▶ 0:09:20Okay, great, great. Okay, thanks. The Subcommittee on Investigations Oversight will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the subcommittee at any time.
▶ 0:09:45Welcome to today's hearing entitled Research Security: Examining the Implementation of the CHIPS and Science Act and NSPM 33. Of course, I'm already breaking one of my cardinal rules, which is we start on time, we stay on time, and we don't use acronyms. Uh I appreciate all of you being here today. Uh for right now, I'm just going to recognize myself for 5 minutes for an opening statement.
▶ 0:10:11Today's hearing confronts a matter that should unite every American and every Defending our research enterprise against foreign adversaries determined to steal, exploit, and undermine at the visions that keep this nation secure and In a world defined by aggressive global competition, especially from Chinese Communist Party, also known as CCP, openness has become a prime target for exploitation right
▶ 0:10:41here in the United The US invest billions of taxpayer dollars, in my opinion, not enough, quite frankly, into cutting-edge research and technology. We cannot allow foreign actors to siphon off those investments by stealing our investments. In the final days of President Trump's first term, his administration acted decisively to initiate the security emphasis.
▶ 0:11:06National Security Presidential Memorandum, which is the NSPM that I've uh referred to before, 33 is the first unified national uh strategy to secure federally funded R&D, research and development. However, we had 4 years under the latest president to build momentum and issue guidance that would protect American intellectual property, but we failed on this basic matter of security.
▶ 0:11:32When we look at the million students are here from foreign uh national areas, basically taking leading-edge technologies and bringing it back to their countries. Uh when we talk about actually protecting the leading-edge technologies that keeps us ahead of our our peers and near peer rivals. Uh we have vague and incomplete requirements that left these universities guessing their way through compliance. Only in the past year we have seen meaningful movement.
▶ 0:12:00The National Science Foundation finally issued an updated research security rules in July. institutes must establish a formal research security program. They must conduct comprehensive assessments. They must maintain documentation of foreign affiliations, and they must train all personnel supported by federal research But let's be clear. We are nowhere near finished.
▶ 0:12:31Universities continue to provide valuable feedback to close the gap of inconsistent, confusing, or incomplete The CCP is a major threat, but is not the only threat. Our other hostile actors are pro-probing every weakness in our research system. Of course, we have cybersecurity issues. The implementation that we need must be swift, thorough, and crystal clear. America has always welcomed global scientific collaboration.
▶ 0:13:02That's a good thing. However, that relationship must be honest and must be reciprocal. Not one-way street that leaves our institutions exposed. At a minimum, every federally funded institution must disclose all foreign affiliations, manage conflicts of interest and commitment, and protect sensitive data and infrastructure, and comply fully with federal law without exceptions.
▶ 0:13:33Congress has a duty to ensure these safeguards are enforced. If institutions take taxpayer dollars, they must meet the standards that protect the nation, and where risk is higher, strong protections must follow. Oversight is not optional. It is a national security imperative.
▶ 0:13:53Today, the committee will evaluate progress on implementing the memorandum and the safeguards with the CHIPS and Science Act, identify barriers holding institutions and determine whether additional legislation or enforcement authority is Our mission is straightforward. Keep America's research secure, protect taxpayers' investments, and ensure our scientific leadership remains unmatched.
▶ 0:14:23The American people expect nothing less. I now recognize ranking member Representative Sykes for an opening Thank you, Chair, and thank you to all of our witnesses who are here today. Happy holidays. I'm glad to see so many of you involved in the holiday spirit.
▶ 0:14:42Uh so, research security has long been a productive and bipartisan topic in this committee, and we've been able to put aside a lot of the noise coming from the committees and the members who are less serious about understanding the nuances of this issue. And we have a lot of successful legislation to show for that. Our scientific enterprise is better off for it. However, there's only so long that we can close the shutters, mute our phones, and pretend we don't see what's happening outside these doors.
▶ 0:15:10This is the second time this subcommittee has met on this topic this year, and this is only our third hearing. Perhaps if our subcommittee were a bit more active, and if there were bipartisan interest in exerting our oversight authority over this administration, we could have discussed the myriad of issues that are directly compromising our agencies and institutions' ability to function and conduct research on topics our constituents care about, from lowering energy costs to new healthcare All of our science agencies
▶ 0:15:40have experienced massive brain drain of career civil servants who were fired or coerced out of the workforce. We would be naive to think that has an impacted our research security and our research readiness. Inspector Generals have been fired across the government.
▶ 0:15:56So, how can we claim to take research security seriously if there are members unwilling to call out the Trump administration for firing the very people who hold agencies accountable for following the laws and investigate bad actors in our federal research At agency level, CHIPS and Science mandates that NSF have a have five full-time research staffers, and it is my understanding that the law is not being followed.
▶ 0:16:22Additionally, science agencies are in the process of imposing a 15% cap on indirect costs, falling in line with the attic first proposed in Project 2025. Do the authors of Project 2025 know what indirect costs funds? Well, let me help them out.
▶ 0:16:41I hope my majority colleagues who are so concerned about research security can pick up the phone and tell them that university compliance officers responsible for ensuring that grant-receiving institutions are following agency policies are paid out of those very indirect costs.
▶ 0:16:57The director of Office of Science Technology Policy, Michael Kratsios, should know all of this well, and he should be representing the interests of the scientific community and pushing back on harmful administration proposals while supporting agencies in harmonizing their policies per the CHIPS and Science Act. However, his agency has been entirely absent as others in the White House have taken a flamethrower to our federal scientific ecosystem.
▶ 0:17:23And as we embark on the second hearing of this kind, we should not ignore the fact that the Trump administration is the true threat to research security. We are not talking about an ivory power ivory tower problem removed from kitchen table consequences. We on the Science Committee have consistently reaffirmed National Security Decision Directive 189, which states that fundamental research should be unrestricted to the maximum extent possible.
▶ 0:17:54And I'm proud to say that in Akron, Ohio, where I represent Ohio's 13th District, we demonstrate how fundamental research can lay the groundwork for economic prosperity and good jobs. Researchers at the University of Akron have conducted world-class research in fundamental chemistry. That research is at the core of Akron's Sustainable Polymer Tech Hub. That Tech Hub is estimated to produce a $5 billion economic impact and over 4,000 new jobs over the next decade.
▶ 0:18:23Standing up for fundamental science now is standing up for thousands and thousands of jobs that will come from As a matter of fact, we are already seeing this failure to follow through on investing investing in science-based jobs in Ohio and across the country. For example, Intel was supposed to be starting operations on a plant to produce microchips this year, but now they are saying it will be delayed for at least 5 years.
▶ 0:18:54We on the Science Committee should be holding companies accountable for breaking these promises, because we dedicated billions of federal dollars to these programs, and those dollars need to be spent as intended so the American people can benefit. That's why, Mr. Chair, I sent you a letter requesting a hearing on Intel's delay in September after our March discussion and conversation on the same topic.
▶ 0:19:17Yet, I have not heard back from you or your To make sure this letter gets to you, I have printed a copy here, and I request unanimous consent to enter enter it into the record. No objection. Thank you. I truly hope that I can count on my Science Committee colleagues across the aisle to reject any policy claiming to bolster research security while making it harder for the next great breakthrough to lead to American jobs. There's a lot of talk out of this administration about onshoring jobs and outclassing China in innovation, manufacturing, prosperity.
▶ 0:19:49And if we forfeit if we continue to forfeit our scientific excellence, then is really all it is. Just talk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Thank you, Ranking Member Sykes. Uh, I now recognize Chairman of the full committee for a statement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, um, for holding this hearing on such an important topic.
▶ 0:20:11And I also want to thank, uh, uh, I got here just a little too late to shake everybody's hand, but I want to welcome all of you, uh, uh, expert witnesses that are here. Dr. Kaiser, Dr. Evans, Dr. Valdes, and uh, Valdez, excuse me. And, um, Mr. Tilden. Thank you. Thank you all for being here. Looking forward to hearing what you folks have to say. Uh, today we're here to address a matter of growing concern for this committee and the American people.
▶ 0:20:38And that is the security of our federally funded research and development enterprise. The United States leads the world in science and innovation because our research system is open and collaborative and driven by excellence. But that openness, one of our very greatest strengths, also makes us very vulnerable to foreign actors seeking to bypass the hard work and the costs of original innovation and infiltrate research programs.
▶ 0:21:07I'm not naive at to think that there are our adversaries, especially the Chinese, are stealing everything because they are innovating fast as they could possibly be on their own. But these threats are real. They come from governments and organizations that do not share our commitment to openness, to integrity, reciprocal collab- collaboration. Protecting American research from such exploitation is not a partisan issue. It is a national security imperative.
▶ 0:21:37The motivation for today's hearing is clear. To ensure that the laws and directives that Congress and the executive branch have already put in place to protect US research are being implemented effectively and consistently across our federal agencies. In 2021, President Trump issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 33, directing federal agencies to safeguard the integrity of the US government supported research and development.
▶ 0:22:06The following year, Congress built upon that foundation with the CHIPS and Science Act, which reinforced federal research security standards and required institutions to establish policies on foreign affiliations, conflicts of interest, and data protection. Together, these measures form the backbone of our national research security, uh, framework. They are meant to defend American innovation against foreign espionage, cyber attacks, and intellectual property theft.
