▶ 0:04:37The subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific will come to order. This hearing aims to explore strategies for countering China's influence within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, while enhancing the United States engagement in the region. I now recognize myself for opening statement.
▶ 0:04:58Again, welcome to the East Asia and Pacific Subcommittee's hearing titled Building Bridges, Countering Rivals: Strengthening US ASEAN Ties to Combat Chinese Influence. This hearing presents an opportunity for us to examine China's growing footprint in ASEAN and to discuss ways the US can counter it by strengthening cooperation across economic, security, diplomatic, and law enforcement sectors.
▶ 0:05:28China has long prioritized Southeast Asia in its foreign policy, using diplomacy, infrastructure, investment, and trade to entrench its influence. In contrast, US economic engagement has Initiatives like the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Indopacific Economic Framework for Prosperity aimed high but failed to deliver meaningful market access or address trade imbalances.
▶ 0:05:59Despite our inability to engage economically, we continue to build robust relationship with countries like the Philippines, Vietnam, and Singapore. But we too often underestimate ASEAN's collective weight in our own Indo-Pacific strategy.
▶ 0:06:20We need to ensure the United States has a genuinely responsive and effective strategy to remain the partner of choice in ASEAN and ask ourselves where have our past strategies in Southeast Asia fallen short. What legislative tools can strengthen our regional position? Are our frameworks aligned with ASEAN partners priorities?
▶ 0:06:46Despite China's reach, the United States is the preferred long-term partner of choice for many ASEAN countries. In the 2025 State of Southeast Asia survey, favor the United States over China, recognizing our leadership in investment, security, innovation, and shared values. on security.
▶ 0:07:11The United States has made real strides expanding maritime security with the Philippines and partnering with other South Asia ch uh South China Sea nations on law enforcement, maritime safety and capacity building training, enhancing disaster response and maritime governance capabilities.
▶ 0:07:32Economically, however, we are While China remains ASEAN's top trading partner, the region is a$4 trillion dollar market with enormous potential, especially in critical minerals, regional trade, and development The threat of Chinese dominance isn't going away.
▶ 0:07:54China is aggressively pursuing deals over 100 secured just this uh April with Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia. These efforts reflect Beijing's recognition of growing US engagement and its desire to blunt it. We must show ASEAN partners that China's promises rarely deliver lasting benefits. We also need a bold whole of government strategy.
▶ 0:08:23One that affirms our leadership, reinforces our alliances, and upholds the sovereignty and rules-based order that underpins a free and open Indo-Pacific. So, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and uh your expertise will guide us in crafting stronger, smarter US policy in South Asia. So, let me now recognize ranking member from California, Mr. Barah, for uh your opening statement. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
▶ 0:08:52I want to thank the witnesses for being here on what is a timely conversation in important region um Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia is home to more than 650 million people um and has some of the fastest growing economies in the world, critical sea lanes and key partnerships. um in our interest as we look at peace and prosperity and sovereignty in the Indoacific.
▶ 0:09:18Um collectively the Southeast Asian um ASEAN nations represent the fifth largest economy in the world and it's our fourth fourth largest export market. Um so what we do here in Congress, the choices that we make, the partnerships um and deals that we put together matter um intensively. That's why I really do have some concerns about the Trump administration's approach. Obviously, these sweeping tariffs have created a lot of uncertainty in the region.
▶ 0:09:46Um but it hopefully you know it creates some opportunities. Um not each um country has been you know looked at equally and if I think about a country like Singapore um this is a country that we have a free trade agreement with. We have mechanisms to um resolve issues and we have a $2.8 8 billion dollar trade surplus with Singapore. So, we're doing quite well with with a country like Singapore.
▶ 0:10:12I'd also think about the opportunities um you my conversations with some of um our ASEAN ambassadors um they don't want to be put into a position where they have to make a choice between China, which is in their neighborhood, or the United States. But the uncertainty that's been created by the Trump administration approach has brought into clear focus that they don't want the United States leaving their markets either.
▶ 0:10:34So, this is a time to engage in um in trade negotiations and perhaps look for those opportunities where we can reduce those um trade barriers. As someone who was a supporter of TPP, you know, as much as I'd love to go back and and see if we could join the CPTP, that probably is a ways off. Um but can we do digital trade? We ought to be able to do digital trade. It's in our interest and certainly um it's in their interest.
▶ 0:11:02Can we um you know, if Vietnam's willing to contemplate going to zero tariffs, let's engage in in what that looks like. Can we work with um you know, countries in the region like Indonesia um to help develop um redundant supplies of critical minerals and and you know develop their geothermal capabilities. Um we ought to think about that.
▶ 0:11:26Can we work with places like Vietnam that do have energy resources in their EEES that are being harassed by the PRC? We ought to work there. And the Philippines, you know, certainly um they've experienced the brunt of much of the harassment in the South China Sea. How do we work with nations like the Philippines and and others to continue to deepen and um return to where we historically have been with the Philippines? So, there's many more opportunities.
▶ 0:11:52Um, you know, again, the Trump administration's approach is not how I would go about doing this. But we are where we are. We've got to double down on our conversations, look for those partnerships, um, create those redundant supply chains and bring the the Southeast Asian nations closer together, not as a choice between China and the United States, but recognizing the unique assets, the unique opportunities, the vibrant young population, and the dynamic economies of the region.
▶ 0:12:19So with that, Madam Chairwoman, let me go ahead and yield back and I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses. Thank you. Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record and we are now pleased to have distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this very important topic. First, Mr. Gregory Polling is director and senior fellow of the Southeast Asia program and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Stic and International Studies.
▶ 0:12:49Thank you for joining us. Mrs. Barbara Wiser, non-resident scholar at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Thank you for being with us. And Dr. Lynn Quac, Lew Kuan Yu Chair in Southeast Asia Studies at the Brookings This committee recognizes the importance of the issues before us and is grateful to have you here to speak to us today.
▶ 0:13:14Your full statements will be made part of the record and I'll ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to five minutes to allow time for member questions. Let me now recognize Mr. Polling for your opening statement. There we are. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Kim, uh, Member Barra, and and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I'm honored to share my views before you today on the topic of US ASEAN cooperation to combat China's influence in the region.
▶ 0:13:43Before I begin, I should note that CSIS uh my home institution does not take policy positions. So, the views represented are mine and mine alone. In my testimony, I've been asked to address both US cooperation with ASEAN in the maritime domain, particularly South China Sea, and more broadly on on the geopolitical front. And I'm happy to say that on the first, I think the US and its allies and partners, particularly the Philippines, are doing a remarkable job of holding the line in the face of Chinese coercion.
▶ 0:14:10On the second, the broader competition for influence in the region, I worry that the US is putting at risk what uh has traditionally been its stronger position over China in most of the countries of Southeast Asia. When it comes to the South China Sea, China seeks to control all activity, peaceime, and military in clear violation of international law. This is a direct threat to US national interests, long-standing US commitments to freedom of the seas, which has been an abiding US interest since the early days of the republic.
▶ 0:14:38It's also a direct threat to our oldest ally in the Indoacific, the Philippines. This has been recognized by administration after administration, Republican and Democrat. And uh the US has done a remarkable job in both showing its own flag, pushing back on Chinese coercion and helping build the maritime capacity of partners and allies in the region to maintain uh their own presence in disputed waters even in the face of what China now has the largest navy, the largest coast guard, the largest missile force in the world.
