▶ 0:35:58The subcommittee on South and Central Asia will come to order and the purpose of this hearing is to discuss the administration's plans for enforcing US export control laws. Members will have the opportunity to explore legislative options to strengthen the enforcement of US export controls and block adversary access to sensitive US and allied technology. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
▶ 0:36:23We are here today to discuss the AI arms race against the Chinese Communist Party and our law enforcement efforts to protect America's crown jewel technologies. Just last night, Reuters reported that Deep Seek's latest AI model was trained on illegally smuggled Nvidia Blackwell chips, America's most advanced AI chips. President Trump wisely banned China from getting that chip, but China is finding them finding them anyway.
▶ 0:36:52China's AI chips cannot compete with ours, so Beijing is resorting to theft instead. This chip smuggling story has ju is just one example of how China's AI ambitions are living off of stolen American technology.
▶ 0:37:06Beijing's as AI giants like Deep Seek and Moonshot AI are stealing the intellectual property of America's leading AI labs through a method called The theft of our AI models is so brazen that when one Chinese model was asked to identify itself after being released this month, it called itself Claude, the name of one of America's leading AI models. China is also smuggling the technology it needs to make AI chips.
▶ 0:37:35In 2024, Huawei smuggled components from TSMC to make the equivalent of 1.5 million of its most advanced AI chips. The only reason the US government even learned of this smuggling is because a tech blog discovered it and notified Huawei's stockpile of smuggled AI chips from TSMC is still paying dividends for China more than a year later.
▶ 0:37:59Based on public reporting, it's unclear whether Huawei has produced any AI chips without that smuggled stockpile. We are still waiting to see what TSMC's penalty will be for the worst violation of export controls in American history. The evidence is clear. Without US and allied technology, the CCP would lose the AR AI arms race. So, Beijing resorts to stealing.
▶ 0:38:25But to date, the United States has struggled to fully stop the CCP's AI theft. That brings us to today's hearing. Assistant Secretary Peters is tasked with cracking down on violators of our export control laws. Thankfully, BIS's export enforcement is doing what it can to enforce our rules. On the first day of the administration, President Trump and the America first trade policy memorandum instructed his team to strengthen enforcement on our export controls.
▶ 0:38:55The administration administration requested and the House supported a 77% increase to BIS's budget with most of that going to export enforcement. Although, however, the Senate only agreed to a 23% increase. That is a good start, but it's not where we should be. America's adversaries are working around the clock to circumvent our export controls and the status quo will not meet the urgency of this moment is my fear.
▶ 0:39:25I look forward to partnering with BIS on this mission as Congress also plays a major role in this story as well. Yesterday's news of deepseek using smuggling ch smuggled chips is only one of many. Every few months we learn of multi-million or even billion dollar AI chip black markets in China. Last year, the Financial Times reported that over a billion dollars in Nvidia chips had been smuggled into China in just three months. Don't take it from me.
▶ 0:39:53In the recent confirmation hearing for the next leader of CyberCom and the NSA, Lieutenant General Joshua Rudd stated, quote, "China is aggressively seeking to acquire advanced AI chips to accelerate its development of AI enhanced weapons." Close quote. I introduced the Chip Security Act to help meet this challenge.
▶ 0:40:14The Chip Security Act ensures that AI chips are not smuggled to China by scaling up best security practices, encouraging innovative technologies, and directly supporting the Trump administration's AI action plan Without this bill, we can be confident that Deep Seek can never again use with sorry, with this bill, we can be confident that Deep Seek can never again use the black market to get the AI chips it needs.
▶ 0:40:40This committee is ready to help the Trump administration win the AI AI arms race against the Chinese Communist Party. We cannot fail in this enforcement mission. Every case that BIS brings against these smugglers is one step closer to ensuring that the free world and not the Chinese Communist Party wins the defining technologies of our time. And with that, I yield back. And the chair now recognizes the ranking member from California, Representative Kloger Dove, for an opening statement.
▶ 0:41:09Thank you, Mr. Chair, for holding this important hearing. And thank you to Assistant Secretary Peters for being here. Export controls are only as effective as our ability to enforce them. And today's hearing is an opportunity to examine and address the major barriers to better enforcement. Over the past few years, insufficient funding has been one of the most consistent challenges to our export enforcement capacity.
▶ 0:41:34BIS has had to execute complex new rules related to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and China's access to AI technologies using outdated IT systems. and only 11 export control officers conducting inuse checks overseas. I'm glad that Congress has finally stepped up and increased BIS's budget by 23% for the 2026 fiscal year.
▶ 0:41:58My bill, the Export Control Enforcement Act, would increase the number of export control officers who are the backbone of our global enforcement efforts. With these new resources, I hope BIS's first action is to hire more ECOs in line with my legislation. But funding is not the only ingredient for effective enforcement.
▶ 0:42:18The massive scope of BIS's remitt means success is only possible if enforcement is treated as a team effort across the inter agency in partnership with industry and in coordination with our allies. And given that the volume of controlled transactions will always exceed whatever resources BIS may have to monitor them, clear, stable, and predictable regulations are necessary to reduce self-imposed complications.
▶ 0:42:46I am alarmed at how the Trump administration has gutted some of the key pillars of effective enforcement, including robust cooperation with industry and our allies. This administration's self-defeating export controls policy and bureaucratic mismanagement have exacerbated enforcement challenges and hurt the effectiveness of our controls. First, Trump's erratic use of export controls as negotiating tools are deeply disruptive to the enforcement process.
▶ 0:43:15Temporarily imposing controls to gain leverage in trade talks upends enforcement priorities and burns up finite investigative bandwidth. Similar disruptions are caused by BIS's um making it far more complicated for enforcement officers to identify what constitutes ER violations. Secondly, this administration has dangerously undermined the multilateral cooperation that is essential to effective enforcement.
▶ 0:43:44Partnering with overseas industry and local law enforcement dramatically enhances BIS's ability to prevent and disrupt violations in real time. Yet BIS has gutted the international policy office dedicated to managing coordination with foreign counterparts and ECOs abroad. The bureau also stopped providing technical assistance and capacity building to help countries identify and prosecute illegal diversion after Rubio's foreign aid freeze.
▶ 0:44:13Meanwhile, Trump's antagonism toward our allies is undermining our export controls regime. We cannot expect countries to restrict their industry or direct their law enforcement to support our national security priorities if Trump is outright threatening their core territorial and economic interests.
