▶ 0:00:20I think so too.
▶ 0:00:23Anything else? One more.
▶ 0:01:00When do you think they're 30 days?
▶ 0:01:03Oh gosh, I I don't know. So they they announced it formally Monday.
▶ 0:01:08Okay. Um so Scott's office
▶ 0:01:30we'll keep us posted. If I hear anything, I'll be sure
▶ 0:01:58there's only three votes.
▶ 1:07:39The committee on homeland security subcommittee on emergency management technology will come to order. Without objection, the chair may declare the subcommittee in recess at any point. The purpose of this hearing is to assess the threat of uh agro terrorism to the United States food and agriculture sector and examine how federal efforts to prevent, respond to, and recover from such attacks can be strengthened. I now recognize myself for an open opening statement. Good afternoon and thank you for joining us today.
▶ 1:08:09Today, this subcommittee is meeting to discuss the threats posed by agot terrorism and other malicious actors who seek to harm America's food and agriculture sector. The importance of our nation's agriculture assets to both our economy and national security cannot be Agro terrorists who use biological agents and other means to disrupt our food supply chain can find success in generating mass fear, instability, and economic damage.
▶ 1:08:40This makes our agriculture a tempting target for hostile actors. Just earlier this year, the DOJ charged three Chinese nationals with uh trying to smuggle hazardous biological material into the United States, materials that could have threatened the health of our crops and our livestock. These Chinese nationals intended to conduct further research on the materials at the University of Michigan laboratory.
▶ 1:09:06That raises serious questions about the risk of modifying dangerous pathogens and other strengths of security measures protecting research conducted within our universities and laboratories. While CBP agents successfully intercepted the undeclared biological materials, this instant highlights the critical role of food safety and security in our homeland security operations.
▶ 1:09:30Unfortunately, these incidents are just the latest development and an ongoing trend of foreign and malign interest in US The risk we face aren't limited to just the international introduction of biological threats. More and more the food and agriculture industries have incorporated automations and digital technologies to improve the efficiency of farming.
▶ 1:09:55But as the farming industry continues to increase its use the of these technologies, it becomes more vulnerable to cyber attack, potentially jeopardizing the entire supply chain. Rogue actors have also attempted to breach our agriculture sector from within. A GAO study from January of last year confirmed that foreign ownership of US farmland has been steadily increasing over the course of decades.
▶ 1:10:22And there's a growing concern that groups affiliated with the PRC will continue to seek the per to purchase of farmland near and around US military bases and installations. That's why I'm proud to have sponsored the protecting America's agriculture land from foreign harm Act 2025. My bill would prohibit people tied to the governments of Iran, North Korea, China, or Russia from purchasing or leasing agriculture land in the United States of America.
▶ 1:10:50It's a common sense step to protect our food, fiber, and supply chain and prevent adversaries from using our farmland as a base for operations that threatens our homeland security. I hope that the relevant committees of jurisdiction can take up this bill soon.
▶ 1:11:07I'm also uh I also commend President Trump and his administration for standing up for na for uh the national farm security action plan which brings together USDA, DHS, the Department of War and other federal agencies. This initiative has the potential to revolutionize the integration of agriculture security into national security and I strongly support it.
▶ 1:11:33Today we are fortunate to have a panel of experts who can testify to the nature and se severity of the threat that terrorists and other malicious actors can pose to agriculture. I look forward uh to hearing their perspectives of what else Congress and the federal government can do to protect our farmland and our food supply chain from bad actors. I now recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Kennedy, for his opening statement.
▶ 1:12:03Thank you, chairman, and good afternoon. Last week's uh several members of this committee traveled to New York City to pay our respects and honor the lives of those who were lost on September 11th, 2001. I'm glad we were able to come together in a bipartisan manner to remember those who perished on that tragic day.
▶ 1:12:27One of the problems identified in the aftermath of September 11th was our country's failure to imagine the absolute worstcase scenarios. In recognizing those gaps in our national security, the Department of Homeland Security was created the following year and Congress invested in first responder resources to strengthen communities ability to counter all types of threats and hazards.
▶ 1:12:51In fact, as a direct result of the 9/11 attacks, Congress and the George W. Bush administration recognized the need to improve the United States preparedness toward agot terrorism and biocurity more broadly.
▶ 1:13:06This included designating agriculture as a critical infrastructure sector and passing legislation in 2002 to implement a coordinated whole of government strategy for bioteterrorism Since then, over the last two decades, the federal government has worked closely with farmers, private sector partners, animal and plant experts, and academia to ensure that we have strong infrastructure in place to detect and defend against any
▶ 1:13:36biocurity threats. In fact, in my home state of New York, Cornell University hosts the Animal Health Diagnostic Center, a level one facility that is part of the US Department of Agricultures National Animal Health Laboratory Network.
▶ 1:13:54Their work involves receiving specimens from livestock and testing them for infectious diseases that could have a devastating impact on animal agriculture and subsequently on our national Unfortunately, in the last week, Cornell's lab received notice that two funding agreements they were set to receive from the USDA have been paused.
▶ 1:14:18If Cornell's role in the national lab network is diminished, the entire biocurity surveillance system becomes weaker, meaning there's a lower capacity nationwide to respond quickly if we were to experience an aggro terrorism event.
▶ 1:14:36There is a risk that terrorist groups could develop aggro and biological weapons in isolation or may even receive help from our foreign adversaries like North Korea, China, Iran or Russia with biological weapons programs. Cornell's lab hosts the infrastructure that would help counter a threat like this.