▶ 0:22:37Threats that are neither hypothetical nor distant. We've seen individuals attempting to smuggle federally, uh, funded research, sensitive data, and even dangerous biological materials in and out of our This committee has already issued several letters to institutions seeking information on research security These responses that we've received highlight significant confusion about expectations, timelines, and and enforcement.
▶ 0:23:09These gaps are exactly what our adversaries exploit. And that is why congressional oversight is absolutely We are not here to point fingers. We are here to ensure accountability. The federal government has a duty to provide clear, actionable guidance, and research community has a duty to follow it. Protecting uh, taxpayer funded research should not depend on which agency you work with or which grant you apply for.
▶ 0:23:37It must be streamlined, clear, and However, as implementation of these directives begins, we must ensure that agencies are not imposing unnecessary administrative burdens or conflicting requirements that make compliance harder rather than easier. Security and innovation are not mutually exclusive. But achieving both requires coordination, clarity, and commitment.
▶ 0:24:04The goal of today's discussion is to identify what is working and what is not, and what Congress can do to strengthen support for our research We all share the same objective here. To protect American innovation, uphold the integrity of our research system, and to ensure that taxpayer dollars advance US interests, not those of our adversaries.
▶ 0:24:30I want to thank our witnesses for being here again, uh, this morning and for the work that each of you is doing to address these very challenges. This committee is dedicated to working to secure the future of American science and technology for the benefit of all citizens. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Thank you, Chairman Babin. And now I recognize the Ranking Member for, uh, of the full committee for a statement. Uh, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
▶ 0:24:57Before making my statement, I would like to welcome back to the committee Representative Don Beyer, uh, who was appointed by the Democratic Caucus to our remaining vacancy yesterday. Uh, he has been a terrific member of the committee in the past, and we welcome him back. I, uh, continue to hope that research security, uh, will remain a bipartisan and productive topic for this committee. We have an impressive legacy, uh, of legislation as well as oversight on research security.
▶ 0:25:27For years, on both sides of the aisle, we have maintained a deep understanding of and respect for the spirit of openness that animates fundamental research. Republicans and Democrats alike have taken threats to research security seriously while understanding that in order to be the world leader in science and discovery, we must welcome international So, I don't minimize the importance of this topic.
▶ 0:25:55Nevertheless, I wonder why we're holding a second hearing on research security when there's no evidence that the Trump administration has implemented anything of substance on research security this year. Quite the contrary, President Trump has taken uh, many actions that are damaging uh, the very research policies uh, these were designed to protect.
▶ 0:26:18As Ranking Member Sykes outlined many of these destructive actions, I'll speak uh, to what we are at risk of losing. Uh, for years now, Democrats and Republicans celebrated the fact that the United States was the chosen home of world-class talent. We took pride in the fact that nearly 80% of foreign-born STEM PhD recipients chose to remain in the United States.
▶ 0:26:44Uh, since 2000, uh, about 40% of all Nobel laureates, uh, in uh, coming from America, have been foreign-born, Americans by choice. Uh, an analysis from the National Foundation for American Policy found that more than half of startups valued at $1 billion or more here in the United States were started by immigrants.
▶ 0:27:09Now, what happens if we block or discourage foreign-born STEM talent from opportunities in the United States? Here's the answer. They'll take their know-how and entrepreneurial spirit to other countries, allies and adversaries Welcoming international talent is important to advance the economic and national security of the United States.
▶ 0:27:31In our first hearing this session, we heard testimony from former Republican Congresswoman and former Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson. Um, she, uh, told us that the People's Republic of China has vastly overtaking the United States in several areas of emerging technologies.
▶ 0:27:51According to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute studies that Representative Wilson cited, China now leads in 66 of 74 emerging technologies. In the years prior to this administration, US federal research funding was already stagnant at best.
▶ 0:28:09Despite uh, multiple reports citing China's growing advantages, we're now in the worst of times with the Trump administration politicizing grant making, dismantling our federal science agencies, and undermining confidence in the US as a trusted partner. This isn't how you compete with China. This is how you surrender. This is not how you make America healthier.
▶ 0:28:31It's how you needlessly send children to the hospital with measles, pertussis, and other diseases entirely preventable with vaccines. This is not how you make America great. It's how you undermine our resilience to natural disasters, epidemics, and all manner of risk to our national security and societal well-being. And this is not how you build a scientific ecosystem that produces research worth protecting in the first place.
▶ 0:28:59It's how you atrophy our excellence to the point of no return. The Trump administration is responsible for implementing these disastrous policies. But Congress is complicit in its failure to exert forceful, bipartisan oversight and legislation to stop the bleeding. I support the bipartisan work that the Science Committee has done to bolster research security.
▶ 0:29:25And I applaud the valuable work that each of the witnesses has performed to further those goals. However, I fear that unless both Republicans and Democrats stand against the destruction of our scientific enterprise, we are ceding our leadership to China in ways that no research security policies can prevent. Uh, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, ranking member Lofgren.
▶ 0:29:50Now, let me reintroduce our witnesses, which I'm exceedingly thankful for considering this uh special and very busy time of year. Our first witness today is Dr. Rebecca Keiser, acting chief of staff for the National Science Foundation. Our next witness will be Dr. Daniel Evans, assistant deputy associate for research for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. I will not try to say that twice. Uh our next witness is Dr.
▶ 0:30:20Patricia Valdez, chief extramural research integrity officer for the National Institutes of Health. And of course, our final witness will be Mr. Jay Tilden, director of counterintelligence and intelligence for the Department of Energy. I now recognize Dr. Keiser for 5 minutes to present her testimony. Thank you very much, Chairman McCormick, Chairman Babin, ranking member Sykes, and ranking member and members of the subcommittee.
▶ 0:30:51My name is Dr. Rebecca Keiser, chief of research security strategy and policy, and acting chief of staff. Yes, I have two long titles at the US National Science Foundation. It is an honor to be with you today to discuss how NSF is working to protect critical US taxpayer investments in R&D and in our domestic STEM talent from malign foreign actors.
▶ 0:31:18Research security is a vital part of the NSF mission and is essential to US economic and national security. NSF works closely with partners in federal law enforcement, including the NSF OIG, and the intelligence community, as well as other federal R&D funders, some of whom are also represented here today. NSF counts Congress as an important partner in this work.
▶ 0:31:45We thank you for your work to date, and we remain committed to working with you to continue to bolster US research security efforts in response to current and evolving threats. Under the first Trump administration in NSF commit commissioned a report by the JASON. The findings and recommendations of which have helped inform NSF's approach to research security.
▶ 0:32:10It found that a group of governments, notably the People's Republic of China, were attempting to benefit from the global research ecosystem without upholding the core values of openness, transparency, and reciprocal As co-chair of the National Science and Technology Council Subcommittee on Research Security with OSTP, DOE, and NIH, NSF collaborated on the development of NSPM 33, which was released in January 2021
▶ 0:32:40to provide clear research security direction to the community. Indeed, many of the NSF efforts I'm excited to speak with you about today have either been bolstered by or are in direct response to NSPM 33 and legislation this committee helped to And it is my office at NSF, O Crisp, that stewards these efforts for the This work is a matter of protecting American competitiveness and national security
▶ 0:33:10and requires continued vigilance, culture change, and The security of the US research ecosystem is the responsibility of the federal government, as well as the recipient recipients of federal research NSF has continued to work diligently to bolster our research security efforts and to implement NSPM 33 and the research security provisions of the CHIPS and Science Act.
▶ 0:33:36NSF implemented the prohibition on funding for researchers that participate in a malign foreign talent recruitment including certification requirements of both research institutions and senior personnel on NSF awards. NSF has established robust analytic capabilities and published related guidelines to help the community understand how the agency approaches these practices.
▶ 0:34:01NSF, in partnership with the broader interagency community, developed research security training modules to provide researchers with clear guidelines and effective strategies to protect against existing and emerging research security threats.
▶ 0:34:15Researchers must also now certify that they have taken research security training to qualify to apply for NSF NSF established the first of its kind Secure program, under which we have funded the Secure Center and Secure Analytics to empower the community to identify and mitigate foreign interference that poses risks to the US-funded federal research enterprise.
▶ 0:34:39NSF also established the TRUST framework to guide the agency in assessing grant proposals for potential national security risks. We are implementing TRUST in three phases, which I outlined in greater detail in my written testimony. In FY25, NSF is also excited to fund the first cohort of awards under the NSF Research on Research Security program.
▶ 0:35:02This program was established to advance the understanding of the full scope potential challenges and nature of the Research on Research Security field through scholarly taxpayer investments in research and innovation is central to US national security and international As good stewards of American taxpayer funds, NSF remains committed to this, and we look forward to continuing to work with you on this vitally important issue.
▶ 0:35:32Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I welcome your questions. Thank you, Dr. Keiser. I now recognize Dr. Evans for 5 minutes to present his testimony. Uh thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman McCormick, ranking member and uh Mr. Babin, Chairman Babin, it's very nice to see you, sir. Distinguished members of the committee, in 1958, Congress wrote the National Aeronautics and Space Act. That document did something profound.