▶ 0:44:32We certainly can't expect our partners to take seriously the threat of China's AI dominance while Trump turns around and sells potentially hundreds of thousands of advanced AI chips straight to the As if pulling back from international cooperation weren't enough, the administration has also reduced coordination with the private sector, which is key to supporting industry compliance.
▶ 0:44:57BIS has discontinued regular industry training sessions across the country and effectively shut down many of its technical advisory committees, which it uses to solicit expert input on export controls. BIS also cancelled its yearly update conference, which educates over a thousand companies annually on how to comply with new controls.
▶ 0:45:20Finally, it's hard to see how Trump's use of export controls to engage in eyepopping levels of corruption wouldn't defang related enforcement efforts. If a company like G42 is getting AI chips because their chair bought a half a billion dollar stake in Trump's crypto company, can we really be sure that Trump won't interfere in an enforcement action against his business partners?
▶ 0:45:45This compromising of our national security is precisely why financial conflicts of interest are illegal and why I sent a letter to the Commerce Inspector General requesting an immediate investigation into this arrangement. I hope today we can have an honest conversation about the obstacles that need to be addressed to improve our enforcement efforts. I look forward to a robust discussion and I yield back.
▶ 0:46:10Gentle lady yields back. Uh, I am now going to request unanimous consent to enter into the record uh three articles. One from the Wall Street Journal, the Underground Network, sneaking Nvidia chips into China. Uh, the other, the New York Times, with smugglers and front companies, China is skirting American AI bans. And the third from the Financial Times, Nvidia AI chips worth a billion dollars smuggled into China after Trump export controls without uh without any objections so ordered.
▶ 0:46:40Um the other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may also be submitted for the record. And we're pleased to have Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement for the Bureau of Industry and Security at the US Department of Commerce, the Honorable David Peters before us today. Uh the uh the the committee recognizes the importance of the issues before us and is grateful that you are here to speak with us today. Uh we know that you were confirmed I believe in October.
▶ 0:47:10uh we had a then 43day interruption of government operations which I'm sure did not help your work or frankly it didn't help our work uh but here we are today and uh we're glad that uh you are here your full statements will be made part of the record and I'll ask to keep your spoken remarks uh to five minutes or so in order to allow time for member questions so with that I now recognize uh Assistant Secretary Peters for an opening statement
▶ 0:47:42Thank you, Chairman Heisinga, Ranking Member Klager Dove, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today. Among its many responsibilities, the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security, or BIS, is charged with the civil and criminal enforcement of the nation's dual use export control laws. The stakes of this mission have never been higher. Our adversaries are determined to gain access to our best dual use technologies to erase America's economic and military preeminence.
▶ 0:48:12Export enforcement or EE stands at the forefront of protecting America's technological edge. And under the historic leadership of President Trump and Secretary Lutnik, enforcement today is stronger than it's ever been. The offices of export enforcement and enforcement analysis, both components of EE, are staffed with highly skilled federal law enforcement agents and intelligence analysts. Though underresourced, E punches well above its weight.
▶ 0:48:38For example, we recently secured high-profile indictments and arrests in the Southern District of Texas in the Middle District of Florida of individuals and entities engaged in smuggling and unlicensed exports of advanced AI chips and GPUs.
▶ 0:48:52Additionally, recent trial convictions, including one just last week in the Southern District of Florida and sentences throughout the country for export control violations, demonstrate the quality of our criminal Moreover, in the past 12 months, BIS has announced significant administrative penalties against companies that have run a foul of the export administration regulations. Last year, we reached a $95 million settlement with Cadence Design Systems for unlawfully exporting critical semiconductor design technology.
▶ 0:49:22And just two weeks ago, we announced a $252 million settlement with applied materials for selling semiconductor manufacturing equipment to a company on the entity list. This was a statutory maximum penalty and the second largest standalone penalty ever imposed by BIS. The message to everyone paying attention should be clear. Follow the law or face the consequences. With more resources, our enforcement would be even stronger.
▶ 0:49:52In fiscal year uh BIS collected far more in criminal and administrative penalties, forfeitures, and restitution, roughly $278 million, than our funding, which is approximately $191 million. As a financial matter, the American people get far more at b far more out of BIS than they put in. And with more funding, increased penalties and stronger deterrence are sure to follow.
▶ 0:50:16The FY26 budget, which gave BIS an increase of approximately $44 million, was a significant step in the right direction, although it felt it fell far short of the $122 million requested by the president's budget. With this increase in funding, BIS is prioritizing hiring more personnel. That means more agents, more analysts, more overseas export control officers, as well as obtaining advanced analytics and threat relevant training programs.
▶ 0:50:44This will enable better accountability of license trade abroad, more investigative leads, more investigations, increased criminal and civil penalties for violators, and ultimately greater deterrence. To achieve these goals, we also encourage Congress to increase statutory civil penalties.
▶ 0:51:02Uh currently the maximum civil penalty allowed for violations under the export control reform act or ECRA stand at twice the value of the unlawful transaction or $300,000 adjusted for inflation whichever is higher. Compare that to violations of the international traffic and arms regulations where the Arms Export Control Act authorizes a penalty of approximately $1.2 million per unlawful transaction. Too often companies treat BIS's administrative penalties as a mere cost of doing business.
▶ 0:51:32And the reality is that ECRA's financial penalties are not enough to punish and deter bad actors and create a culture of compliance in companies. Beyond increasing financial imped financial penalties, it would also be helpful to extend the statute of limitations under ECRA from 5 years to 10, which is similar to Congress's recent revision to other statutes.
▶ 0:51:51This is justified by the complexities inherent in investigating export control To conclude, stronger penalties and stronger deterrence are critical, and this is because the risks to our dual use technologies have never been more serious. I appreciate that the members of this committee recognize the threat, and I'm grateful for your support in confronting it. Thank you again for having me before you today, and I look forward to your questions.
▶ 0:52:18Thank you, Assistant Secretary Peters. Uh, appreciate that input. And uh with that, I'm now going to recognize uh the Cong gentleman from Texas, Congressman Self, for five minutes of questioning.
▶ 0:52:30Uh thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for being here. Uh did you say that was a $252 million penalty? Okay. Thank you. Look, we uh we know that both TSMC and Nvidia TSMC uh has smuggled chips. Nvidia has always built builds chips just under the threshold that Congress sets. So with that, I'm concerned about the gaps in our export controls and I agree with you.
