▶ 0:44:16Okay, today's hearing will come to It's good to see you there, Mr. Bolton. Good afternoon and welcome to the strategic forces subcommittee's first hearing of the 2027 fiscal year posture season. I am filling in for the chair uh who's still in transit trying to get here, but I am proud to be a part of this uh committee. First, I want to welcome all the members back to the best subcommittee here on the House Armed Service Committee with maybe the exception of cyber.
▶ 0:44:42They have a little bit better chairman on the cyber subcommittee. I look forward to working with you all again as we build the National Defense Authorization Act. As you sit here today, the Joint Force is conducting operations in the Middle East against the Iranian threat. We do not take for granted the sacrifices of our men and women in uniform. And that is why it is more important than ever that we make sure they have the best or have what they need and when they need it. I'd like to thank our witnesses for appearing before us today. With us, we have Mr. Mark Burkowitz, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, and Dr.
▶ 0:45:12Robert Kick, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical and Biological Defense, someone who I've worked with uh extensively over the last few years. General Steven Whiting, commander of the US Space General Greg Gregory Guio, who at one time commanded the best wing in the Air Force, uh, commander US now commander of the US Northern Command, and Admiral Richard Carell, commander of US strategic command at one of the best BA the best base in America right there at Offet Gerald Whiting and Gerald Guio.
▶ 0:45:40It's good to see you again and special welcome to Admiral Carell, Mr. Burkwitz, Dr. Cadillac in their first appearance for the subcommittee. As you await the president's budget request for the upcoming fiscal year, we look forward to hearing from each of you about the complex threats you are seeing in your areas of responsibility and the capabilities you need to address them. Space plays a vital role in everything the joint force does, and it's more apparent now than ever. GPS jamming has become a common occurrence in every recent conflict from Ukraine to now as we've seen in Iran.
▶ 0:46:10How we fight and posture our space assets is central to the success of the success of the mission both here and abroad at defense of the homeland. Joe Whiting, I look forward to hearing from you from you how this increasingly threatened space domain is factored to your plans to both support the joint force but also break red kill chains.
▶ 0:46:28I was happy to see the administration's national defense strategy recognize that nuclear threats are growing, particularly with China's rapid nuclear buildup and emphasize the need for a robust and modern nuclear However, while our strategy may recognize that threats have changed, we continue to field a deterrent designed for a bio a bipolar nuclear world and to pursue a modernization plan that was developed nearly a decade before China's nuclear breakout began. Dr.
▶ 0:46:54Cadillac and Admiral Carell, I look forward to hearing from you about what changes are needed to adapt to the current threat environment and what additional capabilities are necessary to prevent deterrence gaps. Joe Guio, as the war fighter responsible for homeland defense, you stand at the intersection of all the subcommittee's mission areas, nuclear deterrence, space operations, and missile defense.
▶ 0:47:13While many of us continue to have questions about how the Golden Dome architecture will address your needs for domain awareness, defense capabilities, I know General Gutland is working hard to finalize the plan, and there's only such so so such such only so so much can we discuss at this time. With that, I'll turn it over to the ranking member Molton for any remarks you'd like to make.
▶ 0:47:35Thank you very much, uh, Mr. Chairman. I I had all these nice things I was going to say about the rear a real chairman. Have to take a look and see if, uh, well, actually, they apply even more so to you. So, thank you very much for your partnership, longtime partnership on this on this committee. We're going to miss you.
▶ 0:47:51Thank you.
▶ 0:47:53I also want to welcome our witnesses and thank you for your continued service to our country. It's a difficult time. We seem to have a new war every few weeks. Uh but before we begin, I want to take a moment to especially welcome Admiral Carell, Dr. Cadik, and Mr. Burkowitz on the subcommittee as this is our final hearing with you. Get that right.
▶ 0:48:13first hearing with you. Did not get it The policy and programmatic issues in front of us are some of the most consequential that we face as a nation and we must continue to work together to ensure the department is a good steward of the taxpayers's money but also because the world we will leave our children depends on it. I also would like to thank General Guo as this will be his final posture hearing in front of this committee.
▶ 0:48:41I have always appreciated your thoughtful and measured approach uh as head of Northcom and NORAD and your leadership there will be The responsibilities of this committee encompassing our space, missile defenses and nuclear forces form the foundation of security in America. So the issues before us should be debated rigorously and honestly. On that count, I'm going to be blunt speaking not just as a senior member of this committee, but as a for veteran of a misguided war in the Middle East.
▶ 0:49:09We simply cannot ignore the fact that as we sit here today, America is more at risk than we were before the Iran war began, both in the Middle East and here at home. We should all hope for a miracle, but miracles are not strategies, and it's very difficult to see our way forward right now. Since taking office 14 months ago, the so-called president of peace has attacked seven countries and through these conflicts of choice has expended scarce munitions and emboldened both RH Russia Russia and China.
▶ 0:49:40He has sought regime change in both Venezuela and Iran and failed twice. Maduro's regime is now headed by his vice president. In Iran, we've succeeded in replacing an 86-year-old in failing health with his son in his 50s. And in case you wondered whether he was more or less hardline, we killed his wife and his son.
▶ 0:49:59It's hard to imagine a better way to turn the pro-American Iranian people against us than raining down bombs from the sky and killing at least 187 innocent civilians, most of them little school girls. But Trump did find a better way, doing it with the Israelis. And now implausibly with the straight of Hormuz closed and oil prices skyrocketing, Trump is actually losing the war.
▶ 0:50:27He has kicked a hornet's nest and gotten his floorshime foot stuck in it. Russia is happily helping Iran target American troops. Some Democrats criticized Trump for enforcing oil sanctions on the high seas. I did not. I said it was long overdue, especially against Russia's so-called dark fleet. But now, as if to thank the Russians for targeting Americans, Trump is rewarding Putin by lifting the oil sanctions and giving him more money to fight Ukraine and build out its nuclear arsenal.
▶ 0:50:56I can't imagine what our troops who risk their lives to board those ships a few weeks ago are thinking now, except that I can imagine what they're thinking because I lived through similar hairbrain decisions in Iraq. The president is now appealing to both China and Russia for help. That's how bad it is. You can't make this up. And yet it's no fairy tale.
▶ 0:51:16The cost is paid in the lives of brave young Americans willing to serve as the president was not, as well as by children and innocent Against this back of self-inflicted geopolitical idiocy, the mission we are discussing in this hearing is increasingly important. It represents the backs stop against our worst day.
▶ 0:51:36Even as the threat is growing in scope, importance, and urgency, the Chinese Communist Party's ICBM fleet continues to exceed US intelligence estimates, and they have deployed several hypersonic weapons that can carry nuclear weapons, warheads. Russia has developed a treaty violating space-based nuclear weapon that would destroy nearly all the satellites we rely on for GPS and communications every day. And again, as a reminder, we're lifting sanctions on Russia, the only country with the capability to completely destroy the United States.
▶ 0:52:06Last year, I spoke at a defense conference about how dangerous the president's golden dome idea is for strategic deterrence, instigating an arms race where our adversaries develop weapons to get around it. When I came off the stage, my team told me that the senior Republican speaking after me had just asked his staff to ask Chat GPT why Golden Dome is good. Again, you can't make this up.
▶ 0:52:31I don't know if Chat GPT has come up with a better answer yet or not, but I do know that the Russians are developing multiple weapon systems to attack the US that will be not that will not be defended effectively by Golden Dome years before we will ever see anything fielded. I don't never before has Congress spent so much money on something so ineffective with no strategy whatsoever. Though I guess the Iran war could give Golden Dome a run for that record. Now for the first time since the Cold War, we are living in a world with no agreement to constrain nuclear weapons.
