▶ 0:03:06The subcommittee on cyber security, information technology and government innovation will now come to order and I want to say welcome everyone. Uh without objection, the chair may declare recess at any time. And I now recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening statement. Good afternoon and thank you for joining us for this discussion on quantum computing and its impact on cyber security. To those watching this hearing and asking what is quantum and why should I care? You are not alone.
▶ 0:03:34Quantum computing is complicated, but it's important for the government to understand and prepare for how quantum will change everything from encryption to drug discovery. Classical computing is what we all know and use today. It's the kind of computing that runs your phone, your laptop, pretty much everything uh every government system. This type of computing is what we're used to talking about around here. It's a type of computing we're thinking of when we talk about cloud-based software, chip production, and IT modernization.
▶ 0:04:04Quantum computing, on the other hand, sounds like it's the stuff of science fiction, and it might be, but it's real and it's very powerful. Today, quantum computing is in its pre-market stage, but United States companies are already investing billions of dollars each and every year into its development. A 2023 McKenzie report projected the quantum technology market could be larger than 100 billion by 2040. Quantum computing applies the laws of quantum physics to get more information out of fewer computations.
▶ 0:04:35Quantum computers aren't faster classical computers. They operate completely differently and allow us to solve new types of problems which classical computers cannot solve. Quantum computers will contribute significantly to problems which require the evaluation of vast numbers of possibilities all at once. This will lead to incredible new discoveries specifically in the fields of medicine and science. However, this will also be used to break traditional encryption thought to be unbreakable by most classical computers.
▶ 0:05:05An important role of this subcommittee is to ensure proper cyber security of federal technology. One thing all experts agree on is a sufficiently advanced quantum computer will upend cryptographic security in every sector including finance, healthcare, and defense. This is why I led the Quantum Computing Cyber Security Preparedness Act with Representative Kana, which was signed into law in December of 2022.
▶ 0:05:29This bill requires the federal government to develop and execute a plan to migrate federal IT to postquantum cryptography. The federal government must not wait to tackle this enormous task. Already we know foreign adversaries are implementing a quote steal now decrypt later quote strategy with the hope today's data will still be valuable when they have a quantum computer. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about the progress of agencies in implementing our bill.
▶ 0:05:57When President Trump signed the National Quantum Initiative Act into law in 2018 he showed the United States is taking quantum technology seriously. It's essential to the US that we lead in this disruptive technology. And I will now recognize ranking member Brown for her opening statement. Uh thank you Chairwoman Mace for calling a hearing on this important topic. Ensuring that Americans data is safe is a top priority. That's why I'm proud to have introduced the Electronic Consent Accountability Act with Chairwoman Mace today.
▶ 0:06:26This bipartisan bill would ensure federal agencies are modernizing and simplifying electronic consent while protecting their personally identifiable information. But safeguarding data doesn't stop with consent alone. It also depends on the strength of the technology behind the scenes to protect that information.
▶ 0:06:46For decades, encryption technology is something that governments, companies, and private citizens alike have relied on to protect our text messages, passwords, documents, financial transactions, and so much more from hackers, leaks, and bad actors. Originally, it was believed it would take the best supercomputers millions of years to crack the codes that we use to protect our data and privacy. But then came quantum computing.
▶ 0:07:11While we are still in an estimated 10 to 20 years away from a quantum computer that is able to decode the encryption technology that we currently use, we must prepare for the day when our current encryption meth methods fall before the power of the next generation of machines. This is not a theoretical problem. Foreign adversaries like China and Russia have already started what's called steal now and decrypt later attacks in which they steal as much of our encrypted data as possible.
▶ 0:07:40When they crack the code of quantum computing, they'll already have vast troves of sensitive secret data from the American people and the federal government at their fingertips, ready to unlock and exploit it. Given the risk to privacy and national security, we must invest to keep the United States a global leader in quantum computing and prepare the federal government for the quantum computing age.
▶ 0:08:05In 2022, the Biden Harris administration implemented the national security memo on quote promoting United States leadership in quantum computing while mitigating risk to vulnerable crypto cryptograph cryptograph cryptographic systems. Easy for me to say. End quote. This memo gives a blueprint to prepare government technology for postquantum future.
▶ 0:08:29This is not a quick fix, but it began the process of upgrading federal IT systems vulnerable to quantum decryption. It is essential that we keep that momentum going. Researchers at universities and laboratories across the country have demonstrated that quantum computing is real and can solve problems that traditional computers struggle with. In 2023, I attended the unveiling of the first on-site private sector quantum computer in the United States at the Cleveland Clinic.
▶ 0:08:58The first time anyone in the world had applied a quantum computer to be wholly focused on health care research. Today, that machine is working at helping the Cleveland Clinic accelerate scientific breakthroughs to save lives and improve treatments.
▶ 0:09:14From fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2022, Congress allocated more than $2 billion in research and development across multiple departments and programs to study quantum capability and to harden our systems against quantum ready adversaries.
▶ 0:09:32The National Institute of Science and Technology has approved three cryptography cryp cryptography standards for the postquantum world and we need to provide the funding necessary to implement these standards governmentwide to safeguard guard privacy and security. Investing in US relationships in quantum computing also means investing in basic research, educating top talent and other essential building blocks of scientific advancement.
▶ 0:10:01For decades, federal funding has been a vital tool in positioning the United States as a leader in innovation. We take for granted GPS, voice assistance, and the touchcreens that we use every day. But each of these technologies was developed thanks to foundational research funded with federal dollars. Despite the clear importance of federal science funding to our national security and economic prosperity, the Trump administration has cut this funding to its lowest level in decades.
▶ 0:10:28While our country faces unprecedented global competition in science and technology, this includes $700 million in cuts to National Science F to the National Science Foundation grant program and $879 million in cuts from new and existing STEM education grants. President Trump's budget requests asked Congress to slash the NSF budget by more than half.
▶ 0:10:51Experts say this could this could amount to the same level of long-term damage to the US economy as a major recession. So, I look forward to our conversation today on how we can best prepare the country for quantum computing and postquantum encryption. But it would serve everyone here to remember that America is only able to lead and benefit from scientific advancements because of federally funded scientific research.
