▶ 0:04:58Select committee will come to order. Good morning everyone. Thank you for being here. United States leads the world in scientific discovery because we've built a research that's rooted in openness, innovation, and excellence.
▶ 0:05:19American taxpayers invests billions of dollars each year in fundamental research to advance national security, our economy, and human The discoveries made in our laboratories today have become the technologies that drive commercialization, sustain our industrial base, and protect our nation tomorrow.
▶ 0:05:43Our free and open society is the envy of the world and we value the scientific contributions Chinese Americans and members of the Chinese diaspora have made to our The Chinese Communist Party has a different agenda. It seeks to exploit American taxpayer funded research.
▶ 0:06:08Its policies have long leveraging foreign universities, laboratories, and researchers to accelerate China's scientific, technological, economic, and military Some of those policies explicitly encourage overseas Chinese communities and individuals with cultural or familiar ties to China to acquire knowledge and expertise
▶ 0:06:38in service of the Chinese government's national China's military civil fusion strategy erases the distinction between civilian and military innovation. And the CCP's 2017 national security law makes clear there is no such thing as a truly private company in China.
▶ 0:07:02Scientific discoveries, commercial technologies, and academic partnerships are expected to serve the priorities of the CCP, including the modernization of the People's Liberation Army. China has openly declared its ambition to become the world's leading technological power and to build a military capable of challenging the United States and its allies.
▶ 0:07:29China's theft and diversion of American technology and research is not It is documented through criminal intelligence assessments, congressional and the Chinese government's own public The issue before us is not whether this occurs, but rather what we need to safeguard taxpayer funded research against China's exploitation.
▶ 0:07:59At Duke University, Pentagon funded research on military stealth technologies was ultimately diverted to China and reportedly contributed to stealth capabilities associated with the J20 fighter aircraft. We have a responsibility to ask one question. Should American taxpayer dollars be used for research with entities within China's defense research and military industrial base?
▶ 0:08:29The common sense answer is no. Subsidizing an adversary that exploits our openness for malign purposes, commits human rights abuses, and seeks to displace the United States is Over the past two years, the select committee has extensively documented research security vulnerabilities.
▶ 0:08:50Our report, Fox in the Hen House, identified approximately 2400 recently published publications involving Department of War funding and Chinese institutions, including more than half involving entities within China's defense, research, and industrial base.
▶ 0:09:11I want to thank Secretary Hexath and his department for acting on that report's The Pentagon has now strengthened postawward monitoring, enhanced compliance mechanisms, and prohibited research involving entities which had been publicly identified by the US government as posing national security and other risks.
▶ 0:09:33[snorts] Our investigation into the Department of Energy identified roughly 4,350 publications involving Chinese entities. This included more than half connected to Chinese defense institutions, more than 200 involving the seven sons of national defense universities, and dozens involving Chinese supercomputers linked to China's nuclear weapons [snorts] enterprise.
▶ 0:10:04DOE is taking some positive steps to correct these problems, but challenges remain and we look forward to discussing today how DOE can move faster to close those remaining gaps. I also want to thank the National Science Foundation for its proactive approach to update their research security policy to prohibit NSF funds from being used to conduct research with entities identified on US government restricted entity lists.
▶ 0:10:35Finally, the committee's investigative work on NASA demonstrated that meaningful reform is possible. NASA strengthened its policies, established a dedicated research security office, improved oversight, and suspended active awards that appear inconsistent with agency requirements and federal law.
▶ 0:10:57What the Pentagon, NSF, and NASA have done should be the standard across the federal government, which is why I, along with Senator Jim Banks, introduced the Securing Innovation and Research from Adversaries Act. This legislation simply codifies what Department of War has done and establishes clear governmentwide prohibition on the use of federal research funds for collaborations with entities and individuals on US government blacklists.
▶ 0:11:28The American people deserve and expect the discoveries that they fund will strengthen our nation and secure our future. They do not expect those investments to accelerate the ambitions of China. a strategic competitor that openly seeks technological and military dominance at the expense of the United States. That is the challenge before us today. And I now recognize ranking member Kana for his remarks.
▶ 0:11:55Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your leadership in convening this important hearing. Uh I represent Silicon Valley, one of the most innovative regions on Earth, and I see up close what American science can do. So let me start where I think we all agree. De Democrats, Republicans, scientists and researchers and every American agrees that we need to protect research security.
▶ 0:12:19Our cutting edge research cannot be weaponized by the People's Liberation Army or dual you dual use entities. Not quantum, not sensitive AI, not the breakthroughs that keep America safe. I have zero tolerance for the CCP stealing what American scientists build. and so do the career officials in front of us. The CCP is running a deliberate campaign to acquire our most sensitive research that is real.