▶ 0:53:01And that is to our disadvantage because to be clear, our adversaries have and are building more than we are. I don't know if that's the art of the deal or not. With everything going wrong in the Middle East, it's easy to lose focus on America's strategic defense. But it remains the bedrock of our national security and must remain a top priority. Even the right weapons with the wrong policy can be destabilizing, weakening our national security. We need strength, not chaos. We need weapons to deter our enemies, not recruit more.
▶ 0:53:31We need defenses that work to defend the country, not bankrupt us. And we need leaders focused on reducing the need for nuclear weapons, not spoking bestow stoking an arms race for even more. I look forward to working closely with the members of the subcommittee and our witnesses to make America stronger and more secure. We often say that our nuclear arsenal must be safe, secure, and reliable. Our country should be the same. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
▶ 0:53:58We'll now move to opening statements from our witnesses. I would note that your prepared comments or statements will be made part of the record, but you'll have each five minutes to make some opening remarks. Mr. Burkowitz, let's begin with you. Oh, thank you. Uh, Chairman Dejar, Ranking Member Molton, uh, and distinguished members of the committee, Congressman Bolton.
▶ 0:54:23Um, thank you for the opportunity to testify, uh, about the department's, uh, space and missile defense posture. It's an honor to appear alongside my colleagues, Assistant Secretary Catlick, Admiral Carell, General Whiting, and General Guio. America faces intensifying strategic competition in the security environment. Outer space is an increasingly complex and contested warf fighting domain.
▶ 0:54:46Competitors have fielded and operate sophisticated arsenals of space, missile, and integrated air and missile defense systems. Indeed, as Secretary of War Hegsath has stated, space is the most important domain of warfare. The fight for space is a fight for the future of the world as we know it. President Trump is restoring American strength to meet these challenges.
▶ 0:55:10To secure peace, he issued an executive order which prioritizes the defense of US vital interests to, in, and from space by ensuring America's space superiority. The president also issued an executive order to field and operate the Golden Dome for America, a comprehensive next generation defense against the most catastrophic threats facing the United States. The Golden Dome will protect our homeland, citizens, critical infrastructure, and second strike capability.
▶ 0:55:41Space and missile defense forces are central to US strategy. They help to ensure America has the world's most powerful, lethal, and advanced military to protect our interests, deter wars, and if necessary, win them quickly and decisively. Access to and use of space is a US vital interest because of its overriding importance to our security and economic prosperity.
▶ 0:56:04Space systems contribute to all elements of America's national power and we will secure and defend our interests to in and from space. Space assets enable strategic deterrence. They provide domain awareness, including access to denied and hostile territory, indications and warning, launch detection, command control and communications, detonation detection, and attack assessment. The president's Golden Dome initiative is the cornerstone of our homeland defense posture.
▶ 0:56:34It's a necessary and pragmatic response to the growing threat posed by ballistic, hypersonic, and advanced cruise missiles, as well as other next generation weapons. The Golden Dome will complement our nuclear deterrent. Today, our capability to defend the nation is limited and its effectiveness is eroding against increasingly advanced threats. The Golden Dome will rectify this by creating a layered defense and depth of the United States.
▶ 0:57:01Combined with the prospect of US retaliation, it will strengthen deterrence by denying adversaries to pre to achieve their objectives through coercion or aggression. Moreover, the Golden Dome will save lives and limit jam damage should deterrence break down. China is our pacing competitor. We will deter China from a position of strength, not confrontation with the denial defense along the First Island chain.
▶ 0:57:28Space and missile defense capabilities are essential to this effort because they enable the intelligence, command and control, and other warfighting functions needed to project power effectively across the Indo-Pacific region. Our global alliances will remain a strategic advantage if our allies and partners invest properly in the in their defense.
▶ 0:57:49The department will continue to pursue opportunities for space and missile defense cooperation to increase burden sharing capacity and We are also supercharging the US defense industrial base by cutting bureaucratic red tape, empowering program leaders to take calculated risks and leveraging private sector innovation. We must accelerate the delivery of critical space and missile defense capabilities at scale.
▶ 0:58:14In closing, with the continued support of Congress, the War Department will invest in the space and missile defense posture necessary to achieve peace through strength. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
▶ 0:58:26Thank you.
▶ 0:58:30Dr. Codick,
▶ 0:58:33thank you, Chairman uh Dejarlay and Ranking Member Molton, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on our nation's strategic posture. US strategy is at a critical inflection point. China's strategic nuclear breakout means we now face the unprecedented challenge of deterring two nuclear peers. This is not a distant problem. It's a central organizing challenge for our defense defense strategy today. Compounding this external pressure are two additional factors.
▶ 0:59:03immense budgetary, industrial and programmatic strains of mo modernizing at once the three legs of our nuclear triad and its command and control and the expiration of the New START treaty this past February. We must be cleareyed about these threats we face. China is engaged in the most rapid and opaque nuclear expansion in its history.
▶ 0:59:26This nuclear buildup is coupled with a massive investment in theater range delivery systems designed to hold US forces, allies, and partners at risk in the A force of this size and sophistication provides China with a spectrum of nuclear options to try to deter US invent intervention and coers a resolution of a conflict on China's terms.
▶ 0:59:50Russia fields the world's largest arsenal and retains a doctrine that explicitly integrates nuclear weapons for regional coercion. Its ongoing modernization and development of novel systems like Poseidon Skyfall cruise missile underscore its continued reliance on nuclear forces to offset conventional weaknesses. The 2026 National Defense Strategy correctly identifies this new and more dangerous environment. to support that strategy.
▶ 1:00:17The reality is that our nuclear posture must be a credible backs stop to our denial strategy, not a substitute for it. In Asia, this means wielding a conventional force alongside our allies and partners capable of defeating a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
▶ 1:00:34The role of our nuclear arsenal in this context is not to fight and win a nuclear war, but to deter China escalating to nuclear use in the first place or from believing it can use its nuclear arsenal to coers us into accepting a fyakam plea. Our nuclear forces must provide the president with credible options to manage escalation, demonstrating that any nuclear use will be met with a response that leaves the adversary worse off.
▶ 1:01:02This requires a flexible and modern nuclear posture. A solvent defense strategy also requires our allies and partners to carry their fair share of the conventional burden. US nuclear extended deterrence is a powerful enabler of this, providing our allies in both Europe, Europe, and in the Indo Pacific region the critical security backs stop they need to invest in their own conventional denial We must now plan for the real possibility
▶ 1:01:33of coordinated and or opportunistic aggression across multiple theaters. Our force structure, posture, and nuclear strategy must be robust enough to deter both peers simultaneously. Even if we were to be engaged in a major conventional conflict with one, this does not mean we must match their combined arsenals warhead for warhead.
▶ 1:01:57It means we require a nuclear force sufficient to inflict unacceptable costs on both adversaries under any contingency either ensuring that neither believes that they can exploit a crisis elsewhere for their own gain. To execute this strategy, our modernization programs are an urgent necessity. The transition from our legacy systems to a modernized triad occurs during a period of maximum geopolitical risk. There is no room for error.
▶ 1:02:26We must fully fund and where possible accelerate the Sentinel ICBM, the Colombia class submarine, the B-21 bomber and the LRSO cruise missile. Critically, we must feel also field theater range nuclear options. Slickum N is one example. It is essential and a vital tool for managing escalation in a conflict with a peer competitor. We're entering in a into a new, more dangerous era.
