▶ 0:03:10So, we're waiting on the ranking member. He'll be right here. He's got the gavel in on the secretary before he comes, so give us a few minutes to get him here.
▶ 0:03:53The Subcommittee on Europe will come to order. The purpose of this hearing is to examine the foreign policy implications of emerging threats to security and stability of outer space. I now recognize myself for an opening statement, but before I do, I ask unanimous consent that the member from Florida, Representative Herodopoulos, be allowed to sit on the dais and participate in today's hearing. Without objection, so ordered.
▶ 0:04:36Just a few weeks ago, the world watched as our astronauts completed a historic mission circling the moon, the first astronauts to return in over half a century. It was once again a powerful reminder that American leadership in space is unmatched and must remain that However, the realities in outer space are very much different today than when than they were 50 years ago.
▶ 0:05:03Space is now a congested and contested domain, one the US Space Force characterizes as a war-fighting domain. Our hearing today on space security is important as our Subcommittee grapples with the question of how to compete effectively and maintain US leadership in a competitive global environment where technology and the nature of conflict are ever changing.
▶ 0:05:28Space is an environment where actions can be difficult to attribute, formal norms are limited, and intentions are frequently unclear. China, for example, has engaged in aggressive maneuvers in space from pushing defunct satellites out of orbit to close proximity operations that the US Space Force has characterized as dog fighting in orbit.
▶ 0:05:51It is difficult to distinguish between benign and aligned in space because so many space systems are dual use, frankly. Put simply, a satellite's grappling arm that may be used to repair another satellite in peacetime could in wartime be employed to disable a US reconnaissance or military communication The competition is not only playing out in orbit, but also here on Earth.
▶ 0:06:18China is rapidly expanding space partnerships in developing countries, investing in ground infrastructure to improve tracking, monitoring, and launch And while China has now surpassed Russia as America's greatest challenger in Russia still maintains a formidable space program. For years, the Russians have been deploying a nuclear-capable anti-satellite weapon that if employed would have devastating impacts on satellite operations in low Earth orbit.
▶ 0:06:46At the same time, concerns in outer space extend well beyond counterspace The competition for space superiority is also front and center in the civil, commercial, and diplomatic realms. Programs like NASA's Artemis Accords in coordination with the US State Department show how American leadership in space strengthens our alliances and advances US interests.
▶ 0:07:1163 countries have signed on, establishing a shared framework to guide the civil exploration and use of outer But China is working aggressively to challenge that leadership from lunar base ambitions to expanding satellite constellations through the International Telecommunication Union, the ITU. That is why it is encouraging to see the State Department prioritizing these emerging challenges.
▶ 0:07:37Secretary Rubio created a new Bureau of Emerging Threats, which among other priorities will focus on the very space security issues we are discussing today. It is important that we authorize this bureau and advance additional legislative actions, which we will discuss in more detail today to ensure this committee supports efforts to strengthen the security and stability of the space domain.
▶ 0:08:00As chairman of the subcommittee with oversight responsibility of the Bureau of Emerging Threats, as well as a member of the space subcommittee on science, space, and I look forward to working with my colleagues to advance these priorities. I would like to thank all the witnesses for your time today, and I look forward to hearing your testimonies on this important topic. The chair now recognizes the ranking member from Massachusetts, Representative Keating, for an opening statement. Well, thank you, Mr.
▶ 0:08:30Chairman, for having this hearing here today. decades, the United States has engaged in strategic competition in space. This began with a space race in the Cold War and continues today as we race back on our way to the moon. Yet, the race to achieve new heights in continues. The US, China, and Russia are competing in space in the military and security sectors.
▶ 0:08:57As our world becomes more the need for greater number of satellites has driven the development of new space-based capabilities, as well as the systems to counter them. Today, the threats posed by space-based security issues have been long-standing, and in recent years, the United States and international organizations have taken important steps to mitigate risks and ensure the freedom of movement in space, while also recognizing that space is a militarized domain as
▶ 0:09:27well. In 2019, NATO allies declared space an operational domain, and at the end of the 2021 Brussels Summit, NATO recognized that attacks on, from, or within space present a clear challenge to the alliance. Meanwhile, in 2022, the Biden administration implemented a moratorium on direct ascent anti-satellite missile testing, or ASAT missile testing.
▶ 0:09:55The moratorium on ASAT testing, as well as efforts like the Artemis Accords, demonstrate not just how the United States will position itself to compete in space, but also how the United States will lead in space. We've established norms, promoted responsible behavior, and worked with allies and partners to create a shared understanding of how we should engage our adversaries in space.
▶ 0:10:21Space, by definition, requires a coordinated strategy to ensure the United States can not only participate in the system, but also shape it. I'm disappointed in the Trump administration's space policy and certain steps that are taken to by the administration that have hurt US interest. First, the administration has failed to publicly reaffirm the prior administration's moratorium on direct ascent ASAT testing.
▶ 0:10:48These weapons should not be tested, and a failure to reaffirm this policy gives way to countries like Russia and China to test offensive capabilities as well. the Trump administration needs to provide more information to the public about its plans for Golden Dome.
▶ 0:11:06While Golden Dome has increased security in concept, the administration has not provided enough details to Congress or the public about how it's plan how it plans to utilize the requested $180 billion for this program. At the same time, many critics believe such a multi-layered missile defense system will be prohibitively expensive and impractical.
▶ 0:11:30Others believe the administration will uh the contracting process for Golden Dome to reward its friends at the expense of the American taxpayer. We need answers and I hope the administration can provide them to us and importantly to the public. Finally, the Trump administration must do away with its {quote} American alone policies in space and double down on international engagement.
▶ 0:11:53This includes the International Telecommunication Union election later this year where the administration must work to reelect Doreen Bogdan-Martin as Secretary General. It also means working to protect the US delegation and the US industry as well as as they travel to China to China for the World Radiocommunication Conference in 2027.
▶ 0:12:17After the Trump administration's chaotic start rewarding China with the hosting of this conference, we must now ensure that China's home-field advantage in Shanghai doesn't stack the deck against US interests. Space is and will remain a national security interest for the United States. As ranking member, I believe the State Department must play a more robust role in carrying out our space diplomacy efforts and combating China and Russia's influence in space.
▶ 0:12:44Moving forward, US leadership in the space arena relies on upholding the vital frameworks and initiatives it's already put in place long before the administration but with an administration has the opportunity to carry forward still. I'm hopeful our panel here today can shed some light on these issues and particularly how we in Congress can further our space diplomacy efforts in the Department of State and throughout all the US government.
▶ 0:13:12I look forward questioning the witnesses and I yield back. Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. We're pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic. The Honorable Kerry the director of the Aerospace Security Project and senior fellow of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Dr.
▶ 0:13:37Scott Pace, the director of the Space Policy Institute at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, and the Honorable Mallory Stewart, the chief executive officer at the Council on Strategic Risks. Uh this committee recognizes the importance of the issues before us and is grateful to have our panel here to speak with us today.
▶ 0:14:00Your full statements will be made part of the record, and I'll ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to 5 minutes in order to allow time for member questions. I now recognize Ms. Bingen for an opening statement. Thank you, uh Chairman Self, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the invitation to appear before you today with these esteemed colleagues and friends. I was privileged to work with this committee while staffer on the House Armed Services Committee and saw firsthand the importance of your work.
▶ 0:14:29I would like to highlight three key challenges shaping the space security landscape and offer five recommendations and how we better employ the diplomatic tool of national power to to address First, space capabilities underpin how our military fights and projects power, providing connectivity across dispersed forces, intelligence in denied areas, and are critical to missile warning, precision targeting, battle damage assessment, and weather. In Ukraine, we have seen how a militarily overmatched nation can use space-based assets to level the playing field.
