand because JC isn't a combatant command like CyberCom is. Correct. Uh that is correct. back there subunified command.
▶ 0:46:02Okay, so it sounds good at first glance, but the what what it worries me is that the command has been trying to incorporate this for 12 years where you can't do both inside of SOCOM or am I misunderstanding that, Congressman? Just like SOCOM, we have components and we have subunified commands to include the cyber national mission force and joint force headquarters to similar to SOCOM. Okay. I I just I guess I wonder if Miss Buck out and you can weigh in this anytime you want because I know this is a complex issue.
▶ 0:46:32It really is. And we've been arguing this since I got here. This is we're going on two and a half years now. They were arguing it way before I ever got here. And I just want to make sure when we're recreating 2.0 that we're we are moving at light speed as fast as possible without the the getups of organizational uh crosscontamination, if that makes sense. When you talk about prepping prepping somebody administrative versus deploying them tactically, usually it's done in separate commands, not in the same command. And that's what worries me is that we're we're bump bumping up against this. The services want to have their own silos.
▶ 0:47:02We want to have a same command. We tuck it under uh SOCOM. It it hampers us to do the mission correctly. And that's what I'm just really worried that we put a lot of thought process into this before we we jump on this next time that we we understand we look before we leap. Is that does that sound reasonable? Yes, Congressman. That's too easy. Too easy. All right. Well, thanks. As with that, I yield, Mr. Chair. Thank you. Uh, Mr. Whitesides, you are Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
▶ 0:47:30Uh, I'm grateful to the two witnesses here and for the bipartisan leadership of this subcommittee. I would add my voice to their comments this morning. Today is May uh 16th, 6 weeks after the previous cyber command commander was removed on April 3rd. Over those six weeks, Congress and the subcommittee have re have received no details from the Secretary of Defense or the White House about the reasons for his removal. This is utterly unacceptable and a sign of the cavalier lack of professionalism from this administration.
▶ 0:47:59Without explanation, it seems clear that the reason that our top general fighting cyber attacks was removed was because an extreme conspiracy theory with the ear of the president had it out for him. This is, to put it mildly, a crazy situation and highly dangerous given the extreme stakes of this domain. It puts our citizens at risk. It hurts the morale of the dedicated men and women of Cyber Command and it hurts the national security of the United States. Now, to today's witnesses, thank you for being here this morning.
▶ 0:48:27I know the chaos that has been injected into US cyber operations over the past months is not your fault, and I know that you are both doing your best in a challenging situation. With that said, there has indeed been chaos. We've seen orders that paused our cyber operations against one of our key global adversaries without any credible justification. And although I know that none of this can be laid at your doorstep, it nonetheless falls to this subcommittee to turn to you with our questions.
▶ 0:48:51Secretary Buckout, has the Department of Defense resumed planning for offensive operations against all US near-per Thank you for that question, Congressman. Uh I'm afraid that I cannot discuss uh cyber operational matters in this open forum, but we remain committed to uh uh countering our global adversaries in cyerspace. Did the pause in offensive cyber operations against Russia, which was publicly disclosed, serve any specific operational purpose?
▶ 0:49:21I cannot confirm that pause, sir. Okay, General Hartman. In this time when our adversaries are putting untold resources towards recruiting talented cyber operators, it's important that we do everything we can to draw talented operators to government service despite the myriad opp myriad opportunities offered by our worldleading technology industry.
▶ 0:49:41Can you talk to us about uh specifically what new opportunities and employment structures Cyber Command and NSA now offer for recruiting and retaining our top talent and how the agency is working to get the word out to recruit the best people? Congressman, we we have a number of initiatives. Uh I think from a technology standpoint, the one uh that's uh most worth mentioning is where we're going with artificial intelligence.
▶ 0:50:08We have a artificial intelligence roadmap uh thanks to a requirement from Congress. Uh we have a artificial intelligence task force that executes pilot programs across the full spectrum of our operations. And we partner very closely with the National Security Agency to ensure that we leverage uh the advanced technical capabilities that the agency has in a way that makes the best use of the resources of the American taxpayers.