▶ 0:15:08Uh under Cinping's leadership, China for the last decade plus has engaged in a campaign of coercion uh in what is often called the gray zone just below the level of military force using Coast Guard vessels and militia vessels to intentionally create risks of collision to bully and intimidate smaller states into giving way in the South China Sea. And that campaign had a great deal of success for the better part of a decade. For the last three years, that has not been the case.
▶ 0:15:38For the last three years, starting at the end of the Rodrigo Duterte administration of the Philippines, but accelerating under the current presidency of Ferdinand Marcos Jr., we have seen the Philippines stand tall for the first time in quite a while. The Philippines engaged in a nearly year and a halflong standoff with China from 2023 to 2024 in order to resupply and repair its facility at the BRPC Madre on Second Thomas Shaw, an underwater feature.
▶ 0:16:05Despite the largest presence of Chinese militia and Coast Guard we have ever seen deployed in the South China Sea. By December 2023, the Philippines was sailing two to three ships up against 50 Chinese vessels. didn't blink, managed to get through, often with the USPA overhead, and with the US's repeatedly stated commitment to defend the Philippines should China use force. And it was China that blinked, not the Philippines in that standoff.
▶ 0:16:29On the oil and gas front, we have seen Vietnam, for the first time in many years developing new oil and gas fields despite a persistent Chinese Coastg Guard presence in its waters. Malaysia over the last two years set new records for drilling offshore wells in disputed waters. Even Indonesia, which has traditionally not viewed itself as a part of this dispute, has begun to receive forceful uh bullying and coercion from the China Coast Guard because of new oil and gas fields. It's developing and it's done so anyway.
▶ 0:16:57What we see is a a Chinese strategy that is clearly floundering and all the US really needs to do is continue course in order to make sure that China continues to flounder. Where I'm more worried is on our overall influence in the region. Uh, as Chairwoman McKin said, if you look at public opinion polling, elite opinion polling, UN voting records, educational data, the US remains the partner of choice. The United States is more trusted. Its leadership is more sought after globally.
▶ 0:17:27It is more popular in most places in Southeast Asia. In the Philippines and Vietnam, the US has enormous leads over China in every metric you could imagine. In Indonesia, the largest country in the region, Indonesians are conflicted, but in general, they dislike China a great deal more than they dislike the US. Although that did flip last year, and I worry that it will remain the case in the future that China may begin to edge a cell in Indonesia.
▶ 0:17:54Uh while you have pro-Chinese elites in charge in places like the military hint in Burma or in Cambodia, when you look at public opinion polling, Cambodia and Burma are the third and fourth most pro-American publics in Asia. Even in Laos and Thailand, the US holds its own, it's really only in Malaysia where we see China making any considerable ground on this issue of soft power, of influence, of whose leadership do you support?
▶ 0:18:19And to be clear, the US cannot win a geopolitical strategic competition with China with military and economic might alone. At the end of the day, it's a competition over the rules and institutions of the international order. And that requires other countries to agree with us more often than agree with China. That means that we need to not forget the power of attraction, not just coercion and compulsion.
▶ 0:18:46that we have to be the preferred partner, not just the partner that one has to side with. And so, as we've seen the uh winding down of US support, sorry, yes, ma'am, on US aid, VA and Radio Free Asia, as we've seen the pauses on Fulbright and student visa interviews, I worry that we are undermining that multi-deade latent advantage we have in being the preferred partner. Thank you. Thank you.
▶ 0:19:15Um, I now recognize Mrs. Weiser for your opening Thank you, Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Barra, and distinguished members of this subcommittee for the invitation to appear before you today.
▶ 0:19:29My name is Barbara Weisel and I am currently a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, but previously spent nearly two decades working on Southeast Asia at USR and have many thoughts on your question on how the US can strengthen ties to ASEAN to counter China. As well recognized by members of this committee, Southeast Asia is an important US economic partner.
▶ 0:19:55It is our fourth largest export market and a central player in global supply chains. US businesses have long been invested in these dynamic markets and their ties have expanded in recent years as businesses with US government encouragement sought to diversify away from China.
▶ 0:20:14ASEAN countries stood to benefit directly from these diversification efforts in hoped they would help strengthen economic ties to the US commensurate with our expanding military But the US imposition of tariffs has created anger and confusion in ASEAN regarding their relations with the US and resentment about the unilateral nature of US actions.
▶ 0:20:38While US while ASEAN countries have long been concerned about China's dominance in the region, they see the imposition of tariffs as a much more immediate threat and direct assault on their Facing a five alarm fire set by the United States, they will not only avoid antagonizing China, their largest two-way trading partner, but welcome its overtures of greater economic It is also likely that the US will reach bilateral agreements
▶ 0:21:08with ASEAN in the coming weeks or months. To accommodate the US, Southeast Asian countries will commit to lower their tariffs and address long-standing trade barriers and increase purchases of US LNG, agriculture, planes, and other goods. At the same time, they will pursue de-risking strategies that lessen their economic dependence on the US and expand trade and investment ties to China and other partners.
▶ 0:21:36So, while the US may see some immediate results from the tariff leverage that's exerted over Southeast Asian countries, if China is the threat about which the US is most concerned, then we need to keep our eye on the ball. We need to build an affirmative ASEAN economic strategy that relies on carrots, not just sticks.
▶ 0:21:57This strategy should build trust and certainty and deepen our economic It also should capitalize on ASEAN's interest in keeping the US engaged in the region, create room for Southeast Asian countries to work with the US on curbing unfair trade practices from China, and foster ASEAN integration to promote regional stability and security. Let me briefly offer five proposals for deepening economic ties.
▶ 0:22:26First, we should promote development of the Southeast Asian critical minerals sector and US ASEAN critical mineral supply chains even as we work to build our own capabilities in this sector. These efforts should include negotiation of critical minerals agreements with select Southeast Asian countries.
▶ 0:22:45These agreements should include criteria for trusted critical mineral supply chains and guaranteed supplies of critical mineral resources for US industry as the Japanese government has successfully Second, the US should swiftly pursue a plurilateral digital agreement with Southeast Asian countries drawing on the commitments the US government is pursuing in its bilateral agreements with ASEAN countries.
▶ 0:23:13Maintaining US leadership in setting digital trade rules is vital given this sector's role in US innovation and economic growth and to ensuring the US remains at the forefront of the AI revolution.
▶ 0:23:27Doing so also would support US efforts to counter China's model of digital Third, the US should propose a customs cooperation initiative that demonstrates its willingness to work in partnership with ASEAN as a group to tackle this priority issue.
▶ 0:23:45Many Southeast Asian governments already are strengthening rules in this area, but a US ASEAN customs cooperation agreement would better position ASEAN to deal collectively with trans shshipment from Fourth, Congress should fully fund US economic statecraftraft tools, including reauthorization of DFC this year.