▶ 0:15:00Starlink became a lifeline for connectivity and satellite imagery is aiding in battle space awareness and helping to document evidence of war It should come as no surprise that our adversaries want to deny this battlefield advantage. China and Russia possess a range of counterspace weapons. In the last year alone, we have seen prolific jamming of GPS and communication signals. Chinese and Russian satellites are conducting unusual and concerning maneuvers in orbit, including a first-ever orbiting orbital refueling mission in GEO.
▶ 0:15:29These dynamics are a key reason the Space Force and Space Command were created. They are focusing on building more resilient space architectures, developing operational tactics and procedures, and integrating with allies and industrial partners. A second trend is the rise of commercial space. More than 80% of satellites on orbit are commercial, and over 100 countries now operate in space. With more actors in space, broader access to technology, and greater economic stakes, global competition is intensifying.
▶ 0:15:57China, for example, is building its version of Starlink and Falcon 9 rockets, and challenging the long-standing US lead in commercial satellite imagery. One consequence of this new dynamic is a far more transparent battlefield. Persistent surveillance from worldwide remote sensing satellites means that military movements and signatures are increasingly visible.
▶ 0:16:17This is playing out in real time in the Middle East, where US firms have withheld satellite imagery to protect US forces in the region and avoid aiding adversaries, while foreign providers, including Chinese companies, continue to supply similar data. We need a more nuanced policy approach that protects national security without disadvantaging US companies relative to foreign competitors.
▶ 0:16:37At the same time, US forces must adapt to a more transparent battlefield by strengthening operational security, training under persistent surveillance, and investing in protection, deception, and disruption capabilities. Third, China is the most consequential threat and competitor in space.
▶ 0:16:55Marking one of the swiftest climbs in the history of any modern space program, China has amassed hundreds of satellites in orbit, set record launch rates, built satellite gigafactories, and advanced flagship projects related to space station and and the moon. China is using space as a tool of diplomacy and influence, expanding its partnerships across the global south. On the diplomatic front, Chinese delegates are becoming increasingly skilled at navigating international forums like the ITU and the UN.
▶ 0:17:23The long-term implications are profound. As nations align with either the US or Chinese in standards, the winner will not just supply technology. It will set the terms by which information flows, networks interoperate, and how the world is seen. So, recommendations. First, space is soft power. US space companies remain global leaders in SATCOM and earth observation, navigation, and launch services. For many partners in the global south countries, US firms provide practical solutions.
▶ 0:17:54Satellite imagery for agriculture monitoring, maritime surveillance to combat illegal fishing, communications that connect underserved regions, and geospatial data that supports a disaster response and infrastructure development. The State Department should expand this advantage. Our embassies should actively support the US commercial space industry, and space data and services should be integrated into their security cooperation toolkit. This is a three-fer, strengthening US industry and and increasing investment in US companies, extending American influence, and countering China.
▶ 0:18:26However, outdate outdated export restrictions still treat many space technologies and data services as though they were weapons. So, second, we must continue to modernize our export control policies and processes, finding a better balance between protecting sensitive technologies while enabling firms to compete and partner globally. Third, our allies and partners from Europe to Japan are committing to record defense budgets including major increases in space.
▶ 0:18:50The State Department, working with their defense and commerce colleagues, can shape these investments so they produce capabilities that complement ours, create opportunities for US industry, and strengthen collective security. Fourth, the United States should sustain leadership in key governance and standard forums like the ITU to support US companies in managing scarce spectrum, shaping technology standards and best practices for satellite operations.
▶ 0:19:14Finally, we are in a strategic technology competition with China, which has prioritized aerospace alongside AI, quantum, and biotech. These technologies will reshape warfare and confer significant economic and geopolitical advantage. We need a holistic approach that advances US technology leadership while checking China's progress. This will require deepening State's technical expertise and better integrating it with diplomatic tools. So, I'm hopeful that the new Bureau of Emerging Threats can provide such focus.
▶ 0:19:44The United States leads in space today, but that lead is not assured. Sustaining our strategic advantage in space will require urgent action at home, strong partnerships abroad, and continued leadership in shaping the future of the domain. Thank you for your time today, and I look forward to your questions. Uh thank you. I now recognize Dr. Pace for an opening statement. Thank you.
▶ 0:20:08Uh Chairman Self, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished members of this subcommittee, uh thank you for holding this important hearing, and and thank you also for the uh the panel uh you've assembled here uh with them honored colleagues that I've worked with for many years. Um in light of ongoing military operations, disruptive technologies, and shifting balances of power, this is a very timely opportunity to consider American space enterprise, in particular, the role of diplomacy at the US State Department.
▶ 0:20:33We have moved from a bipolar contest between the United States and the Soviet Union into a crowded field defined by globalization, democratization, rise of new space. The United States Space Force envisions its future operating environment as being a what they call a heteropolar world order, a global system defined by uneven concentrations of capability where the United States and China hold dominant but asymmetric influence.
▶ 0:20:57Our most visible space effort, the Artemis program, is not a military effort, but it is a geopolitical instrument of national security and diplomacy. It signals that the United States intends to lead an international and commercial coalition built on transparency, shared expectations, and a sustainable presence. For the State Department to meet the demands of this new strategic landscape in space, I offer a few recommendations. First, of course, strengthen the T and E family coordination.
▶ 0:21:24The recent reorganization that merged arms control and nonproliferation into a Bureau of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, I believe is a logical one. Disarmament and nonproliferation are two sides of the same coin, so aligning these functions within the department that more efficiently to address threats from weapons of mass destruction, including those that may use the space domain. This should not neglect the civil side of space as represented by the Office of Space Affairs in the E family and the role played by multilateral institutions such as the UN Committee on the peaceful uses of outer space.
▶ 0:21:55Civil, security, economic interests are all important to US foreign policy. As was mentioned, a focus on the ITU in the upcoming World Radio Conference 2027 is crucial. The department must take an assertive lead on ITU matters, not leave it to others. Speaking with a unified voice for the administration to balance the equities of both government and the private sector.
▶ 0:22:17The work team needs to be fully resourced and engage early with regional blocks such as in the Americas, Asia-Pacific, and of course Europe to enter into work 27 with a coalition that can defend a rules-based spectrum governance. Next, complete space export control reforms. As was mentioned, the space State Department should finalize the space export control reform regulations that were released for public comment in late 2024.
▶ 0:22:44We need to ensure industry feedback is incorporated, and it's crucial that foreign commercial availability is evaluated on the front end of the process so US firms are not restricted from selling technology that is in fact already accessible on the global market. Third, strengthen allied space security dialogues. The US should move beyond episodic consultations to include space security in annualized dialogues with priority allies, especially in the Indo-Pacific region such as Japan, Australia, India, and South Korea.
▶ 0:23:13These dialogues should explicitly integrate space into broader defense and deterrence conversations aligning threat perceptions and pre-negotiating crisis response procedures. Next, expand a space-literate diplomatic cadre. Um I'm an international affairs school, so teaching more space to uh international affairs majors is a pet project. Um the department should develop and maintain a cadre of space-literate diplom- diplomats who can serve as resident experts in key embassies and multilateral missions.
▶ 0:23:43This expertise can draw upon other agencies like NASA and the Department of War who have representatives at US embassies, but we need a whole-of-government representation at our embassies. One team, one fight. To ensure our commercial and space security interests are embedded in our diplomatic engagements in a more integrated way. In conclusion, space activities touch all aspects of our national life.
▶ 0:24:06The rules of this new frontier will be made by those who show up, not those who stay If the United States and its partners lead, we can ensure the space environment remains safe, stable, and conducive to our values of liberty, democracy, rule of law, and free market principles. And that should be a guiding goal of US space diplomacy. Uh thank you for your time, and I look forward to your questions. Uh thank you. I'm now recognizing Ms. Stewart for an opening statement.
▶ 0:24:33Good morning, Chairman Self, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished Good morning, Chairman Self, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My fellow panelists have already underscored the importance of outer space to the United States as well as the growing threats to our space I will re-emphasize one specific theme. If the United States does not lead in shaping the rules of behavior in outer space, others will.