▶ 1:14:58and losing a link in the USDA surveillance network due to withheld funding would severely our ability to respond to an act of aggro terrorism such as this. More broadly, a weakening of federal infrastructure is a trend we're seeing across a counterterrorism and public health sector, undermining the very lessons learned from September 11th.
▶ 1:15:20Just last month, the Federal Emergency Management Agency announced $134 million in cuts to counterterrorism funding from cities that have repeatedly been identified as top targets for terrorists. New York City, the site of the dead deadliest terrorist attack to hit our nation, will have to weather a cut of $64 million this year alone.
▶ 1:15:49these grants support the first responders who encounter threats from today's hearing subject, agot terrorism. The Trump administration's counterterrorism funding cuts to New York City, Washington DC, Chicago, Los Angeles, Jersey City, and San Francisco should be caused for bipartisan concern. And I hope the majority will hold a hearing on the impacts of funding losses in places targeted by terrorists.
▶ 1:16:17Since taking office, the Trump administration has also dismantled some of the institutions that would lead to a robust public health response to an aggro or bioteterrorism attack. This administration has fired the head of the Centers for Disease Control, failed to appoint point permanent leadership to the administration for strategic preparedness and response and to FEMA.
▶ 1:16:43The administration has canceled hundreds of millions of dollars for vaccine development and fired federal employees, including scientists and researchers who would support a mass public health response to emerging zunatic diseases such as avon flu.
▶ 1:17:03These federal agencies, all of which are leaderless, would have a primary role in a mass aggro or bioteterrorism I'm incredibly concerned that America is not prepared to respond to a serious biological threat. We are walking straight into a scenario where we know the risks but are completely hamstrung in addressing them not just today but in years to come. I hope today's conversation will be useful and informative.
▶ 1:17:33I want to thank the witnesses for participating in today's hearing. I thank the chairman for his leadership in putting this together and I look forward to all of your testimony so we can work together to move forward to make our nation stronger and the citizens protected. With that, I yield
▶ 1:17:52Thank you, uh, Ranking Member Kennedy. Other members of the subcommittee are reminded that the opening statements may be submitted for the record. I'm very pleased to have such an important panel of witnesses before us today. I ask that the witnesses please rise, raise their right hand to be sworn in. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will be given before the committee on homeland security of the United States House of Representatives will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
▶ 1:18:22So help you God. Thank you. Please be seated. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in the affirmative. I would like to now formally introduce our witnesses. Dr. Daniel K. Whims is the president of Alabama&M University, proudly located in my district. Dr.
▶ 1:18:40Whims has served 25 years in government and higher education, leading academic and student affairs, teaching agriculture science, and directing farm research and development programs across the southeast. Dr. Whim's extensive educational background in aronomy has u uh informed his leadership of Alabama&M's robust agriculture and food science programming. Um thank you for being here today. Dr.
▶ 1:19:07Chris Young is a professor of practice at the college of veterary medicine at Auburn University. Dr. Young has worked with USDA animal uh plant health inspection services, veterary services in uh various roles. He has led instant response to aven influenza, cattle, fever, tick, and screworm. Dr.
▶ 1:19:30Young also served 25 years in the US Army Reserve during which he commanded the 358th Medical Detachment and held assignments with the standing joint force headquarters of the 350th Civil Air Command. Welcome. Dr. Marty Bernine is the director of the National Agriculture Bio Security Center at Kansas State University and the associate director of the biocurity research institute. Dr.
▶ 1:19:59uh Verin oversees programs that address diverse threats to the US and world agriculture economies and food supply and she serves as a liaison to the national, state and local stakeholders and industry groups. Thank you for joining us. Dr. Asha George is the executive director of the bipartisan commission for biod defense. In her role, Dr.
▶ 1:20:23George develops and assesses recommendations to strengthen biod defense, conducts research, and makes policies and oversight recommendations to counter biological threats. Dr. George also served as active duty in the United States Army as a military intelligence office officer and paratrooper. She is a decorated de desert storm veteran. I thank all the witnesses again for being here today. I now recognize Dr. Whims for five minutes to summarize his opening statements. Dr.
▶ 1:20:54Thank you, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and honorable members of the committee for allowing us to participate in this critical uh conversation on national security, agot terrorism. My name is Daniel K. Williams. served as the 12th president of Alabama Agricultural and Mechanical University and 1890 land grant HBCU in Huntsville, Alabama.
▶ 1:21:16Of note, for 16 years prior to becoming president uh four years ago, I served as executive vice president, provos, and vice president of academic affairs, vice president for research, and professor of agricultural sciences at 1890 land grant universities in Alabama and Georgia. Over the past 30 years, I've served in various administrative and professorial capacities at L grant universities such as Alorn State, Southern, South Carolina State Universities, Fort Valley State, and Florida&M.
▶ 1:21:45I'm grateful to be here today to discuss this critical topic of the threat of agro terrorism in the United States, particularly the food and agricultural critical infrastructure sector. In 2023, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Agriculture, Food, and Related Industries contributed roughly 1.5 trillion to the US gross domestic product, 5.5% share.
▶ 1:22:11The output of America's farm contributed 222 billion of this sum and8% of the US GDP. With nearly two million farms in the United States, agriculture is essentially our nation's most important pillar. Americans must eat safe and high quality food.
▶ 1:22:34Today, threats not only expose us to risk of food shortages, foreign dependencies, and higher prices, but they also strike at one of the most critical essential pillars of America. And those threats to American agriculture could lead to agot terrorism. Defending access to American abundance and preserving the American experiment is the is the essence of agro security and is why farm security is national security.
▶ 1:22:5923 years ago the chairman of the joint economic committee addressed Congress stating that an aggro terrorism incident could immediately cost in the range of 25 to 60 billion. Given the inflation rate this could cost as much as 106 billion today. In 2001, footmouth disease in in UK affected 9,000 farms and required the destruction of more than 4 million animals.