▶ 0:52:59They're too far uh they're too low to deter bad behavior. Um my ECRA penalties increase act. I want to go directly to a comment you made. It increases it from two times to four times the basis of the transaction. and the base penalty from 300,000 to 1.2 million. Now, that may level it up, but we're talking about vast sums in these chips if they get exported.
▶ 0:53:28Is that enough in your mind to deter bad
▶ 0:53:34Thank you for the question, Congressman. Uh, I appreciate your work uh on this bill and and I appreciate your support for increasing these penalties. As I stated uh during my opening, as I stated during my testimony a moment ago, increased penalties are really key here um in and amongst other tools to make sure that we are creating a culture of compliance and establishing what is critical that is effective deterrence.
▶ 0:53:59Listen, four times uh the value of the unlawful transaction is certainly a good place to start, but I'm not entirely certain it's where it's where this discussion should end. I do think that there is, you know, potentially a sweet spot where if the penalties get too high, it discourages our voluntary self-disclosure program, but four times the uh value of the unlawful transaction, I really believe is is where we ought to be starting this conversation, if not
▶ 0:54:29if not dramatically
▶ 0:54:30Okay. Have you seen any evidence of companies actually pricing in the cost of violations into the cost of doing business? Do you see that? I I don't know if I'd say the evidence that I've seen in our ongoing enforcement actions shows directly that they are pricing in the cost of potential enforcement.
▶ 0:54:50What I do see and you know without speaking about any particular case or company is just an underinvestment in compliance and due diligence know your customer procedures and that reflects in the nature and and and I'll call it quality of the violations that we see stuff that you would have to imagine with an effective compliance program just simply wouldn't happen.
▶ 0:55:14Okay. I want to go to the affiliates rule because you rolled BIS rolled out the affiliates rule last year I believe to crack down on it. Now that basically is a parent company if it's blacklisted then all subsidiaries that are owned 50% or more. My stop shells act uh wants to codify that but we've got to understand that goes two or three or four levels deep. Can you address the affiliates rule for us?
▶ 0:55:43uh does it help our export controls and would this bill help uh because it it the stop shells act is you've got to go that deep sometimes to figure out if it's an affiliate or not. U again thank you for the question and and I appreciate your support as reflected uh in your interest in this legislation. What I'd say is if we take the the affiliates role is is potentially a significant tool.
▶ 0:56:10What I'd also say, however, is that separate and apart from whether the affiliates rule or some version of it exists, companies still have due diligence requirements. They still have compliance requirements. They still have an obligation to know who their customers are.
▶ 0:56:24So my message would be we need to start beyond whether the affiliates rule is currently in effect or not and and focus specifically on the due diligence obligations of the companies that are purporting to do the exports. What does this mean? Do you know who your actual customer is? Do you know who your customer's customer is? To what extent is your compliance program designed to catch potential entity listed companies already on the entity list get getting access to your materials or potential military end users?
▶ 0:56:55Um so okay so what gaps remain? Let's say we we talk about the increase the penalties we talk about uh the stop shells act. what gaps remain uh to evade the 50%
▶ 0:57:10Well, Cong Congressman, I think another important issue is one that I referenced during my opening statement and that is the extension of the statute of limitations. Um, as should come as no surprise, these investigations are inherently international. They are very complex. They tend to be very document. And to the extent that we're trying to gather evidence from overseas, although five years seems like an extended period in which to get enough evidence to finish an investigation.
▶ 0:57:38Oftentimes that that that may not be the
▶ 0:57:41Uh thank you for your answers, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
▶ 0:57:45Gentleman's time has expired. With that, uh, the chair now recognizes the ranking member, uh, Sydney Commager Dove, who represents the home of the next
▶ 0:57:56uh, where we will see once again great American victory. So, that's right with that for five minutes.
▶ 0:58:00Oh, that's so nice. Uh, thank you, Assistant Secretary Peters. Uh, do you know how many black wells have been sold to G42?
▶ 0:58:13Sitting here today, Congresswoman, no, I don't know the exact number. Okay. Do you know how many H200s have been sold to Chinese end users so far?
▶ 0:58:22Uh my understanding is that so far none
▶ 0:58:25so far none. Okay. Well, that's interesting because there have been different reports uh with different numbers. Um so I actually think that is important um for a department to know um that has enforcement control authority. Um, so once you get that information, it would be great if you could share that with this committee.
▶ 0:58:48Um, do you know how BIS is able to determine if a Chinese company has violated um, the restrictions as they are laid out? Um, and how you're able to determine if a Chinese company is being truthful about its customers and their end uses.
▶ 0:59:07Well, well, thank you for the question, Congresswoman. I I appreciate it. Um again as uh the official responsible for enforcement our our authorities derive primarily from the export control reform act as well as the E. We have a number of law enforcement tools and and information gathering tools available to us.
▶ 0:59:27These start in many instances with our overseas export control officers about whom you referenced uh during your opening statement and and and I appreciate your attention on the role that that they play. We also have access to uh a variety of sources of information. Some public publicly available, some on the classified side, and that drives a considerable amount of our analysis of whether um of whether there are potential violations of law.
▶ 0:59:57Well, I I certainly think it's, you know, I think that information is important and and then this tends to be a bipartisan issue. I think most of us think that information is important because many of us are concerned with um Chinese access to these chips and then how they will be used. So would you say that stopping the diversion of controlled technology is an important priority for your office?
▶ 1:00:24Absolutely, Congresswoman. It's it is the priority for us in export enforcement. stopping the you know preventing diversion is our is our breadandbut task.
▶ 1:00:34I am so glad that you said that. Um so my next question is does BIS plan to use its new funding to restart the technical training and capacity building that was helping partner countries to better identify and prosecute the illegal
▶ 1:00:52Uh thank you for the question Congresswoman. we you know we interact with a variety of countries with respect to with respect to this problem set. I I disagree somewhat with with the premise of the question that we and export enforcement are not involved in uh partnership with uh foreign law enforcement partners.
▶ 1:01:13Um we we remain actively involved as not only part of our ECO programs uh run out of our embassies abroad but also just as a as a general matter of course we we are regularly in contact with foreign law enforcement agencies.