▶ 0:11:20We must continue to make it a priority to do so. And with that, Madam Chair, Chairwoman, I yield back. Thank you. And I'm now pleased to introduce our witnesses for today's hearing. Our first witness today is Dr. Scott Crowder, vice president of IBM Quantum Adoption. Our second witness witness is Miss Marisol Cruz Kaine, director of information technology and cyber security at the US government accountability office. Our third witness today is Mr. Dennis Mandich, chief technology officer at Crypt. And our fourth witness today is Dr. Dr.
▶ 0:11:49Brenda Rubenstein, associate professor of chemistry and physics at Brown University. We welcome everyone and pleased to have you here this afternoon. And pursuant to committee rule 9G, the witnesses will please stand and raise your right hands. Do you solemnly swear or affirm the testimony that you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? So help you God. Let the record show the witnesses all answered in the affirmative. You may sit down. We appreciate all of you being here today and look forward to your testimony.
▶ 0:12:19Let me remind the witnesses that we have read your written statements and they will appear in full in the hearing record. Please limit your oral statements to 5 minutes. As a reminder, please press the button on the microphone in front of you so that it is on and the members can hear you. When you begin to speak, the light in front of you will turn green. After four minutes, the light will turn yellow. When the red light comes on, your five minutes has expired. And we would ask that you please wrap up. One thing I want to uh note is that we're scheduled to have votes at 1:30 today.
▶ 0:12:47So we hopefully will get through the your intros uh five minutes each and then we'll break for votes and then we will come back for questioning. I will now recognize Dr. Crowder to please begin his opening statement. Uh Chairwoman Mace, Ranking Member Brown, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to once again testify before you all. As a global leader in technology and quantum computing, IBM's mission is to bring useful quantum computing to the world and to support the transition to postquantum cryptography.
▶ 0:13:16We have the largest fleet of quantum computers and the largest ecosystem of quantum computing users in the world. We have built and made available to our customers over 80 quantum systems via our data centers in the US and Europe. All of our quantum systems are manufactured in the United States in Pikipsy, New York. Our industry research and academic partner network has over 275 members exploring the use of quantum computing for business and science to accelerate algorithmic discovery and workforce development.
▶ 0:13:44Partners such as the Cleveland Clinic, University of Missouri, Oakidge National Lab, Wells Fargo, and Loheed Martin are working with IBM to advance applications of quantum computing and build their quantum skills. 2025 marks the 100th anniversary of the birth of quantum mechanics. We've already witnessed the first quantum revolution based on our understanding that nature is discreet or quantized. This understanding has led to technologies such as lasers, transistors, MRI machines.
▶ 0:14:11It's had tens of trillions of dollars of economic benefit and a fundamental impact on our lives. Quantum computing will usher in a second quantum revolution based on the insight that the mass of quantum mechanics can be used to do computing in a new way. Quantum computers will be able to more accurately simulate chemistry, leading to breakthroughs in areas like personalized medicine, advanced materials, and more energyefficient batteries.
▶ 0:14:34Quantum algorithms will be able to discover patterns and data that are pure random to classical algorithms, leading to improved financial modeling and optimized manufacturing and logistics. Quantum will be used in concert with classical computers to drive a new computing revolution that will generate significant economic and societal Since my testimony in 2023, the industry's made significant progress.
▶ 0:14:56IBM now has a fleet of 100 plus cubit quantum computers of sufficient scale and quality that they can run quantum programs that are too complex to execute on the world's largest classical This threshold enables research into application of quantum algorithms which hold an advantage over any known classical method. IBM has stated we will demonstrate this quantum advantage by next year.
▶ 0:15:19Based on public data, we believe IBM, Google, and possibly the Chinese Academy of Sciences are also building systems that may be capable of meeting this threshold. And this progress is accelerating. Multiple vendors have published technical road maps to build more powerful fall tolerant quantum computers that will enable a much wider range of Earlier this month, IBM announced we were building what we believe will be the world's first largescale fall tolerant quantum computer in Pikipsy, New York by 2029.
▶ 0:15:49This system will be capable of running programs 20,000 times more complex than today's quantum computers. Congress can help ensure the United States remains a leader in this emerging technology in three ways. First, by investing in the deployment of high performance quantum computing technology. In addition to reauthorizing the National Quantum Initiative Act, the federal government should ensure agencies such as the departments of energy and defense deploy and integrate quantum supercomputers.
▶ 0:16:18Without greater access to the best available quantum computers, the US government will fall behind other nations in applications critical to national defense and economic Second, by increasing the focus on algorithmic discovery to capitalize on the benefits from this emerging technology, rapid advances in AI have demonstrated it is the combination of advanced computing and algorithmic innovation that determines our global leadership.
▶ 0:16:44As an AI, our ability to main technological superiority in the quantum era requires research into new algorithmic approaches, innovation in the application of these algorithms for specific use cases, and access to leading edge compute infrastructure. Finally, the US government and industry must become quantum safe and quantum ready. If the industry continues to advance at the expected pace, quantum computers will have the ability to break asymmetric encryption.
▶ 0:17:11NIST has recommended existing encryption vulnerable to quantum computers be disallowed by 2035 and previous experiences have shown broad adoption of new cryptography can take more than a decade. Thus, we must act now. We must ensure our nation's most critical systems are safe from this future threat. Thankfully, this committee has realized this need and has already begun acting.
▶ 0:17:34Congress can help further by supporting the passage of additional legislation that ensures rapid adoption of postquantum cryptography and appropriating funds to support this transition. With much of the work on standards already done, now is the time for action and implementation. Thank you for convening this hearing and I look forward to today's discussion. Miss Cruz Kaine, you're recognized for your introductory statement. Chairwoman Mace, Ranking Member Brown, and members of the subcommittee.
▶ 0:18:04Thank you for inviting me today to discuss the rise of quantum computers and the risks they present. As you know, quantum computers hold the promise of solving critical problems that conventional computers cannot. These computers use the property of quantum physics to perform calculations dramatically faster than today's conventional computers. This allows them to execute significantly greater numbers of calculations in the same amount of time. This increased computing power has potential applications in many different fields.
▶ 0:18:33For example, quantum computers may be able to simulate critical chemistry processes for developing new fertilizers and medicines. However, the flip side of this potential is that quantum computers can threaten the security of information systems and the data they contain, including those controlled by the federal government. For instance, quantum computers could defeat widely used encryption methods that individuals, federal agencies, and critical infrastructure entities rely on.