▶ 0:50:36Are we paying our folks enough um to compete with the private sector? Congressman, we have made significant progress in, you know, our ability to provide incentive pay for both our military and our civilian workforce. Uh I think it is adequate. We're never going to attract and keep talent because of the money we pay them. uh we're going to do so because of the mission uh and because of the culture and the organization that that's laser focused on defending the nation.
▶ 0:51:06I think I speak for the committee. We want to make sure we you know help you get the best possible people. So if there are other ideas or structures, you know, I think we're we're all uh all ears on that. Thanks Congressman. Uh last question. I hate to ask this but um uh Buck, do you have signal on your phone on your on your on your work phone? I do not. Yeah. Uh why Because there are other means.
▶ 0:51:32There is a basic it is a basically encrypted workphone and I remain dedicated to ensuring uh our national security remains as secure as it can be. I have 41 years of a top secret clearance with absolutely no security violations and I remain committed to that. Thank you ma'am. Uh Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you. Uh Mr. Vinman, you are recognized. Thank you, Mr. chairman.
▶ 0:51:58Um so first of all I want to um say that I completely agree with your um statements your opening statements Mr. Chairman this morning uh about uh how important the cyber mission is to this country and the fact um and echoing uh my colleague Mr.
▶ 0:52:15white sides that it is completely unacceptable that um the commander of a combatant command would be fired uh solely at uh the request of um of a nut like Laura Loomer. That's unacceptable. It's disrespectful to the uniform and the decades of service that um General Hawk and everybody in uniform puts in.
▶ 0:52:45Um so the second thing I want to talk about is um this idea of uh restoring the warrior ethos. I think that is also tremendously uh disrespectful uh to uh department of defense and people that have served. Um the warrior ethos is is part of what's ingrained uh throughout the career and you know it's a headline.
▶ 0:53:14Uh the remainder of the commentary is is acceptable. But this idea that uh the American service member does not have the warrior ethos is uh frankly outrageous and um unacceptable. And uh I want to be on record for that because uh I know this is a priority from the Secretary of Defense and that's an issue I'll take up with him. Um but uh that that verbiage is is uh ridiculous.
▶ 0:53:40Let me um kind of jump into the meat of the questions here. So um thank you for for joining us, Miss Buck, and and for your years of service. In your testimony, you spoke about the significance of the Russian cyber threat to the United States, our allies, and our partners. and I share your concerns and I assume you agree that the the given the significance of the threat we should keep all defensive and offensive cyber operations on the table as it relates to confront confronting the Russian threat.
▶ 0:54:11Thank you Congressman. Uh we do have a number of elements on the table now as far as specificities. I would refer that perhaps to a a different place to discuss and to General Hartman. Okay. What I'm asking is that as it relates to the Russian threat topline that we we keep defensive and offensive cyber operations on the table.
▶ 0:54:32Is that your I think we do so at this time and to the specificities I would refer to General Hartman that that's uh that's what I was looking for. And in early March it was widely reported in the press and this is a followup to the line of questioning Mr. white sides was asking about. But there's a specific point here I want to get to. Uh it was widely reported that Secretary Hexath issued an order to Cyber Command to pause offensive cyber operations against Russia.
▶ 0:55:00On March 4th, the DoD rapid response Twitter account. So that's from DoD denied that stating that the secretary neither canled nor delayed any cyber operations directed against malicious Russian targets and there has been no standown order whatsoever from that party. I'd like you to confirm that the secretary did not issue any standown orders to Cyber Command as it relates to Russian operations.
▶ 0:55:26I was not here at that time, but I'm not aware of any standown operations ordered at that time. Okay. Um, Mr. Chairman, are we going to have a second round of uh of questions? Yes. Okay. So, let me start then on this line. And Mr. Vman, if I could, I'm going to put you on pause for a second. I actually dug into this whole matter. I just want to address it.