▶ 0:24:07Similarly, to promote US exports, Congress should reauthorize the export import bank next year and ensure adequate funding for the US Trade and Development Agency. And lastly, the US should consider regionalizing the trade commitments it is negotiating bilaterally with ASEAN countries, building out an ASEAN agreement with rules of origin that limit nonparties from benefiting and including rules in critical areas to US
▶ 0:24:38In exchange, the US should gradually eliminate tariffs on imports from Southeast Asian parties to the agreement. A regional agreement with reciprocal commitments would incentivize Southeast Asian countries to deepen supply chains with U the US in ways that can promote US manufacturing and exports. Again, thank you for this opportunity to share my views and I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Mrs. Weiser. Let me now recognize Dr. Quark for your opening statement.
▶ 0:25:09Thank you so much, Chairwoman. Um, Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Barra, members of the subcommittee, um, thank you for this opportunity to testify. It's an honor to be able to contribute to this important conversation on strengthening US engagement with Southeast Asia, a region that is at the very heart uh, both the geographic as well as the strategic heart of the Um, you've both outlined why Southeast Asia matters.
▶ 0:25:36So let me just say that despite its economic and strategic importance um I think the region uh remains a weak link in US Indoacific um US influence in the region is declining and China is gaining ground.
▶ 0:25:54uh both yourself chairwoman and Greg mentioned how the United States is the partner of choice but in a regional survey in 2024 um the survey showed for the first time China actually um uh the majority of respondents in Southeast Asia actually choosing to align with China over the United States if they were forced to choose now that margin was slim um overall 50.5% versus 49.5% but support dropped dramat atically in
▶ 0:26:24some countries including all three Muslim majority countries by about 20 percentage points. The 2025 survey you mentioned reflected a modest US rebound but it was conducted very early in the year from um early January to midFebruary and preceded several developments most notably the uh April 2nd announcement of tariffs. This hit all countries in Southeast Asia including some of its poor poorest.
▶ 0:26:50Cambodia, Laos and war torn Myanmar face a 49% 48% and 44% uh tariff level These liberation day tariffs have triggered a strong backlash in the region.
▶ 0:27:06ASEAN leaders recently expressed deep concern over these unilateral tariff measures and the Singapore prime minister warned that they undermine the global trading order that the United States helped build and declared bluntly that these are not actions that one does to a friend. What began as frustration over limited US engagement or limited US economic engagement in the region is now concern over counterproductive policies.
▶ 0:27:33Washington is not just missing an economic action in Southeast Asia, it is inflicting real damage. Tariffs as well as aid cuts are hurting Southeast Asia's countries. Now, for years, relatively weak US engagement was offset by the important security role it plays. But that too is increasingly cast in doubt as Washington recalibrates away from long-standing allies and partners in Europe and the president openly questions uh defense commitments.
▶ 0:28:04Lack of clarity around US goals in in the in the Indo Pacific compounds um these concerns as the possibility of a grand bargain or even a more economic limit a more limited economic deal entailing concessions to Beijing on issues vital to allies and partners such as the South China Sea or the US Philippine alliance so further doubt about American intent consistency and staying power.
▶ 0:28:30US standing in the region has also been badly hurt by its handling of the Gaza crisis. Um although a loss for the United States doesn't necessarily mean uh a win for China, um Beijing has been very proactive about continuing to deepen its regional ties through trade, through investment, through infrastructure, and through consistent diplomacy.
▶ 0:28:58And as you mentioned, chairwoman, in the weeks after the April 2nd tariffs, Beijing visited Southeast Asia and concluded 113 uh deals, and even a few of those materialize, I think the signal was clear that China is a consistent and reliable economic partner, while the United States throws a wrecking ball at the global trading system. Beijing's actions in the South China Sea are a serious irritant in its relations with its neighbors, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam.
▶ 0:29:25But I think China has been remarkably adept at containing the fallout both through the use of economic incentives as well as through quiet diplomacy. Southeast Asia does not want to choose between the two countries and they will continue to hedge for as long as possible. But China's growing sway hampers Washington's ability to engage bilaterally and multilaterally in the region to strategic effect.
▶ 0:29:51I've detailed policy recommendations for the US government as legislative proposals in my written testimony, but very broadly these touch on three areas that the United States must act on. First, economic engagement for the region. Economics is security and failing to understand this leaves Washington on the back foot.
▶ 0:30:13Congress can lead by first reviewing tariffs, second advancing targeted trade agreements in strategic sectors like digital infrastructure and critical minerals and third bolstering funding support for inf inf infrastructure and It can the second um main area that um the United States uh needs to work on is strengthening its alliances and partnerships in Southeast Asia.
▶ 0:30:36It's done well with the Philippines, but I think what's necessary at the moment is commitment at the very highest levels to treaty commitment and expanding economic and strategic engagement with key regional players including Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Cambodia. And finally, the third area, defending international law and maritime rights. International law reduces conflict risks and advances concrete US interests.
▶ 0:31:03The second Trump administration should maintain the strong stance that it adopted during its first term when it made regular lawful assertions of passage rights and freedoms of the seas and when it affirmed the merits of the 2016 tribunal decision a step that the previous administration had failed to take. Madame Chairwoman, ranking member and members of the subcommittee. Well, let's continue the conversation during question and answer period. Thank you so much.
▶ 0:31:29I appreciate all of the uh witnesses giving your opening testimonies and for the recommendations that you are making and uh uh we can hopefully get into that more and let me start with the uh first round of uh questioning.
▶ 0:31:44Um you know as you all mentioned uh we want to be the partner of choice and our ACSEAN partners are waiting for us to show up and we need to provide a clear and consistent economic framework for the Indo-Pacific region but unfortunately uh we have US has struggled to regain momentum in uh economic engagement following its withdrawal from TPP.
▶ 0:32:09Uh so Miss uh Weisel, what elements of the TPP and IPAF prove effective and ineffective? Uh and how can future agreements demonstrate strong commitment to Southeast Asia's development goals while safeguarding our US interests? Thank you for the question. Uh I think um in terms of TPP um I mean it TPP is now enforced.
▶ 0:32:37The US is not a party to that agreement. So it was a successful agreement notwithstanding the fact that we are no longer party. I think that what was successful about TPP was first that it was a very high standard agreement and include a lot of issues that had not been part of previous trade agreements that advanced rules that were of importance to US economic competitiveness including on things like intellectual property on stateowned enterprises and competition and other areas.
▶ 0:33:08um in in um looking back at what we would want to do were we to pursue a a a um free trade agreement with the region. I think there are definitely additional areas updates that you would want to consider and things that we learned for instance um over the last couple years about resilience of supply chains about our competition with China that you would want to add to an agreement like that that were not issues then but as in
▶ 0:33:38all free trade agreements you know there are new generations of agreements new issues that you need to think about and incorporate in updated agreements. Um, IPF I think um try was in my in my view more of a political agreement than an economic agreement. Um, and that the purpose of that uh was to demonstrate to our trading partners that we were going to be engaged in the region.
▶ 0:34:03Yeah, we wanted them to commit to a range of issues related to areas of mutual concern including related to supply chains but we were not prepared to discuss market access in any way. And I think that that really um hobbled the effort. I also think that our decision not to engage on digital trade was problematic and something that we would want to revisit going forward. Thank you.
▶ 0:34:28Um, as we strengthen our stigic posture in the Indo Pacific, particularly with ASEAN partners like the Philippines, Subi Bay, which I visited, is again emerging as a critical location for US logistics and operational planning. And our defense cooperation agreement with uh Philippines, grants us access to sites like Subi.