▶ 0:25:03To elaborate, I will briefly address three points. First, why the US must work with its allies and partners both for greater outer space security and in the formulation of rules. Second, why the US needs clear space security policy leadership from the State Department. And third, how the State Department's bilateral and multilateral engagements advance US national security interests. As the subcommittee knows well, one of America's greatest advantages is our alliances and partnerships.
▶ 0:25:31These relationships are not just political, they are operational. They are built on shared laws and norms that allow us to cooperate with predictability, interoperability, and The same logic applies in outer space. For decades, the United States has understood that it is in our national interest, as well as the global interest, to establish rules for greater outer space stability.
▶ 0:25:53We have done this through treaties, norms, and shared As space becomes more congested and contested, however, the risks of miscalculation and conflict will grow. The limited existing rules will not be able to support the scale and scope of operational growth. Moreover, as discussed, space is extremely relevant to global militaries. That makes it even more important to strengthen deterrence and resilience against attack in outer space. Alliances and partnerships are central to this effort.
▶ 0:26:22Interoperability among allied systems increases resilience and allows us to respond collectively if systems are Collaboration enables us enables us to establish shared expectations for responsible behavior in space. Establishing such expectations in the form of rules helps us deter and identify anomalous or intentionally irresponsible behaviors, giving us more time to protect and defend our collective assets. For the strongest possible partnerships, trust is critical.
▶ 0:26:53Without it, cooperation declines and normative deterrence is not possible. To sustain our partners' trust, the United States must demonstrate that its approach serves collective and not just national interests. This is where US diplomacy plays a central role.
▶ 0:27:09Russia and China have promoted a narrative that the United States seeks to dominate space, and they have proposed to legally ban all space-based Putting aside that their proposed treaty fails to address their own ground-based cyber and dual-use capabilities, the text itself lacks a clear definition of a space weapon. Because any satellite in space could be used as a weapon, such a legal prohibition would be meaningless, unenforceable, and would not improve space security.
▶ 0:27:38The United States has taken a different approach to space rules, focusing on observable, verifiable behaviors. A clear example is the 2022 initiative to ban direct-ascent debris-generating anti-satellite tests. Despite Russian opposition, this effort gained the global support of 155 nations in the United Nations. That success was not automatic. It required sustained, coordinated diplomacy to demonstrate that the initiative benefited all nations.
▶ 0:28:07This is what space policy leadership should look like: support for practical, verifiable rules that enhance our collective security and outer space But effective US diplomacy abroad depends on close coordination at home. Today, responsibility for space security is spread across multiple US agencies and within multiple State Department bureaus. That structure can work, but only with strong leadership.
▶ 0:28:31With the cancellation of the US Space Council, the State Department must play a stronger coordinating role, aligning the interagency and commercial sectors, engaging allies, and ensuring that the United States government speaks with one clear voice on all space security Finally, the State Department should restart and expand US space security dialogues. These dialogues allow us to share threat perceptions, explain our policies, and better understand those of other space actors.
▶ 0:28:59They also help coordinate the US interagency, bringing together the numerous voices in space security diplomacy to ensure a unified These engage engagements, especially with our strategic competitors, are stabilizing. They reduce misunderstanding, build transparency, explain US positions, and help prevent In sum, the future of space will not be shaped by emerging technology alone. It will be shaped by rules, norms, and leadership.
▶ 0:29:26To protect US interests in outer space, we must lead in collectively defining clear, enforceable rules of responsible behavior, strengthen alliances and partnerships, improve policy coordination across the government, and reinvigorate the State Department's space security diplomacy. If we fail to do so, others will shape the environment in ways that could undermine our security.
▶ 0:29:49But if we lead clearly and consistently, we can ensure that space remains stable, secure, and accessible for generations to come. Thank you. Uh thank you. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. I will start by saying uh I believe that we are currently in a hybrid war with China today and and other nations, but certainly with China.
▶ 0:30:10So, uh a lot of our discussion so far has been about rules, and we need rules, but we also I think we need to understand that we are already in hybrid war. So, Ms. uh in your written testimony, you talked about ensuring we have adequate defenses and necessary offensive capabilities. I don't hear people talk a lot about offensive capabilities in cyber and space.
▶ 0:30:35Uh can you uh can you talk about what offensive and defensive capabilities we're currently investing in? Are there other things that we need to be in, specifically the offense I'd like for you to focus on.
▶ 0:30:49Chairman, I would be happy to. And if I can first frame it by there are I mentioned there are a range of threats that we see China and Russia pursuing from cyber methods to electronic warfare like jamming, all the way up to kinetic direct ascent missiles, on-orbital systems, and then even nuclear. So, that all speaks to us looking from a looking at investing in defensive capabilities more as an architecture.
▶ 0:31:15At the same point in time, when you see what China is doing in space, building and launching over 500 ISR satellites building their versions of Starlink. They're essentially closing their kill chains. And frankly, they're practicing targeting our ports, our ships at sea, our bases. When you think of an Indo-Pacific scenario, so much of our military connectivity, our command and control, our ISR, our eyes, our ears, our ability to communicate rests in space. The Chinese know that.
▶ 0:31:45Um they're also taking advantage of space to target our forces on the ground. It raises the of we also need capability to hold at risk their ability to see us, to target our forces on the ground. It doesn't have to There There are options. You can do it kinetically, you can do it non-kinetically. But we are now at a time where space is being used against our joint force, and we need to have tools in the book it to hold that at risk, the same way that they hold our systems at risk.
▶ 0:32:15Uh thank you, Dr. Pace. Uh Well, no. Ms. Bingham again, you also said delivering capabilities that would support our allies' security needs. What do you think that looks like? Is that like our FMS program for weapon systems? Uh are we talking about money? We talking about equipment? What are we talking about there when you when you delivering capabilities to our allies. It's a range of options.
▶ 0:32:44It's everything our industry building satellites and and providing them as part of a sovereign architecture for Japan or for
▶ 0:32:52But but how do we do that? I I've got that. How do we do that? Is this an FMS system, a DCS system? I think it can be all of the above. I think it be it can be direct commercial sales. It can be through FMS and security cooperation. It can be providing hardware. It can be providing software. Providing services.
▶ 0:33:10Do we have that today?
▶ 0:33:11degree we do and I mentioned a a bit briefly, sir. There are are some of our export constraints. ITAR in particular is inhibiting certain sales and provision of data, but it is allowing for others. So, it is a mixed scorecard. Which brings me to one of the points you made, we need more nuanced policies in your written in your spoken testimony. What are those nuanced policies you're talking about ITAR? Uh that that's one of the
▶ 0:33:38export control That that's that's one of them and I would not recognize, I mean this committee's done a tremendous amount of work in this area. One example though that I'll give and and I'll this comes from my time working in the commercial space sector at a company commercializing signals collection and I will acknowledge I'm currently on their advisory board, but they were providing data on Chinese fishing vessels to allow our partners to counter illegal fishing.
▶ 0:34:05That data, that dot on a map of the fishing vessels are still subject to ITAR. Okay, very good. And Dr. Pace, obviously China is hosting the next radio communication conference in Shanghai. What policies do we need to see come out of that and how do we keep China from using their home field advantage, I think one of you said. How do we do that cuz they do have a home field advantage? Thank you, Chair. A couple of things.
▶ 0:34:34First of all, um, strategically that one of the most important things we can do is to strongly support uh, Doreen Bogdan-Martin's re-election. Um, which nominated of course, you know, during uh, the first Trump administration, uh, re-nominated for current position during the Biden administration. We nominated her again. Uh, she's been a a tremendous uh, asset and in terms of ensuring that the ITU is run in a fair way, uh, I think her re-election is number one.
▶ 0:34:58Second thing we need to think about uh, at a fairly granular level, uh, security uh, for our delegation while they're over there. Uh, World Radio Conferences always have a certain share of intelligence activities going on from various Uh, the fact that this is look where it's located in China is a particular problem. There'll be people who won't be able to actually even go there. Uh, so paying attention and to the resources and practices to secure our own delegation Thank you.