▶ 0:35:59At the height of the Cold War, it declared that the United States would not hide its achievements behind a wall of secrecy. Instead, it mandated that NASA would share its discoveries with the world. That decision to be open was a bet on the American system, and it paid off. Because we shared our science, we sparked a global revolution in Because we were transparent, the world's best minds flocked to our universities.
▶ 0:36:30And because we led with our values, the United States became the undisputed leader of the space age. That openness remains our greatest It's the engine that drives our economy, and it's the engine that inspires our But we also know that the world of 2025 is not the world of 1958. We're in a fierce competition. Our adversaries are no longer just watching our launchpads.
▶ 0:36:59They are actively seeking to extract the intellectual capital that this committee and the American taxpayer have invested My message to you today is that we do not have to choose between being open and being secure. We can and we must do both. As of last month, my office is leading a modernized approach to research security that safeguards NASA's crown jewels without dimming the light of American science.
▶ 0:37:30And our strategy rests on three simple principles: integrity, clarity, and alignment. First, integrity. We're enforcing a bright line. Pursuant to the CHIPS and Science Act, we've established a strict statutory We're no longer relying on the honor system. We're implementing a dual-layer verification process.
▶ 0:37:53Every researcher must certify that they are free from malign foreign talent recruitment programs, and their university must back them up. In short, if you are funded by a foreign to undermine US leadership, then you have no place in a US lab.
▶ 0:38:14We're lifting the fog on who's doing the Thanks to the work of this committee and the administration, we moved away from fragmented, agency-specific paperwork, and adopted a single, transparent disclosure system across the federal This allows us to see the full picture. We can now verify exactly who is working on a grant, and ensure that they are free of conflicts of commitment.
▶ 0:38:38We've replaced blind trust with verification, ensuring that we know where every single tax dollar is going and to whom. Third, let me speak about alignment. We're protecting the scientist as well as science. We know that red tape can be just as damaging to innovation as any external threat. That's why we refuse to go it alone. We work hand in hand with the National Science Foundation, with our interagency partners, to harmonize our requirements.
▶ 0:39:08And this consistency is our safeguard against bias. By adhering to a single, objective standard, we ensure that every researcher is judged by the same criteria. We scrutinize conduct, not Simply put, we at NASA want our brightest minds focus on finding life on Mars or designing the next supersonic not navigating a maze of conflicting Mr.
▶ 0:39:36Chairman, in conclusion, NASA represents the very best of this country. We do the hard things, and we're building a security posture that is worthy of that mission. One that's rigorous enough to stop our adversaries, but agile enough to welcome the brilliant minds who want to join team USA. We're proving that a free and open society can out-innovate any closed system in the world. Thank you for your leadership. Look forward to your questions. Thank you, Dr. Evans.
▶ 0:40:06I now recognize Dr. Valdez for 5 minutes to present her Chairman Babin, Babin, [clears throat] Ranking Member Lofgren, Chairman McCormick, Ranking Member Sykes, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on behalf of the National Institutes of Health about this important topic. My name is Patricia Valdez, and I serve as the Chief Extramural Research Integrity Officer at NIH.
▶ 0:40:33NIH plays a central role in shaping the biomedical research landscape of the United States. The scale of NIH's investment reflects not only a mission to advance health and discovery, but a duty to protect the integrity of taxpayer-funded science.
▶ 0:40:48NIH executes this responsibility through a comprehensive approach and in partnership with institutions across the NIH has no tolerance for breaches of integrity or misuse of federal taxpayer It is particularly concerning when problematic behavior occurs at the instigation or support of malign foreign Some behaviors NIH has witnessed include non-disclosure of foreign research support, including undisclosed foreign employment, unmitigated conflicts of interest, violations
▶ 0:41:18of peer review integrity rules, and repeated misrepresentations to institutional officials and NIH during compliance NIH's compliance efforts aim to ensure proper stewardship of federal funds and to safeguard the research enterprise from foreign interference, while protecting the integrity of research. Our multifaceted approach strengthens research security in partnership with institutions across the country.
▶ 0:41:43In 2018, NIH undertook an extensive effort to ensure recipient institutions are prepared to mitigate mitigate against these concerns. Over the next several years, NIH released reminders and clarifications about policies on disclosures of foreign and other support and financial interests and security and confidentiality and peer review.
▶ 0:42:03In 2021, NIH strengthened disclosure forms by requiring certification of other support by senior key personnel and enhancing its internal capacity to detect signs of foreign interference or disclosure non-compliance. This year, NIH implemented a system to fund foreign collaborations as direct subproject grants instead of subawards to improve the oversight of funds going to foreign sites.
▶ 0:42:27At the same time, NIH remains committed to responsible international scientific cooperation, recognizing its essential role in US innovation and global Since 2018, NIH's [clears throat] Office of Extramural Research has received almost 700 allegations and has contacted institutions regarding 272 of 271 of these allegations. Nearly all cases were resolved through administrative remedies.
▶ 0:42:53Escalation to the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, OIG, occurs only depending on material facts, intent, pattern, or potential harm to agency or US In 53 cases, including six cases working with the Department of Justice and OIG, the US government recovered approximately $37.8 million in repayments. Again, the majority through administrative processes.
▶ 0:43:18Institutions have indicated that NSPM 33 aligned requirements offer clearer expectations and more centralized While establishing new processes can feel significant, institutions have been strong partners. Indeed, reports involving foreign interference to an Indeed, in recent years, institutional self-disclosures account for over half of all reports um of involving foreign interference to The number of allegations has declined sharply over the past several years.
▶ 0:43:47This shift like likely reflect reflects improved awareness and compliance with disclosure requirements at universities and universities and research In accordance with the CHIPS and Science Act, NIH recently announced research security training requirements for NIH This training strengthens knowledge and compliance related to topics of cybersecurity, international collaboration, disclosure requirements, conflict of commitment, and conflicts of The National Science Foundation, in partnership with NIH, the Department of
▶ 0:44:17Energy, and the Department of War, have provided online training modules as a resource to the extramural community. Along with our agency partners, NIH has implemented common disclosure forms in which senior key personnel must certify that they do not participate in a malign foreign talent recruitment program. To increase transparency of our assessment process, NIH published a decision matrix last year.
▶ 0:44:38NIH has also partnered with the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and our agency partners to strengthen research security standards and streamline disclosure processes so that compliance expectations are remain NIH will continue to protect the integrity of US government-funded biomedical research in partnership with institutions, federal agencies, and law enforcement, and values its ongoing collaboration with Congress to strengthen research integrity and ensure that security measures support scientific collaborations.
▶ 0:45:07Thank you again for the opportunity, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Dr. Valdez. Uh I now recognize Mr. Tilden for 5 minutes to present his testimony.
▶ 0:45:18Chairman McCormick, uh Chairman Babin, uh Ranking Member Sykes, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to discuss the Department of Energy's commitment to research security. While my role at the DOE is primarily to prevent espionage directed against national security activities, I'm here today representing the entire department's efforts on research At DOE, we are clear-eyed about the strategic and adversarial competition that the People's Republic of China poses to the United States, and we view the diversion of taxpayer-funded
▶ 0:45:48unclassified research for malign purposes as an abiding threat to our economic prosperity and our national The United States leads the world in science and technology. Central to that leadership is scientific collaboration, bringing together the best and brightest minds, be they American-born or from DOE strives to balance the inherent security risks of international collaboration while preserving America's S&T edge.
▶ 0:46:17Our approach seeks to mitigate risks in an evolving environment while fostering innovation that keeps the United States in the lead. The science and technology threat landscape is dynamic. Certain governments, notably but not only the PRC, exploit our largely open scientific ecosystem through both cyber and non-traditional collection approaches. A more detailed discussion of the PRC and other foreign threats can be provided in the appropriate setting.
▶ 0:46:44DOE continuously strengthens our research security through multi-layered approach consisting of foreign national screening and vetting, internal processes and procedures, cyber tools and controls, and control of critical infrastructure. This is all executed by expert security, export control, and counterintelligence The cornerstone of DOE's unclassified research framework resides with the within DOE's national laboratories and their internal safeguards.
▶ 0:47:13Unlike some universities, DOE can and does direct national laboratories to operate in a consistent manner, a managed research environment that balance risk and benefit while monitoring, adapting, and evolving threats.
▶ 0:47:27All 17 national laboratories adhere to an integrated security framework consistent with NSPM 33 and the CHIPS and Science Act DOE maintains and continues to refine a range of controls at the national laboratories, including foreign national and tailored mitigation measures based on the science and technology risk matrix.
▶ 0:47:50This risk matrix categorizes selected technologies that either allow, constrain, or outright prohibit foreign national participation. Our commitment to safeguarding research extends to grants and external funding.
▶ 0:48:04DOE's research, technology, and economic security framework aims to minimize intellectual property loss, protect supply chains, and guard national and economic security through due diligence reviews, tailored security requirements, and post-selection The Department has implemented CHIPS and Science Act research security requirements and collaborates with our interagency partners on NSPM 33 DOE requires robust disclosure uh disclosures from applicants.