▶ 1:01:27Yes. So I should I should restate that was not the premise of the question. The question is, now that you've gotten a little bit more funding, if you would be willing to commit to more training and capacity building because we want to make sure that our partners in other countries are working in tandem with us and have the resources that they need that we need them to have in order to be able to identify and prosecute illegal
▶ 1:01:50Thank you, Congresswoman. I'm sorry if I if I misstated the premise of your question. Um, of course, as we get new funding and as we ex and we hope to expand our ECO program, um, that is inevitably going to result in more host nation law enforcement, you know, leto interaction with an eye towards having, you know, helping them to help us to identify potential violations of law.
▶ 1:02:15So, you're saying you need new funding, the more funding, not the current funding that you got. What I'm saying, Congresswoman, is now that we have the new funding, our expectation is to expand use it in part to expand our ECO program, which I expect is going to bleed into additional LE to
▶ 1:02:33Okay. Well, that's helpful to hear. As you also heard me in my opening statements, I talked about the annual update conference. So, are you willing to commit to working with your export administration colleagues to resume BIS's participation in its technical advisory committees and to hold the annual conference?
▶ 1:02:54Uh, Congresswoman, we work with our export administration colleagues on a on a daily basis on a variety of issues. As far as the tax are confer are concerned, again, that is primarily an an EA function. We had some interaction previously with I believe it was the regulatory and policy tack. Um I'm not sure what the status of that is but I'm happy to take that back to my colleagues in EA uh and get an answer for you.
▶ 1:03:18I would appreciate it if you could get back to us on a few of those things including that but also if you're able to access the number of chips that have been sold I think that would be of use to the committee as well. Thank you and I yield back.
▶ 1:03:29Gentle lady's time has expired. Uh with that uh the chair recognizes the delegate from Guam, Mr. Mouland for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Assistant Secretary Peters, thank you for coming on in tonight uh today. And you made it pretty clear that halting China's AI advancements and maintaining US leadership is one of our most critical uh for us and the national security is a challenge every day that you have to go through. Uh and then we have some the what we call the China AI power report act.
▶ 1:03:59It requires BIS and State Department to create an annual report on China's entire ecosystem, including its computer compute capacity, supply linkages, and applications to its military and industries. And if we don't have that, then I'm afraid we're just simply shooting our darks blindfolded in the dark.
▶ 1:04:20Uh the challenges we need to address is recruiting and retaining people who understand their national security imperatives but also have industry knowledge and technical in uh Just last month, a federal jury convicted former Google engineer Leong Ding for stealing thousands of pages of documents on Google's AI trade secrets.
▶ 1:04:44While stealing those secrets, he worked to stand up a new technology company in China to use that exact stolen Google tech. So, Mr. Peters, what are some of the lessons uh learned from that case? And what sort of precautions should our technology companies have to reduce insider risk for stealing our
▶ 1:05:05Well, thank thank you for the question, Congressman. Again, part of our core responsibility within export enforcement is to make sure that we are in regular communication with companies answering questions that they have about how to best um comply with the export administration regulations and their obligations under ECRA. I'm happy to say uh that in the time that I've been at BIS, we've been we have we have really endeavored to be responsive to questions from the business community.
▶ 1:05:34You know, there are a variety of ways that the business community may interact with BIS. Obviously, we're aware, you know, they're federal law enforcement agents. So, at times they may show up with requests for documents. They may show up with subpoenas. They may show up to interview members of the company in support of an investigation.
▶ 1:05:50But there's also just standard routine outreach that has no connection to any particular investigation or subject matter, but where we seek to go out and educate our partners in the business community because truly it's through them that we tend to identify a lot of these potential violations of ECRA and the EIR. So I I see that as a core part of the obligations of my office of export enforcement and we've been actively engaged in that in the time that I've been in my current role. Thank you.
▶ 1:06:20And how about the disruptive technology strike force? Is that still active?
▶ 1:06:25Uh again, thank you for the question. Disruptive technology strike force was a was an edifice of the prior administration. What I'd say is separate and apart from whether there is something currently called the disruptive technology strike force. We are still focused on priority areas of enforcement. that was we work handinand glove with our partners in other law enforcement agencies including the FBI, HSI, DCIS.
▶ 1:06:53We also work very very closely with our prosecutorial partners in the US attorney's offices as well as the national security division at the Department of Justice. We have regular syncs. I am regularly in contact with the leadership in the US attorney's offices where a significant percentage of our cases tend to lay. Um I I'm proud of that relationship.
▶ 1:07:17I I you know coming from a background in the Department of Justice, you know, it's something that I think I'm able to add uh in my role as assistant secretary. So, I'd say we are we are very well coordinated with our other federal law enforcement partners as well as our partners in DOJ to bring effective enforcement cases.
▶ 1:07:37Thank Thank you. And um you mentioned export enforcement is how important that is and why it's uh we welcome um which is why I welcome the 23% budget increase in FY26. But data uh packages and tools have been essential for technical insights and they are what reveals the gap in our enforcement.
▶ 1:07:59So beyond the budget marked for supporting more agents, how is BIS budget budgeting for data collection tools, analysis and IT
▶ 1:08:11Again, thank you for the question. Uh, Congressman, IT modernization is definitely a priority uh, not just for export enforcement, but but throughout the Bureau of Industry and Security. It's my understanding that an IT modernization program has been put in place and is being actively implemented uh, in the time that this administration has has been in charge.
▶ 1:08:32Um, and there is a I'm reticent to quote the exact dollar amount, but a significant there are significant resources invested in our IT Very good. Thank you, sir. Appreciate your presence here today. Mr. Chairman, I yield.
▶ 1:08:50Gentleman's time has expired. Uh, with that, the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Shre, is recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Secretary Peters. It was good to visit uh with you just for a few minutes before uh our hearing got underway. So you share with me that you've been working in this space the export control space since 17. So for nearly a decade which is longer than certainly I have or many of us uh here on the dis.
▶ 1:09:20It's it's fastm moving uh as the evolution in semiconductor technology uh is dizzying uh and threatening certainly to our our country. Um rapidly uh evolving advancements in the increasingly complex export controls span hundreds or thousands of of pages of of regulation.
▶ 1:09:50It's hard for congressional staff and certainly members of Congress to interpret the intricate rules of BIS. Um and I'm concerned that our export control officers also will face difficulties in consistently applying them. Um to help address these gaps, I recently introduced the BIS strength act with our ranking member Klunder Dove.