▶ 0:35:23Thank you, Dr. Pace. My time is up, unfortunately. I appreciate it. I wish I had more time, but I'm going to uh, recognize the ranking member for 5 minutes. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Uh, Mr. Stewart, uh, in in your remarks, you emphasized the need for partnerships and cooperation.
▶ 0:35:42Uh, can you take a few minutes and detail the progress that's been taking place there going forward and and the importance of getting these partnerships to share uh, to to make sure that the principles in the international community are aligned, uh, and particularly uh, in the area of space and how that's a different than so many other uh, approaches that we have to take.
▶ 0:36:14Thank you for the question. Really appreciate um, the the emphasis
▶ 0:36:17sorry. Could Could you move the microphone closer to you? Yeah. Okay. Really appreciate Is that Thank you for the the and appreciate the focus on partnerships, alliances, and norms, especially in the outer space The the previous administration and in fact uh administrations prior to the Biden administration had focused on developing processes and standards that enable greater cooperation that were in the interest of stability and security of the outer
▶ 0:36:47space arena because we recognize that that was also in the US's interest when operating in the space environment. In order to achieve these norms and these treaties, we had to work collectively with the global community to explain why it was in all of our interest to have some standard rules, to have some norms that allowed us to know which way we were going uh in in in um you know in in in situations in which we were going to uh have conjunctions,
▶ 0:37:18in situations in which we may interact, to allow us to understand what is normal and responsible behavior so that anything that fell short of that um could be identified as irresponsible. That that system that really we developed in in numerous domains like aviation and maritime allowed for safe operations and allowed us to understand how we should perform even when intentions are unclear.
▶ 0:37:42In the space domain, when intentions are even less clear because we cannot communicate directly, we cannot see very clearly where these satellites are operating or or or what their intent is, we need those norms and cooperation capabilities more than ever. And so, the US has pursued um the direct ascent destructive ASAT testing normative uh principle in the UN.
▶ 0:38:04The US has pursued um another uh strengthening of the outer space treaty in 2024 in the UN First Committee resolution recognizing that treaty and emphasizing Article 4's prohibition on the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit around the Earth, particularly to highlight for the international community that any activity to violate that outer space treaty would be harmful to all space operators.
▶ 0:38:28And in fact, the US believes that the Russians are developing such a program to place a nuclear weapon in orbit around the earth. And so highlighting this treaty, highlighting this norm of responsible behavior is important to our success. The reason we need partnerships is so that they can agree and support and collaborate and in fact enforce the normative deterrence against those irresponsible behaviors. And this has been the approach of many US governments up until this point, and hopefully it will continue in this administration.
▶ 0:38:58Yeah, you you mentioned direct ascent ASAT testing. With the conference coming up and everything else, what's the opportunity for the this administration and other administrations going forward to to have that kind of and the importance of that going forward? How should we approach the Chinese and the Russians about this? I'll open that to anyone in the panel that might want to comment on that, the importance of that. I'm happy to answer that question.
▶ 0:39:26I agree that the US government should reaffirm its commitment not to conduct direct ascent destructive ASAT test. The US has made this operational decision years ago. This is not any problem for us to recommit to, but it's important for us to affirm this normative approach that the rest of the world sees that we are being responsible players and to highlight that if anyone violates this normative approach, it's irresponsible and it degrades the environment in the outer space arena for long-term sustainability is not in the interest of the global
▶ 0:39:56community and should be deterred by preventing contracts or continued coordination with any country that conducts such a direct ascent destructive ASAT test. There's about 25 seconds left. I would say that uh uh one of the important uh of the important things about this is to recognize that a lot of developing countries are recognizing that they're incredibly reliant on space.
▶ 0:40:22So, we want our space systems to work, they want the space systems to work because they're reliant on it. And by providing an attractive narrative where people can join with us uh responding to US proposals, those votes come our way. And those votes are important in the ITU, they're important in COPUOS, uh they're important in shaping that sort of global environment. And so, people need something to vote for, not just to reject, you know, these rather unworkable Chinese and Russian systems.
▶ 0:40:48So, whatever gives us something that others can rally around uh is very helpful because many the interests of developing countries, I would argue, are in many cases aligned with what our interests are. We want space to be stable and peaceful and leave it alone. Thank you. And I I think you hit the central point. Uh I think we'll hear more of in this hearing. So, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Uh thank you. And I recognize the representative from Ohio, Mr. Davidson. Uh thank you, Chairman. Thanks for this hearing. Uh for our witnesses, thanks for your preparation and your comments already today.
▶ 0:41:18Um as we talk about um the emerging threats, uh space is one of those areas where there's emerging opportunity, but there's inherently emerging threats. it's also often observed that the chief export for the European Union is So, one of the primary threats to anything is too much regulation or bad regulation. So, maybe start with you, Mr. Pace.
▶ 0:41:44What concern should the United States have about the EU's proposed Space Act? Well, thank you for that question. Um I think the it's interesting that both the the Commerce Department and State Department work fairly closely to provide US comments uh back to the EU. Uh and we and it's also fair to say we have a number of problems with that. Um the EU desire to regulate and in many cases uh put up barriers to US firms being able to operate inside the EU uh is a serious one.
▶ 0:42:15Many cases if you look at the language it looks like it could be okay, but on the other hand it could be interpreted so many different directions. And so because of that vagueness, because of that uncertainty, I think there are a number of problems with it. One of the ones that are particularly keen interest to me are some of the requirements on cybersecurity. Some of the EU requirements there are fairly onerous so we're fairly expensive and I suspect would probably hurt you European firms as much if not more than ourselves.
▶ 0:42:42So Europe is playing its hand I think in regulation but it's not really a good one. I wish they were doing more in other areas to be good partners with us including in defense and burden sharing as well as working with us in multilateral forums as was described. Yeah, I think they're pretty already well staffed on So they haven't staffed up on space and defense.
▶ 0:43:04Do they have an autonomous space capability or to what extent do they depend on the United They they they do they they do have a lot of capable technology and therefore it's disappointing they don't do some more with it.
▶ 0:43:17They're deeply concerned about the state of commercial industry because they see that as a source of innovation and power on part of the United States and they're concerned with how do they keep up with it but they're not really doing the kind of reforms I personally would argue for in terms of slimming their own regulation, putting more private equity and financing into their markets and putting on a more entrepreneurial end. There are things they could do, they recognize they can do. It's been hard for them to bring themselves to just pull the trigger and and do what they need to do to compete.
▶ 0:43:48Yeah, so as we look at our our relationship with historic allies in are we at least united in the threat and challenge posed by China and Russia? I believe there's a common sense I'll defer maybe to my colleagues here but there is a recognition of the threat. There is a lot of good discussion at the working and operational levels, I think within NATO and within the military.
▶ 0:44:11Uh the problems tend to be, I think, at the higher sort of political and economic competition levels, uh which are not always as aligned as we would like them to be. Yeah, thanks. Ms. Bingham, you have thoughts on um are we united in countering China and Russia? So sorry, I I think in in general, I would agree with what Dr. Pace said. A lot of it though comes down country to country. So so NATO increasingly has recognized space as a warfighting domain and we have threats, particularly the Russian threat. Germany and France are increasing their space budgets, including for defense and security.
▶ 0:44:42ESA, the European Space Agency, civilian agency, but for the first time has been given a mandate to also support security. Um if I can also touch on your first question briefly and generally talk regulation, we have such an innovative commercial space sector right now. Private capital is going into these areas. There are missions now being commercialized that I would have never imagined being commercialized.
▶ 0:45:04It was something only the government do or or or we imagined only the government would So the challenge here is we do not want to stifle this innovative sector where we're still exploring these new missions and applications before they even get out of the gate. Yeah, thanks. And so for, you know, taxpayers back home, they they often think of space as, you know, why would we weaponize space?