▶ 1:23:28That would cost taxpayers in excess of 60 billion today. As an 1890 land grant university, Alabama&M has robust agricultural research capacity. Our researchers have been actively working on technical solutions and research projects in agro security food safety and quality diagnostic and detection of food born pathogens such as E.coli, Salmonetta and Lististeria.
▶ 1:23:56Additionally, the Alabama Cooperative Extension System is a primary outreach organization for the land grant mission of Alabama&M University and Auburn University. My friend, Auburn University President Dr. Chris Roberts and I are committed to research and outreach of these programs and collaborations.
▶ 1:24:16AC's agents play a pivotal role in educating farmers and stakeholders about agro terrorism and agro security through different agriculture programs such as food safety and security, integrated pest management, soil health and water quality, aronomy, animal and plant health and food safety modernization act.
▶ 1:24:34ASUS has assigned agents to work with FEMA agents and get trained by FEMA agents, particularly in times of crisis emergencies, and these agents are ready to work and coordinate with FEMA agents as needed. An additional threat is the increase of foreign investment in our nation's agricultural land from countries like China. This too cannot be ignored. In fact, legislation introduced by you, Mr.
▶ 1:24:59Chairman, the Protecting America's agricultural land from Foreign Harm Act is a step in the right direction in safeguarding these lands from foreign adversaries. In closing, I'd like to reinforce the role of as an 1890 land grant institution and what we can do to help play in keeping our food safe.
▶ 1:25:22It is evident from the threats that Alabama&M is aligned with the national farm security action plan introduced by USDA in July of 25. Our scientists stand ready to partner with industry, the government, and other academic institutions to ensure our homegrown food supply remains safe and secure for consumption for all Americans. Farm security is national security and I thank you for bringing attention to this important matter as
▶ 1:25:50Thank you, Dr. Williams. It's an honor to be with you again. I now recognize Dr. Young for five minutes to summarize his opening statement. Dr. Young.
▶ 1:25:59Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, other members, distinguished members of the subcommittee. My name is Christopher Andrew Young, and I'm a veterinarian by training, former USDA program director, as you mentioned, and a retired US Army Colonel. I'm here today representing Auburn University though the views I express will be my own and do not necessarily represent the views or positions of the university. Having said that, let's talk about agarrorism.
▶ 1:26:27Each year, Auburn University's bios surveillance research team reviews several thousand articles across a broad spectrum of open-source work. Also on average a couple of hundred books are read although not always cover to cover but we read the sections that are pertinent to the work that we're doing in our ongoing analytical operations on agarism.
▶ 1:26:47One consistent finding that that we see is that there is no single vetted source of information addressing the diversity and complexity of the threats to food agriculture and water. Also even more importantly no single work explains how those threats can be mitigated.
▶ 1:27:04Our team spends a great deal of time examining data generated by private industry which we find holds more information more data on food a and water than government Food a and water systems are widely considered essential components of our national security.
▶ 1:27:22Without security and resiliency in these critical infrastructure systems that provide safe, reliable food and water, we are vulnerable to exploitation, thereby jeopardizing our nation's public health, our economic prosperity, our military readiness, and our ability to to perform force projection. The term biocurity traditionally refers to a set of practices on farms designed to minimize risk from disease for plants or animals.
▶ 1:27:49But biocurity can also be thought of as a desired state of being a matrix of success if you will where risk and threats have been identified and neutralized before they become manifest. The term biosecure means to be protected against harmful biological agents both naturally occurring or in or intentionally introduced which can include infectious diseases, pest and invasive species that may have an impact on the health status of a system or
▶ 1:28:20And so maintaining systematic biocurity entails continuous monitoring and the persistent stare that's needed to occur across the continuum of the security domains would include both animal and plant agriculture public and one health laboratory research security environmental security and ultimately national security and defense To frame the problem succinctly, if the United States ever goes
▶ 1:28:50to war with a pacing adversary, food, a water will be as important as traditional military concerns such as submarines or missiles. Critical problems could emerge first to our west in the Indo-Pacific, but perhaps even within the continental US. Wars can be and are lost by lack of material, but they can also be lost due to strategic and tactical errors involving food and water.
▶ 1:29:15Non-state actors like terrorists and violent extremist organizations may also target our homeland food supply via the agricultural sector. And I am especially concerned today about grreyzone So what would our adver adversaries objectives be? Put simply, their goal is food and water disruption followed by tactical and strategic dominance and eventual destruction. This picture is bleak, but food a and water threats already widely distributed and continually growing in intensity.
▶ 1:29:46Both the critical infrastructure and the food supply itself will almost certainly be more intensely targeted in the future. Attacks are likely to be geographically diffused, staggered over time and be combined with cognitive warfare elements, the specifics of which are more suitable for a classified forum. Because of this threat landscape, it is critical that the US government better prepare for and mitigate threats to our agricultural sector.
▶ 1:30:10I'd like to thank the committee chairman, Chairman Strong, and the members of the committee for holding this hearing and for the opportunity to testify on this important issue. This concludes my opening remarks.
▶ 1:30:20Thank you, Dr. Young. I now recognize Dr. Vernin for five minutes to summarize her opening statement. Thank you, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today on surveying the threat of agarism perspectives on food, agriculture, and veterinary defense. I'm Dr.
▶ 1:30:43Marty Veneer, director of the National Agricultural Biocurity Center and associate director of the biocurity research institute at Kansas State Agotarrorism has a very long history. From ancient wars to more recent times, agricultural agents have been used to damage food supplies, spread disease to humans, animals, and plants, disrupt economies or governments, or create fear to affect political change.