▶ 1:02:53The luxury assuming a single major adversary is gone. The cost of modernizing our nuclear deterrent is significant, but the cost of failing to do so is immeasurably greater. Congress's continued support is essential to ensure we have the deterrent we need to preserve peace, protect our nation, and our freedom. Thank you, and I look forward to your
▶ 1:03:20Thank you, Dr. General Whiting, you're
▶ 1:03:24Chairman Deser Lelay, Ranking Member Molton, and distinguished members of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. It's an honor for Sergeant Major Stackpole and me to appear before you today alongside Assistant Secretary Burkowitz, Assistant Secretary Cadlck, General Guio, and Chief Master Sergeant Storms, and Admiral Carell and Command Sergeant Major Nelman. And I'm privileged to testify before this subcommittee for a third time as the commander of US space command representing the men and women who work tirelessly to ensure the United States maintains our dominance in space.
▶ 1:03:53US Space Command's area of responsibility is the ultimate high ground from which we provide critical capabilities and overwatch that enhance joint force lethality. In space, we also protect American interests from the threats now arrayed against our space systems to include our opponents capabilities that allow them to conduct space enabled attacks.
▶ 1:04:12Thanks to the steadfast support of Congress, US space capabilities ranging from precision navigation and global communications to missile warning and real-time intelligence provide the joint force with unmatched precision, accuracy, reach, and lethality. We saw the joint forc's unmatched integration of multi-dommain capabilities in operation midnight hammer, operation absolute resolve, and more recently operation epic fury during which space effects were critical to mission success.
▶ 1:04:41As the chairman of the joint chiefs recently highlighted, space and cyber forces were the first movers, employing layered non-kinetic effects to enable freedom of maneuver for the joint force. General Kane's remarks underscore the importance of achieving and maintaining space superiority, not only to safeguard the systems essential for precision strike, missile warning and tracking, and secure communications, but also to provide overwatch for terrestrial forces operating in harm's way.
▶ 1:05:10Should an adversary degrade or destroy our space capabilities, the joint force's ability to fight as it is sized and designed would be immediately and materially impacted. At US Space Command, we command and control offensive and defensive space capabilities provided by the military services to conduct operations that set favorable conditions for our joint warf fighters.
▶ 1:05:32This operational imperative aligns with Secretary Heget observation during his Arsenal of freedom tour that quote space is the ultimate high ground and we must deliver supporting fires from our position of advantage to cover our maneuver forces unquote. Make no mistake, our opponents are moving at an alarming pace, developing and deploying capabilities to deny us the use of space.
▶ 1:05:54China has integrated space enabled effects across its forces to make them more lethal, precise, and far-ranging while fielding weapons purpose-built to outmaneuver and destroy our satellites. At the same time, Russia continues to demonstrate capabilities designed to disrupt our assets, including the potential placement of a nuclear weapon on orbit, the single greatest threat to our space architecture. These developments threaten our joint force in every domain.
▶ 1:06:20Since the control of space shapes outcomes on land, at sea, in the air, and in cyerspace, to ensure US Space Command can deter conflict and maintain dominance in space, we request continue congressional support of our key fiscal year 2027 priorities.
▶ 1:06:37This includes fielding integrated space fires, active protection of our high-valued satellites, enhancing our battle space awareness, building an integrated command and control system, sustaining our forces freedom to maneuver, and providing sufficient cyber defenses for our space enterprise. We thank Congress for its support this past year, which has enabled us to begin the disciplined transition to our permanent headquarters at Redstone Arsenal, as directed by the president.
▶ 1:07:04To guarantee mission continuity, we are executing a phased relocation, operating from interim facilities while a new purpose-built command and control facility is constructed. Our people are central to this effort, and we are using retention and relocation incentives to keep our mission critical talent throughout the move. Your continued support and authorizations for FY2026 and 27 are essential to accelerate the completion of this modern headquarters and ensure our uninterrupted readiness.
▶ 1:07:32With the continued support of Congress, US Space Command will remain prepared to address the evolving threat landscape, deter aggression, counter adversary actions, and safeguard America's interests in space today and for generations to come. Armed conflict in space is not inevitable, but should deterrence fail, the integrated space power of our team will provide a decisive advantage. Thank you for your steadfast leadership and unwavering support to our mission. And Mr. Mr. Chairman, my posture statement has been submitted for the record and I look forward to answering your questions.
▶ 1:08:03Thank you, General Whiting. Uh, General Guillo, you are recognized.
▶ 1:08:08Good afternoon, Chairman Digger, the ranking member Molton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I thank you for the opportunity to appear today along with my teammates to the left and right and represent the dedicated and disciplined men and women of the United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.
▶ 1:08:27As the strategic environment has grown more complex, NORAD and US Northcom have responded by fundamentally transforming both commands, taking on new missions, and rapidly implementing innovative approaches to safeguard North America. from intercepting long-range bombers off the coasts of Alaska and Canada, tracking advanced maritime platforms in the approaches to North America, or standing ready to defend against long-range missile attacks. NORAD and US Northcom remain vigilant, capable, and committed.
▶ 1:08:56The commands have undertaken several initiatives over the last year to build on our preparedness to respond to any threat, including two that are particularly relevant to this subcommittee. In January 2026, US Northcom activated Joint Task Force Gold to serve as the operational arm for future layered defense system provided by Golden Dome for America.
▶ 1:09:17And US Northcom developed a rapidly deployable counter small UA flyaway kit to defend military installations and critical infrastructure through exercises like Falcon Peak. We are also accelerating the development of new counter UAS technologies and partnerships with GIATA 401 and industry. NORAD and US Northcom continue to pursue critical investments in modernized domain awareness systems and defensive capabilities to meet the challenges of tomorrow.
▶ 1:09:45The ability to detect, track, and discriminate threats from the seafloor to space is critical, and I remain grateful for the subcommittee's ongoing support for space-based airborne moving target indicator, over the horizon radar, airborne early warning, and integrated undersea surveillance systems. The men and women of US Northcom NORAD have embraced these new challenges and are unwavering in our no-fale mission. disciplined defense of our homelands in all domains from all avenues of approach against all those who intend us harm.
▶ 1:10:16We appreciate the stead excuse me steadfast support of this committee and I look forward to your questions. We have the
▶ 1:10:23Thank you General Guio. Admiral Carell, you're recognized.
▶ 1:10:28Good afternoon, Chairman Dejle, Ranking Member Molton, and distinguished members of the committee. Command Sergeant Major Nman and I are honored to appear before you today alongside General Whiting, General Guo, Assistant Secretary Burkowitz, and Assistant Secretary Kadlick. Before I begin begin my prepared remarks, I'd like to take a moment to honor our fallen US service members. The joint force is eternally grateful to those that paid the ultimate service price in service to our country.
▶ 1:10:58This is my first time addressing this committee as commander of US strategic command and I want to express my gratitude for the committee's steadfast support. Your commitment to providing the resources necessary for us to execute our mission during this critical bi-generational period of modernization and recapitalization is deeply appreciated. I also extend my sincere thanks to the American people. Their unwavering support enables us to remain the most advanced, lethal, and credible fighting force in the world.
▶ 1:11:29Our nuclear forces, the foundation of our national security, are safe, secure, effective, and credible. My confidence does not come solely from our combat capabilities, but from the professionals at US Strategic Command, the very essence of our credibility. As I testify before you today, Stratcom and its components stand ready, not seeking out confrontation, but deterring strategic attack and underpinning all Department of War operational plans.