▶ 1:10:12The legislation authorizes the appointment of highly qualified experts to fill some of the identified expertise gaps that we have within BIS. Mr. Uh Peters, my question for you is while it's clear we need to bring in additional expertise in this fastmoving state space, what steps are you is your department taking to ensure that our current export control officers understand these complex rags so they can effectively administer and
▶ 1:10:42enforce
▶ 1:10:44Thank thank you for the question, Congressman. I really appreciate your interest in in this area, which is obviously very important to us. I think there there's an important distinction to be made between our domestic special agents who are, you know, badge and gun carrying uh federal law enforcement agents and our export control officers who are located in located abroad.
▶ 1:11:08Our export control officers, not all of them, but many tend to be uh have a law enforcement background often within uh the office of export enforcement. like many of them are special agents from OEE who apply for the opportunity to go abroad and fill the ECO program.
▶ 1:11:27Um so what I'd say is to to answer your question directly as far as the ECOs are concerned these are by and large uh men and women who have spent many years enforcing ECRA and the E and its predecessor statute um as line agents domestically. They're very very knowledgeable about the regs.
▶ 1:11:48um they're often respons we as I stated earlier we partner with other federal law enforcement agencies not in every case but almost every case and often it's incumbent upon us to make sure say our partners at HSI or the FBI or DCIS are familiar with uh the regulations that we're attempting to enforce against potential defendants.
▶ 1:12:09Um, so as far as the I I have great confidence that our ECOs abroad are already are there with an already established strong foundation in the rules that they're there to enforce to the extent that they have questions. We have significant resources state side to help them both through my office as well as our partners in export administration. We also have access to our office of chief counsel within the Bureau of Industry and Security.
▶ 1:12:42I take some comfort in hearing uh of your confidence level. It would it would seem to me that it' be extraordinarily difficult to keep up uh uh with the subject matter expertise. Uh but I appreciate knowing that you've got that that confidence as you're much closer to it on the ground. I want to turn briefly to Iran specifically. and their use of restricted components for UAVs uh including the Shahid drone.
▶ 1:13:12The uh Iranian UAVs have been deployed both directly and indirectly u by groups against Israel and uh our US partners. It poses a significant security risk particularly uh given our country's uh heightened presence in the region.
▶ 1:13:30Uh, Secretary Peters, what steps is BIS taking to disrupt global networks that supply components such as these micro electronics and navigation systems to Iranian uh UAVs,
▶ 1:13:44Well, again, thank thank you for the question, Congressman. This is among our chief areas of enforcement is to prevent our technology from winding up in weapons that could potentially be used against our allies as well as our own forces abroad. What what I'd say is we take a we take a a priority approach to our enforcement buckets.
▶ 1:14:06The the Iranian question is among the the the top of our priorities and we have all of the same tools available to us under ECRA and the E to enforce against violators in that space as we do in in other spaces.
▶ 1:14:20So typically leads will come in suggesting the diversion of uh micro electronics, GPUs and so on and so forth to you know problematic end users, potential military end users, companies on the entity list and we investigate them in many of the same ways as we investigate other other matters that fall within our charge. Thank you. My time's expired. Gentleman's time has expired. Uh with that, the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Kaine, is recognized for five minutes. Thank you. Mr.
▶ 1:14:50Chairman, and thank you, Assistant Secretary Peters, for being here today. China is notorious for its efforts to obtain illegal access to American innovation, often by invading export controls. Its efforts to steal America's innovative technology and gain a foothold in AI race must be thwarted.
▶ 1:15:09I look forward to hearing from our witness today about how we can continue to strengthen America's export control regime, shoring up America's uh technological edge and ensuring that America wins the AI race. Mr. readers.
▶ 1:15:23A June 2025 article from the Center for New American Security indicates that China had been abading the US export control regime to smuggle somewhere somewhere between 10,000 to one excuse me to several hundred,000 AI chips into China in 2024 I know that at BIS you are working hard to reduce these numbers.
▶ 1:15:46Can you share the primary means through which you investigate and address export control Uh yes, I'd be happy to and thank you for the question. I'm I'm pleased to see your interest in this area. Obviously, it's it's very important to us. We again, as I as I said a moment ago, we have the full complement of law enforcement tools and authorities available to us under ECRA and the E for this problem set as well as every other problem set to which we are addressed.
▶ 1:16:16generally speaking, the law the the process is not dissimilar from that which our other federal law enforcement uh partners engage in. That is we receive leads. Those leads get assigned out to an appropriate field office. An agent takes charge of it. They do an initial investigation.
▶ 1:16:33They'll work the case to a point where they believe they have enough to go to the United States Attorney's Office to open up and potentially gain access to a grand jury and then issue additional process out of the US attorneys through the prosecutors in the Department of Justice that they would that that our law enforcement partners and other agencies would in any other kind of case.
▶ 1:16:53What's what perhaps makes us unique uh not only our office uh is not only our office of enforcement analysis in which we have internal intelligence analysts and access to trade data. We also have, as I've mentioned several times throughout this hearing so far, the advantage of our export control officers overseas.
▶ 1:17:13And although they are, you know, currently few in number and we hope to we hope to fix that soon with the money that we've received, the information that they get through end use checks is invaluable and it feeds what I like to refer to as a virtuous cycle of uh of information that's not only relevant to my partners in export administration uh my co rather I should say my colleagues in export administration but also to our law enforcement investigations be they criminal or civil.
▶ 1:17:43And you know, you you bring up, Congressman, the issue of, you know, AI chip diversion. Uh, and I'd like to direct your attention to a December 8th, 2025 press release um out of the Southern District of Texas related to a matter that we call Operation Gatekeeper in which uh we have arrested several individuals uh responsible for smuggling, you know, hundreds of millions of dollars of AI chips and GPUs uh to
▶ 1:18:13to the places that you mentioned as areas of concern. But the but that viol the violation was not discovered by BIS but by a small tech block originally when when so the question here is um you've issued the foundry due diligence rule which significantly enhances BIS's ability to ensure that um Huawei and other Chinese networks are not illegally using front companies to gain access to TSMC's advanced
▶ 1:18:43manufacturing capacity. Is that enough? Is that strong enough?