▶ 0:18:59These computers could break current encryption in only hours or days compared to the billions of years a conventional computer would take. Some experts predict that a quantum computer capable of breaking existing cryptography could be developed in the next 10 to 20 years. Furthermore, adversaries or other malicious actors could copy data protected by cryptography today and store it with the intention of accessing it later once a sufficiently powerful quantum computer is developed. Today, I'll focus on two important issues.
▶ 0:19:29First, the factors that affect the development of a quantum computer and second, the federal government's strategy to address the threat that quantum computers pose to cryptography. In October 2021, we identified several factors that affected the development and use of quantum computers and technologies. We also outlined options that policymakers should consider to address these factors. I'll highlight two.
▶ 0:19:52First, the United States needs to develop a strong quantum workforce to maintain its leadership position in quantum technology hardware and software development. In doing so, leveraging programs, training, and hiring are key. For example, educational programs could provide the qualifications and skills needed to work in quantum technologies across both the public and private Second, sustained investment is particularly important to advance these technologies.
▶ 0:20:19It's imperative for us to find additional ways to incentivize or invest in the development of quantum technologies. To do so, basic funding for research and early development activities is essential with the respect to the security threat quantum computers pose.
▶ 0:20:34In 2022, Congress passed the Quantum Computing Cyber Security Preparedness Act, which outlined important steps to facilitate the government's transition to postquantum Nonetheless, we reported last year that the federal government lacks a comprehensive national strategy for addressing cyber security risk posed by quantum computing. Various documents developed by the White House, OM, NIST, and DHS have contributed to an emerging US national strategy.
▶ 0:21:03However, the documents, even when taken altogether, don't fully address the threat. For example, while the documents included evaluations of risks to the critical infrastructure sectors, there was no similar assessment of the risks to federal agencies. In addition, the strategy documents did not assign roles and responsibilities to key federal entities for helping critical infrastructure sectors migrate to postquantum forms of cryptography.
▶ 0:21:29One reason we identified for the lack of a comprehensive strategy is that there's no single federal organization responsible for coordinating such a strategy. We believe that the office of the national cyber director is well positioned to lead the coordination and oversight of a quantum strategy and we recommended that the office take steps to do so. In summary, quantum computers hold tremendous promise for solving problems and improving life across multiple fields.
▶ 0:21:56But at the same time, their enhanced computing power creates serious risks to the security of information systems and the sensitive data they contain. Policymakers have several options for expanding the development of quantum computing. While doing so, it will be important that the country takes a coordinated and strategic approach to dealing with the risks it presents. This concludes my remarks and I look forward to answering any questions you may have. Thank you. And I now recognize Mr. Mandich for your opening statement. Thank you, Chairwoman Mace.
▶ 0:22:25Ranking member Brown, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the national security risks posed by quantum computing and the urgent need for postquantum cryptography PQC. For decades, our cyber security strategies focused on preventing immediate threats. But today's dangerous vulnerability stems from what has already happened.
▶ 0:22:44We now live in an era of retroactive in insecurity where vast amounts of sensitive and encrypted data uh government communications, defense secrets, critical infrastructure, telemetry are being silently intercepted and stored by foreign adversaries. This is known as harvest now decrypt later. A tactic perfected during the cold war and actively pursued today most notably by China. I'll point out that we say harvest now decry not stolen or stored now in crypto later because you still have your data. There's just a copy of in China.
▶ 0:23:13The recent exposure of Salt Typhoon, where nine of our largest telecom backbone networks are compromised, is undeniable proof hostile actors already have pervasive access to collection points of encrypted data, including infrastructure used by the intelligence community and law enforcement. Some officials have labeled the arrival of cryptographically relevant quantum computers, one capable of breaking today's encryption as a black swan event, rare, unpredictable, and catastrophic. But that's not a black swan event. This is a white swan event. It's inevitable.
▶ 0:23:42It's only unknown as to the arrival time, the question of timing when this will happen. With billions invested globally in rapid advances and error correction, timeline is shrinking. The sh the threshold is roughly 4,000 logical cubits and leading programs are racing towards that mark already. Delay is not just risky, it's irrational. Progress in quantum computing is nonlinear and prone to sudden breakthroughs. And our adversaries have every incentive to conceal milestones until it's too late. But the real danger isn't only in the quantum threat.
▶ 0:24:12It's in our complacency. We've seen this pattern before. Flame malware exploited weak cryptography many years ago, lingering undetected for years. from China, you're probably familiar with, resulted in Microsoft's master signing key being stolen, compromising nearly all federal agencies. And to this day, the true root cause remains completely unknown despite CISA's excellent reporting on it.
▶ 0:24:37Deprecated algorithms like MD5, Shaw 1 and flawed random number generators like DY CD, DRBG still exists across critical infrastructure that we use today. Even with full public knowledge of these flaws, meaning reform, meaningful reform is very slow, fragmented or entirely absent in many cases.
▶ 0:24:53The transition to PQC will be far more complex than any previous cryptographic upgrade because like in the 1990s we now operate on a global scale of digital infrastructure, cloud networks, AIdriven systems, exosiscale computers and quantum research itself. Our systems were never designed to res resist the types of catastrophic nation states attacks we're seeing today. Worse, PQC is not a silver bullet.
▶ 0:25:17The collapse of pro promising algorithms like psych just two years ago broken in under an hour by a regular laptop computer remind us it's a sober reminder that no encryption is invulnerable. Even new standards like the PQC algorithms will have flaws. Waiting for the perfect solution is a fantasy. This will be a long continuous process not a finish line. Compounding this risk is the convergence of AI and quantum technologies which amplifies the threat vectors involved. AI accelerates cryp analysis, enabling automated, scalable, and unpredictable new attacks.
▶ 0:25:48Data poisoning becomes a systemic risk where AI agents ingest corrupted or intercepted data, creating catastrophic decision failures. Future Stuckset like campaigns will combine malware, AI, and quantum powered exploits embedded in persistent invisible threats at our firmware and hardware levels. The status quo of reactive cyber security patching after they are weaponized cannot survive in this environment. We need a proactive architectural shift. The basics are simple. It's crypto agility.
▶ 0:26:17Systems must be designed so encryption can be hot swapped very quickly. Redundant and distributed defense systems. No single points of failure. They must all be eliminated, especially with PQC. And a government-ledd mandate above all else. The US government as the world's largest technology customer can drive the market by refusing to procure any non-PQC compliant systems. The PQC transition isn't just technical, it's strategical and a national economic security necessity.