▶ 1:31:12In current times, economic disaster is the intended effect of agot terrorism events. There is a significant amount of data, some of which you've heard, to quantify the cost of an attack on the US food supply. However, the data do not reveal the complexity of the US agricultural enterprise and the costs incurred by the interconnected elements. My experience is centered on animal disease response.
▶ 1:31:40However, I do want to mention two other issues. The first is the threat to the cyber security of operating systems in the agricultural community and the second issue is that of protecting intellectual property. While the hearing's topic is agotarism, it is important to acknowledge that mother nature is the most accomplished terrorist.
▶ 1:32:03Therefore, introduction of any high consequence animal or crop disease naturally or by accident will require the same response and result in the same consequences as an introduction by a terrorist group. In the most basic sense, there are three steps to a successful response to a high consequence disease event. One, identify it. two, find it.
▶ 1:32:33In other words, where is it? And three, control or eliminate Rapid and accurate diagnostics are critical, and planning and training for local responders is an absolute necessity for a successful response. The response to a high consequence animal disease event will be so large that it will require both traditional and non-traditional responders.
▶ 1:33:02These two groups do not speak the same language nor operate from the same system. A major role of NABC is to bring these groups together to understand a common operational picture, develop response plans and train to those plans. Information sharing at all levels is important.
▶ 1:33:25There are a variety of regional groups that share information between state emergency management and agricultural agencies and also plan joint exercises for these groups. There's also a role for classified information sharing. It gives us the ability to see over the horizon to recognize potential threats before they get here.
▶ 1:33:52The Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center has addressed biological and agricultural threats at the classified level since 2012 to protect the state and the nation. While all agricultural disasters are local, there is and must be a role for the federal government to provide support and resources.
▶ 1:34:15USDA supports plant and animal disease diagnostics and policy decisions surrounding disease spread and elimination in accordance with domestic and international trade policy. DHS supports technology development by DHS S&T and resources from FEMA in the form of access to training and planning support for responders and logistics support for state emergency managers. Mr.
▶ 1:34:44Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear today before you and I welcome any questions that you may
▶ 1:34:53Dr. Veneer, we're honored to have you here. Please uh forgive me. I mispronounced your name not once but twice and uh we'll correct that, but it's an honor to have you before us. Uh I now recognize Dr. George for five minutes to summarize uh her opening statement. Dr. George.
▶ 1:35:09Thank you, Mr. Chairman, uh, Ranking Member Kennedy, and the other members of the committee, um, the subcommittee. Thank you for having me. Uh, it's always an honor, of course, to appear before Congress to, uh, provide testimony for important issues. Uh, but it is particularly important to me. I'm glad to be here. I'm former committee staff uh, for this committee and, um, it's always interesting to be on this side of the table, on this side of the dis uh, instead. So, thank you.
▶ 1:35:38Um, I would like to uh just highlight a few things from my written testimony. Uh, as a former intelligence officer, uh, I think it's important for the committee to remember that agricultural uh, terrorism, agricultural warfare, these are not new uh the enemy, the enemy of the United States and enemies around the world have sought out uh agents, biological agents, and have used weapons specifically targeting agriculture.
▶ 1:36:07uh in recent history, relatively recent history, we can go back to World War I and World War II where we have all kinds of evidence of our countries, foreign countries, um uh targeting the United States and specifically developing agents for the purpose of attacking our agriculture and our food. Uh we haven't gone backwards from that. Uh those those countries, some of those countries have gone forward. Uh as stated earlier by Mr.
▶ 1:36:34Kennedy the uh the there are active offensive biological programs in Russia and North Korea and we suspect the same uh in for Iran and China. Uh and we should not seek to uh be relaxed even about that. There's no way those four countries are all by themselves in the world pursuing these biological agents and uh and and others.
▶ 1:36:58Um the other thing I think is important to remember is that uh terrorist organizations around the world have also expressed interest. Uh part of it is because of the economic security impact. Part of it is just that it would be just so incredibly obvious and painful to any country that's attacked in this way.
▶ 1:37:20If they were to use, for example, wheat blast, which has come up in the literature from other uh from terrorist organizations, and wheat blast were to blow through the United States, we wouldn't have obviously we wouldn't have wheat. Uh but can you imagine our citizens going into grocery stores and not finding bread on the shelves, not finding flour on the shelves, etc. I know that there's a tendency to say, well, you know, no big deal.
▶ 1:37:47we can we we'll just depend on corn or we'll depend on something else. But I think that that's a very um maybe overly practical uh aspect. That is not what terrorists are looking to do. They're looking to evoke an emotional response and that would absolutely happen if they used uh biological agents.
▶ 1:38:07Uh beyond that, I think it's also important to remember that agriculturally related crime, food and agriculturally related crime is on the rise, as is many other types of crime. Um but those three things, crime, terrorism, and warfare are all things that this committee has been uh interested in and has something uh has has to do something uh about.
▶ 1:38:31Um leadership is key of course and uh we need those leaders not just at USDA but also at the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense and Department of Interior when we're talking about these threats. Um but I think also given the nature of agriculture and food in our country and and in every country uh supporting the leaders that we have down on the ground, boots on the ground, uh is incredibly important.
▶ 1:38:58Our commission, the bipartisan commission on biod defense uh is co-chared by former secretary of homeland security Tom Ridge and former secretary of health and human services Donna Shala. Others we have other representatives, former representatives sitting on the commission as well as well as former Senate Majority Leader Tom Ridge. Um but this is important. This is important to our uh commission.