▶ 1:18:48The the foundaries the again I think it's important to understand the functionality of of BIS export administration. My colleagues in export administration are largely are solely responsible I should say for issuing policies and rules are you know on the export enforcement side we are responsible for enforcing those rules. I I I want to answer your question. I do want to go back to operation gatekeeper for a moment if I could. It's my I I I I will go back and check this to make sure I'm providing you accurate information.
▶ 1:19:15It's my understanding, however, that that investigation did not initiate from a Tech Insights blog. That may be a reference to uh another matter. In either instance, we investigated that case with our law enforcement partners um and secured, you know, vital cooperation from an initial defendant that led to uh that led to uh arrests in
▶ 1:19:38and is the due diligence foundry due diligence rule strong enough?
▶ 1:19:43Uh the foundry due diligence rule is one of many issu is one of many issues that that we are addressed to. Um, you know, we are always looking and working with our colleagues in export administration to make sure we have the best possible rules to attack our to attack these
▶ 1:19:58Thank you. I yield back.
▶ 1:20:00Gentleman's time has expired. Uh, with that, I'll grant myself my five minutes. Um, it's interesting. Today's sort of been uh national security through uh the uh the the various levers of trade and commerce. Uh this morning we had Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy and Environment Jacob Hellberg in uh sitting where you're sitting to uh to testify on the advancing national security through commercial diplomacy.
▶ 1:20:27Here we are talking today about some of those levers of enforcement uh of those things. Um, and I'm assuming, as you can tell by my opening statement, I'm especially worried about the extensive smuggling of AI chips to China in violation of our export uh control laws. Uh, in just in November and December of last year alone, we saw two major cases against smugglers of our advanced AI chips come to light.
▶ 1:20:55And thank you for your work in trying to bring those smugglers to justice. Uh despite ample US government and public reporting evidence, to the contrary, some companies say that they see no evidence of chip smuggling, which seems a little hard to believe. Uh but Assistant Secretary Peters, from your perspective as the chief enforcer of our AI uh export controls? Uh is chip smuggling
▶ 1:21:21Simply put, yes, there is chip smuggling. It is going on. We are actively addressed to this problem. It is among our top enforcement priorities. We This is one of the things that we get up thinking about every day in export enforcement and I'm very grateful for the skill and diligence of our agents, our analysts and our export control officers uh who are who who live and breathe this at the ground level.
▶ 1:21:48Right. Well, pass along our thanks to them uh as well if you would. U I think what most people don't understand is the scale of America's sale of AI chips worldwide. how massive it really is. Uh, America or in America will make upwards of 10 million AI chips, AI chips this year with many of them sold internationally from Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and even to Armenia, places like uh that where you wouldn't necessarily think of them as tech hubs.
▶ 1:22:17Uh however, America is only 11 export control officers that you've been talking or rather those on the front lines responsible for ensuring export control compliance worldwide. U given the scale of the AI chip sales and BIS's limited personnel, would you say it's been challenging for BIS to have certainty that the chips that America is selling uh around the world and selling abroad uh have not eventually been smuggled to China?
▶ 1:22:46Well, thank you for the question, Congressman. Again, enforcement is there. There are always there are just inherent challenges with enforcement whether it, you know, domestically there are challenges. Obviously, those problems, you know, are are increased in an overseas setting where you're required to rely on host nation law enforcement support in order to accomplish your mission. Um, of course, with more resources, we can do more. We are going we are doing a lot now.
▶ 1:23:14We these new resources will enable better accountability of our trade abroad. As I've mentioned several times, I anticipate an expansion of our ECO program. Um, so you know, the idea being more ECOs, more ability to observe license trade abroad, more ability to contribute to what I've now referred to several times as a virtuous feedback loop of information to inform not only licensing decisions, but also the the trajectory of potential
▶ 1:23:45criminal and civil regulatory investigations.
▶ 1:23:48Right. And and I to be frank, it's one of the reasons why I introduced the chip security act HR 3447 um which would create security uh within those chips and and within the technology and give BIS uh hopefully some more confidence that when our chips are sold abroad uh that they do not end up in the hands of the Chinese Communist Party.
▶ 1:24:15Uh that was one of the things that was discussed this morning uh was some of the uh was some of the technology announcements uh uh I believe it's G42 out of UAE uh that announced that uh they're able to put that technology in into the chips. Um and I think we're all trying to build towards certainty of making sure that we know where those chips are.
▶ 1:24:40Are they in the hands of the intended recipients or are they being um used for malign purposes? Um so with uh I don't know if you have anything quickly that you want to add on that otherwise hopefully the gentle lady from Florida has been settled in and is able to take uh her five minutes. So um unless you have something very quickly you want to add to that. No, Congressman, again, I we appreciate your interest in this area and your and your support in ensuring that we are better able to do our job.
▶ 1:25:10Um, I'm not I as I sit here today, I'm probably not familiar enough with the technical capabilities to perform the action that you just described, but it's something that I'm open to certainly open to learning more about and working with your office.
▶ 1:25:25Great. With that, I yield back. Uh the chair now recognizes the chairwoman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, uh the gentle lady from Florida, Maria Alvier Salazar for five
▶ 1:25:38Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. And uh I commend you for putting together this uh this hearing and to you, Mr. Peters, for coming and uh sharing with you sharing with us your experience and and your comments. I just wanted to share with you a letter that we sent last week to the under secretary Kesler and signed by U. Mario Diaz Balard, Carlos Himenez, and myself.
▶ 1:26:02And this letter says specifically requesting from your office a full review of all export licenses to the island of Cuba. I'm not sure if you are familiar with this letter.
▶ 1:26:15And the reason why we did this, Mario Diaz Balard, Maria Salazar, and Carlos Himenez or Carlos Himemenz and myself, Maria Salazar, is because there is a new elected official in the city of Miami, the city that I represent, called uh Dariel Fernandez, who is the tax And thanks to him, he went over and beyond his call of duty.
▶ 1:26:37and he was able to discover that there were general licenses granted by OFAC and by your office BIS uh to export items to the island of Cuba and he was able to discover that the United States government has allowed for Ferraris, jet skis,
▶ 1:27:09golf carts to be exported to Cuba. A country that has the average Cuban does not have water, electricity, does not have food, medicine, and they don't have freedom. So, I don't think that sounds really humanitarian to me. Were you aware that that was happening?
▶ 1:27:29Um, thank you for the question, uh, Congresswoman, and and and I share your concern about this issue. In my role as the assistant secretary for export enforcement, we investigate violations of ECRA in the E.