▶ 1:11:58The strategic capabilities provided by each leg of the triad, coupled with assured nuclear command, control, and communications or NC3 systems, underpin everything the department does in defense of our nation and American interests abroad. Our fundamental challenge, one that we successfully face each and every day, is to deter great power conflict and to deter multiple nuclear competitors while simultaneously adapting to dramatic technological change.
▶ 1:12:26This change is most evident in five evolving threat vectors. Cyber counter US space capabilities, a contested electromagnetic spectrum, novel missile systems, and supply chain challenges. Adapting to this changing environment requires constant vigilance, sustainment, and modernization of our strategic forces.
▶ 1:12:48As we bring the B-21 bomber, the Colombia class submarine, and the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile system online, we will continue to ensure the credibility of our deterrence for decades to come. Thank you again for your support and trust in the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, and civilian professionals that comprise US strategic command and for dedicating your time and effort to our mission and portfolio. I look forward to your questions.
▶ 1:13:16Thank you, Admiral. Uh I will now uh yield to myself for uh questions. Dr. Cadlick, I'd like to start with you. Our nuclear strategy from the Cold War to the present has been remarkably consistent. Bad policy ideas such as countervalue targeting or no first use policy have been rejected by presidents on both sides of the aisle and remain completely inconsistent with the threats we see today. As I mentioned, as doc Dr.
▶ 1:13:43or General uh Bacon mentioned in my opening statement, um I think the main question is whether we have sufficient capabilities to achieve our strategy in the new threat environment we face. I understand that the department will not be conducting a formal NPR, but can you talk about uh the follow-on work you will be doing to look at this question?
▶ 1:14:06Well, thank you for the question, sir. And I just want to make sure that you understand that what uh we decided in the department and this is uh under secretary Kby working with Admiral Carell is to do a nuclear strategy review which is really looking at some very specific issues as it relates to the two-pier problem and that is the pace of modernization and sufficiency of what we have already in the programs of record.
▶ 1:14:31We have we're going to be taking a look at the theater nuclear forces issue as well uh and and also other factors that have been identified in the uh national defense strategy. All of this is to come come back uh to to the president and uh I think to the congress to identify those things where there there may need to be some changes or additions made.
▶ 1:14:55uh in previous conversations uh people have asked about numbers and I think this is the first opportunity to really evaluate the threat in a way that it's real and tangible uh with the commander of stratcom uh uh to to actually see what we will need to have going forward and again that will identify areas for uh maybe expansion uh but I will just pause and and remember remind you of the strategic posture commission's findings is that what we have as far 's program of records
▶ 1:15:26is necessary but not sufficient to deal with the two-pier
▶ 1:15:31Okay. Thank you. Uh Mr. Burkowitz, the space domain faces similar challenges. Our adversaries are moving rapidly to counter our space capabilities and deploy their own and I don't think the previous administration responded sufficiently. I was disappointed that the national defense strategy had no discussion of space which doesn't seem to reflect the president's long-standing uh prioritization of this domain with the creation of space force.
▶ 1:15:57How is the policy team working to set a strategy for space and align budgets to meet our
▶ 1:16:05Thank you for the question, chairman. space is absolutely essential to the uh security and defense of the United States. Uh, the president's executive order on ensuring American space superiority states very clearly that the defense department uh will take all the steps necessary to be able to detect, characterize, and counter threats uh to our interests both from uh very low earth orbit all the way to cis lunar space including the placement of a nuclear weapon in orbit.
▶ 1:16:35Um, consistent with uh the president's direction, the national defense strategies top two priorities, the defense of the homeland and our ability to deter China in the Indopacific region uh are are fundamentally enabled by our space capabilities. And I look forward to the uh to the classified session so we can get into uh the details of of of what we're planning on doing there.
▶ 1:16:59Okay, sounds good. Uh, Admiral Carell, your predecessor strongly supported the slick amend program. Do you also agree this capability is extremely important? I do, ranking member uh dejalay. It's uh it's very important to address the deterrence challenge in front of us.
▶ 1:17:16from my perspective where the adversary is developing and fielding a range of theater nuclear capabilities and uh so our ability to have a capability that raises the uh the threshold or decision calculus for the adversary for theater nuclear weapons is important.
▶ 1:17:35Okay. And I know we can talk about this a little more in the classified session as well. Um Dr. Codlick, when we talk about nuclear modernization, we typically think about the major acquisition programs to recapitalize our triad like Sentinel or Colombia or our efforts to rebuild our production complex. While these programs are foundational to the future of our deterrent, they take decades to execute and cannot pace the dynamic security environment.
▶ 1:18:01uh can you talk about the importance of investing in tailored supplemental capabilities that can rapidly uh are be rapidly developed to complement the major modernization
▶ 1:18:12Well, thank you Mr. Chairman again for that question. The the whole intent here and there is efforts underway in the classified setting. we can talk a little bit more about them particularly in the areas of theater nuclear forces that would represent some of our efforts to kind of get to capabilities that would be using the existing stockpile and existing platforms that are available to expand our capabilities rapidly.
▶ 1:18:36Okay, my time's just about expired, but Admiral Carell, from a threat perspective, do you believe this is necessary? And can you also discuss how Stratcom is working with Dr. Cadlick and the Nuclear Weapons Council to put this approach into practice? Yes, Chairman Desire. Uh we're working very closely with uh with [snorts] um Mr. Cadlick and his team on the capabilities and prioritization of those capabilities and uh we can discuss that more in a classified setting.
▶ 1:19:04And don't worry, Generals, I got questions for you in the classified setting. I'll yield to my good friend and ranking member uh Seth Molton for
▶ 1:19:12Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Um I thought the chairman asked a great question uh to you, Mr. Burkwitz about the prioritization of of space strategy which we've heard from the president is important and yet that's not reflected in the budget. I mean you can they say you can judge values by the budget and the national defensive strategy strategy of course as well both the unclassified and the classified versions are completely silent on space.
▶ 1:19:37Um, can you elaborate on why that is and what you're doing to rectify given that given the fact that we're spending billions of dollars on something the department can't even prioritize in the only strategy document that they have delivered to Congress thus far?
▶ 1:19:56Well, I appreciate the opportunity to uh to uh correct the mischaracterization. Uh in fact the national defense strategies classified uh report uh addresses space uh can say uh in addition is that um the inter agency is in the process of conducting a broad range of activities to implement the president's executive order on ensuring American space superiority.
▶ 1:20:23Uh part of that effort includes developing a new national security strategy uh for space security. Um as part of that we will be uh that will be used to drive an architecture as well as a technology roadmap uh that will be reflected in the president's forthcoming budget request.
▶ 1:20:44We look forward we look forward to seeing it. I mean you have a subcommittee here that recognizes this is important and would very much like to invest in capabilities and we'd love to see the prioritization you know commensurate with what we saw from previous administrations including the first Trump administration. I'm not sure how you rank Venezuela in space, but to me, space is much more In the national defense strategy, the department supposes uh to deal with si simultaneity via burden sharing amongst allies.
▶ 1:21:12It's been the country's position for many years across decades, in fact, that global proliferation of nuclear weapons, even if amongst allies, is inherently destabilizing. It's hard not to correlate France's recent announcement to increase their nuclear weapons arsenal as not directly tied to President Trump's continued bashing of our European allies and questioning America's commitment to NATO. Dr. Cadlick, can you please elaborate on how the department views burden sharing with regards to nuclear weapons?