▶ 0:26:44The internet itself evolved from 1970s telecom's networks prioritizing scale and monetization over resiliency and security. That model is now unsustainable given the geopolitical risk we're facing today. Harvest now decouplater isn't speculative. It's happening now. quantum feudal capable exploiting the stockpiles of UN of this data is foreseeable in the future and combining with AI the threat is not additive.
▶ 0:27:06It is now exponential in action costs more than preparation and history shows we rarely regret moving early to mitigate these predictable and catastrophic risks. The EU has now mandated all their systems of highv value data and critical infrastructure must be completed by 2030. More than a decade ago, NSA director General General Alexander said it best. This is the single greatest transfer of wealth in human history and we cannot survive this if quantum is achieved in China before the US. Thank you for your time. Thank you. And Dr.
▶ 0:27:35Rubenstein, you are recognized for your opening statement. First and foremost, I I would like to thank Chairwoman Mace, Ranking Member Shantel Brown, uh and the honorable members of this committee uh for your continued interest in in quantum technologies. I particularly applaud this committee's efforts uh for thinking about the Department of Defense's quantum computing center of excellence which would potentially uh significantly transform the technologies that our armed services use routinely. Quantum technologies are absolutely critical to our nation's health, prosperity, and defense.
▶ 0:28:04I thank the committee for thinking about this and inviting me to testify regarding these matters. For background, my name is Brenda Rubenstein. I'm an associate professor of chemistry and physics, uh soon to become the Vernon Cream Professor of Chemistry at Brown University. Uh I'm an expert in in quantum mechanics and statistical mechanics with 20 years of experience who's led a number of large teams on quantum computing and in particular we're looking at how we can actually use quantum computers to understand biochemistry and biological and health problems. Um my experience transcends academia.
▶ 0:28:32Uh I previously worked at the national laboratories. Uh I've formed a number of different startups. Uh and I'm a member representing quantum science and the US defense science study group. uh to get to the point uh the reason why we're here is is thinking about quantum uh technologies. Uh as we all know over the past several decades communing uh computing has emerged as one of the cornerstone technologies uh of all of society enabling a number of transformative advances in communication, health, business and other areas.
▶ 0:29:00To give you an example, my grandfather was one of the first uh mathematicians, a basic scientist uh who worked on UNIVAC and used it to actually predict election results. You may remember that UNIVAC got the election right uh and actually uh CBS got the election wrong. Since that time in 1952, we've witnessed an incredible increase in in the computational power that we have which has completely transformed our society. However, classical computers, however advanced they have gotten, cannot solve every single known problem.
▶ 0:29:29There are wide classes of problems uh in optimization uh in energy and in biology uh for which we cannot solve uh rapidly and efficiently using classical computation. These problems can potentially be addressed by quantum computers. And as was said before uh if America is the first to use these, it will be the difference between using uh my grandfather's 1952 computer and us using modern computers of of today.
▶ 0:29:55In order to ensure our our quantum leadership, however, we must train a fully skilled quantum workforce. Uh as Vanavar Bush phrased it so eloquently many years ago, we shall have rapid or slow advance on any scientific frontier depending upon the number of highly qualified uh individuals and scientists exploring it. The same rings true today for quantum technologies. In fact, quantum science is a particularly uh special area for developing the workforce because it requires a number of complex skills.
▶ 0:30:23One must know quantum, one must know biology, one must know a variety of different areas in mathematics and engineering in order to realize the quantum computers of tomorrow. Fortunately, the United States is very positioned uh to uh train individuals in these different areas. We come with an approach where we train quite broadly uh and we educate the leaders of the future to think and innovate beyond what others have done before. However, what's critical to ensuring our workforce is basic research. Basic research uh is the way that we train our students.
▶ 0:30:52we train our trainees in order to think creatively and innovatively to solve these different key challenges. Basic research is also the way that we've come up with quantum computing in the first place. So if we think about Richard Feman, Feman annunciated and thought about quantum computers out of thought, out of curiosity, out of interest. Uh and so many things about quantum computing rest uh on the pillars of basic research. However, uh as as uh many of you know, uh basic research uh has been substantially reduced and looking at future budgets.
▶ 0:31:20um we're seeing significant uh reductions in in what we will be able to expend uh on our quantum workforce. Um if we look at the NSF budget alone, that will be reduced by 57% and then a total of 85% for physics. So that's all the basic physics research that has gone into quantum computing over the many years. Uh there will also be significant cuts to things like graduate research programs.
▶ 0:31:42uh these fund our graduate students in order to perform uh the kinds of important research that we need in order to advance quantum technologies over the future and there are even significant cuts to DoD basic research as well including in fields that are related uh to quantum technologies. These different cuts have had marketked impacts on the psyches of of our trainees and on educators. Labs even at uh prestigious universities are starting to shut.
▶ 0:32:07And let me tell you, one of my students who's a Lindal Nobel laurate, the highest laurate you can be as an undergraduate and graduate student uh once recently told me that maybe he shouldn't do physics because there won't be a job for him. So this leaves us uh with the question of who will be our next generation of American scientific leaders who will lead our quantum re Um I therefore advocate uh that if you want to think about that mountain vista of of attaining uh quantum leadership that we must traverse the mountain and we must
▶ 0:32:37actually support scientific research including basic research. Thank All right. Thank you. Um, and since we're going to be voting here momentarily, pursuant to the previous order, the chair declares a subcommittee in recess subject to the call of the chair. We will plan to reconvene 10 minutes after votes. Uh, the subcommittee now stands in recess.
▶ 1:53:47come to order. Um, and I would like to thank everyone for your patience this afternoon. Uh, I would now like to recognize myself for five minutes. Miss Cruz Kane, my first question goes to you. The Quantum Computing Cyber Security Preparedness Act signed into law in December of 22. What progress has the federal government made in migrating to postquantum cryptography and where are we failing behind?
▶ 1:54:11OM's guidance asked for inventory of systems that have sensitive information and also asked for funding and what that would take. And lastly asked agencies to start testing the postquantum cryptography that NIST gave. Right now we have ongoing work um and we're looking to release that at in a couple months I think. So I can't give you the findings of that but what I can tell you is we're in the very early stages. Okay. And then this is a question for everybody on the panel today.