▶ 0:55:53There was a one-day pause, which is typical for negotiations, and I just that's about as much I can say was a one-day pause. Okay, thank you for that clarification. All right. uh as it relates to cyber operations.
▶ 0:56:10Um as we know and this is not an exhaustive list but there's u uh and so this will give you an opportunity to think about it because for the second round of questioning but um you know cyber attacks have uh objectives of attacking, damaging, destroying systems. But you know there are also uh aspects that are less that that are more pernitious and and and pervasive and this is attacks related to deception and disinformation.
▶ 0:56:35And what I'm not seeing and it seems to me as a result of ideology from this uh administration is this idea of attacking disinformation from our adversaries around the world. And if we're not doing that, then we are leaving ourselves completely open to a a major line of attack. And so I only have 13 seconds left. I'll let you ruminate on that and then come back to it this during the second round. Thank you.
▶ 0:57:06Thank you, Mr. Fman. I ask unanimous consent that non- subcommittee members be allowed to participate in today's hearing. Uh is there any objection? Okay. With that, Miss Alfroth, you are recognized. Thank you very much, Mr. Mr. Chair, and thank you for your grace and letting me uh join you today. So, um I am I'm the very proud representative of the fence line of your home at Fort me and represent many of the men and women uh who who work every day in cybercom. So, um I'm I'm going to try to focus my questions on them.
▶ 0:57:34I also want to echo my colleagues deep concern with the firing of General Hawk and the signal that that sends to our adversaries abroad. And I want to follow up on a few points made and dig in a little bit on personnel. Um, General, I was really glad to hear you say that people are the most valuable asset of CyberCom and I think this this committee just in the 37 minutes I've been here would agree with that as well. Uh, not just the hiring freeze. I wanted to dig into the impacts or potential impacts of the actions of Doge on the personnel.
▶ 0:58:03I would be curious to hear from your perspective how many uh under your command took advantage of the fork in the road offer. how many probationary employees were separated from the agency. Um, and I have a follow-up question to that, but I would love clarification from you first. Thanks for the question. From a percentage of the workforce, the the target was 5 to 8%.
▶ 0:58:30And uh, we will fall somewhere in the 5 to 8% uh, category. uh no probationary employees were terminated as a result of this unless it was for non-performance or disciplinary reasons. Um and uh to to date we haven't had any. Okay. So 5% still I would argue that as everybody has mentioned before this is an incredibly important command. 5% of that is going to be felt.
▶ 0:58:57Can you speak to how you're going to balance out being able to deliver while losing 5% of your workforce? Congressman, we we have a uh a deep and uh talented workforce uh and we have junior leaders that will move up and uh and assume those responsibilities and it will be difficult. It will require leadership. Uh but uh we know who's leaving. Uh we've developed contingency plans and it's my job to ensure that that we execute those plans uh and continue to perform our mission.
▶ 0:59:28On the note of those who are leaving, I I I'm deeply concerned about the potential and an and unnecessary national security threats of disgruntled employees, especially if they were separated in the way General Hawk was. Not to imply he would have or at all or anybody would, but I think it's an unnecessary national security risk to separate employees in any kind of disrespectful manner. Can you speak to what you are doing to ensure that everybody's treated with respect and that the information that they carry with them is continues to be classified?
▶ 0:59:57So, first, we terminated no one against her will at Cyber Command. So, I am not as concerned as a workforce that would have been terminated. too. You know, the guidance I've given is that every person that has served their nation, the first thing we should say is thank you and we should do everything we can to facilitate their transition and to help them be successful.
▶ 1:00:20I would also uh recommend to you the even the folks who separated willfully, willingly um in order for them to to land successfully and continue to be able to keep food on their families tables and roofs over their heads. Uh has there been any discussion of helping them I understand their their their resumes have to be go through a clearance uh some type of of process and that can take up to a number of months. That's deeply concerning for my constituents. Can you speak to how you're so preparing for that?