▶ 1:21:45Ranking member Molton, thank you for the question. And I would just uh offer you the insights from under secretary KBY who recognize that proliferation even within our allies is not something that we would accept or or find beneficial. And so I think from the standpoint of France, they have an independent nuclear force that operates independently of NATO and and I think that's their choice to make.
▶ 1:22:09But as far as NATO members, I think uh Under Secretary KBY is on the record, whether it's in this chamber or in the Senate, saying very specifically about that that it's not beneficial.
▶ 1:22:20So, is there anything that that the Secretary or the Department of Defense that intends to do to alleviate France's concerns about our reliability in defending NATO so that they do not expand their arsenal?
▶ 1:22:33Well, I think we've already done it and uh under secretary uh Colby again is on the record publicly in the Munich conference and during his visit to NATO to say unequivocally America extends its uh extended deterrence uh capabilities uh to NATO and to the Indoacific region.
▶ 1:22:51Well, that's great that he said it, but the reality that's transpiring is quite different. Well, sir, I think the reality is that we have aircraft, F-35s that are stationed in Europe and we have dual capable aircraft and we have nuclear weapons stored in Europe and I think that's a pretty pretty loud statement in terms of what our what our policy is and what our capabilities are.
▶ 1:23:13Uh, President Mcron's statement was pretty loud as well and I think we ignore it at our peril. Um, Dr. Dr. Look, I was uh pleased to hear you talk about the challenges of dealing with two near-per adversaries. Some might call this the three-body problem as opposed to the two-body problem and the the mathematical challenges that that presents. Uh I know General Cotton was pursuing this uh both within the Pentagon but also within uh academia.
▶ 1:23:44Uh I I asked uh I got the chance to talk to Admiral Carell about this. Uh would either of you like to comment on how you continue intend to continue General Cotton's work and get us a better answer here in Congress uh than uh as the um the distinguished uh gentleman from from Omaha said in the uh gentleman from Tennessee's opening statement, we don't have good numbers here.
▶ 1:24:09They're really outdated and we want to be good stewards of the taxpayer dollars to get what we need for our fundamental strategic stability. Uh yes uh uh ranking member Molton um the uh the work that John Cotton has done forms the basis of the starting point for the strategy discussion and the ongoing work in terms of um force sufficiency for our nuclear forces
▶ 1:24:40to address that challenge. back now. Recognize the gentleman from Omaha, General Bacon.
▶ 1:24:51Thank you, U Mr. Chairman. My first question, well, I have three questions, but I just want to make a comment. Mr. Burkowitz, I appreciate what you were saying about missile defense. I couldn't imagine having this fight right now in the Middle East. Without it, cities are being targeted. We see it also in Ukraine. This isn't going to go away. And leaving America undefended is not not an option. So, I appreciate your comments. My first question is to Admiral Carell. We're hearing now that maybe 150 B21 bombers is the target area.
▶ 1:25:20I'd like you to maybe comment on that. What is the Stratcom numbers? Are we building the infrastructure to support that?
▶ 1:25:29Yes, Representative Bacon. Uh uh Stratcom has uh John Cotton has uh gone on the record and said based on our analysis for our portfolio of capabilities and the bomber leg of the triad that uh 145 is the number um you know from a stratcom perspective. There's ongoing work within the within the joint force to determine what that endpoint might be.
▶ 1:25:54And there are of course investments that have been made to uh uh increase uh the production rate and to potentially open a second production line. That decision has yet to be made, but clearly the B-21 represents a really significant capability both from a conventional and a nuclear perspective for the joint force.
▶ 1:26:16It's a sixth generation stealth capability with standin or standoff precision distance strike or standin precision strike and the ability to maneuver within a contested electromagnetic spectrum. So what it enables for the joint force goes beyond you know the strike capability associated with it. It's an important capability for the joint force. I sure hope we accomplish this because I know what we said about the B2. We ended up with about it's currently 19.
▶ 1:26:46I think 145 is uh the number we should be aiming for. Um Dr. Cadillac, I'd like to talk about electronic warfare. I am an electronic warfare officer uh by trade. The Paycom and Air Combat Command say they need 22 EA37s. If it wasn't for Congress, we'd be at six. Uh coming out of this committee or or the H the Armed Services Committee, we've been able to fund four more. I think we have enough money for two more, but I'm not too sure if the if the department's going to fund 11 and 12 yet.
▶ 1:27:16So, I'd like to ask are what's the plans from the department on aircraft 11 and 12 and is the target 22?
▶ 1:27:24Uh, sir, I can't talk about what's in the budget, but I would love to provide you with that uh briefing on where we are and where we need to be. And I do believe that in terms of what the Indopaccom commander needs is a very important factor in what we purchase and what we supply to the war fighter.
▶ 1:27:42I think the all the services and the war fighters like it. The A37 has significant capabilities way beyond uh the old EC130 platform. And but I would tell you if if it wasn't for Congress, we'd be at six right now. And that concerns me. We it's been Congress pushing the department to fund uh this platform. And so my confidence has always been a little shaky on are we going to get to the numbers that our war fighters say they need.
▶ 1:28:08And my last question deals with nuclear command control uh survivability really for Dr. Cadillac but maybe Admiral Carell would like to comment as well. You know we Stratcom, Pentagon, White House Peterson Air Force Base, we can all get hit in 15 minutes with hypersonic weapons. I'd like to know what is the plan for the Looking Glass mission one, but two, isn't it beyond time that we have a 24-hour airborne alert again like we did for 29 years?
▶ 1:28:37Because I don't think we can dependably have survivable command and control without an airborne 24-hour a day alert or something comparative on the ground. And right now, I think we're leaving ourselves vulnerable and it makes me concerned. Dr. Killac.
▶ 1:28:52Well, sir, I I do agree with you that uh NC3 nuclear command and control is probably the the king jewel in our crown of our nuclear deterrence and and certainly the ability to ensure the ability to provide uh you know detection uh decision space for the president and direction of our forces is critical and whether that takes air or land or both.
▶ 1:29:15Uh I do know that during my recent trip to Omaha, I saw one leg of that uh and again uh very impressed with the uh development of technologies and I do know that the looking glass next is part of the plan. So I'll defer to Admiral Carell to offer some more specifics as to timing.
▶ 1:29:34I know you got short time but please uh thanks Dr. Cadlick and uh Congressman Bacon and I appreciate the r robust discussion that we had on this issue in uh in uh in your office in our office call. Um I would just reiterate what I've said uh previously and that we've got to with assured command and control both both for conventional and especially for nuclear capabilities.
▶ 1:29:58We've got to account for those five threat vectors and where we don't have the strategic warning that we feel we need then we need to complicate the adversar's targeting problem associated with that. And so uh you know mobile distributed capability is uh is what our uh uh trade space study with associated with future command and control architecture indicates and uh you know it is likely to be a mixture of air and terrestrial mobile capability.
▶ 1:30:27I'll yield it back to the chairman but I just think to the chairman and the ranking member this is something that we can really work on in this NDAA. Thank
▶ 1:30:35Thank you general. Uh chair now yields to the distinguished member from California, Mr. Gar Mendy.
▶ 1:30:44Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. Uh is extremely important. Unfortunately, we're not going to be able to get into the depth that's necessary. Uh Mr. Burkowitz, you spent your entire opening uh in a discussion of Golden Dome. What is the goal of the Golden Dome and what would it cost?