▶ 0:45:24Um people don't always think about all the commercial applications uh that are there for communications, not just for defense, not just for targeting or surveillance, um but even GPS and our way to, you know, operate in modern society. So space is an increasingly important domain. And so I, you know, I get the frustration with Europe, I guess. I'd say, why should we keep working with these folks?
▶ 0:45:48I mean, there's a there's a sense of frustration at some point where you go, well, like, you guys just do you, we're going to do you know, it's a shame to get to that point on some levels of this, but, you know, what what are the pros and cons of that? Just saying, look, we're we're done trying to persuade you. We're just going to do it." Kind of go it alone is as alleged. Dr. Pace?
▶ 0:46:08I would I would say that that would be very unfortunate if it came out that way because first of all, a practical reality among the as you're familiar with the Five Eyes countries of, you know, Canada, UK, Australia, um the they're integrated in our operations. I mean, they're we sit console by console, you know, with with these folks. We're looking at Germany is starting to make movements toward a more serious defense posture. They're putting more into space-related areas. We'll see if they can execute on that.
▶ 0:46:36So, as as as as as Carrie Bingham was saying, you have to look country by country and in that regard, the EU itself is somewhat disappointing, but individual countries are making movements. You're seeing movement in the commercial sector by Italy. You're seeing France taking some of the commercial stuff more seriously. We'll see what they can do with it. As I mentioned, the Five Eyes are aligned with us.
▶ 0:46:58So, I think if we look as the phrase is, a more nuanced approach, there are some signs of hope that we should encourage and work with while still pushing back against the attempts to have a giant top-down European regulator in charge. Thank you all. I appreciate your testimony today and I yield back. Uh thank you. We are already 16 minutes into a vote, so this committee will recess for votes and we will return.
▶ 1:30:47Thank you for your patience. The committee comes to order and I now recognize representative Amo for your 5 minutes of questioning. Thank you, Madam Thank you to our witnesses for being Earlier this month, the Artemis 2 mission reminded the world what's possible when we lead and when we lead This wasn't just an American achievement, as you know.
▶ 1:31:10It included partners in Canada, one brave astronaut, Jeremy Hansen, and it was built on decades of cooperation from partners around the world. This isn't the first time we coordinated with our allies to make space exploration possible. The world watched Neil Armstrong take a giant leap for mankind thanks to scientists in Australia relaying the broadcast from space around the world. In 1975, the US and Soviet Union met in space for the first time as part of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.
▶ 1:31:40And since 2000, the International Space Station has served as a microgravity laboratory, bringing together astronauts from 26 different nations to conduct groundbreaking research. We don't lead in space alone. We lead by bringing others with us. We lead by setting the rules, shaping the standards, and ensuring that space remains uh stable, and accessible.
▶ 1:32:05Uh that's why I'm working with Congressman French Hill to pass the Taiwan and American Space Assistant Act Act, uh also known as the TASA Act. Our bill would help NASA, NOAA, and the State Department coordinate more effectively with Taiwan on space exploration, satellite programs, atmospheric research, and, importantly, science education. It's also why efforts like the Artemis Accords are so important.
▶ 1:32:29They bring countries together around shared principles and avoiding uh a destabilizing race uh in orbit. And just last week, Jordan became the 63rd signatory of the Accords, and we hope to welcome additional countries to the Accords as the Artemis program So, uh I'd like to start uh miss with Ms. Stewart.
▶ 1:32:50How were was uh excuse [clears throat] me, how does the international cooperation in space like the Artemis Accords benefit the United Uh thank you so much for that question. Absolutely agree that the Artemis Accords benefits the United States because it brings everyone together on the shared principles of supporting the outer space treaty, of sustainability and safety.
▶ 1:33:13Uh it it coordinates our efforts toward a common goal of of cooperation, of understanding where we're coming from and where we want to achieve greater scientific progress, um civilian um benefits across the board for all participants. Um the outline of uh the expanded Artemis Accords um provides some principles to ensure future space exploration is peaceful, sustainable, and beneficial to all. And that's certainly in the US national interest.
▶ 1:33:42We need to keep our reliance on outer space safe and secure. We need to be able to grow and expand into the space commercial industry, and we need to work with partners and allies for resilience, for interoperability, for greater capacity in the scientific arena. So, this is all consistent with the principles of the Artemis Accords and it's consistent with the US's own national practices even if the Artemis Accords didn't exist.
▶ 1:34:05Is that our ability to cooperate with others expands our capacity to utilize, to benefit collectively from the outer space environment, and to work collaboratively. And so, having these kind of concepts of Artemis Accords, of other normative agreement with partners and allies allows us to work together toward mutual benefit. And that is really important in the outer space arena. And I I appreciate that It highlights the fact that our security, our self-interest is deeply connected to partnership, right? We have to move together.
▶ 1:34:36Uh now, under President Biden, the State Department dedicated a special envoy for space who worked to advance American leadership in space exploration and to foster commercial opportunities. But, unfortunately, President Trump eliminated both the Office of Science and Technology co- cooperation and the science envoy program, weakening our ability to lead and coordinate globally. So again, Ms.
▶ 1:35:02Stewart, what were the benefits of having a special envoy for What opportunities is the United States missing out on now that that role was eliminated by the Trump administration? Any opportunity to coordinate the complex issues in the outer space environment, the complex sort of reliance we have from commercial to science to military and other reliance purposes is important.
▶ 1:35:28And to have one special representative who could help as an envoy bring all of that together, understand it more clearly, and even be a figure for the international community to reach out to if they had questions, if they wanted to understand better, or cooperate with us. That was valuable and that was seen as beneficial to the US national interest.
▶ 1:35:46In the absence of a special envoy, we need to understand who are the touch points, who can provide the communication, coordinate everyone, and be available to other governments and other partners in the commercial arena to help guide those conversations toward cooperation. I think, you know, in the absence of the US science envoy program at the at the State Department, specifically having that science envoy for space, we should figure out how we enable that coordination and the cooperation and the voice that can represent the US government on space.
▶ 1:36:16Thank you. My time is expired, but I appreciate you highlighting the space personnel yields good space policy, and we have to continue working together. With that, I yield back. I now recognize myself. Um Mr. At the State Department, civil and commercial space diplomacy are handled under the E family, while space security, arms control, and defense-related space issues are handled by the T family bureaus.
▶ 1:36:44This organizational split reflects the dual-use nature of space, but can create disconnects in policy execution. So, from your experience at the department, uh can you briefly discuss how or the characterize the day-to-day coordination and information sharing between the bureaus? And if you can talk about what improvements you can suggest uh for robust inter-bureau coordination to avoid sending mixed signals to allies and partners. But, let me throw one more question out there.
▶ 1:37:14In practice, how do the relevant bureaus ensure alignment and coherence when the US engages in international forums such as Conference on Disarmament, which is led by ACN, and the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space that is led by OES? Thank you so much for the question. I had the benefit of working at the State Department under the existence of a space council, which actually one of my colleagues on this panel was a excellent leader of.
▶ 1:37:45That space council helped us coordinate our international messages, helped us coordinate our commercial capacities, helped us sort of think more inclusively as to what we needed to address and how we needed to address across the spectrum of arenas we were appearing in for outer space policy. So, that was very valuable. In the absence of a space council, the US State Department does try to coordinate its messaging when there's overlap.
▶ 1:38:10And the the important part about that is that between the bureaus, we should make sure there's invited participation in all of the external representation. So, having the E family on T family you know, appearances, having the T family help advise and participate in E family conversations, making sure that externally we have a coordinated message requires everyone who's dealing with space to work together because sometimes the overlaps are not as obvious.
▶ 1:38:40But, having presence on the delegation, I think is the really important part. Thank you very much. Dr. Pace and Ms. China has made itself the default partner for developing nations seeking space capabilities.
▶ 1:38:54And through integrated packages to support developing space programs, including satellites, launch, and ground infrastructure, Beijing has expanded its footprint across the global south in ways that often embed Chinese technology standards and potential dual-use dependencies. So, what should the US do to compete more effectively and ensure we are the partner of choice for countries looking to develop a space program?