▶ 1:54:41Uh what keeps you up at night when it comes to quantum? It's a loaded question. Mr. Crowder, you can go first. Um sure. I mean, I guess as a vendor of quantum computing, part of what makes keeps us up at night is making sure we're staying ahead. We've been very public about what we're going to do in terms of building quantum computers. We obviously don't tell people how, but we tell them what we're going to do. We're very public about that.
▶ 1:55:05So that means we literally have to execute on our road map in order to maintain leadership since we've kind of set a target on ourselves. So that keeps me up at night. And then the second thing that keeps me up at night is yes, you know, I am concerned about postquantum cryptography uh uh implementation. I mean a lot of the hard work from a technical point of view is already done, but the the harder part of it isn't really the technical part.
▶ 1:55:33It's actually finding all this stuff, fixing all this stuff, and you know, doing it in such a way it's easy to fix the next time. Do you think we're doing enough, I guess, pre-post cryptography? I mean, how do you plan for that if it hasn't quite arrived, right? Yeah. So, we can because you know, NIST has done a pretty good job, I think, I think maybe even an excellent job of starting early um and you know, getting the mathematicians to come up with with, you know, um new new algorithms, you know, getting the standards in place. So standards are there.
▶ 1:56:03So I think we know what we need to do. Um we know that it's not going to be a perfect fix as as Dr. Vandage said. Um we also know how to do like more agile ways of fixing crypto, but it's a lot of work. It takes a lot of investment. Um and I think that's where the challenge is. And Miss Cruz Kane, what keeps you up at night? I think the two things are harvest now and decrypt later.
▶ 1:56:26The government has a lot of sensitive information and we are not sure what our adversaries have and are holding until a quantum computer is developed. And then the second is the cuts to the funding. The agencies, the private sector need the funding to do their research and also start the transition to postquantum cryptography. Mr. Mandich, it's the possibility that possibility that China is ahead of us and we don't know it.
▶ 1:56:53um they've gone very silent on what they're doing on the quantum for the last couple years. Before this, they were very public about it. There's no incentive for them to publicize the fact that they have it and that they can actually exploit a lot of the data that they're already sitting on today. My other concern is that we're relying on a single algorithm. There's three that are standardized, but only one does the actual data encryption. If that fails, there's no backup plan right now. We have to transition to that sooner rather than later because we know the ones we're using today are quantum broken.
▶ 1:57:20But if all those things happen at the same time, we're in a dark place. Dr. Rubenstein, I agree with everything that was previously said. Just just to add, um I I worry about how American leadership and what American leadership will look like in the future. We rely on a relatively small pool of of people who are are trained and educated in the United States. If that pool goes away, I'm very worried about who who will be leading us uh in the future when we compete against China and other Europe. Uh Mr. Manage, where do you think China is?
▶ 1:57:48What's your personal opinion or assessment on China and their quantum capabilities? Sure. I, you know, I was in the intelligence community for decades. I've watched them very up close and personal. Uh, stealing the the scale of theft is extraordinary. So, I think my my guess is that they have access to everything that we've already done and it's not just from one company, it's from a lot of companies and that they're pulling all of that in a single facility in Onwi Province.
▶ 1:58:15This is all public information where they're gathering uh tens of thousands of people to train them as the next generation of physicists and and we're not doing that. The other piece is that there's no quantum industry in the United States without that fundamental research that you just mentioned. There's not a single US company quantum computing or otherwise that did not rely on the research the fundamental pieces that came out of the universities and the national labs. That includes everyone that you've heard of. How's AI playing a role in this both in what we're doing and maybe what China's doing to advance?
▶ 1:58:46Oh, they're they're definitely going to use AI to do crypt analysis on the existing set of algorithms and the flaws that are available to them that they know about. We talked about zero days offline here, but it's all the other things that go along with that. That's the real power behind all this. I don't think AI is going to be very useful for these other pieces, but for breaking crypto, it's going to be incredibly useful. Who do you think uh how far behind do you think China is from the US on AI?
▶ 1:59:10I it's another situation where I do believe that just again having observed them for so long they have access to everything that we've ever done in all of our companies. All of our companies have been penetrated as far as we know. Many of their employees are in China. In many cases those employees actually physically work from remote locations in Chinese intelligence agencies, not even in the private sector. So I do feel that because they're so quiet about this, they're being very secretive about what they're doing. We don't even know the names of the quantum companies in China. There's only a couple of them that are public.
▶ 1:59:40The rest of them are completely unknown. We're likely going to experience a deepseek moment um in quantum computing. Um that again deepseek there there was no deepseek before chat GPT3. That's that came up afterwards and that came up very quickly and that didn't happen from fundamental research. It came from data theft and IP monetization. One of my fears too and I yield back. I'll now recognize Mr. uh for five minutes. Uh thank you, Madam Chair. Uh and thank you to the witnesses for being here today.
▶ 2:00:10Uh I um for Miss Cruz Kane, you mentioned in your testimony that we need to have a national security strategy for quantum, especially when quantum breaks encryption. Just for the folks at home, what are the ramifications of maybe a bad actor having access to quantum that can break encryption? What would that mean for economy, for national security? it's going to have severe ramifications for all of the things that you just mentioned.
▶ 2:00:35So the bad actors again are taking data, our sensitive data, our PII, government information and storing it and once in 10 to 20 years when the quantum computer is developed, they can access all of that information and much of that's going to be still sensitive in the next 10 to 20 years. So it can have severe ramifications on military operations. It can have um severe damage to people whose PII is now out there.
▶ 2:01:03Social security numbers, health information, you name it, as long as we are holding it and it's being protected by current encryption um standards, they can take it and it'll be accessible to them once the quantum computer is developed. Isn't it true that um theoretically quantum could break the encryption of Bitcoin, right? And that's a huge market alone, just Bitcoin, right? Is that true? Yes.
▶ 2:01:27And so it have huge ramifications for economy, for national security, and and you mentioned wanting the ONC to put together a strategy. Would you or anyone on the panel have any thoughts on what that strategy would look like or any suggestions that the Congress could take action on right now? I will yield to everybody else. But first, in our report that we issued last year, we mentioned that there was a couple of key things missing from the documents that do comprise the strategy we do have. One, there was no risk assessment to the federal government.
▶ 2:01:57So there was a risk assessment done for critical infrastructure sectors and what the risks of quantum computing would be to that sector, but not to the federal government. So unless we have done a complete risk assessment to find out where our vulnerabilities are and the threats that they pose and how to mitigate it, we are not even prepared to start to protect our systems and transition them to PQC. And then also there's no milestones there to sort of measure ourselves against and when we should be in certain places.