▶ 1:31:16Thank you for the question, Representative. Um, I'm going to defer any conversations about cost to the direct reporting program manager, uh, since that's outside of my perview.
▶ 1:31:26Excuse me. Just what are you doing if you don't know what the cost is? Well, I do know what the cost is, sir, but as as you may be aware, uh there is a number from the president. Um I would repeat that number, but um but I'm not responsible for the program or its cost. I'm responsible for it for policy matters associated with the program.
▶ 1:31:45And then let me go to the opening part of my question.
▶ 1:31:48What is the purpose of Golden Dome? What is it to achieve? Uh the purpose of Golden Dome is uh is to provide a comprehensive next generation defense of the United States against the most consequential threats, the potentially the most catastrophic threat that we face. Our adversaries are diversifying, expanding, and modernizing nuclear arsenals and their long-range delivery systems.
▶ 1:32:12Those include ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, advanced cruise missiles, and other forms of advanced aerial attack. So the purpose of the Golden Dome is to defend to stop all of those threats. Is that
▶ 1:32:28The the purpose of Golden Dome is to provide a defense of the homeland and in the process to deter coercion and and in so doing we will do so in combination as a complement to our nuclear deterrent. I'm going to go back to just being very simple. It's to stop those threats. Is that correct?
▶ 1:32:54Uh that is correct, sir. The the uh deterrence. Well, if I could
▶ 1:32:59Well, Mr. General or Admiral Carell, your task is to penetrate the defensive systems of our adversaries. Is that correct? or to be able to penetrate those defensive systems.
▶ 1:33:20Uh that's correct.
▶ 1:33:21Okay. And therefore achieve deterrence.
▶ 1:33:24That's correct. The the ability to hold at risk and achieve the damage expectancy for whatever particular target we're holding at risk.
▶ 1:33:31War games at the Pentagon are rather Have you thought about how you are going penetrate the Golden Dome defensive And do you have the necessary uh offensive systems to do that?
▶ 1:33:53The uh the Golden Dome is uh is a US capability. So we have not done analysis on our ability and and that's a system that's still being developed.
▶ 1:34:05Uh in terms of adversary capabilities, we pay very close attention uh to those.
▶ 1:34:10I'm going to go to my point here. My point is uh Golden Dome is to stop a whole array of nuclear threats as just listed by Mr. Burkowitz. Your task is to provide an American system to penetrate the defensive mechanisms uh that Russia and China might deploy.
▶ 1:34:33And I'm just curious how you would address the task and purpose of Golden Dome. In other words, a very interesting little war game. Wouldn't it be? In other words, testing the purposes and the effectiveness of the multi- billion, hundreds of billions of dollars that would be spent. In other words, as my
▶ 1:35:02member next to me so eloquently put up in his opening statement, becomes a fool's errand here.
▶ 1:35:08You defend, we offense. You defend, we defend back and forth and we're caught up in a nuclear arms race.
▶ 1:35:18Go with that.
▶ 1:35:19I'll I'll yield back at this point. But it would be seem to me beneficial for us to think about this in the context of the purposes of Golden Dome and how it would or would fail would achieve or would fail its purposes and the kind of weapons that we presently have that might be deployed uh with China or Russia or even similar weapons much many of which were already
▶ 1:35:49discussed here that are now being deployed, developed by Russia and China, taking us back to Golden Dome. Is it indeed a fool's errand? I'll let that hang out there. I yield back.
▶ 1:36:05Gentleman yields back. And and just for thought purposes, the way the pendulum swings in Washington in 2029, this may not be called Golden Dome, but would you all agree that everything that you're doing right now is something we should be doing anyway, whether it had a fancy name or not?
▶ 1:36:23I see mostly nods. Yes, sir.
▶ 1:36:26Thank you all. Um, no disrespect to my colleagues. Um, but I I I I just think we get hung up on on on the name more than what the purpose of what we're trying to do because our adversaries are not slowing down. I would now recognize the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Crank.
▶ 1:36:43Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I I apologize [clears throat] for my voice in advance. So, I'll ask short questions and give you more time to respond. General Guio, is Northcom prepared for the tight decision timeline uh needed for boost phase intercepts? Um, and what more needs to be done in that area?
▶ 1:37:02Congressman, yes, we are prepared and we uh train and exercise that multiple times each day.
▶ 1:37:10General Whiting, um, to the extent you can share in an open hearing, how do you at, uh, Space Command view the cyber threat, and we talked about this earlier today in my office, to our space capabilities, and what more can Congress be doing to ensure that we stay ahead of our adversaries in uh, in this cyber
▶ 1:37:29Congressman, thank you for the question. We think the the cyber threat is a um is a is a true threat to our space capabilities. While Russia and China have demonstrated they can attack us in space with weapons like direct ASAT or high energy lasers, uh I think they would rather attack us using cyber because it's cheaper for them and harder for us to attribute. So we have to harden um in the cyber domain our space enterprise. And we've made a lot of progress in that area.
▶ 1:37:54But uh Congressman, I think I would ask the the Congress to continue to support US Cyber Command as it grows out its forces and capabilities and the forces of the individual services that they delivered to Cyber Command that provide defensive uh cyber capabilities. We routinely have defensive cyber teams from the different services that that help us harden our systems. Uh but but there's more that could be done there.
▶ 1:38:18are the main [clears throat] are the main cyber threats China and Russia uh with regard to space do you believe or or are there other actors congressman I agree those are the fundamental uh principal uh threats
▶ 1:38:31okay and then general guio a key element of golden dome will be the ability to defeat uh missiles in the init in the initial launch phase however the compressed timelines inherent uh to boost phase intercept challenge legacy command and control architectures designed around longer midcourse engagement windows.
▶ 1:38:52How are you thinking about your requirements for sensor integration uh sensor integration, battle management software and operational procedures to compress the timeline, boost phase intercept? Congressman, the the way we need to do this is through a layered approach that takes uh a variety of different types of sensors.
▶ 1:39:14There's not a single sensor that we can uh establish and put either on orbit or on the ground that will will give us all of the cues that we need to go from boost phase all the way through uh midcourse or even into terminal phase. So the layered approach uh is essential. And perhaps the biggest challenge that uh General Gutline and I uh discuss is how do we tie all this into a single command and control system
▶ 1:39:40uh that takes probably a dozen or more uh disparit uh command and control systems and ties it into one screen where the operators can look from the boost all the way through the terminal phase and seamlessly inject all of the different sensors and aectors that it would take to uh defeat that. Uh he does think that we're on track for that. uh you know within the next year or two for the demonstrated capability and I'm confident that he'll get there.
▶ 1:40:07How about uh AI AI and how that would relate and how do you keep a human the reliability of a human in the loop if we're if we're using AI in that process.
▶ 1:40:18Congressman, I I do think AI is ne necessary. Uh what we usually face today, for example, would be a uh single North Korean uh interceptor. And if you looked, you've been to our headquarters, you see we have six or eight different screens and hundreds of people yelling and talking about one interceptor inbound. If we looked at a raid from a a peer uh nation, the number that that might be, we would have to have AI.
▶ 1:40:43Uh but as you mentioned, we cannot replace the human on the loop to make the decisions at the right points from detect all the way through engagement. uh but it would allow us to to um you know address multiple threats simultaneously which we'd be challenged to do now.
▶ 1:40:59Thank you General and I apologize to everyone in the room for my voice and Mr. Chairman I yield back. Thank you.