▶ 0:48:33Further, DOE was the first agency to implement required research security training and prohibits prohibits entities of concern and associated personnel from receiving DOE funding. DOE is committed to harmonizing our research security requirements with other federal agencies. Despite DOE's efforts, challenges persist. Variance in research security programs and awareness across academia creates potential vulnerabilities.
▶ 0:48:59To assist, DOE co-funded research security training modules for academia and collaborates with the interagency colleagues to support uh the research community, of which the NSF Secure Center is example. At the same time, sustaining and enhancing comprehensive vetting and monitoring program demands dedicated resources for counterintelligence, security, and our tests unclassified due To address these challenges, we offer three considerations, three key
▶ 0:49:29Uh first, tailored and risk-based strategies. To avoid blanket prohibitions, we must provide clear, consistent guidance for academic to mitigate potential foreign threats before they arrive at our national laboratories or work on DOE-funded efforts. DOE supports a comprehensive interagency approach with flexibility for agencies to take necessary risk-based actions tailored to their Second, we need to enhance federal capabilities.
▶ 0:49:56We recommended We recommend strengthening analytic vetting and continuous monitoring through dedicated resources, state-of-the-art tools, and easily connectable IT We need to out-innovate and we need to out-educate. We support investment in research and in academia and in our national laboratories while expanding the American-born STEM talent pipeline. In closing, DOE views research security as a top priority.
▶ 0:50:25We're committed to an effective, balanced, and continuously improving approach to protect our nation's scientific enterprise. We're confident in our framework and our frameworks and expertise, and we are dedicated to working closely with Congress to ensure America strengthens its leadership in science and Chairman McCormick, Ranking Member Sykes, members of the committee, thank you very much for your leadership, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Mr. Tilden. I now recognize Ranking Member Sykes for 5 minutes questions.
▶ 0:50:54Thank you, everyone, again for your testimony. Dr. Kaiser, I'm going to jump right in with you and talk about something I mentioned in my opening statement. NSF's office of chief Office of the Chief of Research Security Strategy and Policy is required per the CHIPS and Science Act to have, quote, no fewer than four full-time equivalent positions in addition to the Chief of Research Security. Dr. Kaiser, how many people are currently working in that office?
▶ 0:51:22Currently, we have the Chief of Research Security and three additional personnel. And we are in the process of increasing those resources. We've been coordinating with you and your team, and of course, we have been concerned about this reduction across the foundation. We have lost quite a few staff members.
▶ 0:51:45We're very aware of the priority of research security, and so actually, we are in process of adding an additional representative onto the office, as well as developing the hiring plan that's required under the executive order to ensure that we make the office even more Thank you very much. And how many people were working in the office on January 19th, 2025?
▶ 0:52:08there were me, plus there were seven additional representatives in the office at that time. So, on January 19th, there were seven people, and now there are four? And per the CHIPS and Science Act, no fewer than four full-time equivalent positions in addition to the Chief of Staff, but that is a split job that you have. Uh so, would you say that the agency is in violation of the law?
▶ 0:52:38I would say that we are in the process of building up the office again. In fact, we have a representative uh who is actually transferring to our office next week to ensure that we're compliant. At the same time, we want to go beyond that minimum number because we know what the importance is of of research security and national security. So, as part of our hiring plan that we're developing consistent with the executive order, we're going to build up the office even more.
▶ 0:53:07So, let me be clear, the law requires how many staff people in this office? It requires four. And how many people do you have in the office? We have myself plus three. And so, we're building up again. Correct. And we do need to build that
▶ 0:53:22Dr. Kaiser, are you saying you have four people in the office? Correct. And the law requires four, so you're saying you are in compliance with the law. We We are in compliance with the law, and we are building up even more. Thank you very much.
▶ 0:53:36Uh so, this office has clearly incurred incurred serious uh with the Trump's administration month-long campaign and in the words of OMB Director Vought to [clears throat] make civil civil servants, excuse me, quote, not want to go to work because they are increasingly viewed as the villains. And I would imagine as we are using two out of the three hearings that we've had here to talk about research um perhaps those are not the villains.
▶ 0:54:03They're trying to protect us from the villains, but nonetheless, they are We'll have a quick commercial break.
▶ 0:54:13Uh this administration has wanted to force or coerce people out of the federal workforce and act to the detriment of research security, and they have succeeded. And so, you've explained how you are coming in compliance. What is the timeline uh that you imagine that we will now have a more robust office to actually tackle the issue of research We are bringing on an additional member as we speak. Uh that that human resources action is taking place now.
▶ 0:54:43In addition to that, the hiring plan that we've developed to ensure that we're consistent with the executive order, um has been developed. It's going through coordination also as we speak to be sent over to the White House and OPM. And we anticipate within the next few months. Of course, uh we all know how human resources actions are and the and that it is unpredictable about the time that it takes. Uh but we will be in train as soon as we receive approval of that plan.
▶ 0:55:14Great, thank you. Really quickly, I want to ask the panel, and I'll start with Mr. Tilden. I mentioned in my opening statements uh that the Trump administration is the most direct threat to research security. How is the Trump administration threatening your research security, Mr. Tilden? And I only have 30 seconds, so please quickly. Yes, the Trump administration is not threatening our efforts. Our efforts has If you were to look at it from Biden to Trump, the efforts that we're doing internally are on a consistent slope to improve.
▶ 0:55:41I will say the one thing that is bothering us is uh being in a shutdown and or CR status, of course, prevents us from going where we need to go. Thank you, Dr. Valdez. Our work continues in research security as we had, you know, years before, so we continue the work. Thank you, Dr. Evans. Uh it was a priority before. It remains a priority now. Great, thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chair. Thank you. And I recognize right actually our chair, Mr. Babin will be or Dr.
▶ 0:56:11Babin will be our next 5 [clears throat] minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. And again, thank you, witnesses, for being here. Um I'd like to address the notion that implementing research security is too costly or that agencies and institutions are not funded enough to enact appropriate Uh I'd like to remind my colleagues, especially on the other side of the uh that taxpayer funding for research is not a right. It is a privilege.
▶ 0:56:41If researchers and institutions cannot protect federally funded research from foreign exploitation, they shouldn't simply should not be receiving funding. I also challenge institutions to evaluate their priorities. Funding for diversity, equity, and inclusion, or DEI, at universities has exploded over the debt last decade.
▶ 0:57:02DEI staffing growth has outpaced faculty hiring, increased tuition costs, and done nothing to increase black and Hispanic graduation At R1 and R2 universities, which receive the lion's share of federal research funding, mandatory DEI curriculum is estimated to cost over 1.8 billion dollars over 4 years, according to reporting from last March.
▶ 0:57:28The average spending at R1 universities on DEI is 8.5 million annually. NSF alone funds 2 billion for DEI-aligned STEM research benefiting R1 If we are really worried about funding research security, then we should prioritize it over DEI. I'd also uh like to uh talk about R1 universities and staffing and compensation.
▶ 0:57:58Uh DEI investment, as I said, averaging 8.5 million annually, uh have um uh have have have has has exploded over the years. And uh Where was that other one? Here it is. I'm sorry.
▶ 0:58:17R1 universities lead in DEI investment averaging 8.5 million annually, as I said, that's 0.62% of total The University of Michigan employs 241 DEI staff at an annual cost of 30.68 While Ohio State University increased its DEI workforce from 88 employees at 7.3 million to 189 employees at 20.38 DEI executive salaries frequently exceed faculty
▶ 0:58:47earnings with OSU's DEI head earning 300,000 and University of Michigan's former Chief Diversity Officer earning 431,000 Just for the record, I would like to mention those. Uh I'd also like I have a question here for uh for all four of you, if you if you don't mind. If I've got time, and I think I do.
▶ 0:59:10Would you agree that delays in implementing NSPM-33 increase the risk that US taxpayer-funded research was compromised or transferred abroad? We'll start with you, Dr. Kaiser. Chairman Babin, we started at NSF in working together with the interagency to implement NSPM-33 uh as soon as it was released.
▶ 0:59:36We prevented and prohibited the participation in malign foreign talent recruitment programs by NSF staff. We required that NSF staff be US citizens. We also began the coordination among our agencies to harmonize on the very important disclosure requirements that are needed by those applying for federal research.
▶ 1:00:00And it did we I have been successful in having a harmonized approach to that to that disclosure which is currently being implemented. We also have taken efforts of course to make sure that we convey to universities that this is a joint responsibility.
▶ 1:00:21That they have a responsibility not only to disclose to us, but to address research security risks as soon as they are found and that they need to have programs in place to do so. The secure center and secure analytics has been established to assist in that It is active. It is providing tools and information and coordination.
▶ 1:00:45An example I think of the way that this is working and that this is in train is just in the past week. I have received three emails that were forwarded to me from researchers in the community who had been approached who for recruitment by Chinese malign foreign talent recruitment programs. Now the fact that they were approached even now in 2025 is extremely concerning.
▶ 1:01:13The fact that they came to us and notified of us of that is great progress in that regard. Now the other thing I wanted to mention however is that unfortunately the PRC government keeps moving the goal posts. So the these foreign talent recruitment programs the names of them are not in any list because the names keep changing. And so this is why we have to have consistent due diligence and keep at this and not rest on our laurels. Absolutely.