▶ 0:12:46It's a persistent challenge and we need to stop it. And on that issue, we look forward, Mr. Chairman, to working uh in a joint effort. But we cannot protect American research while the administration is dismantling the very people and programs that protect it.
▶ 0:13:04The president's own budget request proposed devastating cuts to three agencies before us today, including 26% cuts to the NSF research security office, NSF's Inspector General, both of which help keep our research secure. President also proposed capping the indirect costs on grants at just 15%. This is money universities use to fund their research security efforts.
▶ 0:13:29Meanwhile, Doge fired every civil servant at NSF, NIH, and DOE that our scientists relied on to assess security risks. The administration even fired every member of the board overseeing the NSF. You cannot claim the high ground on research security while firing the people who do it and cut the programs that fund it. If we are serious about research security, we need to put our money where our mouth is. But it goes deeper than budgets.
▶ 0:13:57The bigger question is why does the CCP want our research so badly? Because it's the best in the world. America leads. We lead because of a formula that took generations to build. Open research, the best universities, and attracting the world's best talent. That leadership is what the administration is putting at risk.
▶ 0:14:19With the administration's relentless cuts to funding science attacks on foreign talent, many top scientists are moving their research elsewhere or not coming here in the first place. And due to federal funding cuts, the number of students admitted to PhD programs this fall fell by 15%. Even while overall PhD enrollment is declining, China remains our top source of science doctoral students.
▶ 0:14:44Nearly 80% of America's billion-dollar startups were founded by an immigrant or have an immigrant as a key leader. If we turn these people away without exception with visa crackdowns and a climate of suspicion, they won't stop innovating. They'll just do it somewhere else. And in the past year, that is exactly what we have seen.
▶ 0:15:03American scientists moving their labs to China, Europe, and beyond because the administration cut off their Universities are already being defunded because of their perceived politics. And now OM is proposing to hand the final say over to federal research grants to political appointees. For too many American scientists have faced unfounded discrimination and xenophobia through the failed China initiative which left left us weaker in our competitiveness and innovation.
▶ 0:15:33It's a false choice between being tough on China and protecting civil rights. We can have zero tolerance for CCP theft and zero tolerance for civil rights violations at the same time. So the path forward, first fund and staff research security. Second, protect what makes us great, our research funding, research environment and attracting the world's best talent. Third, protect the civil rights of every researcher.
▶ 0:16:01Fourth, keep funding the world's best research. That is how we keep our research out of the hands of the People's Liberation Army and that is how we make sure the next great discovery happens right here at home. Thank you, [snorts] Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Thank you, Ranking Member Kana. And uh if any other member wishes to submit a statement for the record uh without objection, those statements will be added to the record.
▶ 0:16:26I now submit for the record without objection a statement from Chairman Babin of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. Now, I'd like to introduce our witnesses today. Dr. Rebecca Kaiser is the acting chief of staff and chief of research, security, strategy, and policy at the National Science Foundation.
▶ 0:16:54She oversees NFS's research security strategy and has been instrumental in developing policies to protect federally funded research while ensuring the United States remains the global leader in science and innovation. Mr. Jeremy is senior policy adviser to the under secretary for science at the US Department of Energy.
▶ 0:17:18In this role, he advises DOE leadership on science policy and research security and has been involved in the department's efforts to strengthen protections for federally funded research in the national laboratory system. Dr. Patricia Valdez is the chief extramural research integrity officer at the National Institutes of Health.
▶ 0:17:43In that role, she provides strategic leadership on NIH's research security and integrity policies, including efforts to address foreign interference, research misconduct, and the protection of taxpayer funded biomedical research. With that, I want to welcome all of our witnesses today and thank you for being here. And Dr. Kaiser, you are now recognized for your opening remarks.
▶ 0:18:10Chairman Molinar, Ranking Member Kana, and members of the select committee. My name is Dr. Rebecca Kaiser, chief of research, security, strategy, and policy and acting chief of staff at the US National Science Foundation. It is an honor to be with you to discuss how NSF is working to protect US critical US taxpayer investments in R&D and in our domestic STEM talent from malign foreign actors.
▶ 0:18:40Research security is a vital part of the NSF mission and is essential to US economic and national security. NSF works closely with partners in federal law enforcement, including the NSF IIG and the intelligence community, as well as other federal R&D funders. The security of the US research ecosystem is the responsibility of the federal government as well as the recipients of federal research dollars.