▶ 1:39:22And how can we leverage US advantages in innovation, transparency, and alliance networks while addressing the cost and financing barriers that currently favor China? Dr. Pace, you may go.
▶ 1:39:38Thank you for that question. Um, yes, China is making a lot of advances across the global south or the famous Belt and Road Initiative and there are there's a spatial component of that. I think one of the first things I would recommend is the greater use of Development Finance Corporation on the US. We have capabilities at at DFC, XM Bank, and so forth that have not really been specifically space focused.
▶ 1:40:01And some of the kinds of investments that developing countries need are quite a bit less than ports and harbors and other kinds of things that that DFC is used to. So, I think that's an underutilized capability that could be leveraged even further if it's coordinated with overseas support, say with countries like Japan and Korea that do do international aid, but we could coordinate more coherently across the Asia-Pacific region.
▶ 1:40:26And then lastly, I'll say that the Artemis program itself, we have a number of signatories that are fairly small. And then the question is, well, what are they going to do? This is where I think NASA in talking about increasing the number of robotic missions to the moon, there's an opportunity to provide more payload opportunities for those countries to contribute small payloads that they can to then help us increase the cadence of activities on the moon. And that countries that are even fairly modest can be a part of this effort.
▶ 1:40:55So, I think that will also help in outreach by giving an alternative to the China narrative that otherwise would be out there. Thank you. Ms. Bingham, can you add to that? Yeah, Congressman, absolutely. What do I see is China is using these these tools space as a tool of diplomacy and influence. So, they're expanding their presence, their ground infrastructure across Latin America, across Africa. We see countless examples of that and some colleagues at CSIS have done a fantastic job through a program called the Hidden Reach series.
▶ 1:41:23For us, space is tremendous soft power. We have this phenomenal industrial base that still leads in many areas of technology. We have this burgeoning startup ecosystem. It is soft power. And so, from states' perspective, I look at there really be three authorities and three areas that it can very much press on to leverage that soft power of space. So, commercial direct sales, our embassies, our folks on the ground encouraging US space solutions, working with our industry.
▶ 1:41:50Number two, we talked a little earlier about FMS and FMS, I it's traditionally been focused on ships and aircraft, but I think there's a space component to that that we need to look at and think creatively about. And then third, security cooperation, our security cooperation officers in these embassies is to look at those authorities and what space data and services could be brought to bear for a maritime domain awareness, resource management, etc. Thank you very much. I now recognize Representative Cut- Uh, for 5 minutes.
▶ 1:42:19Thank you. Thank you very much. I'm sorry the chairman's gone because I wanted to direct some of this to him, but thank you for sitting in for him. I'm really still trying to understand why we're talking about space today when there are so many other issues in the subcommittee's jurisdiction that we could be talking about that are happening like on Earth. We've got the war in Ukraine that continues to rage.
▶ 1:42:47We've got democracy that's backsliding in Europe. You've got energy insecurity that remains top of mind for our European allies and partners. You got USAID's dissolution which spurs worldwide health crises.
▶ 1:43:02You've got rising authoritarian influence throughout Eurasia, and that doesn't even take into account Trump's war of choice against Iran which is having an impact on Europe raising gas prices, fertilizer prices, and we've even seen the uh Iranian drone attack on Cyprus which is a critical partner of ours in the Eastern Mediterranean.
▶ 1:43:25Now, I'm wondering if perhaps we're having this hearing to distract from the administration's failure to meaningfully address any of those major issues here on Earth. Uh, I I don't mean to imply that space doesn't matter. It certainly does. Mr. Keating laid out lots of reasons why, and our witnesses have talked about that.
▶ 1:43:47But, uh, you know, if the majority were serious about space security, as the chairman alleges, they might start by supporting the very institutions that makes American leadership in space possible. Uh, they're they're doing just the opposite, as it turns out. The Trump administration has proposed cutting NASA's budget by roughly 23%. That's about $5.6 billion.
▶ 1:44:14They're slashing the science programs by nearly half, effectively eliminating dozens of missions. They removed every member of the board overseeing the National Science Foundation just a few days ago. Uh, but here we are holding hearings about space security, and yet at the same time undermining the very infrastructure that underpins our uh, in this field. And that doesn't even take into account STEM education.
▶ 1:44:45That's the pipeline for the next generation of scientists and engineers who'll be the tip of the spear when it comes to implementing some of the policies that y'all have recommended, uh, and and addressing some of the threats in space. But, the administration has proposed eliminating eliminating NASA's Office of STEM Engagement, just getting rid of it all together, which cuts programs that support students around the country.
▶ 1:45:13And at the same time, thousands of research grants have already been canceled or frozen across federal science agencies, disrupting billions of dollars in innovation. All of this is happening while we're sitting here talking about how we need to be superior in space. So, I what is the goal here?
▶ 1:45:33Cuz from where I'm sitting, it looks like a commitment to space security and the commitment to talking about space while you're dismantling the very capabilities that make space leadership possible is just counterproductive. Now, if we're serious about competition with our adversaries, we'd be serious about investing in technological leadership, serious about national security ties and where those investments can be made.
▶ 1:46:02So, whether it's on Earth or in orbit, maybe we should go back to funding some of the science that would make this superiority And we should address the urgent geopolitical challenges that are right here on Earth in front of us before we start speculating about what's going to happen in space. Now, we also hear that the White House is planning to cut NASA's science mission directorate by half in fiscal year 2027.
▶ 1:46:34Scientific research missions rely on government funding to survive. Without that funding, the programs focused on innovative research and and exploration are just going to disappear. Ms. Stewart, how do you how do you justify cutting funding and how is that going to undermine our stated priority of ensuring American space superiority? Thank you, Representative Titus.
▶ 1:46:59I agree that we need to support our outer space infrastructure domestically in the science and technology arena, including in the NASA budget context. I don't disagree with what you've said. I think the good news is that there's a lot of agreement on this panel and it sounds like there's a lot of agreement in the subcommittee of the importance of outer space for our alliance building and our partnerships and hopefully for the future of our safety and security.
▶ 1:47:26So, while um these cuts are happening and this these concerns are valid, I'm hoping that this committee this subcommittee and this panel can help encourage greater coordination cooperation for the future of alliance building but also for the future sustainability of the outer space environment. Thank you. Now you're back. Thank you. I now recognize representative Moylan of Guam for 5 minutes of your questioning. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you to the panel.
▶ 1:47:55for Guam, we're really concerned about the Indo-Pacom situation, of course, and our aggressor uh being the most western soil of the United States so close to our aggressor in China. I I think any support that we can get from uh with your efforts here would truly help out uh Americans in Guam and and uh protect our allies as well.
▶ 1:48:18But one thing we also realize as Guam continues to have increase in met uh military readiness in the build-up, especially military readiness also depends on a resilient local community.
▶ 1:48:32Now, if Guam if Guam's civilian power grid, communication lines, ports, and hospitals are targeted as a precursor to a space domain conflict, uh it directly impacts the Space Force personnel and mission. So, uh Director uh Binjian, sorry.
▶ 1:48:58Do you believe that the federal government is providing enough dual-use investment in Guam's infrastructure to ensure our space assets remain during a regional crisis? And what investments should we be making into our dual-use infrastructure on Guam to harden them against cyber attacks and other threats. Congressman, thanks for that question.
▶ 1:49:25I've been fortunate to visit Guam when I was here as a staffer on House Armed Services Committee. It's a beautiful beautiful place, incredibly important to our security. You know, I would say a few things is one, space capabilities have a role in the defense of Guam, period. When I think about you know, you mentioned for example, you know, undersea cables and connected to to to the rest of the world and to our you know, distributed forces across the Indo-Pacific. Space capabilities provide that communications that command and control, that connectivity.