▶ 1:39:22We have gone to Kansas and Colorado state to hold meetings and have issued some reports about that and included uh a related and food related recommendations in our latest national blueprint for biod defense. Um but I I I think I'll just end my statement by saying when we're talking about our state and local and tribal and uh members of communities that are trying to produce our nation's food and are trying to deal with uh agriculture.
▶ 1:39:51There are two things they need to do. They need in order to execute on the president's direction that they feel empowered and that they take charge. One is time. They can't just turn on a dime and say, "Okay, now we're in charge of everything." The other is funding. How they get those two things is something this committee is going to have to uh weigh in on. Um so anyway, thank you. Thank you, committee. Really appreciate the opportunity.
▶ 1:40:20Thank you, Dr. George members will be recognized by order of seniority for the five minutes of questioning. An additional round of questioning may be called after all members have been recognized. I now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning. Dr. Whims and Dr. Young, it's great to have you both here today. Alabama&M and Auburn University are pillars of strength in our state and I'm proud to see you representing those institutions in this direction. Dr.
▶ 1:40:47Whims, you and I share concerns about foreign acquisitions of farmland. What do you see as the biggest risk when adversaries acquire US farmland?
▶ 1:40:58Speaking from
▶ 1:40:59Sorry, Mr. Chairman. Speaking from the 1890 land grant perspective, we have uh farmers and producers throughout the southeast southern crescent. And um as you know the focus say in Louisiana is catfish andor uh crawfish, Arkansas rice. Uh in Alabama we have a robust catfish uh production apparatus as well as uh cotton. Now um in Georgia, you know, we have poultry farms.
▶ 1:41:30And as you travel and visit and our extension agents and professionals work with those producers, you will find that they're very open and very vulnerable. And that uh particularly for for those who if they lose a season, they essentially lose their wherewithal to support their family and to maintain the farm. So uh we think that that awareness as well as education technical assistance is very important.
▶ 1:42:01Technical assistance via our cooperative extension system uh with very clear and concise research produced uh information from our researchers. But as my colleague said, that requires funding and there has to be a better and closer uh collaboration between research and extension particularly relative to uh terrorism and the dangers that we face.
▶ 1:42:32The challenge with us is being able to marry the agricultural sciences, our research and our extension agents with our computer scientists and our people who are proficient and professional and prepared in artificial intelligence as well as cyber security. We have not done a good job of that. Again, resources and time.
▶ 1:42:55Um I also think that uh the type and way that we produce, process and then distribute uh food and fiber has to be carefully studied in terms of the dangers that we face relative to uh a potential threat having access to uh food systems and the way that we distribute and and store food.
▶ 1:43:25Uh I am a chief administrator at an institution of higher learning. On every day, uh we have hundreds of pounds of food that we prepare and serve our students and our constituents. Uh it is vulnerable and we need systems in place whether it be artificial intelligence and or cyber security to make sure that we protect not just the production but the distrib distribution, dissemination and uh storage of those food. items.
▶ 1:43:55Thank you, Dr. Dr. Williams. Dr. Young, our research institutions and universities often partner with foreign institutions to conduct research and share information. Do you believe that American institutions can maintain these research partnerships while ensuring the safety of research and intellectual properties from foreign malign actors? I I do uh but but it takes some work, right? It takes deliberate effort.
▶ 1:44:21So I I would uh point out that Auburn has made a a very significant investment in vetting all the professors that that uh come to Auburn uh even to the point of of um uh separating some from research projects that they were involved in.
▶ 1:44:39So, so it has been a really an effort of Auburn to strive to have uh clearable faculty working on uh the projects chairman that that we you know would would work on in this space in particular. Across all of your experiences, what safeguards can be implemented to protect sensitive research while still enabling American scientists to engage internationally, particularly in addressing agriculture diseases that are generate outside of our borders?
▶ 1:45:09How how would you do that?
▶ 1:45:11Yeah. Well, I appreciate that question, Chairman. I I mean, I like hearing you say that outside of our borders. We were having a bit of a discussion about that before the hearing began that we we need to we need to project our surveillance out outside. So like just as an example for myself, I'm I'm headed to West Africa in a couple of weeks and and and that's part of a project that's funded through the the USDA ARS.
▶ 1:45:35Um, so when we're able to collect samples in in other areas of the world, we can not only keep track of of what we know is occurring and and and potentially impacting our our livestock and poultry, but we can also, you know, keep build a database that would allow us to notice emerging things. So, so I mean, I think that's one of the best ways, yeah, is is get outside our borders and get after
▶ 1:45:59Thank you. Uh, thank each of you for your testimony. I now recognize the ranking member, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Kennedy, for his 5 minutes of
▶ 1:46:07Thank you again, chairman, and uh thank you to all of you once again for your leadership, for being here, for your testimony. Uh it's extremely important. Uh also to those of you who are military veterans, thank you for for answering the call. FEMA's preparedness grant program. I talked a little bit about FEMA and uh the issues that we're dealing with from this administration in my opening remarks.
▶ 1:46:37The state homeland security program and the urban area security initiative are part of that those preparedness grant programs. Uh this is funding that's critical for activities of biod defense including our first responders and detection technology public health systems.
▶ 1:46:57Uh yet this year we saw grant funding frozen delayed applications withheld information about funding awards cuts in many areas including to urban areas that depend on this funding. um as well as failed and timely information about requirements. So this question is for you Dr. George.
▶ 1:47:21How do these delays and freezes, lack of impact localities in states ability to plan and build capacity to defend against these biological and aggro terrorist threats?
▶ 1:47:40Thank you, Mr. Kennedy. I I have to say that the way the system has been set up to date, those activities, planning, preparedness, uh preparing specifically for response and recovery and mitigation, they are um they are dependent on FEMA grant funding as well as grant funding from other uh departments and agencies.