▶ 1:00:48Congressman, I have visited that facility uh and I have worked with the team and I will tell you they are doing just an enormous amount of work uh in order to to clear the resumes uh in a way that allows personnel to go out and find employment. I do not believe that we'll uh that we will see any significant delay uh as it relates to what we have to do to enable the people that have served with us uh in order to go find a new a new job.
▶ 1:01:15So I'm I'm hearing from you that you're committed to ensuring that that goes faster than a few months. Do you have any time frame of which you're your goal is to clear those resumes? I I will be more than happy to take that uh for the record and provide you an answer. I don't have the exact uh number of days. Okay. I really appreciate that. It's it's of grave concern to me, Mr. Chair. So, thank you.
▶ 1:01:36And then finally, I'll just make a statement that when we're talking about obviously we talked about uh retention, but but even recruitment, I think it's going to be really difficult for us as a nation to recruit the best and the brightest to this space. It was already incredibly difficult when they to Mr. Whitide's point can make significantly more money in the private sector when we are treating our civilian employees with um across the board with the disrespect that we're seeing from this administration. particularly here.
▶ 1:02:01I think everybody wants to see the best and the brightest young people want to go into public service. I'm grateful that you're committed to that mission as well and it's just something I'll be focusing on. And Mr. Chair, I'll yield back. Thank you. And I share your concerns, Miss Alrath, on the reductions. I mean, I've served in the Pentagon. I I get it that we I think there could be reductions at the headquarters levels. And I think so some of that assumptions are I share but cyber command we are in a daily cyber war with Russia and China.
▶ 1:02:32China can put multiple times more people on cyber than we can being they're just five times bigger than we are. And so I I'm an advocate for cyber command making sure that we maintain the full capabilities and potential that we have there. I'm going to do a second round of questions. I'm going to recognize myself for another five minutes and please let us know up here if you'd like to speak. We'll get you in the back in the queue. Um, first of all, I want to ask both of you. I think we're doing a great job day-to-day cyber.
▶ 1:03:02I mean, but but there's also a second part we got to be thinking about. How do we support the co the other combatant commanders, the theater commanders, and there's been some reporting that there could be some improvement there. So, could you both address that? How how can we improve or is that a is that an issue? Miss Buck. Uh, thank you, Congressman. I'm very grateful you raised that question and grateful for your support on this. Um, as part of uh my job to come in and review all policies, procedures, operations, and plans.
▶ 1:03:31Uh, I want to ensure that cyber is well integrated across them all. Additionally, my office is in the process of creating a new 2025 cyber strategy which will also address ensuring that cyber is integrated in all appropriate ways in which we defend our country and approach the enemy. Uh I think we'll be uh covering that down very adequately in the future. Thank you. I'd like to piggyback a little bit on Dr. McCormack's comments earlier.
▶ 1:04:00I I share the view that the SOCOM model I believe is the best, but there's some pros and cons. I I think one of the issu one of the things it takes to make the SOCA model work is service buyin and that means they got to recruit and they got to provide trained people to cyber command at a level that they need but they also got to develop cyber leaders within their promotion system and and growing leadership gets an earlier question I had. not sure that we're doing adequate there, but we got to have full service buyin to make this model work.
▶ 1:04:29And uh would you both uh be grateful if you comment on that that Uh I would absolutely agree with you. I think the relationships with the services have been excellent and they only continue to improve. Uh as cyber continues to become more and more a way of life and certainly a way for our adversaries uh to attack the United States, the services see it as more critically important than ever.
▶ 1:04:58Uh I'll let General Hartman discuss particulars of how the services are working within Cyber Command. Chairman, the services have done a good job of presenting forces to CyberCom. There have been challenges. We've worked through those challenges. Congress has helped with legislation and we appreciate that.
▶ 1:05:20Um, but our assessment is that there is a more efficient model in order to take a basic trained service member and create an expert trained service member that gets at the the idea we call mastery.
▶ 1:05:35And so um instead of trying to do that across all the services, we do believe there's an opportunity using cybercom service-like authorities, cybercom joint force trainer authorities, uh in order to build that mastery in the force, and we look forward to working with the services to do that. I think it's a very important point, but we'll we'll try to help out there. Final question. I think recruiting cyber experts is a different than maybe recruiting an infantry person or a aviator.