▶ 1:49:55Our missile warning capabilities are key and and there are our missile defense systems key missile defense systems on Guam. Our ability to see threats coming, have that indications and warning to buy our operators and our our policy makers some time and space to be able to posture. That all relies on space-based ISR. And then in areas like maritime domain awareness is having awareness of what's going on, the Chinese fishing fleet, the gray hull vessels, etc. That relies on space. So, incredibly important.
▶ 1:50:25To your point, we we've seen the Chinese uh pursue cyber methods to penetrate infrastruc- critical infrastructure on the Chinese are also building an array of space-based ISR intelligence gathering satellites. They're pairing them with their communication networks so that they can have this high ground to see targets, bases, ports including on Guam. That is deeply concerning.
▶ 1:50:51So, um you know, I think one of the key areas for us is putting greater investment in defending our capabilities and providing more resiliency for Guam. But then also, and I mentioned this earlier, sir, is we do not want uh China to have that unblinking eye over Guam or anywhere else in the Indo-Pacific where our forces are. And so, that's going to require us taking some different and and new measures to protect our forces and our facilities on the ground. I thank you and thank you to the panel. Thank you, Madam Chair.
▶ 1:51:22I now recognize Representative Costa of California for 5 minutes. Thank you. Thank [clears throat] you very much, Madam Chairperson. I want to associate first of all my comments with uh representative from Nevada.
▶ 1:51:38I I think this is an important issue and my questions will I think um seek out to to underline that, but the issue in Iran and the issue with Ukraine I think are also important issues and we ought to be discussing those as well. all three of you agree that Russia and China are our adversaries.
▶ 1:52:04And you talked about us taking the while we still can to uh set up the goals and the rules. Is that See you had nodding there. How do you believe that the United States going to be able to do that in the development of counter space weapons and with the threat posed by Russia and Who would like to respond? Uh thank you for the question, sir.
▶ 1:52:32I think we are capable of creating the counter space capabilities necessary to hold Russian and Chinese assets at risk and that hard power is absolutely crucial to ensuring stability and deterrence, but I think that that can't be separate from our diplomatic activities of getting other countries to align with us and find their common interest with us. As I mentioned earlier, many developing countries are very much opposed to conflict in space cuz they understand their infrastructure would be placed at risk.
▶ 1:53:01And I think our allies Absolutely. that include NATO and and other allies in in Asia would be willing to do so, too, if we weren't spending so much time belittling their capabilities and their so, why would Russia and China be willing to engage assuming that we could put together a coalition of of of the uh to discuss counter space weapons?
▶ 1:53:33I I think there's several ways to try to encourage Russia and China to engage with us on the challenges of counter space weapons. And that's encourage the international community to accept uh certain parameters as in all of our interest, including the creation of debris. And so, we can start with the um prohibition on intentional debris creation, ASAT testing. What scares you the most uh you can each respond by this being an un- unattended uh with Russia and China?
▶ 1:54:03Sorry, what scares me the most on what? If if we leave this under the current status quo. Uh I think the arms racing in outer space will continue unabated with no guardrails, and we'll see the diminishment of the sustainability of the arena through creation of debris, potentially through the placement of a nuclear weapon on orbit, or other violations of the outer space treaty.
▶ 1:54:24Carrie Carrie Budge, what scares you the I think at the ultimate end, it's some it's a threat like Russia's nuclear anti-satellite capability that if deployed could lay waste to entire swaths of orbits in space that we use not just for security, but for civilian science, for commerce, um
▶ 1:54:48We haven't even begun to talk about the potential in North Korea, an outlier, to capably have the ability to to create havoc. I I and I think that's a really good point. It is it doesn't necessarily take a an orbiting space mine with a nuclear weapon to to cause significant damage. It could be a somebody with a missile program and a nuclear weapons program, the pair of the two.
▶ 1:55:13And so, what would be the goals and that you think if we were to bring together such a dialogue as you referenced it that that we should be aspiring to? What Yes, Valerie Stuart, you have your hand I think we can clearly remind the international community of the importance of the treaty and normative architectures and show that we should work to strengthen those. And then, one of the ways is to work on verification technologies.
▶ 1:55:41At the Council on Strategic Risks, we're working to develop awareness of existing technologies that can verify the outer space treaty's prohibition on the placement of a nuclear weapon in orbit. And that's really important for the international community to work on. The outer space community was negotiated in the '60s and we didn't realize how much technology could actually help strengthen that. Sir, if you concur so among the two of you with Stuart's comments. Would you add or subtract? Well, sure.
▶ 1:56:09I think that I I agree with the comments that my colleagues have made. I would just simply stress that in the meantime, we need to be looking at working with our allies on exercises
▶ 1:56:20with you more. By the way, my time's expired, but Dr. we can agree to disagree, but until Congress changes the name of the Department of Defense, it's Defense. And it may please some in some sectors to hear Department of something else, Congress ultimately has the authority with all these departments and agencies are named, and we have not changed that. Thank you. And I recognize the representative from Florida, Mr. Haridopolos. Thank you, Mr.
▶ 1:56:50Chairman, for the opportunity to weigh in today. As as many of you might know, I I chair the subcommittee on space and I really appreciate your thoughtful comments today. I'm learning every day. Um I want to focus in on the our relationship with the PRC and understand where we're at. It's pretty exciting to see that it what a lot of people thought was science fiction just a maybe a generation ago it is becoming a reality in a positive way, but we're also concerned about some of the things that the Chinese are doing in space. As you know, so important for our power grid, communications, GPS, [snorts] you name it.
▶ 1:57:20And and we see some nefarious things the Chinese can and are doing in space. And so, the question I have for you is where are we cooperating with the Where can we improve that without risking our national security? So, Director Bingham, if you don't mind if you don't mind answering that question and and then I'd like to move on to Dr. Pace as well. So, let me first say, sir, I think China is the most consequential threat and competitor to us in space.
▶ 1:57:51At the same point in time, you go back to the Cold War, we still figure out a way to talk to the Soviets to reduce risks, to reduce miscalculation. I think there's a near-term opportunity here for us to engage in some sort of dialogue with China and I'd say it should be focused around space safety. China is in the process of putting up several versions of their Starlinks, thousands of satellites.
▶ 1:58:14The way that we if there's a just to put it in real terms, if there is a risk today of a collision course between a Chinese satellite and a US satellite, the approach we take today is an email and we hope that the Chinese answer it. That's not a good strategy and it puts all the accountability and the actions on US operators. They now have much more skin in the game. We need to figure out a way to to talk with them on just reducing the risk of collisions. I think that's a a good way to start, but I'd also say we don't just talk for talk for talking's sake.
▶ 1:58:43There has They have to meaningfully come to the table. Dr. Pace, if you could add that, please. Thank you. There is a number of areas I think following on that comment about exchanging information. To put it in really basic terms, we need basically direct machine-to-machine discussions between SpaceX, Starlinks, you know, Amazon Leo, OneWeb, and the Chinese counterparts. We don't have that yet.
▶ 1:59:06Variety of political barriers to it, but the actual operators need that kind of direct information because doing an email and hoping for an answer is just simply too slow. So, we need to find a way to to get that kind of exchange. We have some cooperation with China now to deconflict around Mars.
▶ 1:59:22We deconflict around space stations. We don't really deconflict around the moon yet. That that is an area which is of increasing activity we're going to need to talk about. I think that there are a number of areas where we can do science cooperation with China, biomedical experiments, sample exchanges, and so forth. Having said that, I will also say that I'm still a supporter of the Wolf Amendment. I think that it's perfectly reasonable to ask that we clear who we're working with on the Chinese side, that there be something of mutual interest.
▶ 1:59:50I understand some people don't like it because it's very it's a symbolic sort of statement. On the other hand, I don't think it's a fundamental barrier to doing things that are clearly in our mutual interest. So, while sticking with that and recognizing others can disagree, I think there are a number of things that we can still do as we did with the Soviets about recognize who we're dealing with. Mr. If you'd comment as well. Absolutely agree that there are numerous areas we could actually coordinate or at least communicate with China regarding outer space stability and security.