▶ 0:34:50But we must balance our military presence with Philippines constitutional limits on foreign bases and sensitivities to nationalist sentiment which has historically complicated our security cooperation. Mr. Polling, keeping this delicate balance in mind, what specific capabilities or prepositioned assets would most enhanced deterrence at Thank you, chairwoman. The most important thing for the Philippines, well, I suppose there's two.
▶ 0:35:19one, it needs asymmetric capabilities much like Taiwan or anybody else facing a giant neighbor. This is not a foot race the Philippines can possibly win. So seeing more deployments like the Nemesis right now, Tomahawks paired with Philippines own mid-range land-based capabilities like the Brahmos missiles they bought from India is key.
▶ 0:35:38It allows the Philippines to hold Chinese vessels in the South China Sea uh at risk in, you know, in a situation in which there's no number of halls that they could possibly be uh sold or loaned that would make up for the asymmetry they face. The second is presence. At the end of the day, there's no military solution to the South China Sea. The Philippines needs to be able to show the flag, and they've done a remarkably good job with a very limited Coast Guard and navy.
▶ 0:36:06We need to see more uncrrewed platforms. We need to see more cheap vessels. We need to see more support for U for Philippine basing in the islands. And that doesn't mean US boots on the ground, but the US could be providing more funding for the Philippines to build up its own facilities as China and Vietnam do as well. Thank you. One of the most pressing challenges in the region is China's dominant grip on critical mineral supply chains, especially for materials vital to clean energy and defense technologies.
▶ 0:36:35And we mentioned Indonesia is the world's top producer of nickel. This is critical for uh battery technologies. So, but it's alarming that Chinese companies control 75% of Indonesia's nickel refining capacity. Um, Miss Wisel, what are the implications of China's chokeold on critical mineral supply chains for the US and allied nations?
▶ 0:36:59Well, I think we're seeing the the results of that chokeold in in um in our industries today where China can limit access to critical minerals and then then it also controls these critical minerals from other countries. So I think um all of this is quite disturbing and and just reinforces the need for the US to establish its own supply chains with with the region.
▶ 0:37:26Um, I think, you know, as I mentioned in in my testimony, Japan has had quite a quite a a good deal of success in trying to um limit its reliance on Chinese critical minerals by promoting its relationships with the region.
▶ 0:37:45They have an organization called the Japanese Organization for Metals and Energy Security that has the purpose of ensuring stable supplies of critical minerals and energy for Japan. And thank you. The result of that and is something I think we should be looking at is that they have been able to successfully um diversify their their sources of critical minerals.
▶ 0:38:11Um and in the in the um funding that they use for this organization that's known as jock they have sorry my time's up so let me uh yield my time I mean time to uh ranking member Bara for his questioning right thank you madam chairwoman and we can stick to the topic of critical minerals Japan built those redundant supplies um after facing economic coercion and retaliation from from China I think in terms of choking some of
▶ 0:38:42those and you know we're we're certainly at risk and experiencing some of that potential risk right now. So there is a an importance and expedience to um not just develop our own domestic supplies but there you know but also look at in a strategic way how we go into um you know whether that's Vietnam, Malaysia, other um Indonesia and build redundant supplies and um I would argue in the Biden administration the min mineral security partnership
▶ 0:39:12um gives us some vehicles by which to work with countries like Japan, Korea and others. um to to help build those and and perhaps even go into, you know, the Koreans are going into Mongolia, perhaps go into other areas. But this is, you know, I would agree with you, Miss Feisel, that you I think this is a key area where we can deepen our relationship in a positive way with South Southeast Asian nations and we should do so.
▶ 0:39:36And um Madam Chairwoman, I think we have a hearing actually coming up um soon looking at at that particular issue. Um, let's go back to digital trade for a second. And um, while I wish we could go back to TPP, I clearly thought digital trade was something that we would get under the Biden administration. It obviously didn't happen. Um, it's in our interest, certainly in the region's interest.
▶ 0:40:00Um, you know, we can work off some of the existing digital trade models, whether that's taking the digital trade chapter out of um, USMCA or, you know, looking at some bilateral um, pieces. But, you know, maybe each of you if you wanted to just touch on the importance of getting a digital trade deal done, maybe we'll start with um Dr. Quac and then work to the to the left um with the region. Thank you very much.
▶ 0:40:28Um I think um in terms of uh the the importance of a digital trade um agreement uh China is embedding its digital norms in the region through its uh uh through its deals with uh countries like Cambodia, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos etc. And um once those norms um the technology and the norms are embedded I think it becomes quite difficult to reverse.
▶ 0:40:52So I mean there's there's very little uh I I doubt there's very there's very little downsides to moving quickly on this issue and um I think the US should be alert to it uh unless it be in the same position as it is now in terms of critical minerals where it allowed uh China to invest in Indonesia since uh Indonesia banned the export of nickel uh uh nickel um and allowed China to invest heavily um in its nickel processing.
▶ 0:41:20Um I think the United States was asleep at the wheel in that respect and I think it needs to uh redouble its um its um its efforts in terms of uh arriving reaching and arriving in um with on a digital trade agreement with Southeast Asian countries. Right. Misel. Yeah. I would just add that uh China is active in this region. They have just recently updated their their China ASEAN agreement which now includes additional digital commitments.
▶ 0:41:48um and there's active cooperation between the two. So I think that's something that we really should keep a close eye on. But I also would note that um the EU is engaged with a number of ASEAN regions and the EU has a different approach to digital trade rules than we do. So absent the US direct engagement in the region, we're seeding it to others. Mr. Poland, I would just reinforce uh that that last point. We have 325 million people in a world of 8 billion and growing.
▶ 0:42:17We can either help set rules in partnership with others or we can end up taking the rules. What we've already seen is almost everybody in Southeast Asia has now adopted a European style GDPR regime. They did that because we had no alternative and they asked and asked and asked and we didn't present it. Later this year, ASEAN will likely release its own digital economic framework agreement. We don't know what rules will be there, but they won't be rules that the US helped set. And that will be the story as long as we decide to take our ball and go home. Great.
▶ 0:42:46And um while IPOF would not have been the approach that um I I would have taken, it was an approach that the Biden administration took. And in our conversations um we looked at it as you know a high standard um negotiation but not each country could actually meet whether it was a labor standards, environmental standards, etc.
▶ 0:43:09And I think how I pitched it um to the administration and I would pitch it to the Trump administration was in a modular way right there that you know it's easy for us to do a trade deal with Singapore and Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea. It's essential for us to do a trade agreement with Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines, um Malaysia and each of those countries may not at this particular moment in time be able to meet those high standards.
▶ 0:43:36But if we use a carrot approach, if we use um and I agree with you, you know, it's not really a trade deal without market access because obviously that's what folks want. You know, if the Trump administration's listening, I would strongly urge us to in a bipartisan way to try to figure this out. And if we don't set the norms and the rules, somebody else is and we may not like them when we wake up. I'll yield back. Thank you.