▶ 0:19:07And NSF counts Congress as an important partner in this work. For example, earlier this year, NSF worked closely with the committee to review and strengthen safeguards governing access to NSF funded computing resources through the NSF access program. We're grateful for that collaboration and remain committed to working with Congress to bolster US research security efforts in response to current and evolving threats.
▶ 0:19:35Under the first Trump administration in 2019, NSF commissioned a report by the Jason to inform NSF's approach to research security. It found that a group of governments, notably the People's Republic of China, were improperly attempting to benefit from the global research ecosystem.
▶ 0:19:54As co-chair of the NSTC's subcommittee on research security, NSF collaborated with OSTP and agency partners on the development of NSPM33, which was released in January 2020 2021 to provide clear research security direction to the community. It's my office at NSF Orisp that stewards the AY's research security efforts, including those responsive to NSPM 33 and enacted legislation.
▶ 0:20:23This work is a matter of protecting American competitiveness and national security and requires continued vigilance, culture change, and accountability. In fact, NSF recently published a dear colleague letter notifying the research community of the agency's intent to implement a policy in FY27, which the chairman just mentioned, to prohibit the use of NSF funds to support research collaboration with entities named unrestricted entities lists.
▶ 0:20:52Under the policy, institutions will be responsible for ensuring funds are not used to support prohibited collaborations, and for maintaining appropriate oversight, to identify and address potential non-compliance before NSF funds are expended. The policy also prohibits NSF funds from being used by senior or key personnel with active positions with or funding from these restricted entities.
▶ 0:21:18This policy bolsters the NSF trust framework which guides NSF's assessment of grant proposals for potential national security risks. NSF has also implemented the prohibition on funding for researchers that participate in a malign foreign talent recruitment program including certification requirements of both research institutions and senior personnel on NSF awards.
▶ 0:21:42Researchers must also certify they have taken research security training to qualify to apply for NSF funding to advance our understanding of the full scope potential challenges and nature of the research security field through scholarly evidence. NSF established the research on research security program and funded the first cohort of awards just last year. Accountability is also vital to NSF's research security efforts and NSF works very closely with its OIG in this regard.
▶ 0:22:13NSF has taken and will continue to take swift action in response to IIG referrals. NSF has taken actions such as terminations, suspensions, and debarments. Collectively, NSF has recovered, put to better use, or protected from misuse over $20 million.
▶ 0:22:32Safeguarding taxpayer investments in research in innovation is central to US national security and international NSF welcomes international collaboration and understands that such collaborations can advance the frontiers of science for the benefit of the American people.
▶ 0:22:50The research community, industry, individual researchers and the US government must work together to identify, understand, and address the risks posed to the research ecosystem by foreign actors that do not share those values and improve awareness of these risks through increased communication and information sharing. NSF remains committed to this and we look forward to continuing to work with you on this vitally important issue. Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I welcome your questions.
▶ 0:23:22Thank you very much. Uh Mr. E is you may now proceed.
▶ 0:23:29Chairman Molinar Recommener Kana and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Energy's commitment to research security. I serve as chief of staff to the under secretary for science at the department of energy.
▶ 0:23:44The office of inter secretary for science stewards 10 national labs and provides scientific support to all 17 DOB national laboratories as well as oversees major basic research programs in advanced computing fusion nuclear and high energy physics basic learning sciences biological and environmental research. I have spent much of my 18 years at DOE working the intersection of counter intelligence, national laboratory security, and research security policy.
▶ 0:24:15Earlier in my career, my counter intelligence work focused on China related threat issues, investigations, and oversight across DOE's national laboratory complex. I later helped develop and implement departmentwide research security policies across multiple administrations. I share that background because this issue is not theoretical to me.
▶ 0:24:37I have seen how foreign governments try to exploit research environments and I recognize the importance of disciplined, targeted, and executable responses. The People's Republic of China has publicly documented policies and programs designed to acquire foreign science and technology and to align overseas expertise with national strategic objectives. That reality requires the department to protect taxpayer funded research, intellectual property, and data.
▶ 0:25:07That is why DOE has spent years building a research security framework that is stronger than it was a decade ago. DOE has long maintained foreign national access controls, counter intelligence capabilities, export control requirements, cyber security, physical security protections, and laboratory security programs. I stress this, access is not automatic and mitigations are in place if access is granted.
▶ 0:25:36DOUE continues to build on that foundation with more specific tools for the threats we face today. In a national laboratory environment, one of the most important steps has been the development and use of the science and technology risk matrix. That tool helps DOE and the laboratories identify unclassified areas of science technology where breakthroughs could have significant national security or economic security implications.