▶ 2:02:25So that's another thing that we highlighted in our report and I think those are probably the most important ones. But I will let the fellow panelists take Does anyone else have any suggestions or thoughts on what a strategy might look like thought about Bitcoin is that uh once a cryptographically relevant quantum mess online they'll be able to calculate the largest Bitcoin wallet so the value of Bitcoin will be zero. And do you think that's in the near future or possible in the near future? That's a question about Qday which none of us probably want to answer. Okay.
▶ 2:02:53But the reality is that uh whoever has that computer will be able to transfer that cryptocurrency to their own accounts and that's an immutable transaction. There's no regulatory authority that says that that's invalid and you get the money back. There's no FDIC for cryptocurrency. So that whole industry just goes away. And and so the ONCD and for folks at home, it's the Office of National Cyber Directorate.
▶ 2:03:13and and as uh one of the things the go has mentioned is um that this office should direct the strategy and lead the strategy that that we're talking about right now. Um do you have any concerns about the expertise there, the leadership to be able to um direct our strategy on quantum? We don't. I think it's important to get the national cyber director confirmed so that they have clear and um appointed leadership. That's going to be important.
▶ 2:03:43But they're best positioned being that they are in charge of coming up with national strategies and then sort of piecing out what every other federal agency needs to do to support that strategy. And I think wouldn't you want a national cyber director who has technical experience or some sort of background in cyber policy? Yes, that would be a good idea. Okay. Yeah.
▶ 2:04:05I just say that that's a concern for me right now because um the current one who's up um appears to be someone who's simply a political person uh who was an official at the Republican National Committee and doesn't have a background certainly not in quantum but really in cyber anything else. And so that's a deep concern. I'm also really concerned generally about um our federal government expertise in IT, cyber security, all of these issues.
▶ 2:04:32uh if we keep chasing away the people who have expertise in these spaces then we're going to end up being behind the eight-ball whether it's China or anyone else any adversary and so I'm going to continue to push to try to one you know try to fix this issue and make sure that we have good leadership on NCD and we have a strategy in place and we can do that in a bipartisan way but two also make sure that we're not chasing away the best and brightest in these fields especially in cyber so thank you and I yield back okay I'll now recognize Mr.
▶ 2:05:02Crane for 5 Uh, thank you guys for coming today. Uh, thank you uh, Mr. Chairwoman for hosting this event. Um, I want to start with you, Dr. Rubenstein. Um, are you concerned about adversarial countries like China um, developing quantum computing before the United States? I am definitely worried about this. Um, I think with that we Sorry. Um, I I'm definitely concerned about this.
▶ 2:05:30uh we we really don't know what's what's uh happening in China. Uh we obviously uh share our information quite freely. That's part of our culture. That's part of uh you know what we do in order to innovate and to share ideas. Um as a result of that that that also exposes us. And you're a professor at Brown University. Is that correct? That's correct. Um do you guys have courses in quantum computing, nuclear engineering, etc. at Brown? Uh we do have courses in in quantum computation and and other related areas.
▶ 2:05:58A lot of universities have stepped back from from teaching in nuclear areas a long time ago. Miss Rubenstein, are there any uh vetting processes that take place at Brown to make sure that students coming from adversarial countries aren't getting access to the education and knowledge needed to uh kind of defeat the US in quantum computing. Um so we currently follow the laws uh regarding uh the students that that we take. Um we believe that students uh you know improve our environment.
▶ 2:06:28They contribute to our atmosphere. Uh many of those students come here to pursue a degree in a free country uh where they they want to stay. So virtually all of my students have stayed for example. Uh and so we we follow the law there. Um I'll leave it to you to uh you know prescribe the law moving forward. Do you see that as problematic? I mean, we're sitting here talking about who's going to win this quantum computing race. And if we lose the quant computing race, that could have disastrous ramifications national security-wise, economicwise.
▶ 2:06:59But you sit here as a representative from Brown University and you guys don't vet any of the foreign students coming into your university and you allow them to get educated in many of these fields and then go back, you know, to their countries and uh compete against the US. Um, so we rely on the federal government in order to vet students uh right now and and so we we follow the law in that regard. Um, are these things concerning? Absolutely. They're concerning.
▶ 2:07:28Um, but but there are experts that are better than me who who can prescribe what that law should be and and how it should be affected. I I should say there are pluses and minuses to this, right? So so many of these people come to our country. Um, they work at our companies and and they do in fact uh innovate in ways uh that that are exceptional. Uh and and so we do have to balance those trade-offs uh as well. Um and so someone smarter than me uh should should dictate those laws. Have you ever raised that concern with anybody at Brown? Uh we've thought about these concerns. Yeah.
▶ 2:07:59Um how many inter international students attend Brown University? Uh I I do not know the exact number off the top of my head, but I probably estimate around a th00and to 2,000 out of about 8,000. Okay. Thank you. Uh Mr. Mandic Ditch, is that correct? Yeah. You said you worked in the intelligence field for a long time. Does it concern you that universities like Brown and others allow students to come here.
▶ 2:08:23Sometimes they'll come and say that they're going to start an English program and then they work with maybe a sympathetic professor who shifts them into something like nuclear engineering or quantum computing and then they end up competing with the United States. Well, the you know, we know that China floods the United States with students. That's one of their frontline collection uh platforms. It floods the not just the university system but almost every country and every company that you can think of with collectors.
▶ 2:08:53So we need to do a much better job of limiting that because we've effectively trained their entire uh quantum industry here in the United States. Very little of that happened domestically in China. So we have to do something about it. But we also need more Americans to get into these fields than to get out of, you know, social media and Tik Tok that we need to get that to be the majority in these programs and not the minority. Dr.
▶ 2:09:16Crowder, can you give the American people who, you know, wouldn't consider themselves tech experts by any stretch of the imagination some idea of the type of power that we're talking about here in relation to say the computer I have in front of me or the iPhone that I have in front of me? Yeah. Yeah, I mean the way I would say it is it it it it's a complete different kind of computing. So it'll solve different kinds of problems. So it's not going to like solve the same problem a lot better.