▶ 0:44:00Let me now recognize Representative Morland of Guam for five Thank you, Mr. Chairwoman. And as Guam often serves as the first point of contact with the US for many ASEAN countries, I'm very enthusiastic about further advancing our relationship with them. In the early 2024, the US surpassed China as ASEAN's largest export market.
▶ 0:44:26This dynamic economic development underscores the importance of strengthening our economy tie with the regional group. However, the potential benefits of ASEAN are not limited to economics alone. ASEAN also plays a critical role in promoting regional stability and maritime security, deepening deepening the cooperation for natural disasters and more.
▶ 0:44:49Uh given China's growing influence in the region, it's imperative that we develop a comprehensive strategy to enhance our engagement with ASEAN, counter China's influence, and secure our national interest in the region. As for the economic aspect, the US is the largest source of cumulative foreign district investments, FDI, in ASEON and overtook China as the largest export market this year.
▶ 0:45:16Now, while we need to address unfair trade practice in general, we also need uh to uh consider the potential ramifications of proposed tariff increase on Assion uh countries since many of them have export dependent economies.
▶ 0:45:32To avoid the risks of these countries deepening their economic dependence to China, we should update our strategic engagement with them to promote economic prosperity both in the region and the US and to build a more resilient supply chain. When it comes to regional stability and maritime security, the most urgent issue is China's aggression in South China Sea.
▶ 0:45:57Many incident incidents of harassment against the Philippine ships by Chinese Coast Guard vessels have been reported. And although ASEAN members don't all share the same stance toward China, if we can encourage them to share the common position on this issue, it would serve a powerful voice to deter further Mr. Polling, uh could you describe how opinions among ASEAN members are divided on South China Sea disputes?
▶ 0:46:26Also, how can the US encourage them to adopt more unified position to secure freedom of navigation and maritime security? Thank you, Congressman. Um, the Philippines is obviously the farthest on the spectrum if we were to lay it out. It has been the most uh forward-leaning in defending its rights. It's been the clearest in articulating the legal nature of its rights and its objections to China's through its arbitral victory. just behind the Philippines has been Vietnam.
▶ 0:46:57There's no country on earth when you look at polling that has more skepticism or anxiety about China or views China more as a revisionist threat than Vietnam. And that's because of China's aggression toward Vietnam in the South China Sea. Vietnam uh has been quietly supportive of the Philippines arbitral victory in 2016. It has forged bilateral quiet bilateral coast guard cooperation with Manila.
▶ 0:47:20it has engaged in its own large buildup of its facilities in the Spratley Islands in order to contest Chinese control. Uh after that, there's a steep drop off. I'm afraid of the other claimments to the waters or islands of the South China Sea. Indonesia, which hasn't often considered itself a claimment, has probably been the most forwardleaning and contesting Chinese activity. And Indonesia has had the clearest articulation other than the Philippines of what is illegal about China's claims.
▶ 0:47:50Malaysia has tended to bury its head in the sand and try to ignore the issue at least at the political level. Of course, Indonesian Coast Guard personnel and naval personnel are as frustrated by China as anybody. Of the non-claimments, Singapore has really been the only one that has taken a firm position on the illegality of China's claims. And I think we have to recognize that there will never be an coherent ASEAN position on the South China Sea. Thailand, Lao, Cambodia, they are not going to invite Chinese retaliation on themselves.
▶ 0:48:19in support of the Philippines or Vietnam. And so there has to be a claimance grouping but not an Azon grouping. Thank you very much. Uh Miss Weisel, based on your experience in the US government, including US trade representative, how do you assess the potential impact of the proposed tariff increase in ASEAN members? What do you see as the most effective way to advance our economic interest in the region? Sorry, you have very little time.
▶ 0:48:46I mean I think that um the the actions as I said in my statement have um really put the US at a disadvantage. um the US is seen as kind of impulsive, unpredictable, unilateral actions that is causing ASEAN to reflect on what it needs to do to hedge the the risk against the US and is forcing them to um lessen their their um reluctance to work with China because it has they have no other choice.
▶ 0:49:14if they if they are going to be threatened by the United States than their other major partner China um is that they are going to put that in the position of working more closely with China and we've put them in that position. Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you. Let me now recognize Representative Amo of Rhode Island for your five minutes questioning. Thank you uh Chairwoman uh Kim and thank you to our witnesses uh for being here.
▶ 0:49:40uh you know as we've discussed uh you know Azan is just uh an essential partner uh to the United States. It is uh it is an opportunity uh for uh American power uh but also for global collaboration and I believe the you know Biden administration understood this and made Azan uh central to our Indoacific strategy.
▶ 0:50:06But I'm concerned uh about the Trump administration's foreign assistance freeze, chaotic tariffs, uh and what that's done to really take an axe to uh our relationship with Azan nations. And of course, as uh we've discussed already today, uh this really works against uh our efforts to counter China's influence in the region.
▶ 0:50:32And Trump's chaos and uh uncertainty has undermined our credibility as a partner while doing uh its part to hurt American businesses. Even worse, China is already stepping in to fill the void that we've left behind. And in one particular way uh I I want to highlight in in my time today. I'm worried about uh a potential axe to the US International Development Finance Corporation.
▶ 0:51:00As we all know, uh, the DFC, uh, the DFC provides an enormous return on investment to the American taxpayer, advancing the United States's, uh, foreign policy goals and our economic interests. A true definition of a winwin. And the United States private sector is consistently the largest source of foreign direct investment in the Azan region.
▶ 0:51:25The DSC is also a perfect counter to China's belt and road initiative, providing an alternative to that coercive financing scheme. In the first three and a half years of the Biden administration alone, the DFC advanced over $1.4 billion in private sector uh investments in the Azan countries. Uh so, Dr.
▶ 0:51:48quote, um, "As we work on legislation to reauthorize the DFC, how do you think, uh, we can ensure that the DFC continues working successfully in the Azan region to support our allies, uh, and combat uh, China's growing influence. Thank you very much, Congressman. Um, I think you're right to point out the um, strategic strategic damage that um, the withdrawal of aid has done to the United States. Two caveats on aid.
▶ 0:52:17First, you know, having aid in and of itself um is um it might have hurt in some respects US ability to engage with some of the regional governments who saw aid as u meddling from the United States or some forms of aid as meddling from the United States and um there are some reports that suggest that the strategic return on US aid was unclear.
▶ 0:52:39Nonetheless, the sudden and abrupt withdrawal of of aid um from the United States to some of these countries sends an unfortunate message of US callousness, especially when it impacts um programs that mean the difference of life and death um between life and death in these countries such as humanitarian assistance, health programs and demining which as you pointed out China has already um stepped in to fill. um on um development finance.
▶ 0:53:07Um I think this is clearly something that the United States uh need to step up on and um I urge um I urge uh greater focus in this respect. Um China's belt and road initiative which you mentioned was initiated in 2013. Um amendments or revisions to the build act came in 2018 some 5 years after China's belt and road initiative.
▶ 0:53:33Since then, the United States has had various um infrastructure initiatives uh development and infrastructure initiatives um including uh the build back better world um which was then repackaged as the partnership for global infrastructure investment and all of this is all well and good and very much appreciated in Southeast Asia but it hasn't shown yet any concrete um development in Southeast Asia. So I think you know urgency is the key here.