▶ 1:48:03Um, as I said earlier, it takes two things in order to get the states, the locals, the tribes, and the territories to be able to to take on more responsibility and to execute on those plans. They need time and they need money. Now, if you've decided if someone has decided that the grant funding has to uh has to decrease and has to go away, then the states can they can step up and they can backfill, but they're not going to be able to do it very quickly.
▶ 1:48:32Uh so I suggest to you even putting into the budget uh and specifically the budget request and some of the other documents that have come out uh statements saying that the funding needs to be cut um is a clear indication to others outside of our country that now we've created a vulnerability a vulnerability that the states are going to try uh and fill but they're not going to be able to fill very quickly.
▶ 1:49:00Thank you Dr. George. your organization, the bipartisan commission in on biod defense released a report last year outlining national blueprint in biod defense. Um can you talk about that report and um the findings of the report and as well as what the funding means to the localities and their ability to respond to biological threats.
▶ 1:49:24Sure sir. Um, so yes, our national blueprint for biof is here and it's obviously way too large for uh anybody to absorb all at once, but it's a compendium of all of our of our recommendations over the years since we were implemented uh in 201 well 14 and our first uh blueprint in 2015.
▶ 1:49:44Um some of our findings I I covered earlier in terms of the threat the biological threat has including the food and agriculture threat uh has only increased since 2014. So it's been 11 years of steady increase. Um we now have new threats on the horizon. AI combined with bio as you all know bio and chemistry becoming uh uh increasingly similar.
▶ 1:50:09Um the rise of uh the use of toxins to uh attack people uh not just for assassination but for other purposes. Uh all of that is on the on the rise as is this interest in offensive biological weapons programs by uh foreign adversaries. Um in terms of the impact on the ability of the uh states uh locals, tribes and territories to to respond.
▶ 1:50:38Um you have a threat environment. We have increasing vulnerabilities and we have consequences uh that are that are huge and just simply not mitigated and they can't be mitigated by grants all by themselves.
▶ 1:50:50Dr. George, just for the sake of time, what happens? And what is the risk if that funding disappears?
▶ 1:50:56If the funding disappears, uh I think we're at risk of being Period. And then we have a giant problem. We have a problem that Congress itself is going to have to step in to solve with emergency appropriations. Uh, but I think an event could get away from us very quickly. Uh, when it comes to food and agriculture, you're not talking about something that would be constrained like if we just dumped some chemicals somewhere. It would spread. It would spread all throughout the United States.
▶ 1:51:24And then not only affect our economic and national security here, but it would affect economic and national security throughout the world.
▶ 1:51:32Thank you, chairman. I yield.
▶ 1:51:33The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Bken, for five minutes of Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our witnesses. Uh, as you discussed, whether it be the Chinese Communist Party or Iran, uh, North Korea, a number of of actors could be a real threat using aggra terrorism.
▶ 1:51:55And, um, what uh, you all are discussing, you know, throws open the door to billions, hundreds of billions of dollars of economic harm. um just thinking through as was discussed during the times of the past extended periods of warfare where this could be employed um when you really have to rely on domestic production.
▶ 1:52:19So um with that real threat, what we do know is GAO has shared um with the public about the massive amounts of land that has been purchased some near military bases and the prosperity of our country that is so dependent upon production agriculture. Um I want to kind of figure out Dr. Veneer where are we most vulnerable? Is it animal disease?
▶ 1:52:49Is it plant disease? And um and then as a follow-up question to anybody else on the p on the panel, are the are the is the purchasing of land many times near military installations, does that factor in or is that just ancillary to the conversation for other nefar potentially nefarious means? So Dr. Veneer,
▶ 1:53:13thank you Congressman. Well, my orientation is animal health. Um, animal health certainly is a tremendous threat in the sense that we not only would have issues with livestock production and you've seen that already um with um peedV and swine high path aven influenza
▶ 1:53:45um the idea that HPAI can now jump and infect dairy cattle. So there are all of those ancillary effects and as Dr. George stated, it spreads all of these things can spread so quickly that we can't get our arms around it.
▶ 1:54:07I do though want to recognize threats that exist in the plant world and field crops. Um we we have folks at Kansas State who do a significant amount of work um looking at crop diseases and they tend to be um the redheaded stepchild.
▶ 1:54:35it's not, if I could use the term, it's not nearly as sexy as an animal disease. Um and the difference that we have too is that the crops don't get up and walk around. So, it can be a little easier to control those because you you've got the plants in place, but being able to diagnose these diseases quickly to get uh to get around the disease to corral it and and be able to manage it before the crop is harvested before
▶ 1:55:05the crop is um and allow for the potential for Somebody want to follow up on my question relative to um is is the ownership foreign ownership of land in the United States, could it factor in could they be utilizing that land for something nefarious uh relative to um spreading it quickly on land that they
▶ 1:55:31Dr. George, you look like you're nodding your head.
▶ 1:55:33Yes. Um from a from a military perspective, this is this is what you would want to do. uh you don't just do recon. If you can put people on the ground and you can put people on the ground near uh facilities, near the universities, near where the research is going on, near where the where the vulnerabilities are, you would go ahead and do it. Um you know, I'd give you a different example just quickly. Uh I went to the University of Hawaii for my doctorate in public health. Hawaii.
▶ 1:56:01Uh we we wanted Hawaii because of the military significance that it has in terms of protecting our nation. Yet lots of land has been sold to the Japanese and to the Chinese and many others. What what happens when they own the entire state or most of it and we have all those military assets sitting there? It's the same thing here uh domestically or um in continental unit.