▶ 2:09:42It's going to be able to solve um complex chemistry problems to help materials development or um financial optimization if like you're a bank and you want to do portfolio optimization. Um so those kind of problems that a quantum computer is going to help um with society. Thank you. I yield back. All right. All right, I'll now recognize uh Congresswoman Brown for 5 minutes. Uh thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thank you to the witnesses for being here today.
▶ 2:10:08Far too often, Congress is the last to act in the face of te technological change. The rise of quantum computing and postquantum cryptography poses far too great of a challenge for us to keep our collective head in the sand. Congress has already invested nearly $2 billion in quantum resilience research and development, but that is just a down payment. We should be doing more now to prepare. So, Mr.
▶ 2:10:32Mandich, uh, what should Congress be doing right now to ensure the federal government and our critical infrastructure is secure in the face of quantum computing advancements? We absolutely have to upgrade not just the algorithms that we're using, but everything around that, all the equipment, the people that are trained behind it as well. There's no simple answer to this. It's almost a pervasive problem. So, we really have to get the next generation of people trained up that can even do this, that can implement and upgrade these systems. We haven't done this for decades.
▶ 2:11:00And the last time we did this, there was barely an internet. The cloud didn't exist. Virtual networks, that was a fantasy. We're in a environment now where everything's completely interconnected that was made to be physically isolated before and we're connecting all of that to the internet for autonomous control by AI um for access to more information. It's going to be a long process and we don't have the people to do this. I appreciate that. Thank you.
▶ 2:11:26To prepare for the quantum computing age, we must ensure that the American workforce, to your point, has the skills necessary to innovate and compete on the world stage. So, um, Miss Cruz King, can, um, what are some of the unique intricacies of developing a quantum workforce? And why is building a resilient and long-lasting workforce important for the threats of In a report that we did in 2021, we mentioned having an increased workforce size, but also skill.
▶ 2:11:54And we pointed out there were several different ways that we could do that. We could use existing programs. NSF has a program, the joint industry um graduate training program. And we can use those type of programs to make sure that we are recruiting people as um all of my panelists have said that are have the skill. You're going to need skills from multiple different areas as well. It's not just computing. There's science. There's biology. There's all different types of academic rigor that you need for quantum computing.
▶ 2:12:23So, those are some of the intricacies. It's not just one trained skill. You're going to need many trained skills. And the biggest workforce issue that the federal government has been facing specifically with cyber security is the private sector tends to outweigh our benefits and people will go there. So we've got to increase the collaboration between the federal government's skills and workforce and work with academia, work with the industries to make sure that collaboration is productive.
▶ 2:12:50And it is definitely um we need the funding for the research, we need funding for the skills, we need funding for those type of programs to make them successful. Thank you. And the universities, as you touched on, are critical training grounds for the next generation of innovators. If the United States is to remain a global leader in the science and technology of the future, we will need to continue attracting young innovators from all over the world to study here in the United States. But as you talked about, universities rely on federal funding for the science and technology research that drives American innovation and competitiveness.
▶ 2:13:20And President Trump has released a budget that would cut science funding to its lowest level. So, Dr. Rubenstein, how does federal funding facilitate your team's research and the training of doctoral students in your lab? And then if you could chime in, Mr. Mandage and and Dr. Crowder, how do you how do your companies rely on basic research funding and the pipeline of doctoral students to continue to innovate? Starting with you, doctor.
▶ 2:13:44Uh federal funding is absolutely essential to running any research lab in in any university or college or or institution across the uh the country. In particular, in terms of uh funding graduate students, um virtually all graduate students are are federally funded at at some level. So some work with industry, some work with the the government. Um sometimes there are partnerships, but the majority of funding is is really for uh graduate students. And so without that federal funding, um I believe about 60% of all US graduate students are federally funded right now, at least 60%.
▶ 2:14:14Uh then we're losing about 60% of our graduate students. And since I haven't heard from Dr. Crowder, if I can let them jump in, go ahead. Sure. Yeah, I mean quantum is a very multid-disciplinary um space especially in building quantum computers. Uh so we do rely on like really strong basic STEM uh students coming out of the university system. We actually do vet um all of our hires into our critical space um in that space to address a previous question.
▶ 2:14:42Um and I think one of the areas that I think is also really important is research into algorithms, research into application. Um those areas I think are a little bit under uh focused right now in terms of the the funding that's gone so far. Go ahead. We we we've hired lots of graduate students. Uh we funded them through their PhD programs and hired them afterwards and only one of them was a foreigner.
▶ 2:15:06Uh rarely are you going to get anyone working on some of these problems unless they're in the university or the national lab system. Again, as I mentioned, there are no US quantum companies that did not start on second or third base without that national lab or university system research. They didn't fundamentally come up with any of these technologies, not one. Thank you. I look forward to more bipartisan discussion on this. And with that, I yield back. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. I'll now recognize Mr. Berles for five minutes. Thank you, Madam Chair.
▶ 2:15:35This is a one of my favorite topics. Um, I find it extremely fascinating. Um Mr. Crowder um at IBM I know that there's different types of of quantum like ways in which you can build a quantum computer. There's like photonic um what what is IBM doing? We're using something called superconducting cubits. And uh there are a lot of ways you can hold a quantum state and build a quantum computer. But at the end of the day, from our perspective, you're trying to build a computer.
▶ 2:16:05And um how it works is less important than how quickly it can compute stuff. Uh and that's why we chose the approach that we chose because we think it's the right balance of allowing us to build really large systems in the future, but also the underlying operation is pretty fast. So it's really good as a computer as opposed to just a research project. So So you're measuring the state of of what particle it is basically a some people call it like an artificial atom.
▶ 2:16:35It's basically just uh something that resonates at a certain frequency uh and holds a quantum state. So it's either in the zero state or in the one state or in a superp position of the zero state and the one state which is what's what makes it quantum. Uh, and there's a lot of ways you can build those quantum states. Um, you can use um individual ions, you can use photonics, you can do it the way that we do it. There's lots of different ways that you can you can do it. Okay.
▶ 2:17:02And then once whenever you're you're doing that, there there's different algorithms that do that that perform very well given the the the fact that what you're basically dealing in probability, right? Yeah.
▶ 2:17:16It's actually this bizarre mix of probability and and um precise like so it's actually when you're in a quantum state you're in a very precise exact quantum state but it appears probab pro probabilistic because when you measure it it either collapses to a zero or one based on that precise state. So it's it's one of those head hurting things about quantum computing.