▶ 1:41:05I thought it sounded wonderful. Uh gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Norcross for five minutes.
▶ 1:41:14Thank you chairman and for witnesses for being here today. Um the bulk of my questions I'm going to hold off for the classified but one I think we can have the discussion here today is talking about our ability to deliver that one leg through our bomber fleets um 74 1920 B2s I'm talking for the nuclear dual capable and what we're looking at the 145ish
▶ 1:41:47uh Unfortunately, over the course of the last few weeks, we saw uh us losing six of the or lost or damaged six one Uh certainly will make an impact, but I far from the only ones that we have available. It is an aging platform. It's one that will uh run its time in the next part of this century. How long it makes it uh certainly up there.
▶ 1:42:16KC46 is coming in quickly and at some point will be dual capable. But with the increased bombers in addition to taking care of the entire flying force that we have, are the refuers, the KC46 being delivered at a rate that is acceptable to keep our other platforms flying when we need it? General or excuse me, Admiral Carell.
▶ 1:42:47Um, you highlight the absolute essentiality of the bomber fleet to enable air operations. Any operation the department conducts that involves the air leg is enabled by our uh our tanker fleet. I'm sorry I said bomber, I meant tanker fleet.
▶ 1:43:06Um and uh the uh RC135 is an aging platform as you know and the KC46 is uh is uh ramping up in terms of delivery and production and um the department has analyzed and uh and indicated that we need to sustain the tanker fleet that we have and expand that tanker fleet uh to uh more platforms.
▶ 1:43:34Uh the minimum number uh is about uh 502 tankers.
▶ 1:43:40How many of those are dual capable or you assuming they all will be?
▶ 1:43:45Ideally they're all dual capable but as you know the RC135 is currently nuclear certified. The KC46 is not yet nuclear certified, but we can um we we are on a path to be able to use uh the ca the new tankers to to refuel nuclear capable bombers for conventional uh missions and and that's where we need to get to and then you know fully certify for the
▶ 1:44:15nuclear mission and that's the survivability and endurability piece in a trans attack environment. environment. But in the interim, we accept the risk and we use the capability we have to refuel uh all aircraft
▶ 1:44:28because as we look down the road those numbers are increasing those flying platforms obviously the nuclear capable uh I say would take precedent but we don't know depending on the mission and how it's being delivered at the rate and Boeing has had issues and I think we're past the back end of that. Are we getting the delivery rate or do we have to look at increasing that through Boeing?
▶ 1:44:55I would advocate for continuing to look at options to accelerate delivery of the tanker uh fleet.
▶ 1:45:02I yield back.
▶ 1:45:05Gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Carbajal, for five
▶ 1:45:11Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all the witnesses for being here today. General Whiting, space debris continues to be a concern in orbit. There are thousands of objects in orbit that we cannot maneuver and at the same time we have more satellites in orbit than ever requiring increased maneuvers to avoid collision. This is a compounding issue and the longer we wait to address it, the harder it will be to do so.
▶ 1:45:39Do you view space debris as a threat to US systems in orbit? And what are you doing to address this concern?
▶ 1:45:46Thank you, Congressman, for the question. Just to put a number on the scale that the debris and and number of satellites has increased uh since US Space Command was stood back up six and a half years ago. That number has gone up about 90%. So we've almost doubled the number of objects on orbit in the last six and a half years. So we we do see it as a concern but it's something we have to work every day so that we can continue to derive the benefits of space.
▶ 1:46:08So right now the department of defense through US space command and our space force tactical squadron provides warning to every we track all the objects on orbit and we provide warnings to um any satellite owner operator anywhere around the world so they can know if their satellite potentially is going to run into a piece of debris and uh and take action. Um so it's something we are concerned about and and we applaud commercial efforts that we've seen.
▶ 1:46:34There's been some recent announcements in the last few months about how commercial industry is rallying to to help each other understand where this debris is as well. So we think uh government has a role in this but also commercial industry.
▶ 1:46:46Thank you General Whiting. Let's for one second put aside the technical and fiscal cons concerns that have been raised with regard to the development and deployment of a space-based interceptor system. As the com combatant commander responsible for operations in and in defense of the domain, in your best military judgment, does deployment of a space-based interceptor constellation introduced risk to the domain as a new target for both Russia and the PRC.
▶ 1:47:17Congressman, I think we've already seen that uh Russia and China have demonstrated that they're building capabilities to hold all of our satellites at risk. So it's hard for me to say that the introduction of another satellite or a different class of satellites is going to change the amount of capability that they're developing.
▶ 1:47:34Uh if we look at China, they have developed uh everything from cyber capabilities to reversible jammers to direct ASAT weapons that can hold all orbital regimes at risk to high energy lasers to co-orbital ASAT um satellites. So the breadth of threats are now there. Mr. Congressman,
▶ 1:47:53thank you. Terara Whiting, you recently underscored the need for space-based logistics and sustainment at the space mobility conference in January. However, investments and acquisitions that focus focus on space mobility and logistics beyond rapid launch don't seem to have materialized yet despite increasing commercial capabilities and relevant government demonstrators going back many Can you explain why logistical capabilities are important to sustain effective
▶ 1:48:23operations in space and is the capability that Spacecom needs in order to improve our readiness in space? Thank you, Congressman, for the question. I do think logistics and sustainment capabilities on orbit are critical and not because I just want to see that result. It's because it enables maneuver warfare on orbit. And maneuver warfare has been a advantage for the United States in all domains at sea, in the air, and on the ground. And it's even a principle of warfare. And it's a joint function.
▶ 1:48:52And we need to bring this idea that we can maneuver for advantage to space. And to do that, there's several ways that are going to have to or several means that'll have to be required, but but on orbit logistics, refueling, and sustainment is one of those so that we're not just sitting ducks and we can maneuver for advantage away from threats or uh to maneuver uh you know where best to execute our operations from.
▶ 1:49:13Thank you, Admiral Carell. We all know the issues Sentinel continues to face. This program was supposed to be fielded by the end of this decade, but we know it won't be. At the same time, Minutemen 3 continues to age. The test bodies are not infinite. How are you balancing the need to continue tests with the limited supply until the ground leg is
▶ 1:49:38Thanks for the question, Congressman. Um I'm uh balancing the risk of sustainment versus bringing on the new capability and working very closely with uh direct report portfolio manager General White in terms of uh Sentinel coming online. We have a weekly conversation on um where the you know where the opportunities are to accelerate delivery of that capability. In those conversations, we also talk about sustainment of Minutemen 3.
▶ 1:50:09As the combatant commander, uh, you know, responsible for, uh, the ability to employ those capabilities, my I see my job as to communicate precisely within the department where risks manifest themselves and what we're doing to mitigate those risks. I remain confident in our ability to sustain the minimum three as we transition to Sentinel and I'm encouraged by the progress that Joel White has made as a direct report portfolio manager with uh with Sentinel.
▶ 1:50:39Thank you. I'm out of time. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
▶ 1:50:42The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Bell, for five minutes.
▶ 1:50:50Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the ranking member. Hello to the witnesses. Thank you for being here. Um, Admiral Carell, the St. Louis region is home to one of the fastest growing geospatial technology ecosystems in the country, anchored with the new NGA West campus.
▶ 1:51:09Given how central geospatial intelligence is to nuclear command and control, targeting and missile warning, how is Stratcom integrating next generation geospatial analytics and AI enabled data from places like NGA West into strategic deterrence operations. Congressman, we have a uh a phased approach.