▶ 1:01:42Thank you and I'm I'm out of time and I know the other three would certainly have some some very good answers that I'd be very curious to hear and all of us would be, but I want I will yield back. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I I agree I it's actually riveting testimony. I think everybody here would be interested to hear more on, but uh we'll continue on and stick with my I now recognize Bonamici from Oregon. Thank you Mr.
▶ 1:02:10Chairman Ranking Member and thank you to all the witnesses for your expertise. I'm going to start by saying that years ago I was in an innovation round table and a very successful tech executive said the most important thing for innovation is diversity. So you get people from different backgrounds and different perspectives. I just want to start by saying that. Congress in this committee wrote the Chips and Science Act to protect US research, to incentivize US manufacturing, and to strengthen trusted partnerships.
▶ 1:02:35The implementation of this law, particularly the very important and science part, depends on clarity, staffing, and resources. Yet this administration has drained research security research security offices, capped indirect costs at fund compliance, and abandoned its as an interagency coordinator. I also want to note Mr. Tilden you talked about out educating.
▶ 1:02:59I'm on the education committee and I know this administration is not only trying to close down the Department of Education, but policies that have passed in this Congress and that the administration is talking about will make it harder for people to access higher education in this country. That is not good for this country. I also want to align myself with the the remarks that Ranking Member Lofgren made about the contributions of immigrants. Dr. Evans I I discern by your accent that you're not Native
▶ 1:03:28to the United States of America. That's
▶ 1:03:30Thank you for exemplifying the contributions of immigrants in this country. So we I want to note that this combination of things does not strengthen our national research security. It it creates blind spots and we can't lead in US innovation and emerging technologies if this administration is undermining science agencies, if they're demeaning immigrants, if they're sabotaging federal research, and if they're making higher education harder to access, attacking colleges and universities.
▶ 1:03:57And also I want to note as of just two days ago announcing that they want to recklessly dismantle the National Center for Atmospheric Research. So so Dr. Kaiser late Tuesday night OMB Director Vought announced that NSF would immediately begin dismantling the National Center [clears throat] for Atmospheric Research NCAR. This center is vital for developing life-saving weather models including atmospheric rivers like just happened in the Pacific Northwest. When did NSF learn about Director Vought's directive to dismantle NCAR?
▶ 1:04:28We have been reviewing all of our large facilities and we've been doing so for several months. When did you learn about the director's? We have been having conversations for for a while and we're happy to brief you further. I know that there has been a briefing that has been requested in that regard. Well when when will NCAR functions be transferred elsewhere? Is that what's going to happen and if so to where will they go? This is a very large award and as I said we are reviewing all of our large facility awards.
▶ 1:04:59We're very conscious of the fact that there are vital research functions that are occurring in weather forecasting, weather modeling, seasonal forecasting, wildfires, etc. So as we announced we are going to be releasing a dear colleague letter to solicit input from the community. Get input from
▶ 1:05:21run out of time. I appreciate that. We look forward to seeing that, but does NSF intend to terminate its contract with NCAR? We have sent a notification to NCAR that we were releasing this dear colleague letter and that we are going to be assessing the different components of NCAR. Mr. Chairman I request unanimous consent to enter into the record a memo NSF sent yesterday morning announcing that it will begin closing I request to enter that into the record Mr. Chairman.
▶ 1:05:49And if I could be clear that we haven't announced the intent to restructure Can I enter that into the record? No objection. And Dr. Kaiser I understand that the Office of Science and Technology Policy at the White House has been largely absent from research security coordination. So who's filling that vacuum when the White House steps back? We do coordinate quite closely with the Office of Science and Technology Policy on research security and we also coordinate very closely with the interagency.
▶ 1:06:17OSTP does have a representative who focuses on research security who with whom I've met frequently. Thank you and I appreciate Dr. Kaiser you're you're you're talking about the recruitment of some of our US scientists by China and other places and we've seen documented efforts like that and it's destabilizing no doubt. So how does pushing talent out of our system affect America's research enterprise? I I know Dr.
▶ 1:06:42Babin said something earlier about you know China's stealing everything and looks like they're trying to steal our our researchers too, but if we don't have the jobs for them and if we are not doing what we can to keep them here, how will that destabilize grants and and push our talent out of our system? We do need a whole of government approach and a whole of society approach to make sure that we retain the best talent here in the United States.
▶ 1:07:07As you said before our international researchers, international PhDs, the vast majority stay here. We need to continue that and continue that effort.
▶ 1:07:16Real quickly, does everybody agree with that on the panels that we need to the best researchers here in the United States? Without a doubt.
▶ 1:07:24Yes. Yes. Thank you. I yield back. [clears throat] Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you. I now recognize Mr. Webster for 5 minutes. Thank you Mr. Chairman. So Dr. Valdez does in the Biden administration right at the end of his term I think in December 20 2024 renewed the US China science and technology agreement.
▶ 1:07:54So how does your agency provide and place potential conditions, restrictions, restricted activities and sub agreements that might be negotiated under a broader Thank you for your question. NIH takes research security very very seriously.
▶ 1:08:15One of the things that we have implemented pretty recently was to remove sub awards, foreign sub awards to foreign institutions and we pulled them out and now they're awarded as sub projects. And so by having these awards to foreign institutions and foreign be made as sub projects, we have better oversight of what's actually happening at those sites and the funding. So we know exactly what the funding is being used for.
▶ 1:08:40So instead of having the reporting go through an intermediary which would have been the US institution or the prime institution, we now can have direct oversight of those foreign awards. So that allows us to have better insight to what's happening. does your agency see any conflict between the implementation of the National Security Presidential Memorandum number 33 and the renewed science and technology agreement? Is there any conflict there?
▶ 1:09:11I'm not aware of a conflict. Okay. Can the United States remain competitive in global research without China? So so we definitely need to have international collaborations. Science is We can't cut off all the other countries and so I think it's important that we do manage these types of collaborations very closely and really make sure that we are identifying any risk that could potentially happen.
▶ 1:09:42So again, extreme the increased oversight is important So how could we uh how could the United States structure its research ties um to China with China to ensure that the most most benefits come from it while still protecting the risk against the risk?
▶ 1:10:04Right and and that's one of the things that we we've done again to for foreign sites when foreign when we're funding it funding research at foreign sites, you know, we we're now requiring increased oversight by NIH. So we see exactly where the funds are going. We require the the progress reports from those foreign sites that we are coming directly to us and we have that relationship. So I think the stronger oversight is is really key here to ensure that you know funds are being spent properly.
▶ 1:10:37what actions should Congress take to to to advance US research competitiveness and uh that have not been done to to do to enhance that research? I'll say that we we definitely appreciate all of the actions that Congress has done to give insight to give awareness to the issue of research security.
▶ 1:10:59We definitely appreciate the partnerships and so all I can say is really I think increased our coordination with you as we see the changing landscape of the different threats that arise to continue our communication and you know discourse and to understanding what those risks are I think it's really Uh Mr. Tilden, do you have like any additions to that? sir, I would yes.
▶ 1:11:26I think we can remain competitive in a global like research without the extensive ties with China but let me clarify that often times I think we're we may be mixing between many people who are of Chinese nationality who have been in the states for many years and those are the folks that have migrated through our universities to our labs. Um that will take time for us to wean off if you will, right?
▶ 1:11:50That will take back to this idea of a STEM related kind of a growth in STEM pipeline for talent US born talent. Um I also believe that uh Congress can help us in many ways and you have so we thank you. consistent budget really does help. I don't know if I can emphasize how the CRs and or shutdowns really do send a shockwave through the system.
▶ 1:12:19and again as I mentioned this idea of how do we collectively all the departments here, how do we develop that US born STEM pipeline so we're not as reliant on foreign talent. We are very reliant on foreign talent right now, Very thank you very much. Time's up. Yield back. Thank you Mr. Wester. I now recognize Representative Foster out of Illinois for 5 minutes of questions. Uh thank you Mr. Chairman to our witnesses.
▶ 1:12:49Um you know, I first want to start by acknowledging that you have a really tough job because the you know you know, at the end of the Cold War at the end of World War there was a very clear separation. You had stuff that was nuclear weapons relevant and you had things that were maybe bio weapons relevant and now there is so much that's dual use and that's tough because a lot of people come here because they want to develop drugs and they go home becoming experts on viral and antiviral technologies if they decide to go home.
▶ 1:13:19So I think there are first and most important duty here is to minimize the the time so we push people back to their countries of origin. You know, it's we're 5% of the world population so 95% of the geniuses are not going to be born in the United States. And and so we just have to acknowledge that fact and continue to capitalize on it very very consciously.
▶ 1:13:41Um and and and so you know, one of the reasons that we've been so successful is that a lot of people want to come to work at our universities after they get their education to work at our universities because they're free and open and well funded or work at our our corporations and start their own business which is one of the real you know, engines of growth in this country and it used to be in this country that you if you're going to start up a business to I don't know develop new forms of lithography that
▶ 1:14:11you'd be guaranteed you wouldn't be facing a government funded competitor. That was one of the disadvantages when you go back to China, okay, you start this business and then all of a sudden the Chinese government has a big equity position in your competitor and guess what? You don't there's not a level playing field for regulation and one of the most frightening things from that point of view is this this administration's decision to start acting more like China in terms of taking big equity positions in things and and putting our conflicts of interest into our national labs.