▶ 1:56:27And just following up, I got 12 seconds left. So is it more so if I'm understanding Dr. Veneer your comments and in tandem with Dr. George's comments that animal husbandry on foreignowned assets that could be really an experimenting location to where you can spread animal disease really quickly?
▶ 1:56:45Yes, it could. Uh once again depending on the nature of the land that they've purchased. So in many cases if it's uh grassland or they've purchased a feed lot then yes that would be an animal disease issue. If the land they've purchased is crop land, then you're naturally going to think about the potential of a crop disease.
▶ 1:57:07Thank you. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. McKenzie, for 5 minutes of questioning.
▶ 1:57:15Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of our panelists for being here today. uh agot terrorism and the threat that we face in this sector is one that I've seen uh an increasing number of instances that raise concerns and so I think it's a a very important topic that we're focusing on here on today.
▶ 1:57:32So, uh, just to build on the the previous questioner, uh, items, can you tell me just logistically which ports of entry, airports, land crossings, uh, do we believe are the most vulnerable right now? And what are we seeing, uh, terrorism networks and other individuals utilize uh, to gain access to our country?
▶ 1:57:59Thank you. I I think I would just sum it simply as whichever I don't know the answer but whichever port of entry has the most illegal immigration through it that's our greatest risk.
▶ 1:58:10Sir I think it also depends on uh the consequences you're looking looking for. Um if you're looking for large scale consequences in a high population density place then you're looking at the major metropolitan areas and the ports of entry there. If you're looking to affect agriculture, you're probably looking at the ports of entry into uh into places like Pennsylvania and Oklahoma. Um places where where all of that is happening.
▶ 1:58:36Um I I would also say there's there's a question about staffing as well. You'd have to look and see where are all the agricultural uh inspectors, you know, uh in the airports. How many are there? How many uh do we do we still need? They're not evenly spread through throughout all of that. And lastly, I would say we have ports of entry in the territories as well. They historically receive less in the way of support uh for for security, but they're part of the United States and people can get in through there as
▶ 1:59:07In the history that you have seen these instances occur, where uh are they originating from and is it a concerted organized effort or are they more typically loan actors?
▶ 1:59:24Well, I I suppose recently we've seen um some of the experimentation by foreign nationals who brought in some stuff from China that we didn't want to have here and we said no, you can't do it, but they they they came here anyway and decided to uh conduct that research in in our facilities. Um but I I would say to you, sir, there's probably more of it going on than any of us realize.
▶ 1:59:49We do not have an effective um in investigate investigatory uh mechanism um that that is you know nationwide and even if you do investigate um we don't have a national attribution apparatus either. So maybe you find out about something but to answer your question is it is it multiple countries or multiple people in specific countries it's very difficult to tell because we don't have that apparatus in place.
▶ 2:00:17I appreciate that and I think you're correct that uh we do need to do more to understand the attribution of these cases. And so uh my final question is this. Uh you've mentioned a couple of you who have mentioned more inspectors. Uh we we raised the idea here of uh doing more investigatory work for attribution. What are some of the other potential solutions that you would recommend uh that we should be taking up as Congress and also our administration?
▶ 2:00:47I don't want to make too fine a point of this, but along with the comments that you've heard, one of the things that I personally would like to see when CBP agents intercept seeds, plants, animal products, whatever at ports of entry, those items are not tested. Those items are just destroyed. And the concept seems to be, it's okay, we got rid of it. No problem. I would like to see those items tested.
▶ 2:01:16One to see if they are in fact um carrying a high consequence agent, but secondly, what is the agent? It gives us a better sense of the actual risk that we're facing.
▶ 2:01:31We know we can't intercept everything, but if we can test the things that we do in fact intercept, then we should have a better idea of who what's coming in, where it's coming from, is it an agent that is of high consequence or not.
▶ 2:01:52Yeah, if I can add on to that. So uh you know I mentioned having the whole genome sequencing and and having a a a repository and and we have lots of those in different places in our country but but we don't we we don't bring all that data together. So so if we can bring that together over time we would have the opportunity to perhaps notice trends emerging trends and whether something's been manipulated with gain of function or or crisper type work or is it just downright engineered.
▶ 2:02:22So, so if we're if we're taking advantage of those opportunities when samples present themselves to to catalog that material, it's advantageous for us.
▶ 2:02:30And for our small and limited resource farmers, producers, particularly those that are uh fruit and vegetable as well as farmtotable and those who are producing products for for local outlets, whether it be uh the larger corporate grocery stores or or even our campuses in some cases. uh they need to be better trained and there has to be larger awareness of the threats. They are not aware. They have not been trained.
▶ 2:03:00They have not been taught. Uh and that takes resources, people, teachers, agents. Uh and we need more research on bioteterrorism uh and to again marry our computer science and cyber security areas with uh agricultural scientists and experts. Sir, I would just add two things. First, we need more diagnostics. We need more diagnostic tests. Our country has a tendency to wait until something happens and then throws medicine at it.
▶ 2:03:29And that's okay, but we need to get ahead of it. So, you'd want diagnostic tests that somebody could use right away all the way down at the local level all the way up to the feds. That's one. And then the other is that we need to strengthen our law enforcement. The FBI is is involved very much in in dealing with this, but so is ICE and so is obviously CBP, the US Secret Service, and so forth. They need some more resources to be able to uh to investigate and interdict.
▶ 2:03:59Fantastic. Well, thank you to all of you for those uh recommendations and for being here. Appreciate your testimony. With that, I yield back.