▶ 1:27:43But did you know that specifically OFAC and BIS was allowing under this licenses granted by your office? And I'm not saying that this started with the Trump administration. I'm saying that it has Were you aware that the journal licenses granted to um to certain individuals included Ferraris and Rolls-Royces to the island of Cuba?
▶ 1:28:08Again, Congresswoman, I was not personally aware. I was not personally.
▶ 1:28:12Got it. So, you were not personally aware and anyone in your office. Got it. But it doesn't really sound highly humanitarian. For me, humanitarian is food and medicine.
▶ 1:28:24Not for ours. I I
▶ 1:28:27or jet skis or golf carts,
▶ 1:28:30I fully understand your concern.
▶ 1:28:31Got it. So then since you fully understand, I just want to ask you something very specific. Do you commit right here, right now in public to investigate and revoke any licenses that are not for humanitarian purposes, meaning food and medicine? What I can commit to you today, Congresswoman, is that export enforcement, the office of export enforcement of of export enforcement will investigate any and all violations of
▶ 1:29:00We have done the investigation. I am more than willing and I'm sure that the tax collector is more than willing to give you all the info, all the different companies that are doing this type of maneuvering because this is just trying to it's just a loophole in the law that we have allowed it for years. But this is this is it has to be humanitarian because that is the Trump policy. Humanitarian items to the island of Cuba.
▶ 1:29:29So do you commit to revoke those licenses if we provide to you all the documentation?
▶ 1:29:36What again I I think the I'm not trying to quibble with you with you congresswoman. I'll certainly take your call my your concerns back to my colleagues in export administration who are responsible for our licensing uh
▶ 1:29:48and when and a after that what happens you take it they review what happens
▶ 1:29:53again I I would be I I'd be uncomfortable to speak too much to their equities but they have the option to revoke existing they do they generally speaking have the option to revoke existing license
▶ 1:30:02who has the option to revoke who has
▶ 1:30:05it's within the uh export administration side of the bureau of industry
▶ 1:30:09and who heads that office.
▶ 1:30:11Uh we have an acting uh assistant secretary at the moment. We don't have a nominated and confirmed.
▶ 1:30:17So did you think that maybe the acting secretary could take this request that I am bringing to you and forewarn him what's happening inform what I just told you and I'll give you all the documentation the name and the companies. This is just a loophole.
▶ 1:30:33I will absolutely bring
▶ 1:30:35the United States is not in the business of sending Maseratis and Rollers to Cuba. I understand, Congresswoman. I'll certainly bring your concerns and any information you provide back to
▶ 1:30:44What is the name of the person that we need to talk to?
▶ 1:30:46The person that has the ability to revoke those licenses. What's his name?
▶ 1:30:50Again, we the under secretary for the Bureau of Industry and Security is, I assume you know, is Jeffrey Kesler since you wrote the uh since you wrote the
▶ 1:30:58Yeah. And so I, you know, I can work with him as the under secretary and
▶ 1:31:02please do so because we're going to be following up with you.
▶ 1:31:05Okay. Thank you. and and we're here to help you with any documentation, any research that the tax collector has done. And thank you for your time
▶ 1:31:12and for wanting to help us.
▶ 1:31:14I yield back.
▶ 1:31:15That gentle lady's time has expired and we'd like to welcome a guest of a member of the full committee uh representative from Rhode Island, Mr. Ramo, for 5
▶ 1:31:23Uh thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your accommodation today. Uh thank you, assistant secretary, for being here. As you know, the Bureau of Industry and Security ensures our most sensitive technologies uh stay out of the hands of adversaries and when necessary even from partners who may pose a risk. BIS uses export controls to protect advanced artificial intelligence systems, drone and missile detection technology and other advanced critical tools uh for our national security.
▶ 1:31:51But export controls only work if they're consistently enforced and if BIS has the resources, the staff, and the independence to do its job. Under President Trump, our export controls have been frankly inconsistent and politicized. I'm worried he's seeding ground to authoritarians who would use our technology against us. In January, BIS loosened export controls to allow China to purchase H200 chips.
▶ 1:32:15These chips have six times the processing power of those previously restricted and far beyond what China can currently produce on its own. Approving the export of these chips undermines our competitive advantage and national security in the AI arms race. Trump also approved advanced AI chips to Saudi Arabia and the UAE despite serious national security fears about their close ties to China. The timing raises even deeper alarms.
▶ 1:32:43Two weeks after special envoy Steve Wickoff's son announced a $2 billion cryptocurrency deal with the UAA investment fund, Trump granted the UAAE access to our advanced AI trips. We now know a UAE sovereign wealth fund made a $500 million deal with the Trump family to purchase a 49% stake in that same cryptocurrency company.
▶ 1:33:08These overlapping financial interests raise serious questions about how Trump is abusing our export controls and whether they are being used to enrich government officials and their families. So, Assistant Secretary Peters, are political staff rather than career experts now reviewing and approving export control licenses?
▶ 1:33:26Uh, thank you for your question, Congressman. I appreciate your interest in this area. Again, my as as I've stated several times, my role as the assistant secretary for export enforcement is to oversee the enforcement of uh enforcement with respect to potential violations of ECRA and the E. Uh how licenses are approved and the process incumbent they're an incumbent is the province of my colleagues in export administration. So I I would have to defer to them as to
▶ 1:33:55and do they consult with you or do you have any sort of visibility into their
▶ 1:34:01We provide information, you know, as you know on a case-by case basis that may be relevant to whether on whether to grant or deny uh license applications.
▶ 1:34:12Okay. So there is some visibility there into some of their activities.
▶ 1:34:16Again, we provide information as you know on a case by case
▶ 1:34:19and they may not use it is what you're saying. No, I'm not suggesting that at all. Uh, Congressman, I I think it is among the information that is relevant in my understanding is it is among the information that is relevant in arriving at a decision with respect to a license
▶ 1:34:33And do you feel like you're interacting with political or or career staff at at your engagement point?
▶ 1:34:39You know, BIS is comprised of some political staff and and mostly career staff, many of whom have years, if not decades of of relevant experience. Their sol their expertise is relied upon in my my observations particularly in export enforcement where which is my purview. We rely on uh career law enforcement officials, intelligence analysts um you know without regard to any political uh political persuasions.