▶ 1:14:42Big announcement with X-Lite which is a very good idea but now they're going to be using the national labs to produce parts for their prototypes that um you know, and so how do you how do you negotiate those and avoid conflicts of interest when when the federal government has an equity institution and they have complete control over the national labs and it just there's a reason we've stayed away from from this web of conflicts of interest when we have government investments.
▶ 1:15:11Um now the other thing is you know, I it's a secret to none of you that we've had a hemorrhage of the top talent in federal It's less under easily understandable what's happened inside the weapons labs and the people that work behind it. Mr. Tilden, I I don't want to put you on the spot.
▶ 1:15:29It's nice to see you outside of the skiff but is it fair to say that there that the problems with retaining top talent from people who work you know, behind the wall in in weapons labs and similar they've been they've kind they've mirrored what we've seen in the difficulty of retaining talent in the federal government in the face of DOJ and so on. So uh Dr. Foster, nice to see you as having been in NSA recently but I as you know, I'm in a new position.
▶ 1:15:59My sense is that we've actually had a very good track record of talent retention through this whole process for especially for the national security related functions. Um again just to not to beat this dead right now as you know, we can direct federal employees to work without pay. We cannot direct our national laboratory members because of various laws that are on the books to work without pay.
▶ 1:16:24So while the first shutdown that we went through we managed very well as an agency as a department if we have this second kind of a problem at the end of we will see departures. Um and and that will be a problem. And that's just a fundamental funding issue. People are attracted to this mission whether or not it is AI in the unclassified or quantum in the unclassified or whether it's those related things in the classified section. We I think have been fairly resilient in this.
▶ 1:16:55I know some labs lost some people. You're right on that attracted to this mission and ultimately that depends on being proud to be part of a country that's going in a direction you believe in and when and that also frankly is under threat. We see what's happening today where we have now assembled the biggest armadas since the Bay of Pigs or I guess something similar and with the idea that we're going to use that to take back the oil and the land that somehow was thought to be ours. That makes the United States look like an ugly and dumb country.
▶ 1:17:25And that makes it very hard for foreign talent to want to come and work to be part of the United States. And I I I don't expect you to say anything on that. You're in a very tough position but look at this is the difficulty that you're going to be facing and will continue to be facing until we can start living up to our own ideals again. I have 5 seconds left and I'll yield back. Thank you Dr. Foster.
▶ 1:17:55I now recognize Representative Harrigan for 5 minutes of questions. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I thought we were on a very productive line of questioning a few minutes ago and so I'm actually going to seed my time to the chairman of the full committee, Dr. Babin. I thank the gentleman from North Carolina. I appreciate this and I'll try to yield back to you here in just a second but Dr.
▶ 1:18:17Cazer had answered my question which was do you agree that delays in implementing NSPM-33 increase the risk that US taxpayer funded research was compromised or transferred abroad. So I would like to ask that question again and start with you Dr. Evans and we'll work down the table answer as quickly as you possibly can. Yeah, thanks very much and really speaks to the heart of who we are as a research ecosystem.
▶ 1:18:42We at NASA took a very deliberate strategic posture to eliminate the kill chain and by that I mean eliminating malign foreign talent recruitment programs. And there have been other cases in which we've moved with speed and agility. But one of the the jobs that I have as a research security professional is of course to protect the research security posture of NASA.
▶ 1:19:03But the other job is to deliver the world's most capable and compelling space science program and that's in concert with our academic partners who have told us many many times that bureaucracy really stifles innovation and so we've deliberately moved with harmony among our interagency partners to get the common disclosures right. To move singularly because that really cuts down on red tape.
▶ 1:19:29And the last thing I want to do is chill the innovative spirit that we have in this country. I think our posture has been strong as a result. Thanks. Absolutely. Thank you. Now, Dr. Valdez. Thank you. So, NIH began communicating with um recipient institutions in about 2018 of the problem and the issues of you know, involving research security. Um one of the things is as was as mentioned by Dr. Evans and Dr. Kaiser is that we do work together very closely to harmonize any requirements.
▶ 1:19:57Um we have implemented, you know, um the the the um requirements um and that we are using the um common disclosure forms and and requiring that people that that researchers report whether or not they belong to a malign foreign talent recruitment program.
▶ 1:20:13So, I think as we move along, I think it's very important that we continue to work together as interagency to make sure that that that um those requirements are um are harmonized because we want to not we we do not want to increase the burden on the institutions in having them to report different pieces to different different agencies. Um so, I think um the progress has been good, I believe. Thank you, Mr. Tilden. Yes, sir. Um so, I will say that with within the bounds of everything we do, we have not slowed down implementation. We are continuing to approve.
▶ 1:20:42We're As my colleagues mentioned, the common forms, we're continuing to work on that. We are continuing to attempt to harmonize across the interagency to make sure with again, often times harmonizing does not mean everything needs to be identical. We need to be able to tailor based on the individual missions of our agencies, but we have a very good collaboration going on there. As mentioned before, we co-funded that training. We're continuing that.
▶ 1:21:06Uh I do think an area that we can all agree on that we could do better would be uh a better more uh not automated more more cyber-based information sharing regime and protocol. Right now, if we discover something that looks bad, it's got to be pick up the phone or shoot an email, "Hey, you have this person, too?" Or "You have this" We I think we have to work on that and that does take some leadership from the White House on this Thank you, Mr. Tilden. I'd like to yield back to uh Mr. Harrigan.
▶ 1:21:32Thank you, Chairman, and uh got a minute 30 seconds here and I'll use the the time as wisely as we can. Look, one of the uh comments today was we don't know why we're having this committee hearing for a second time. The reason that we're having this hearing for a second time is because this is such a big problem. Uh the security and safety of our research and development apparatus is of paramount importance to our national security and to the public trust.
▶ 1:21:53And when the FBI assesses that across the different uh mechanisms of intellectual property theft being academic, uh institutional, and and uh uh military that due to espionage across all three of those platforms, we are losing $600 billion every single year. That's not 6 billion, that's not 60 billion, that is 600 billion. We have a really big problem and that should not be a political problem.
▶ 1:22:22That is a national emergency. And so, I think the question ultimately comes down to, yes, we want to welcome international talent. Dr. Evans, I absolutely identify with your comments that we need to be open and secure, but I don't know that we can do that with our adversaries. They have been robbing us blind for decades.
▶ 1:22:42And the fact that as the ranking member pointed out that China is ahead of us in 57 out of 64 critical technologies of the future uh is indicative not of their institutional and academic prowess, it's indicative of their theft. And so, with that, I yield back. Thank you. Thank you. I now recognize Representative Rivas for 5 minutes of Thank you, Mr. Chairman, uh for holding this hearing.
▶ 1:23:12I appreciate hearing from the witnesses who represent uh important agencies and research initiatives within our federal government. Um since the passing of the CHIPS and Science Act, our institutions have been making great efforts to implement many research security mandates. The CHIPS and Science Act requires institutions who receive funding under the law to implement certain compliance with research security policies and stipulates that institutions must maintain internal controls for things like data security.
▶ 1:23:43I worry about the capacity of smaller institutions um to keep up and that concern has only grown since NIH, DOD, NSF, and DOE issued new policies capping indirect costs at 15%. Indirect costs are expenditures that aren't tied directly to research staffing or supplies, but they nonetheless support infrastructure and activities that are vital to the functioning of research institutions such as with research security.
▶ 1:24:14While implementation of these policies is stalled in the courts, our universities are significantly adjusting their operations. The reality is that this drastic reduction in indirect costs uh reimbursements will result in more than 800 million in cuts for the state of California, my home state, just from NIH grants alone.
▶ 1:24:38The life science community in California supports over 1.1 million Californians generating around 400 billion in economic output. And every American has benefited from NIH funding. 3.7 million Californians receive care at teaching hospitals.
▶ 1:24:55The capping of indirect costs will devastate the development of groundbreaking research, inhibit patient access to life-saving treatments and clinical trials, and will cede American dominance in biomedical research to our foreign competitors like China, Russia, and Iran for years to come. Dr. Kaiser, Dr. Valdez, and Mr.
▶ 1:25:16Tilden, do indirect costs contribute to universities' compliance with laws including those related to research security, and how will capping indirect cost at 15% impact universities' ability to comply with the law, and how will those impacts be felt at smaller institutions in particular? I can start.
▶ 1:25:39We're we're committed to providing resources to institutions of all size to focus on research security and research security efforts. In fact, uh we have an award to Los Angeles Valley College in your district to bolster cybersecurity efforts at the college. And um that's that's a direct We also, of course, focus on the uh secure awards to provide the resources that are needed.
▶ 1:26:07Um and the secure center uh has a uh has a co-award at Stanford University. So, these are the ways that we want to make sure that we provide the overall efforts here. Let me say that for for us, the biggest thing that we need to do for our institutions is provide consistency and provide harmonization.
▶ 1:26:31And so, uh the requirement to establish research security programs at universities, we are coordinating through uh through the interagency to do a memorandum of understanding so we have one set of requirements on institutions to lower administrative burden and lower costs. Dr. Valdez. Yes, and and I'll agree with Dr. Kaiser.