▶ 2:00:21I think China equally relies on the lower Earth orbit and would be challenged by intentional creation of debris in the same way that our assets are challenged. And I think we've seen their evolution of anti-satellite testing go from a 2007 test that created 4,000 pieces of debris to a subsequent test of what we expect was a similar system not creating any debris. So, they've evolved to understand that intentional creation of debris is a challenge.
▶ 2:00:46And I think if we could coordinate or communicate the threat perceptions we see in the outer space arena in a way that doesn't disadvantage us in a way that doesn't advantage them, but in a way that equally recognizes our mutual reliance on that arena, we could work together to hopefully prevent Russia's program to place a nuclear weapon in outer space and to work to eliminate or at least diminish the intentional creation of debris. Thank you.
▶ 2:01:09And last question for Director Bingham is that what what Do we have any confidence in the Chinese given some of the things they're already trying to do in space where they've shown there any goodwill gestures they're making at this point other than Well, I think the recent era where they the Chinese communication to NASA saying they were going to maneuver one of their satellites and told us you guys don't move or move around you. That was certainly a good first step.
▶ 2:01:40A fundamental problem I think that we have with China is that they want to have a political agreement first before they'll engage in some of these lower level norm setting and I think we'd like to build confidence from bottom up norms and exchanges before getting to some sort of larger agreement. I think the reality of the Chinese large constellations and their own self-interest are going to I think hopefully drive them toward a more practical discussion, but as long as they hold out a requirement that we sign up for some unenforceable arms control agreement, I don't think we're really going to get very far.
▶ 2:02:10So, the sooner that we can get to reality I think with them the better. Thank you, Dr. Bingham. And Mr. Chairman, thanks again for the opportunity to serve today. I now recognize representative from Florida, Mr. Fine. Thank you. Thank you all of you for being here today. Look, the United States has always been the leader in space and I'm incredibly grateful to the President for reinvigorating it. I used to represent Kennedy Space Center when I served in the legislature.
▶ 2:02:38One of the few exciting things when you're in the legislature, you get invited to just about every launch that exists. And I was privileged to see both America's returned to to man spaceflight, Artemis 1 and Artemis 2. It is part of what makes America America. It's what makes our kids inspired to be involved in science and math. But as we've also seen now, it is not just about the science. It is also a potential weapon that could be used by our adversaries around the world.
▶ 2:03:06I am very concerned about China, as I know many people are.
▶ 2:03:10China sees itself at war with us. I think we don't often times look at it the same way. And so my question, and I'll open it to any of you who want to take a shot at China's building terrestrial space infrastructure around the world, but most prominently in Africa and here in the Western Hemisphere. Many of these systems could be described as dual use. Um how could a commercial or scientific ground station also support military or intelligence activities? I'll open that to whichever one of you would like to answer.
▶ 2:03:40Uh Congressman, you're exactly right. In some of the research that we've done at CSIS, we have seen China develop agreements with a whole host of different nations across the global south and in Latin America as well as in Africa. And they are putting space ground infrastructure antennas, ground station command and control sites. It it is it's basic technology, software and and hardware that allows those ground stations and those antennas to communicate with a government system or a commercial system.
▶ 2:04:08But here's the catch to to the point you were making, sir, is in China is even though they are starting to build out a commercial space sector, it's still very heavily driven by the PLA and the state. Financing, policy, even the priorities for what that commercial sector does. So it is hard for me to at this point time to here and say, "This is purely just commercial and dual use."
▶ 2:04:30take your your statement is basically there really is no difference between commercial and military space in China today. It is hard to make that distinction. If I can add one more thing, sir, is we're seeing that just them build out infrastructure, put many more satellites into orbit, but we're also seeing them build out their own space industrial base. You know, we sit here, we talk about the imbalance in shipbuilding or drones. I think people would be surprised to hear how much they are building up their industrial capacity to go big in space.
▶ 2:04:58Satellite gigafactories, aerospace cities, etc. So, what risks, and you can continue to answer, what what risks do these ground stations located in the Western Hemisphere pose to US national security, and are there are there things that our State Department can use in diplomacy to reveal the risks of hosting terrestrial space infrastructure owned by China to our allies and partners? Dr. Pace, go ahead. I would I would say one of the first things is to uh work with those countries to have them get greater transparency in what's happening on their own territory.
▶ 2:05:28So, they may not know. I I I think in many cases they don't know, or they simply assumed what they were initially told, and the ability for us to uh maybe make clear that they haven't been fully informed as to what's happening in their own territory would be a place to start. I would just add to that that in some of these countries they don't even have access to these facilities. That they've been they've been built by the Chinese. They were told that they would have access and learn from it to their advantage. These local um And then they don't. Exactly. They don't keep their word, huh? Exactly.
▶ 2:05:56And raising that point with them and highlighting that this is a challenge for their own participation in the arms uh race that's happening in outer space, and they could be implicated by supporting China's All right, I only have 1 minute left, so let me ask this question, and we'll start with you, Ms. Stewart. What actions can Congress take? What could we do to discourage nations in our hemisphere from hosting these dual-use, which may not be dual-use, terrestrial space infrastructure? What can we do about it? I I think there's several things that could be done.
▶ 2:06:24I think raising the awareness in these countries is something the State Department should be required to do through its conversations of space security dialogues, whether these dialogues are part of new new conversations or part of two plus two or military analysis conversations, but raising awareness in those countries of the need for them to understand exactly what's happening on their territory is something Congress can ask the State Department to focus on. Dr. Pace.
▶ 2:06:48I would also say this is where we can look at as I mentioned earlier Development Finance Corporation and others so that the Chinese aren't the only ones out there offering, you know, potential terms and conditions for their own developments. I think the commercial space industry in the United States supported by the US government as part of the foreign policy interest of the United States can make headway in a lot of those countries who are interested in being part of a growing commercial space industry worldwide. It's attractive and they want to be a part of it.
▶ 2:07:17I wish I had time, but I'm out of time, so maybe someone else will ask, but thank you all for being here and and addressing this this real issue that faces the United States. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Thank you and I'm going to start a second round if anyone wants to stay for a second round. I want to talk about what you were just discussing. Freedom versus a command economy. We saw this under the Soviet Union.
▶ 2:07:43Back in the Cold War, we thought the Russians were 7 ft tall and uh in fact, I commanded a tactical nuclear weapon in a special forces detachment. Um we carried a little man portable nuke. Our sole mission was to go deep to operational maneuver groups coming out of deep Russia because we thought that they could overwhelm NATO. I think we're in the same situation because we figured out the Soviet Union was a command economy and eventually that falls.
▶ 2:08:12So, we're in the same situation. Now, I want to just from several sources here about the Trump administration perspective on space. First of all, from the EO. Superiority in space is a measure of national vision and willpower.
▶ 2:08:31And the technologies Americans develop to achieve it contribute substantially to the nation's strength, security, and The United States must therefore pursue a space policy that will extend the reach of human discovery, secure the nation's vital economic and security interest, unleash commercial development, and lay the foundation for a new space age.
▶ 2:08:53That's in then that's in the EO then uh we we have to understand that for the the United States Space Force, we have we're investing more than $75 billion. It nearly doubles the budget for the US Space Force. Um and lastly, uh under this we have the depart the Bureau of Emerging Threats.
▶ 2:09:17And frankly, they are charged to safeguard our national security against cyber attacks, the weaponization of space, and similar malicious efforts. So, to say that the Trump administration is ignoring space and space security is a misstatement. And I ask unanimous consent to submit into the record these articles on the Trump administration's efforts to ensure space superiority. Without objection, so ordered. I want to thank our panel of witnesses.
▶ 2:09:47This has been I I hope I didn't miss a whole lot, but I really appreciate your testimony. And I thank the witness for their value the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the members for their questions. The members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions for the witnesses. We ask you to respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rules, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record subject to the length limitations. Without objection, committee stands