▶ 1:51:34Um and uh we've built an analytic engine to account for the threat environment for those five threat vectors that I talked about before, accurately representing those threat vectors and testing the new capabilities to come online.
▶ 1:51:50the capabilities you're referring to are part of the uh universe of capabilities that we're considering for next generation uh nuclear command and control and I acknowledge the importance of uh of those capabilities
▶ 1:52:06and and workforce development is something I've prioritized during my time in Congress. From Stratcom's perspective, how important is a skilled workforce and resilient industrial base to sustaining long-term strategic
▶ 1:52:22Congressman is it is exceptionally important. Um it uh it's essential.
▶ 1:52:28Thank you, General Guio. You've been busy today. Um our missile and homeland defenses ultimately depend on a resilient defense industrial base. Whether it is interceptors, sensors, or aircraft, we cannot afford gaps in production or capability or capacity, excuse me, when we have numerous adversaries watching our every move. Communities like mine in St.
▶ 1:52:54Louis play a critical role in that ecosystem through advanced aerospace manufacturing and a strong supplier base. From your perspective, how important is maintaining a strong domestic aerospace industrial base to sustaining our strategic deterrence and homeland defense posture?
▶ 1:53:13Congressman, it's uh it's extremely important and uh we also benefit from many of the NGA capabilities that Admiral Carell spoke about and then into the uh aircraft um manufacturer and development. Uh keeping a fleet of aircraft uh that can operate in the high Arctic all the way uh down to the southeast part of the United States uh is imperative. We have some old but very capable aircraft.
▶ 1:53:41Uh but they they're going through the process with the Air Force of of being uh replaced and I know that uh some of the manufacturers that you're talking about are critical to that giving us uh longer range, more ability to carry uh ability to carry more weapons uh at the same time and having uh fused avionics that bring in uh inputs from all different types of sensors into the cockpit. All which benefit NORAD and
▶ 1:54:09Thank you. Uh General Whiting, um China is reportedly develop developing satellites capable of inspecting, moving, or potentially disabling other spacecraft, potentially ours. How concerned is Space Command about these capabilities being used to physically interfere with US military satellites during a crisis?
▶ 1:54:29Thank you, Congressman, for the question. It's a capability we have to pay great attention to because we've uh we've seen China demonstrate that capability on orbit by maneuvering a satellite to one of their uh defunct uh satellites, moving that satellite up to a higher orbit and then and then the first satellite returning. And uh while that might have a commercial or a civil use, it also demonstrates a military capability.
▶ 1:54:52So we have to consider all of those from a dual use perspective as as potential threats and uh make sure that uh that we uh have mitigation strategies appropriately.
▶ 1:55:02And then quickly, do we have the ability to detect and attribute these types of operations in real time?
▶ 1:55:09Congressman, we have the an outstanding or let me say it this way. We have the world's best space domain awareness capability, but I would like it to be even better so that I can maintain constant maintain constant custody of these kind of potential threats. So, you asked if we can do that in near real time. Um, uh, we work every day to try to mitigate the amount of time it would take us to detect that, but I cannot say today we can do that in real time.
▶ 1:55:32Thank you. And I yield back.
▶ 1:55:33Gentleman yields back. And last but not least, uh, my Democratic colleagues had a very deep bench today. uh and appreciate your interest in this very important hearing. I recognize a gentleman from California, Mr. Whitesides, for five minutes
▶ 1:55:48today and every day, Mr. Chairman. [laughter] Um thank you. Uh good to see you all. I tell my kids that this is the subcommittee where we have the adults in the room and I think that that's very important. You know, when we're dealing with a subject that has the capacity to cause extreme damage to human civilization, it's very important to know that we have serious people in charge of the relevant organizations and I know that you are serious people. I have one comment and three questions.
▶ 1:56:19My comment is directed primarily at General Whiting which is simply that I believe that the United States is acting as the most responsible actor in space and I think it's crucial that we continue to be so. I know that you share that commitment that extends from public to classified worlds.
▶ 1:56:39Um, as we head into, frankly, a singularity moment in space activity, it is crucial, I think, that we continue to set a good example for the rest of the world on how space can be maintained sustainably, whether militarily or in commercial areas. And so, I would just urge you to carry on that ethos that is, I think, embodied in the new and young uh, you know, organizations that you that you P21.
▶ 1:57:08Um, Admiral Carell, it was great to meet with you and discuss your approach and priorities, uh, including the importance of the airbased leg of deterren deterrence. As you know, I'm extremely proud to represent the folks at Palmdale and, um, the people who build the B-21. Can you briefly describe the ways in which the ability to more quickly produce the necessary aircraft in the fleet could act as an effective deterrent to our adversaries?
▶ 1:57:33Congressman U because the B-21 represents that sixth generation stealth capability and what I talked about earlier it's enabling uh function for the joint force. The sooner we field that uh capability and the sooner we ramp up in delivery of that capability, the stronger position that puts the joint force in to uh to address uh the strategic environment from deterrence to any spectrum
▶ 1:58:04of uh conflict that uh that we would contemplate.
▶ 1:58:07Thank you. And I support Congressman Bacon's um support of the 145 number. Um Mr. Burkowitz, you've written extensively on our asymmetric vulnerability regarding GPS and PNT. China and Russia have developed robust terrestrial backups for their satellite navigation. Uh, does our current policy prioritize a domestic terrestrial backup and how are we incentivizing the commercial sector to harden their pnt dependent infrastructure against the navigational warfare you've warned
▶ 1:58:39Uh, thank you very much for that question. Um I I absolutely share your concern about uh the need to make sure that we have a very robust set of capabilities to provide uh both space-based and terrestrial pnt services to all of our our critical infrastructures uh and especially for for national defense. Um as I mentioned uh previously the uh we're in the process of implementing the president's executive order on on ensuring US space superiority.
▶ 1:59:10One of the issues we're going to be taking up is looking at our uh our pnt policy. Um as part of the overall process of reviewing um as as a new administration reviewing all of our policies, we're going to be focusing in particular on the question of of the future of our space-based pnt capability and ensuring that that is not only robust but resilient. Sir,
▶ 1:59:33thank you. And I absolutely I should have mentioned space-based backup capability as well. Dr. Cadlck, briefly, um, you've identified deterring adversary biological weapons use as a top tier priority alongside nuclear deterrence. In the context of this hearing, are we properly integrating bio- resilience into our integrated deterrence framework, or is this still being treated as a separate health crisis issue? How does our budget and our policies reflect the reality that a biological strike could be a strategic prelude to a kinetic or nuclear
▶ 2:00:03Sir, thank you for the question. And I think the key thing here is that we're in in the process here right now in response to a uh joint urgent operational need by IndoPaccom commander to actually deploy a biodeterrence approach into the indep theater and it's not focused on public health as it is indications early warning characterization and attribution and this is really the link of integrating biodeterrence with our uh nuclear capabilities or capabilities to
▶ 2:00:33respond respond in a way would that we be decisive in response to some use of this in that theater and then uh again propagated globally around the world as well as domestically. So we're we're in the midst of that. I would be welcome to come and brief your staff and yourself on that uh because it's uh gets a little geeky but I think the point here is the intent is we're trying to operationalize this in real time to meet a commander's
▶ 2:01:01Thank you. I yield back. And I'd like to thank all our witnesses today for their uh testimony. Very insightful. And I'll look forward to continuing our discussion in the closed setting. We'll meet upstairs in approximately 5 minutes after a short comfort break if needed. The open portion of the hearing is now