▶ 1:06:04So what can we do to improve recruiting in this very important uh battle space? Uh thanks chairman. Look we have made significant strides in recruiting on both the service and really the civilian side of the house. Our service numbers while not perfect are better than they've ever been.
▶ 1:06:28uh we transitioned from a service standpoint or a civilian standpoint to the Army as our com combatant command support agency and and prior to some of the workforce shaping efforts we're we're going through right now, we'd seen a 45% decrease uh in the hiring timeline. Uh we do believe we have a plan moving forward and we uh look forward to working with the department to get after it. Thank you, Mr. Connor. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
▶ 1:06:56Uh I uh you had referenced uh General Hartman the five eyes and we had talked um yesterday when we met about not really having uh that much intelligence in South Asia with Indian Pakistan. I had I saw Richard Congressman McCormack left. He and I chair the India caucus. Do you think it makes sense at some point to move beyond the the five eyes?
▶ 1:07:21I know we have the nine eyes and to look at countries like India for closer uh intelligence cooperation particularly uh with China's uh challenge and what's going on in Asia.
▶ 1:07:35Uh, ranking member, I I would really defer to the the the the DNI uh and the administration on where we go from a policy standpoint, but I do want you to know on a daily basis, we interact with a number of different partners, not just the five eyes. Uh, and and we look forward to interacting with any country, you know, around the globe where there is mutual benefit to both the United States and that partner.
▶ 1:08:02And I think we'll continue to work those bilateral rel relationships very And is India one of those countries? Ranking member, I would uh welcome to discuss this further with you in the close session. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I uh in the interest of time, I don't have any questions. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Vinman. You're recognized. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
▶ 1:08:29And thank you also for clarifying that point on the one day pause. And so what I would like to do is obviously point out that that statement by DoD rapid response was a outright lie. Um it was at least misleading and um that is not what the American people deserve and that will be something that I intend to follow up with um the secretary when he actually shows up.
▶ 1:08:54Uh on the point of disinformation um is is uh countering disinformation part of the mission set of cybercom. I will address uh if I may from the policy view first. We view cyberspace as um part of a global uh IT information system if you will able to pass information. Uh however information operations is not the purview of my policy office. Okay.
▶ 1:09:23Um, General Hartman, Congressman, CyberCom has never executed operations to counter disinformation, but we have and remain laser focused on malicious cyber actors operating in foreign space that would support those operations.
▶ 1:09:46So, our our adversaries are are daily attempting to influence us and uh they're either attacking our systems or attempting to influence us. Military deception obviously is a one of the key um to military operations. Would you disagree with any of that? No, Congressman. Okay.
▶ 1:10:07And so whose whose job is it to, you know, if they're using uh cyber means to uh perpetrate disinformation, whose job is it to attack that or stop that?
▶ 1:10:23Congressman, we we have and we will remain focused on foreign adversaries linked uh to to foreign governments who are attempting to execute operations targeting the United Um and I would be happy to discuss more of this with you in the close session. And we'll get into it in in more detail in the closed session. Let me ask you this question, and this goes to both of you.
▶ 1:10:50Has there been a change to how um the department and cybercom um between the previous administration and the current administration um respond or engage with disinformation in the cyber realm from the point of OSD policy. Again, that does not fall under my particular purview.
▶ 1:11:17uh and I would defer any particular actions on deferring disinformation from a cyber point of view where it's appropriate to General Hartman. But again, we may want to discuss that more in a close session. Uh Congressman, there's been no change uh in the guidance for us to target foreign actors. Uh again, we don't go after uh information. Okay.
▶ 1:11:43Well, uh, this is probably part of a larger conversation, but again, if disinformation is a a key mechanism that our adversaries are are using, uh, in the cyber realm, it falls in the cyber realm because it it comes through, um, Tik Tok and Twitter and Facebook.