▶ 1:35:09Okay. Well, I hope that limited number of political uh you know employees are actually not wielding the power that I believe they might be. Uh what procedures are in place to ensure that these approvals uh are being made without the influence of government officials who may have personal financial interests in in these deals.
▶ 1:35:31Again, Congressman, two two points. one, I I I disagree or I I take issue with the premise of the question that anybody in the Bureau of Industry and Security is acting in an inappropriate way. I've seen nothing to suggest that that is the case. Um, again, if you're if you're it sounds like your question is one of policy and process for license applications. And again, I would have to defer to my colleagues from export administration in that regard.
▶ 1:35:57Okay. Well, look, the the the premise of the question is is based on the fact that there are folks who are making money off of these deals, and it just so happens to be that they're related to officials in the administration. That may not be under your control directly, and I certainly won't lay that at your feet, but I will say that uh it is essential uh that we don't see the abundance of of corruption that the American people perceive is occurring.
▶ 1:36:23And so to all the officials who have a connection, we should look very clearly and they should know that we're looking. Uh we're they're uh certainly subject to uh our oversight and we have to ensure uh that there isn't any corrupt action taking place. And with that, I yield
▶ 1:36:42Gentleman's time has expired. Um it was my intention uh and we had some agreement to do a second round. Uh I may be the second round if that's okay with uh with you. Um want to ask uh about a recent investigation uh by the China Select Committee which revealed that Nvidia has engineers in China that work closely with Chinese AI labs like deepseek.
▶ 1:37:10uh these engineers uh can get indepth access to data centers and help troubleshoot deepseeeks AI model uh training runs. General prohibition 10 of the E prohibits companies from even facilitating another person's violation of US export controls. If DeepSEK is violating US export controls by using black wells to train their models as has been reported, are these NVIDIA engineers at significant risk of violating general prohibition number 10?
▶ 1:37:41Thank you for the question, Congressman. Again, I really appreciate uh your interest and the amount of work you've done uh to support us in this regard. I cannot speak and won't speak uh to any potential ongoing investigations or to hypothetical applications of of law of or the application of law to hypothetical facts. What I what I will say is that you know Nvidia is one of our most successful companies. You know we we
▶ 1:38:10I think we all celebrate that. We just want to make sure that everybody is adhering to the law.
▶ 1:38:15And and to that point, everybody who is in the export space is accountable to the prohibitions of ECRA and the E. We enforce any potential violation of that law and that and those regulations without regard to who the violator may be. If we we follow facts wherever they may lead.
▶ 1:38:39Um, one of the key roles that ex export enforcement plays is in conducting end use checks worldwide in which BIS ensures that technology that is sold goes to where it actually should be uh arriving. But China places major roadblocks to these enduse checks such as by requiring Beijing's preapproval before checks and by including PRC government officials uh to tag along on those checks. That's my understanding. Is that is that your understanding?
▶ 1:39:10The not unlike other countries, Congressman, in which we perform end use
▶ 1:39:16Um it is often the case that host nation law enforcement or host nation government representatives accompany ECOs on end use checks. And I'll and I'll just note that
▶ 1:39:26oftentimes that is to the benefit of the ECO in order to get in order to garner cooperation from the target of the end use check.
▶ 1:39:33Okay, great. as long as those uh those tag along agents are actually interested in uh in forcing that cooperation. That would be my observation. Um well the wait times my understanding is the wait times between US government's request for an enduse check and the PRC government's approval has some sometimes stretched well over a year if it has been approved at all.
▶ 1:40:00So, how many you started to address some of this how this works, but how many enduse checks did BIS conduct in China last year? And what do China's policies around end use checks tell us about what conditions we should put around our sales to China? Um, and finally, when was there a bilateral agree bilateral agreement between America and China that governs end use check uh end use check access
▶ 1:40:28Again, thank you for the question, Congressman. I don't have the exact number of end use checks uh performed in the in PRC in Hong Kong last year. I'm happy to take that question back and
▶ 1:40:38please I would expect an answer on that.
▶ 1:40:40Yeah. Um you know as and I want to make sure I'm answering. Could you please repeat the second part of your question?
▶ 1:40:46Sure. Uh so okay let's actually I want to start with the last part which was when was the bilateral agreement between America and China that governs end use checks access negotiated? the the last agreement that that I am aware of was from the previous administration um about the timing of scheduling end use checks and potential consequences for not scheduling them.
▶ 1:41:09What I will say on in that regard is I've seen no uh I've not received information that suggests that we are being frustrated in our ability to conduct end use checks in the PRC or anywhere else. If that exists, it would be certainly news to me and I'd be
▶ 1:41:25Does a year seem reasonable?
▶ 1:41:27I for
▶ 1:41:28No, Congressman, it doesn't. But my understanding is at present that's not the amount of time it's taking to schedule an end use check.
▶ 1:41:35So you you are are you asserting that this bilateral agreement solved some of those issues that were reported?
▶ 1:41:44What what I'm asserting whether or not it solved it is to to one side. What I'm saying is I've not seen I've not yet seen evidence or or been presented with a scenario where that much time has passed when we've requested an end use
▶ 1:42:03Um and one last question. Are you planning on doing an enduse check on
▶ 1:42:10Uh again, Congressman, I understand the interest. I I it would not be inappropriate of me to forecast in a public setting where and against whom we would do endies checks, but I'm happy to happy to work with your office and provide information as requested.
▶ 1:42:25Uh that would be appreciated and I'd like to have a better understanding of the bilateral agreement. Um if we could get together on that because I want to make sure that hypothetical whoever you may be requesting uh that enduse check on that it's done in a timely manner. a year does not seem like a timely manner in my mind. Uh my time has expired and uh again I do want to say thank you. We deeply appreciate your time, your effort.
▶ 1:42:52We know as a former staffer myself, I know that uh voluminous book in front of you just didn't appear. Uh unless it was AI generated, I'll let others uh address that or not. Staff are shaking their head. No, it's not. Uh as I know it wasn't. Um but I just want to say thank you. Uh we we do appreciate your valuable testimony and to the members for their questions. Um the members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions or follow-up questions. You've heard some from uh Congresswoman Salazar and and others.
▶ 1:43:22Uh we will ask you to respond to those in writing. Uh pursuant to committee rules, all members have five days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record subject to the length limitations. And without objection, the committee stands