▶ 0:54:00um otherwise it starts to feel like um old wine in new bottles. Uh so certainly the region is is in urgent need of infrastructure development and um uh all of this should be happen should have happened yesterday um if not today or tomorrow would be great and this is not just in the region's interest it's in the US interests as well as it seeks to reduce regional um uh regional reliance on um China um as well as increase uh
▶ 0:54:30US access in the region as well. Well, thank you. Uh, I see my time is close to expired, so I will yield back. Thank you. Thank you. I would like to now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Representative McKenzie, for five minutes. Thank you, Madam Chair. Appreciate the testimony today. It's a very important topic as we seek to combat the rising influence of China.
▶ 0:54:53And I think we all would like to uh make sure that we have greater bonds between the US and the Azan countries uh that we're talking about here today. So uh for Ms. Weisel uh we have seen in the trade disputes between the US and China uh the restrictions that have been placed by China on critical minerals coming into the US and what that means for our e economic uh you know vibrancy uh is felt all across our our
▶ 0:55:23economy potentially. And so are there opportunities that you see for us to build greater relationships with uh other countries in the region uh so that we could have a diversified supply chain in this area? Thank you for the question, Congressman. I think there absolutely are opportunities to build closer ties and stronger supply chains.
▶ 0:55:46I mean, we we know this from going back to the first Trump administration when the US was companies to build ASEAN, China plus one strategies and ASEAN understood that they were going to be a beneficiary of that. They also all several of the ASEAN countries have important critical minerals and are looking to develop their supply chains.
▶ 0:56:09that they see the United States as an important partner in helping them helping them build both their um build out their their critical mineral supply chains and that um are they are quite interested in partnering with us um and I think that um what we need to show here is consistency.
▶ 0:56:31So some of the signals that we sent, for instance, that we want to build our own supply chains, but we have a a 232 investigation going on on critical minerals. So if they partner with us, are they then going to be subjected to 232 tariffs that are going to undermine the cooperation that that we're seeking to build? um if if we can overcome some of those kinds of concerns and come up with the kind of financing that we need to support industry in building those supply chains, I think we have some very interested partners in ASEAN.
▶ 0:57:02And that that's great to hear because I think we saw that coming out of the the trade and tariff disputes back in 2018 2019 is that the countries were willing to take on uh supply chain initiatives outside of China uh working with the US and I think that was actually a good benefit from that trade dispute in 2018 2019. Uh I think we have the potential again this time uh with tariffs there are two different issues going on.
▶ 0:57:30There is certainly the reciprocity issue uh that we see across the board being dealt with uh in in a lot of countries and then there is China that is unique. the the tariffs uh that are being placed on China are significantly higher than in other countries and I think we have this same potential uh ahead of us here because countries uh were shaken in 20189 uh doing business with China they started getting out uh those that stayed uh anecdotally uh have come to regret that and they have said you know what
▶ 0:58:00we got the warning shot in 201819 we didn't fully listen to you we didn't get out we didn't move our supply chains fast enough and I think that that has a potential to be uh something that is going to speed up here uh in this latest round of tariffs.
▶ 0:58:15Uh so if you're saying that that willingness is there uh then the potential for uh that supply chain disruption with the higher tariffs placed on China I think is very real and I think Azion countries uh should be ready to take on that that American business uh get away from China and and I think we have the opportunity to have uh stronger bonds going forward.
▶ 0:58:38Uh I'll I'll close with with one other question uh for you is when we look at uh this disruption in trade uh going on right now. Um I would like to hear from you what other opportunities outside of critical minerals uh do you see as the greatest opportunity for Azan countries to take on? Is it medical devices? Is it uh basic manufacturing electronics? what what do you see as the biggest opportunity uh for those economies to take on?
▶ 0:59:09Um I think that they are very interested in working with us on the digital economy and strengthening their their um digital um trade with the United States but also within each of these countries. They all are very committed. they have large numbers of of young people who are really um digitally um educated and and do see that as the future of their economies.
▶ 0:59:38I think that they see opportunities of working closely with our digital industries and in finding ways to align our uh regulatory approaches. All right. Well, I appreciate that and thank you again for testifying. I think we have great opportunities that lie ahead for uh the US and Azan relationship and look forward to working on those uh together with everybody interested. Thank you and I yield back. Thank you. And I now recognize gentleman from Texas, Representative Castro for five minutes.
▶ 1:00:08Uh thank you, Chairwoman. Uh and Chair Kim, I appreciated working with you to reintroduce the bipartisan partner with ACSEAN Act today. Uh this bill would give ASEAN the same diplomatic privileges and immunities that other major multilateral institutions already enjoy. A step that I believe would strengthen ASEAN's centrality and US regional ties. So I wanted to ask Mr. Polling, how important is it for the US to follow through on this legislation and demonstrate that we treat ASEAN as a strategic partner?
▶ 1:00:40I think it is quite important particularly at a time when ASEAN questions whether the US will follow through on a great many commitments it makes um the the legislation's been pending for I think three years first introduced three years ago um you know a time when ACSEAN fears that the US will withdraw from multilateral engagement at a time when the state department has suggested that it will shut down the multilateral affairs shop within EAP which is in charge Javasian affairs.
▶ 1:01:10This can send an important counterveailing message. Thank you. And want to ask Dr. uh Kuak, you recent polling suggests that public opinion of the United States has dipped in majority Muslim Southeast Asian countries following Israel's war in Gaza. And so, how has the war in Gaza affected the region's public opinion of the United States?
▶ 1:01:38Um, as mentioned earlier, um, the drop in, uh, support for the United States since, um, the recent, uh, Gaza crisis has been precipitous in, um, Muslim majority countries, about tw a 20 percentage point drop, um, in support for the United States since the Gaza crisis.
▶ 1:01:57And um support for China in Muslim majority countries is an a is averaging about 70%age po uh 70 70% uh amongst Muslim majority countries and this was in the most recent poll as well the 2025 poll.
▶ 1:02:12So a slight in uh decrease in support uh for China and increase in support for the United States but still very poor support for the United States amongst these Muslim majority countries amongst um even s Singaporean respondents um because Singapore has a minority Muslim uh population. Uh I think uh sentiment is also quite uh bleak about the United States um uh and uh its um either inaction or its active support of Israel.
▶ 1:02:40And so that has hurt perceptions of the United States. And I think you know the the poll has uh most clearly reflected the drop in support for the United States amongst Muslim majority countries but it hasn't been limited to Muslim majority countries or even the Muslim population.
▶ 1:02:54I think the humanitarian crisis is clear for all to And and I want to ask you given those things, you know, what the long-term implications for US cred credibility and influence in the region are, particularly the longer this goes on.
▶ 1:03:11I think um how much it impacts um the United States ability to influence the region will depend on the situation in the ground um on the ground and um the extent to which I guess um humanitarian aid is able to reach uh victims of this crisis. Um so it will wax and wayne accordingly. Um that said I think uh countries in the region are very pragmatic.
▶ 1:03:33So regardless of that crisis I think you know it'll hurt sentiment but nonetheless countries will seek to work with the United States and we see that from um uh say the say Malaysia whose prime minister has been the loudest and most vocal against uh in terms of criticizing the United States for its support of Israel.