▶ 1:26:54Um we do understand that this may be a concern and No, we we we absolutely want to make sure that all of these requirements are harmonized and all the guidance is harmonized. Um one of the things I wanted to mention was also the secure center which um hopefully when when when it's all set up and running, it'll be able to provide some guidance toward towards these smaller institutions that may not have all the resources that they need. Thank you.
▶ 1:27:21So, this huge notebook here, and I don't have a perfect answer for you on this one cuz this is something that's a little outside of my area, but I will echo Dr. Valdez. One of the ways that we can help the especially the smaller institutes, the smaller academic centers is through like the the the NSF secure center and providing the standardized approach. That way they can just adopt it, right?
▶ 1:27:42They can just uh I I want to flag this uh I think a fantastic Uh sadly, DOE was not involved with this, but we seen it, know it, and it's a great little primer to really help the academic institutions understand, this is the kind of stuff that we need that makes you all much more in alignment with our requirements.
▶ 1:28:04So, uh you know, again, barring um barring an additional law or something, um that's the way we're attempting to to help these smaller institutions to get through this recognizing there are these caps on the indirect. Yeah, I I I'm still concerned on how these caps will hurt um you know, our institutions and uh inhibit our ability to continue our global leadership in R&D, but I yield back since my time is up. Thank you.
▶ 1:28:32I now recognize Representative Baird for 5 minutes of comment or a question. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Um I'm going to start with Mr. Tilden and uh before I begin, Mr. Tilden, I I love the Christmas cheer. Thank you for the bringing that sweater to the committee this morning. And and a hat. I love it. I love it. Um but I want to I want to talk a little bit about foreign talent recruitment programs uh for a moment.
▶ 1:28:59And I I I want to understand from your perspective to what degree do you believe that that uh what we're actually seeing in our academic institutions is more related to technology transfer initiatives um rather than academic collaboration cuz we hear so much on this committee and so many others that this is really about collaboration and we've got to make sure we're we're working with others around the world. And certainly we understand that.
▶ 1:29:24Uh but what we also understand is that in fact many folks that are here in our nation are here uh under the guise of academic collaboration but are really engaged in technology transfer. Can you comment on that and then we'll just go down the line? Yes, sir. Um first off, this is a gray gray area question cuz it really is nuanced. Uh the department first off was the the the leading agency to first uh prohibit any interaction with foreign talent programs.
▶ 1:29:52And we actually identified some folks and had to deal with that. Uh and that is one of the things that we look for just like the entity lists. But it really does and I agree with you that the certainly uh as as as I think Dr. Foster mentioned, if 95% of the geniuses are not here or not US-born, right? They're everywhere else and they come here. There there's guaranteed a fraction of those that might be doing malign activities. But it does take an individual look.
▶ 1:30:18Um so we actually work with our ART test office whether or not it's folks working on grants, folks folks working at uh the universities. Uh and you have to dig into it. how many years ago were they involved, right? I mean, ultimately, if you're getting a higher education in China, it is very likely that you're going to have touched an entity. Um does that mean you're now an agent of that entity? That's a really hard one to sort out.
▶ 1:30:42And this is why we have both a unclassified and a classified component for how we evaluate those foreign nationals coming here. So I hope that kind of gets at it a little bit. Dr. Valdez. Yes, so NIH funds approximately 300,000 researchers. The vast majority of them are intent on doing good research with integrity but we understand there are those bad actors. And you know, we we want to pay pay particular attention to those um those bad actors.
▶ 1:31:11And so we have processes in place where we can identify behaviors. Um and you know, once those behaviors for non-disclosure for example, um are identified, then we can work closely with the institution to determine like what next steps can happen. Um but I think it's it's definitely something that we are always thinking about. We again keep research and research security is is the top of our minds right now. So thank you. I'm I'm going to answer your question with a story.
▶ 1:31:38Uh this is for me as a foreign-born researcher myself who stayed and chose to naturalize into the US. But I'm going to contrast my story with uh that of uh my office-mate. 20 years ago, I secured very very fortunately my first post doc at Harvard. Um and I shared an office-mate with a Chinese guy. And he was working on incredibly benign research, you know, studying the spiral arms of the Milky Way. He's a scientist, not a spy.
▶ 1:32:05Um but years later, he actually went back to China and he formed a very successful tech company. So in my assessment, um this was not a malign foreign talent recruitment program. But it speaks of talent retention. So the issue wasn't so much that we trained him, is that we lost him. And the long-term economic benefit of that that US research investment was actually accrued to an overseas nation. That I think is just a pressing issue.
▶ 1:32:35And I and I think it's just as important as the malign programs as well. It's the the leakage of talent after we train them in this country. I agree. Um and the way that we are addressing these concerns is through a process that we've set up called the TRUST process, Trust Trusted Research Using Safeguards and Transparency.
▶ 1:32:54Because we have to focus on this proposal-by-proposal risk that we see because it varies and we have to look at everyone individually to make sure that we take a careful look. Uh so we look at non-disclosure. We look at associations with malign programs. We look at concerning funding. And from a staffing perspective, per like I was talking about before, it goes beyond our office. It goes to a whole-of-agency approach.
▶ 1:33:22So we have research security representatives in all of our directorates to focus on exactly these issues which are extremely important including in Arctic research. Thank you. And I appreciate the the the commentary here. I think what we can all agree on and and fully recognize is that there is a gradient of activity from malign all the way to genuine academic uh collaboration. We need to continue to make sure that the intellectual property assets that we're developing in this country remain in this country. And uh my time is expired.
▶ 1:33:51So with that, I yield back. Thank you. With that, I I recognize Representative Beyer from Virginia for 5 minutes of questions. Uh Mr. Chairman McCormick, Ranking Member Sykes, thanks so much. I really like to extend my thanks to uh Chairman Babin and Ranking Member Lofgren for letting me back on the committee. I've I eight wonderful years here and I'm so glad to be back however temporarily. Uh and I'll do everything I can to advance American science. Uh Dr. Kaiser, we share a Wellesley history. It's wonderful to see a Wellesley graduate in position of leadership.
▶ 1:34:22It's come to my attention that National Science Foundation used a neural network tool to screen proposals to determine if they're aligned with the Trump priorities. And this is happening after those proposals were recommended by for award by merit review panels.
▶ 1:34:38And I'm worried about it aside from compromising scientific integrity, if a tool like the neural network, a large language um is not handled responsibly, this potentially puts proprietary information into the wrong hands. Can you talk about how you're managing the large neural networks overseeing these proposals?
▶ 1:35:02We have we have uh for many many years, uh in addition to merit review, we have reviewed proposals and awards for compliance and for harmonization with agency priorities, with many other things, research security uh compliance, conflict of interest compliance, and many other things in addition to the merit review.
▶ 1:35:26And so when we did a review to ensure in uh alignment with agency priorities, we had a multi-layered, multi-pronged approach. We used human beings. We did a multi-level approach that went all the way up to the office of the director. Because we have 50,000 awards um at NSF, the tool that you mentioned was one tool in the toolbox to help us with the assessment to then go through the human review that we did.
▶ 1:35:57thank you very much. Is this used tool also used to filter proposals from universities who are on the Trump administration's bad list? Uh we do do not have such a list. We look at proposals for exactly what we always have, right? We do the assessment through merit review of intellectual merit and broader impacts.
▶ 1:36:21Then our program officers do the additional review for portfolio balance and alignment with priorities and compliance with other with other requirements at NSF. And then it goes all the way up the chain, all the way to the to the chief science officer for approval. Thank you. Thank you very much. Mr. Tilden, in your testimony, you mentioned DOE's core focus is on minimizing intellectual property loss, protecting supply chains, guarding national economic security. And DOE has long been involved in semiconductor chips.
▶ 1:36:52And we poured tens of billion dollars into the CHIPS and Science Act. With the Trump administration, they've been deeply involved in it. They're going back and forth on the CHIPS export policy. First export restrictions and licensing requirements and walking it back for certain things as long as a fee was paid. And then the Nvidia H200 chips to China.
▶ 1:37:12So this is both a national security issue and also a technological prowess Because clearly from everything that we read, semiconductor chips are national security assets. And they're critical to our advanced technologies, critical in the AI race with China. How does the current administration's policies on chip exports literally seed technological prowess in a way that walks back the progress achieved under the CHIPS and Science Act and under the and NSPM-33?
▶ 1:37:43Boy, I was hoping you weren't going to ask me that one. Um so look, fundamentally, any export control uh act, uh any export control um measure, if you will, is a function of policy and a decision. And and so in this case, it's really uh well outside of my uh purview, if you will, to kind of comment on whether or not that decision uh about the uh the Nvidia chips is uh you know, a correct one.
▶ 1:38:14Okay. Th- Th- thank you for your honesty in addressing it. But I have to confess, for those of us deeply involved in the tech community, we're confused about why we have this massive race. Um and you talk to the Intel people and everything else that um as long as the race to perfect AI is not a race to lose control, we don't want China to beat us.
▶ 1:38:36And so it's fascinating and difficult to understand this administration's decision to sell these top NVN Nvidia Dr. Kaiser, I only have 14 seconds left but um I I am concerned about how what the first of all, we're thrilled National Science Foundation is going to stay in Alexandria. Uh we're grateful that uh the HUD people are going to not be in 11-story garage anymore. On the other hand, the 55% cost of the NSF are deeply And with that, I yield back.