▶ 1:12:01Um, and it's not necessarily changing ones and zeros in the dig digital space to mess with systems, but it is messing in a much more penicious way with the way people think about things. Um, it's an operation. It's not clear to me, and maybe this will be a response in in the in the uh secure setting, but we're talking really high level who has purview of that mission and how are we countering that?
▶ 1:12:35We have uh policy organizations that engage in that. I would again refer to a close session to discuss that further. Uh congressman really nothing that I can add in this session. Okay. All right. you for Thank you again, Mr. Chair. I'm particularly concerned about the the mental health support for service members under CyberCom.
▶ 1:13:01These folks are are are basically functionally on deployment um while they're right here states side. Um I'm also concerned that Congress directed an evaluation of the occupational resiliency of our cyber operators and the report confirmed that we what we all suspected that military service services organic resources are insufficient to meet the specific needs of this community. It's troubling that this issue appeared to be to go unressed until Congress intervened.
▶ 1:13:27And also concerning are reports from service members who encounter obstacles or stigma when they seek critical mental health care. So given these realities, can you how can we be assured that CyberCom will give this issue a priority it deserves? What are you working on, Uh thanks for the question. So So look, I I uh I acknowledge the report.
▶ 1:13:46Uh I will tell you 5 years ago when I commanded the cyber national mission force we partnered very closely with the national security agency in order to leverage uh some of the occupational uh health specialists that they had. Uh we'll continue to work that. We have this year hired uh the first psychologist at cybercom. We recommend it's a challenge. Uh we will continue to work with Congress and the department to get the resources required in order to bring the professionals on. Uh you and I are really in 100% agreement here.
▶ 1:14:16uh we acknowledge it's a problem and we're working to get after it. I I appreciate that and and the step that you took with the the psychologist if if you could for the record uh give us maybe in writing your your plan here. It's not a priority for me if it's not written down. So I I would appreciate your your thoughts there. I also want to move on to the uh the Air Force recently announced the expansion of again Maryland Air National Guard Cyber Vision transitioning the current unit into the 175th Cyber Wing.
▶ 1:14:44I understand that under its current structure, the 175th Cyerspace Operations Group has supported CyberCom in cyber operations. Could you speak to how the establishment of the new cyber wing will benefit Cybercom's mission? Thank you. First of all, the Air National Guard teams are awesome. Okay. They have been integrated into the Cyber National mission force for the last 10 years and the nation derives significant benefit because of the work they do. Uh we're excited about having additional capacity.
▶ 1:15:15So one, the ability to bring more uh Air National Guardsmen from Maryland into the mission space. We welcome that. Uh two, from a talent management standpoint, it provides another mechanism for us to transition active duty service members to the Air National Guard so that the the United States can continue to utilize their unique skills and capabilities in order to support the the mission. So, I think there's a lot of opportunity there.
▶ 1:15:42Um, I am uh aware of the facility that touches the the almost fence line and and we're excited about it moving forward. I appreciate that. And and final question, um, as part of community engagement uh outside of the fort, uh, CyberCom had has traditionally gone into high schools and tried to we talked about recruitment and retention. Um, tried to get young kids excited about about coding. Um, I understand that Secretary Heath has paused that program.
▶ 1:16:09I'm curious if you've given any thought to restarting it in in the the mission of long-term recruitment. We certainly welcome any opportunity to engage with young people in high schools and across America. We'll continue to do that as aggressively as we can. I'm not sure you answered my question. Could you commit to restarting that in the near future?
▶ 1:16:36Um, we commit to restarting it uh as soon as we can consistent with the department policies. Okay, I'll live with that answer. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back. I want to thank both of you, Miss Buck Hartman, for your leadership. Thank you for your cander. Our our desire is to make sure we give you the tools and the support you need to succeed in this very valuable mission. And I do I'll say again, I appreciate your leadership and your and the hard work.
▶ 1:17:02With that, we'll adjourn. We're going to go to the what's 2337 for the the skiff skiff portion.