▶ 1:03:51Um before Malaysia took up the chair of ASEAN, it actually expressed um that it would seek as ASEAN chair to work with various important partners and it it mentioned a whole list of partners but left out the United States. Since then um you know Malaysia has sought to clarify that it seeks to continue to work with the United States.
▶ 1:04:13So I think even then it wants to work with the United States but the US has to be there to offer up economic um and um uh security options. Well, and speaking of the economic part, you know, I have 45 seconds left. Let me ask you about the effect of the tariffs on public opinion as well because that's another major issue. Um, it's unclear at the moment what the effect of the tariffs have been on Southeast Asia. The 2025 poll I mentioned was conducted from early January to midFebruary.
▶ 1:04:41So before the US um disengagement from U uh Europe before um the US aid uh uh aid cuts as well as um before the tariffs but I think it cannot but hurt the United States given um the steep tariffs as I mentioned on many of the poorest some amounting to almost 50% um tariff rate and and these countries cannot afford these uh tariffs rates.
▶ 1:05:07So um it's not only going to have an economic impact on the region but as as the Singapore prime minister pointed out uh an impact on the global trading system which will then hurt these countries and it will hurt the United States as well. It might um win a little bit in terms of gain an inch but lose a yard because um in terms of it strategic ability to influence the region and get the region to align with it on issues important to it. I've just run out of time but will be on a back foot. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.
▶ 1:05:37Let me now recognize general lady from South Carolina, Representative Bixs for five minutes. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim, and thank you to our witnesses for being here today. Um, so my first question is for Mr. Polling.
▶ 1:05:52So in your testimony, you emphasized the strategic utility of the US Coast Guard in Southeast Asia, particularly in countering China's gray zone tactics through partnerships, capacity building, and shipwriter agreements.
▶ 1:06:09Given the success of China's non-lethal coercion via its Coast Guard and maritime militia, what additional steps would you recommend the United States take beyond current initiatives to strengthen and expand the US Coast Guard engagement in the region? And how can these efforts be better integrated with the needs of frontline states like the Philippines and Vietnam? Thank you, Congresswoman.
▶ 1:06:39Um, I do think that it has been important to see now a small presence of US Coast Guard cutter, usually one at a time, conducting training activities in Southeast Asia. The US Coast Guard is stretched too thin. We have to acknowledge that it is not going to play a direct role in helping support say Philippine activity in the South China Sea. That's going to remain a navy role.
▶ 1:07:00But the more the Coast Guard can be funded to forward deploy to the Indo Pacific, engage in ship riding in the Pacific Islands and training and capacity building in Southeast Asia, the better. The Philippines has done a remarkable job in standing up to China. And so far, the threat of US intervention under the mutual defense treaty has what has kept us in the gray zone where so far the Philippines can handle it.
▶ 1:07:24uh the most important thing from my perspective that we continue to reinforce the application of the new defense treaty and that we continue to fund the 10-year security sector assistance roadmap that we have promised to help modernize the Philippine military. Thank you. So I would like to kind of continue our discussion. Uh you point out to the Coast Guard's effectiveness in building regional trust and countering grayson tactics.
▶ 1:07:47Given the strategic importance of Southeast Asia, what political and operational challenges must be overcome to expand US Coast Guard deployments and agreements such as the shipwriter programs or for deployed cutters in the region and what specific support should Congress provide to achieve this expansion? I don't think it's possible for the US to negotiate a shipwriter agreement for the South China Sea.
▶ 1:08:17Um the nature of the dispute, its multilateral nature makes it all but impossible. It would be far too politically sensitive in the Philippines for I think even the Philippines, our closest and oldest ally in the region to ask. But more Coast Guard presence to help the Philippines bolster its own capability would be welcomed. And the key there is simply funding. The last time we saw significant increases in Pentagon budgets, there was efforts to cut the Coast Guard funding. We need to keep in mind that the Coast Guard is an important tool of US power and credibility, not just the Navy.
▶ 1:08:48Thank you so much for that insight. So my next question is for Mrs. Wisul. Your testimony emphasizes DFC's role in catalyzing private investment to advance both development goals and US strategic particularly in Southeast Asia.
▶ 1:09:07In that context, how can the US inter agency better integrate on the ground insights to improve risk mitigation and foster a more stable investment climate for DFC supported projects across um ASEAN?
▶ 1:09:28Well, I think um as we look to um restructure the way that we're supporting companies in the region, um there is going to be an important opportunity to ensure that agencies that are on the ground in ASEAN are working together and coordinating closely. So you have the commerce department playing a particular role, you have the state department having at least traditionally played another role and the aid agencies also on the ground in these various countries.
▶ 1:09:55Um, I think this is as as we're thinking about restructuring all of this, it is a really important that we have input from all of these various agencies about what the priorities are and the ways that all of them can contribute to support DFC and other um other ways that the US supports US business going forward.
▶ 1:10:20I I mean I think we've talked about here how important it is to um be able to re uh rethink the way we are looking at this given the competition that we're facing not just from China but from other countries that are competing in the region. And so I think we we need to have a very serious look at the way we've been coordinating in the past and what we need to do going forward. Thank you so much for your insight. With that, I yield back.
▶ 1:10:51Thank you. Let me now recognize the gentleman from Maryland, Representative Shookski for five minutes. Thank you so much, uh, Chair Kim. Thank you to ranking member Bara and to all of our witnesses today. I just want to first state how much I completely agree that the US must strengthen our support for our ACSEAN partners in the Indo-Pacific. So, really appreciate you all being here and your comments today.
▶ 1:11:14Uh we know this means defending a free and open region in the face of security threats posed by the PRC. It also means offering a reliable economic alternative and developing financing for countries like Laos that are settled with PRC debt. And it also means supplying the kind of foreign assistance that USID and our other development agencies have delivered to and its member states for more than four decades.
▶ 1:11:39So, um, just lifting up our actions and and words and so appreciate the opportunity for the conversation. I know there's been, um, a lot of talk. I want to turn a little bit to solutions through people-to-people ties. And so, I was hoping that we can, um, focus on that. Uh, I believe that we should be building on the friendship shared by our combined 1 billion people. And I'm proud that Maryland's John's Hopkins is leading the way.
▶ 1:12:05In 2023, John's Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies launched the US ACSEAN Institute for Rising Leaders. However, President Trump's budget request seeks to end this critical educational and cultural exchange. Um, uh, Miss Quac, perhaps you can speak to, uh, or Dr. Quac, I'm sorry, could you speak to the importance, uh, of engaging with youth and emerging leaders in ASEAN countries, uh, and for the long-term US relationship with the region?
▶ 1:12:34How would ending educational and cultural exchange programs in the region affect US influence there and open doors for the PRC to expand its influence? And if there's time, I'd invite our other witnesses to answer as well. Um, thank you very much.
▶ 1:12:48Um, I I have to admit not to have thought very much about this issue because it almost seems um very obvious that the United States is is inflicting a grievous act of self harm when it ends um educational programs for uh the young people of the region who will tomorrow be the leaders of the the countries. Um so I think you know clearly this is a wrong-footed move and that will and it will hurt uh the United States.