▶ 1:39:08Thank you, Mr. Beyer. And welcome back to the committee. It's great to have you. Um I'm going to address real quickly a question you had that I think uh I'm actually been very involved in the in the AI dissemination question. We actually sent a letter to open up the ability to sell our chips abroad because we felt like we wanted to be the industry standard. It's not that you're selling your absolute leading edge chips, but that you don't want to be supplanted by Chinese chips, Korean chips, by Japanese chips. We want to be the industry standard.
▶ 1:39:38If we allow other companies to produce and supplant us, we no longer lead the world in sales, in technology, and in the ability reinvest in the advanced technologies. And I think that's the answer to Mr. Tilden's question, or actually the question to you, is that we don't want to be supplanted by saying we're not going to allow anybody else to have our We are the world standard of technology, and we should remain that way.
▶ 1:40:01We will be supplanted if we have all the chips in America and nobody else gets to have We should be allowed to have a free protecting the technologies that are important to techno to go. I'm sorry. I'm taking my own time. And I will I just realized I have to recognize one more uh I have read in a member, Mr. for 5 minutes of questioning. Thank you. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Merry Christmas, everyone. Thanks for making the time for us this morning.
▶ 1:40:30It's a very important subject, and I appreciate your candor and your responses. I'm going to ask the question of Dr. Kaiser on these, if I could. How are we ensuring that institutions receiving these dollars are actually complying with those standards, not just certifying that they complied? What is that matrix? What kind of forensic accounting? What do you do to make sure that they're actually complying, not just saying they are?
▶ 1:40:55We have an active assessment process where we ensure compliance with disclosure and with all of the other research security components. We do this in conjunction and collaboration with our Office of Inspector General. the evidence on how we've done this is through the actions that we've taken when we see non-compliance. We have taken actions on several institutions where we've seen non-compliance.
▶ 1:41:21Sometimes this is in collaboration with the Department of Justice where there are civil settlements on these institutions. Sometimes there are administrative actions against universities or against individual researchers when we see non-compliance as well. So, we have many examples of this. We are concerned. We do take this extremely That said, what are there criminal elements to this as well, and have there persons been prosecuted?
▶ 1:41:51We hear over and over that China or other nations have stolen technology. What are the criminal ramifications for the individuals who cross the line? We were just talking about this amongst the panel because of course, again, we have so much wonderful interagency Our concern is often what we're seeing is the theft of know-how, even pre-intellectual property, the theft of the knowledge of our researchers,
▶ 1:42:21and the taking of that to China. We had an example just last week where and I think several others have as well, where an NSF-funded researcher, after they got the award, then they were approached by a PRC researcher saying, "We now want to be added to your project, and we want an agreement on that project where we get to publish all the results." And of course, the answer was no.
▶ 1:42:52Um, and so our challenge here is that issues like that, pre-IP in the basic fundamental research space, are not not covered by export control laws and not covered by other laws. Now, we look forward to working with this committee and with others to address these issues because we have real issues in this pre-IP space that aren't current aren't covered by criminal law.
▶ 1:43:22I'll I'll just reserve comment on it for now. Let me just ask Mr. Tilden, if I could. Um, I I've I think we're all of us are intrigued by each of your answers today, but on on the specific one, if you could do anything, one thing, to make sure we have this compliance, what what what weapon, for lack of a better term, would you like to have so that we are protecting our vital interest?
▶ 1:43:44Of course, we want to share in the scientific knowledge when it's it's excellent for the general good, but what what one thing would you do that we're not doing today, given your expertise and background? So, I'm I'm not sure it's anything that we're not already doing today. We just have to keep going further so that ultimately, again, balancing the risks with the idea of attracting. I I do wanted to emphasize a couple things.
▶ 1:44:07It was mentioned before, and I'll I'll say it again with some a little more Oftentimes, these Chinese nationals and others, right? I know we're I'm a little focused on China because I know that's where our head is right now, but it is others. Once they get to that doc and post-doc level, 83 to 85% of them stay in the US.
▶ 1:44:26Many of them continue on and become US And we are in strategic competition with China over intellectual capital, over worldwide intellectual capital. one of the things that we could get after is again back to I think we've mentioned, and we're all trying here, is going back to academia.
▶ 1:44:45How do we how do we help them better understand whether or not someone first comes into their ecosystem, and is it an acceptable risk, or is it we're not sure, so maybe this person ought to be on different lines of work for now until we understand it better? Because oftentimes, at least the DOE national labs, that's where we bring them in at some point. At some point, we draw them out of academia because they've been here for 5, 10, 15 years. So, that's an area that I think and I think the universities some are fantastic.
▶ 1:45:15Some have fantastic programs. And others, it's either not a priority or they're not funded for it. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the opportunity today, and Merry Merry Christmas. Good to have you here with us today. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of Uh, first of all, I want to recognize that we walk a fine line between talent and and risk.
▶ 1:45:37Uh, when I was an associate professor at Georgia Tech, we had a investigation I helped the FBI with as only as a associate professor could I actually get the now the information they needed because FBI has so many limiting features to investigate these folks at universities, which is a problem. But it's also a real opportunity to poach the talent from around the rest of the world like we've been doing for decades.
▶ 1:46:00Uh, indeed, the reason we have the wealthiest man in the world is not just because he came from a foreign country, but he came to a country that actually exponentially magnified his talents and his abilities. I mean, quite frankly, as a guy who's on space and and who really loves space and really loves AI, really loves advanced technology, and really this has been my biggest learning curve as as a guy who has an MD and an MBA, this is my next PhD as a course here. I've had that opportunity to kind of to look at what really makes us tick as a nation.
▶ 1:46:31Uh, you have a guy who now we've divested from space. We really have. I love NASA, but we're not doing what we used to do. We used to lead the Uh, us and Russia, we're the only two people could put space spaceships up in outer space, to get to the moon, to go anywhere. Now, we have one man who puts more spaceships in outer space than every other nation combined. That's a huge parabola. That's a a shift of not only capabilities, but but real pools of money.
▶ 1:46:58And that came because somebody immigrated to the United States and then used this amazing texture of of of technologies and wealth to do what he's done. And that was all Uh, and I'm I just state that because it's not a political thing. It's about business. It's about The business of America is business. And we need good immigration, but we also need good security. So, this is a a tightrope we'll continue to walk for the rest of our lives. It's never going to go away. I understand that.
▶ 1:47:27Uh, it's interesting though, but you talked about the openness of 1958. Elon Musk famously said before he was Once again, this is this is several years ago. He said, "I don't I don't worry about patents. I've never sued anybody. The only reason I get patents is so people can't keep me from using my own technologies." Because he knew if you're copying us, you're falling behind. That's why Russia fell behind us in the first place because they were copying us.
▶ 1:47:52So, I'm not worried about people copying us, but I am worried about the intellectual property that we have in the leading edge technology. If we have somebody we're training or or taking that technology before we've even employed it, that's what I'm really worried about securing. and I thought I thought we've made brilliant comments today. I'm really excited about the future. I actually think this is a a bipartisan issue that we can get our arms wrapped around. We'll never be done. It doesn't matter who the president is. Doesn't matter who the chair is. Doesn't matter who has the majority. This issue will follow us for the rest of our lives.
▶ 1:48:23We we attract talent. We keep talent. We have to keep our secrets. It's pretty Thank you for being a part of that. It's amazing. Uh, I just want to say that when when you talk about the US and and it's maintaining numerous lists of countries, companies, institutions, and persons that US is prohibiting from with our research, contracting, and exporting, how should those lists be used to assess research skill and and That that's the big question that we're asking right now.
▶ 1:48:52I'm going I'm going to quickly I know we're we're running out of time, and I got to stick to my own timeline. Dr. Kaiser, your testimony reflect a significant recent process. Why did NSF not issue comparable enforceable guidance earlier following the NSPM 33's issue in 2021. After the issuance of NSPM 33, we started immediately in coordinating and and after that, we issued the implementation guidance.
▶ 1:49:20So, we did take action right away and we took action right away to issue prohibitions and start start developing the common disclosure forms. Very good. I also want to point out that it's interesting we we're worried about following the law and having staffing and I understand we have shrunk government during this administration. I actually think that's a good thing. We need to be leaner meaner, kind of like the Marines. Do more with less. That's okay. That means we do have to step up. We have to work harder. We have to be smart. We have to use the new tools, the AI that we have.
▶ 1:49:50Each one of you has specifically talked about your roles and unfortunately, we're going to run out of time in no time, so I don't have an opportunity for each one of you to speak more than you've already spoken, but I think you've pointed out how even though you have gotten fewer people working for you, you are doing a great job. You are stepping up to the plate. You are accomplishing the As a Marine, that's very near and dear to my heart, realizing that we can do better and sometimes bigger government doesn't mean better government.
▶ 1:50:18And with that, I'd like to go ahead and do our closing statements. I thank you. I thank you so much for being here for your valuable testimony and the members for their questions. The record will remain open for 10 days for additional comments and written questions from the members. Blessings everybody this special holiday season. This hearing is now adjourned.