▶ 2:17:39Um but but yes, so the the trick is to create these algorithms that use all this compute power in a way that's useful um in a way that's uh efficient. And that's where I would argue we need to put more research because that's really where the rubber hits the road in terms of taking quantum computers and making them useful for US government missions and for industry. Okay.
▶ 2:18:03Uh Miss Rubenstein um in health care how can the the benefits of the way in which quantum computers work and their you know complexity and their performance what benefits how would that benefit the healthcare industry? Absolutely. Uh so there are a lot of uh different drugs that we create uh that will bind to different proteins in in different ways. And so fundamentally what people want to understand is is which drugs will will bind in in different ways to proteins and how can we make those new drugs.
▶ 2:18:34Uh that that can be the therapeutics of of tomorrow. Uh and so uh classically if we use regular computers it can be quite hard to to figure out how that binding occurs. Um I actually use some of the biggest supercomputers in the world in order to figure out these kinds of things accurately. quantum computers in principle will be able to do that very rapidly uh so exponentially faster uh and and extremely accurately and so that will let us predict uh the drugs of the future much much faster than we are Okay.
▶ 2:19:03Um and then I had some questions Mr. Mandich um what are the key differentiators allowing Americans American firms to lead globally on this topic? What are so what is what's benefiting us?
▶ 2:19:20Well, we have a vibrant, you know, startup community, private private sector community, private sector community that's benefited from all this research that came before it that and that that's one of my biggest questions as well is like we have big players like IBM, we have uh Google doing Willow, right? Absolutely. Yeah. And then but then I saw that there's another company called Saiquantum. Squantum is that that's a brand new startup. They're almost 10 years old. They're photonic computing. Okay.
▶ 2:19:45But that but that's they're new relatively speaking compared to these companies didn't exist a decade ago. And so this is you see this as an opportunity for some new startups to kind of venture into this market. Yeah. But no startup can enter this business at all without all this fundamental research. There's nobody that would have studied you know Microsoft just released the Myerana one um which is a topological cubit. There's six or seven different technologies that went into making that that put them on third base to even start building that process.
▶ 2:20:15and that came out of Oakidge, Los Alamos National Lab, NIST, and other places like that. They could never have done that without that foundational piece. Okay. Thank you. I yield back. All right. Now, I'll recognize Mr. Magcguire for five minutes. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Uh, and thank you to the witnesses for being here today. Quantum technologies of the future, and is imperative that the US remains the leader in this realm. In 2023, private investments in quantum startups in the US was roughly 10 times larger than China.
▶ 2:20:42However, China is rapidly investing to challenge the US leadership in the space. And in the sake of time, just real quick, yes or no. Does quantum technology a threat to national security? Do you see that as a potential? So, yes or no, Dr. Crowder? Uh, yes. If we don't get prepared with postquantum cryptography, yes, Miss I agree. Mr. Manage, absolutely. And Dr. Rubenstein, 100%. So, Dr.
▶ 2:21:11Crowder, what areas of US quantum innovation are most at risk of being overtaken by a foreign I think there's again there's two pieces of it. One of them is building the best quantum computers on the planet. Maybe three things. Um, you know, based on public data, um, we think we have a lead over any place else in the world today. Um, but that's only based on public data. Um, the second area is in the algorithms and applications.
▶ 2:21:40Um and right now I would say we're seeing a little bit more uh investment by other governments than by the US government in focusing on you know really the application research. Uh we tend to wait until the computers are large enough to actually solve a mission before we begin the application research for the mission if that makes sense. Makes a lot of sense. Miss Miss Kaine, where in China in where is China in this race?
▶ 2:22:05And what's the national security risk if they develop a cryptographically relevant quantum computer first? There's been research that says that North America, particularly the US, is the leader right now, but China is making significant investments and is closely um closely getting to the spot where we are. So they are not lagging by much.
▶ 2:22:28And I think that my colleagues have said if they are able to produce the different algorithms um but also coming from a federal government perspective if they are infiltrating and taking our sensitive data that could be significantly um impactful later. Thank you. All right. Quantum computers will eventually be able to break today's widely used encryption standards, putting our national security, financial systems, and personal privacy at risk.
▶ 2:22:58So, this is a question for all witnesses. What is a cryptographically relevant quantum computer? And how close are we to seeing one? We'll start with Dr. Crowder. Yeah. So I think it's a tricky question to answer because we have to assume what algorithm they're using and so known on the algorithm that we know today um if you take the technology we're going to build by the end of this decade beginning of the 2030s and just poured a ton of
▶ 2:23:28money into just build a bigger system based on that technology, you get pretty close to being able to build a cryptographically relevant quantum computer which gives you a time frame of like 2030 to 2035ish time frame. The reason why I hesitate to give you an exact date is because I don't know if there's any algorithmic advances that might occur to make that time Well, we have adv if anybody wants to answer this one.
▶ 2:23:55Will we have advanced warning before this technology is My view again is from the Intel side is that we won't know um and that China will keep that very quiet for as long as they can. I'll just add that there's a dozen or so ways that we've tried to make quantum computers with different types of cubits that Mr. Burlesen said. Uh we don't know which one will scale the fastest and make those cryptographically relevant quantum computers. And if history is our guide in technology, there's always just one winner in these things.
▶ 2:24:25Google one search, Amazon one, you know, selling anything, Spotify one music. The same thing might happen in quantum computing and that company might be in China, not in the United States. This subcommittee held a hearing to examine the outdated legacy IT systems currently in place in our government. Do legacy systems pose a greater risk in the face of quantum threats?
▶ 2:24:45Anyone want to jump in on that I think that legacy systems has been an issue that go brings up constantly and it does create significant risk because those legacy systems are sometimes outdated and they don't have the technology that can handle the transition to PQC. So in order for us to uh be able to transition, they're going to need to start planning on how to transition those systems over to technology that will handle the transition.
▶ 2:25:14But also it gets very expensive and some of these systems are so outdated that you might just need to start from scratch and replace the system. As technology continues to evolve, it's imperative that we stay in the forefront of innovation. Thank God we have President Trump who has pushed for continued US dominance in this technology. And with that, I yield back. Thank you. Uh in closing this afternoon, I want to thank our panelists once again for your testimony and your time and traveling to get here today.
▶ 2:25:38With that and without objection, all members will have five legislative days within which to submit materials and to submit additional written questions for the witnesses which will be forwarded to the witnesses for their response. So there's no further business. Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.