▶ 1:13:14I mean, if you look at the youths in in the region today, I think just anecdotally, some of them have been put off to from coming to the United States because of some of these concerns. Um, but more broadly, I think, you know, at I, you know, a couple of weeks ago, the Shangilla dialogue um of defense ministers took place in Singapore and at that dialogue uh the defense secretary, Hexath, he actually talked about how our futures are tied together.
▶ 1:13:42So the futures of the Indo Pacific and the future um the futures of the countries of the Indopacific are tied together. Um yet it feels so much like the region is under an onslaught um from this part of the world. Um so a shared it doesn't feel very much like a shared future and I cannot imagine that it feels very much like a shared future for young people who are whose um futures are thrown up into uncertainty by some of the more um thoughtless actions of uh the administration.
▶ 1:14:13There are thoughts on that particular topic. I just add that a good case study of this is Vietnam which used to train all of its officials and send people to Russia for education and then at a in a certain year that ended and people started going to the United States. they started going to Europe and you saw a sort of a change in the attitudes of those people toward improving relations with the United States and deepening co deepening cooperation.
▶ 1:14:41So you do have these case studies that underscore the importance of of these educational I would add that there is no country in Southeast Asia that reports in the ISIS survey every year that they want to go study in China. There are several now where they have to go study in China as other doors close. In general, the US, Australia, and the UK are the preferred educational destinations, especially for Vietnam, which provides the third largest group of foreign students in the US and the Philippines.
▶ 1:15:11Pausing interviews for student visas, cancelling Fulbright exchanges, this is only going to harm the US in the long term. I appreciate that. And uh, Madam Chair, I think that reinforces the lessons that we learned when we were all uh, in the Pacific Islands recently together on a trip that you helped lead.
▶ 1:15:28So, I appreciate our witnesses that and uh, I think it sort of speaks to our committee's obligation to lift up these kinds of programs for particularly for I loved the comment about the leaders of tomorrow and thinking about our engagement in that way. With that, I yield back. Thank you. Thank you. I recognize the gentleman from Kansas, Representative Bar, for five minutes. Kentucky. Kentucky. it's okay. It's okay. Thank you, Madam Chair, for your excellent leadership in holding this hearing.
▶ 1:15:58And let me uh key in on Dr. Quark's uh testimony when she talked about um these uh ASEAN countries don't or Southeast Asian countries, they don't want to be forced to choose. they would donate. This does corroborate some of the public uh comments and some of the analysis from our embassies when I traveled to Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines.
▶ 1:16:23Um but you know, privately in our meetings with uh our counterparts um they do want to choose they want to choose the United States. That has not changed from the Biden administration to the Trump administration. I would argue uh especially Indonesia a a a vibrant democracy. They want to choose they want to choose the United States and that hasn't changed from one administration to the other.
▶ 1:16:46In fact, I remember very vividly um when we were in um Jakarta uh hearing a very uh stern uh admonition from the foreign minister Marudi how uh terribly upset uh the Indonesians were and other uh ACSEAN country leaders were that President Biden skipped the ACSEAN conference.
▶ 1:17:13So this sense of uh a vacuum uh it's not unique to now. It existed before the Trump administration. I think I think it's not uh a change in policy on trade that has uh uh given us this uh challenge of needing to deepen our ties with them.
▶ 1:17:37In fact, I want to challenge the critics of the Trump administration's trade strategy a little bit when they claim that the president's efforts to negotiate more reciprocal deals are pushing ASEAN nations towards Beijing or making these nations more vulnerable to Xiinping's acts of coercion. In fact, what is the objective of the Trump trade policy? It's actually to deepen our economic ties. It's to reduce the trade barriers to American exporters.
▶ 1:18:05And so if the end goal of this is more reciprocal trade between the United States and ASEAN, this has enormous potential to reverse the sentiment expressed by Prime Min foreign minister Marudi that that the Biden administration was not paying enough attention to ASEAN.
▶ 1:18:24So um so Miss Wisel I I totally agree with your testimony when you talk about a regional agreement that should consolidate and expand ACSEAN commitments to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers in goods and services across the region. You say it also should require new commitments on customs and trade reme remedies. And then you say in exchange the United States should gradually eliminate tariffs on imports from Southeast Asian partners to the agreement.
▶ 1:18:54That sounds exactly like the America first trade policy. We're asking them to lower their trade barriers to American exporters and in exchange we will reduce tariffs on them. Why is this not why does this policy not create an opportunity for greater economic integration between the United States and ASEAN to the detriment of the malign influence of Beijing?
▶ 1:19:22Well, as I said at the outset, I think that they feel, you know, that the tariff threat hanging over them is a five alarm fire. it has caused potentially tremendous damage to their economies. Um, with all of the uncertainty and the threats, I think that all of the ASEAN countries do indeed want to engage more deeply with the United States. They want to have greater economic cooperation, but they want to do so as equal partners in this negotiation.
▶ 1:19:52So as we look to see areas where we can cooperate, they would like to see reciprocal access. In other words, they would take on the rules that we are p pushing um and and in areas that are really important to us across the the um range of economic areas, you know, when we talk about customs and digital trade and and all of these areas that are that are important to the United States, but in exchange, they would like something in return.
▶ 1:20:21And I'm running out of time, but I I and I take your testimony in in good faith that you you argue that the that that the Trump policy does have the opportunity to open up US exports to Southeast Asia, but you still maintain that they will derisk from the United States as a result of this. We I'm not sure that's necessarily true. If we get better, more integrated economic uh uh deals as a result of the policy, I think they will derisk from China.
▶ 1:20:49Um, I don't have much time left, but I I would love maybe in a second round, Madam Chair, to talk about um outbound investment into China and what's going to replace that if we restrict outbound investment in China. Does that create opportunities for more US investment into ASEAN as a way to uh relocate supply chains?
▶ 1:21:14uh my ranking member has just left uh for another engagement and I I wasn't planning on doing a second round if you don't mind. Uh so you can submit your questions and hopefully our witnesses may be able to uh respond in writing. But I do have some closing uh comments if I may.
▶ 1:21:31You know, it's really evident from today's hearing that we need to do more to create a responsive and effective Southeast Asia focused strategy that begins with bolstering and strengthening our bilateral and multilateral relationship with ASEAN members. our witnesses today.
▶ 1:21:51You've all touted out key suggestions and thank you so much for that uh on how we can advance our interests diplomatically, economically and militarily. So it is imperative moving forward that we are able to deliver results in a whole of the government manner if we are going to be the counterbalance that the region is counting on us to be.
▶ 1:22:15um success can be achieved to the extent our strategies, policies and frameworks align with the needs of our regional partners. Additionally, we need uh results showing that a viable alternative to the CCP's state-driven economic model is available. We cannot allow Southeast Asia to be dictated by Beijing standards and we must use every available tool to advance our economic agenda while punishing the China's unfair trade practices.
▶ 1:22:45And now is the time for action. I encourage the administration and my colleagues across the aisle to work together to ensure that our policies would put us in a position to be the trusted partner in the region. Um so I want to thank you again for your valuable testimony and answering our members uh questions. Um the members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions for the witness like uh Rep.
▶ 1:23:14Bar has and uh we'll ask you to respond to those in writing and pursuant to the committee rules. All members may have five days to submit statements, questions and extraneous materials for the record subject to the length limitations. So without objection I declare the committee stands