▶ 2:04:06The gentleman yields back and I concur with the ranking member Kennedy. Um, y'all traveled a long distance to get here and we'd like to do another round of questions if uh that's uh okay with each of you. Dr. Whims, Alabama&M, the National Network of Land Grant Universities make critical investments in homegrown food security and the agriculture supply chain. You've said that and I quote, "Form security is national security." Close quote. One piece of that is um uh imported food.
▶ 2:04:36Are imported food products um held to the same rigorous testing standards as homegrown food.
▶ 2:04:47Mr. Chairman, in some cases, yes, in some cases, no. uh I don't have specific data and I would yield to my colleagues uh if they have more uh uh concise information but as you know many of our vegetables and fruits are imported um and particularly in some sectors of our communities in our southern region there are meats uh i.e i.e.
▶ 2:05:13goats and others that are imported that don't necessarily meet the same standard of review by food drug administration as others. And so we certainly need to to strengthen the testing and strengthen uh the assessment and we in the land grant community certainly uh can support uh in that area. Uh we have a robust uh food safety security testing apparatus on our campus.
▶ 2:05:41We have a doctoral program in food science, food safety, and uh we in the land grant community stand ready to support USDA uh and the Food Drug Administration with any efforts. But the simple answer is no, sir. We don't think that this consistent.
▶ 2:05:59Thank you. Uh would any of the other witnesses like to add to that related to the the standards related to uh here in America versus other foods that are being brought into America? Sir, I would say the standards are the standards. It's a question of enforcement and the resources available to to enforce those. I think um we we do not test every single piece of fruit, every piece of meat, every single piece of anything coming into the country. We just can't.
▶ 2:06:30So, we use a sampling strategy. And what what have we seen? We see cases of of food poisoning, etc. diseases coming into the country because we just can't get to all of it. That's why I think we need to have more diagnostic tests out there even to the point of you know if we could giving them to uh to families and individuals so that if something happens we can test we can be we can be trying to do.
▶ 2:06:53Thank you. I yield and now recognize the ranking member from New York Mr. Kennedy um for another question round of
▶ 2:07:02Yeah. Uh just a couple quick questions. Well f first of all I think this will go for the entire panel. You did travel a long way. Again, thank you for being here. Thank you, chairman, for doing another round. Um, we could start with any one of you who wants to take it on first. This is either a very easy question or a very difficult question. Uh, what is the biggest and most concerning agot terrorism threat that you feel exists in our country at this
▶ 2:07:28Dr. George,
▶ 2:07:29I think the biggest threat would be the use of a disease that is already endemic in the United States against our agriculture. Uh I I agree the I know the plant people won't be excited to hear me say that I think it's an animal thing, but I do think it is. Uh we have plague, anthrax, tuleria, and brucyosis. Those four are all endemic to the United States and they're all on the high concern lists.
▶ 2:07:57using something like that um would immediately uh create a lot of confusion. Was it ours? Did it grow? Did it did it um did did something naturally occur to uh to modify that organism? All of that would take a lot of time.
▶ 2:08:13Thank you. I'm going to I'm going to move on and others. Dr. Whims. Well, as as an aronomous and former uh uh specialist that worked in the limited resource community, I always thought that our water source and how easily it's accessed, particularly out of the recycling areas and and the way that we irrigate, even our farms and then our our catfish farms, our rice farms,
▶ 2:08:43you know, it's just so open and vulnerable.
▶ 2:08:46Dr. young,
▶ 2:08:49lack of food, animal veterinary services in in the needed areas of rural America and really critical infrastructure analysis. Where are our vulnerability points? I think those are the two biggest threats.
▶ 2:08:59Dr. Vaneer.
▶ 2:09:01Well, to follow along with Dr. Young's comments, I would say our biggest threat is complacency and lack of vigilance. Um, I would like to see um diagnostics.
▶ 2:09:15I would like to see u a more robust uh laboratory network system and I would like to see more training for our local responders and communication with our producers so that they can remain vigilant and not be complacent about the fact that well I have a small farm no one's going to attack me. I think they need to understand that they are equally at risk.
▶ 2:09:41Thank you. I have one last question. Uh Dr. George, I if an aggro terrorism attack occurred, FEMA would likely play a critical role in distributing vaccines, antibiotics, other medical countermeasures in that event. Uh yet this administration has repeatedly proposed eliminating or drastically downsizing FEMA without any transition plan to help states or localities.
▶ 2:10:06What are the risks you believe with the Trump administration and that attack on FEMA? Um, what are the risks to the national biod defense if FEMA's ability to distribute life-saving countermeasures are reduced? And how realistic is it to expect states and territories to take on that role?
▶ 2:10:26Well, I think I I think if we were to eliminate FEMA entirely, uh, we would be placing the the nation at much greater risk. Uh, if only because the requirements are the requirements. We have requirements. Whether FEMA's picking them up or somebody else is picking them up, they exist.
▶ 2:10:45If you eliminate the agency that's been responsible for fulfilling those requirements and don't have anybody else in place and nothing else is able to take over for that, then you're suddenly at a loss. Uh the states and localities are not going to be able to pick up the the responsibility as comprehensively. And we're not talking about something happening in an individ individual state. We're we're pretty much talking about scenarios that are going to spread all throughout the states.
▶ 2:11:14So to expect the states to then in the midst of response and recovery trying to um uh coordinate with each other and pull uh resources down from the rest of the federal government. I I think that's just unrealistic. So you're creating uh an even worse threat related
▶ 2:11:36Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
▶ 2:11:39The gentleman yields back. Uh I want to thank our witnesses for their valuable um and the members for their questions. Uh the members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions for the witnesses and we'd like to ask the witnesses to respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule 7E, the hearing record will be held open for 10 days. Without objection, the subcommittee stands in is adjourned.