▶ 0:26:00It gives decision makers a common way to think about the sensitivity of the work before access decisions are made. DOE has also strengthened policy for foreign government sponsored affiliate activities through DOE order 46.1A. That policy prohibits participation in malign foreign tolerant recruitment programs involving countries of risk and places restrictions and disclosure requirements on other foreign government sponsored affiliated activities.
▶ 0:26:26It provides the department a clear basis to address undisclosed obligations, conflicted commitments and foreign programs designed to divert US funded research or expertise. Those tools matter because the national laboratories are complex research environments. They include open science, proprietary work, user facilities, sensitive unclassified capabilities, and classified national security work.
▶ 0:26:52A riskbased system allows DOE to support legitimate mission work while applying strong controls where the technology affiliation access or conduct creates greater risk. DOE has also made significant process progress on financial assistance through the office of research technology and economic security.
▶ 0:27:13DOE now has a dedicated capability to evaluate research technology and economic security risk before and after funds are awarded and as risks change. As part of award decisions where the risk can be managed, DOE can impose mitigation terms and monitoring requirements. where risk cannot be mitigated, DOE can decide that funding not received.
▶ 0:27:41Finally, research security must include American STEM talent development. Long-term security is not achieved only by restricting risk. It also requires building the American scientific and technical workforce that will lead in the technologies that matter most. Dwee's national laboratories are not only research institutions. They are training grounds for the next generation of US scientists, engineers, and national security professionals. The United States must remain the world leader in scientific innovation.
▶ 0:28:11DOE is congressionally directed to achieve major scientific technological advances and that mission requires exceptional and talent across the United States and where appropriate secure and where appropriate and secure around the world. The goal is not to close off American science. It is to make sure that collaboration is transparent, accountable, mission align, protected. Thank you, and I look forward to your Thank you very much. Uh now, let's turn to Dr. Valdez.
▶ 0:28:43Chairman Molinar, ranking member Kana, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the National Institutes of Health. My name is Patricia Valdez and I serve as NAHH's chief extramural research integrity officer. For nearly a decade, I have led NH's efforts to strengthen research security, promote research integrity, and address foreign interference and federally funded biomedical research.
▶ 0:29:11NIH is the world's largest public funer of biomedical research, supporting discoveries that improve health, drive innovation, and strengthen Americans America's leadership in science and technology. With that investment comes a responsibility to ensure that taxpayer funded research is conducted with integrity, transparency, and Research security is fundamental to that Safeguarding federally funded biomedical research from foreign interference helps
▶ 0:29:42protect America's scientific leadership, economic competitiveness, and national NH is committed to protecting the US biomedical research enterprise enterprise while recognizing that appropriately managed international scientific collaborations remain essential to scientific progress and US Our approach is designed to protect both security and openness through clear disclosure requirements, riskbased oversight, strong institutional partnerships,
▶ 0:30:12and close coordination with our federal partners. Since 2018, NH has significantly strengthened its research security program. We have updated disclosure requirements regarding foreign support, conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment, implemented mandatory research security training and a prohibition on participation in malign foreign talent recruitment programs and enhanced our ability to identify potential disclosure disclosure non-compliance and indicators of foreign
▶ 0:30:45Most recently, NAH introduced a new approach to managing foreign collaborations by replacing traditional foreign subawwards with linked foreign sub projects. Under this model, foreign collaborator collaborators receive separate directly linked awards providing NEH with greater transparency into foreign research activities, stronger financial accountability ability, improved tracking of federal funds, and enhanced oversight of international collaborations while continuing to support legitimate global
▶ 0:31:15scientific partnerships. Throughout the grant life cycle, NAH employs a risk-based approach to research security. We reviewed disclosures submitted with grant applications and throughout the award period to identify potential concerns including undisclosed foreign research support, conflicts of interest and commitment, funding overlap, participation in malign foreign talent recruitment programs, and threats to the integrity of the peerreview system.
▶ 0:31:42To ensure these reviews are conducted consistently and objectively, NH uses a decision matrix to assess potential foreign interference involving covered individuals and senior or key personnel. Active participation in a malign foreign talent recruitment program is automatically disqualifying while other foreign activities are evaluated individually based on the specific facts and circumstances allowing NAH to distinguish between legitimate international scientific collaboration and
▶ 0:32:12activities that present unacceptable Most compliance matters are resolved through collaborations with in re recipient institutions. When evidence indicates potential fraud or other violations of federal law, NH coordinates closely with the HHS Office of Inspector General and the Department of Justice. When matters of national security arise, we work with the HHS Office of National Security. Our efforts are producing measurable results.
▶ 0:32:39Since 2018, NH has received more than 700 allegations involving potential foreign interference and related disclosure concerns and identified possible non-compliance in 273 matters. Most were resolved through administrative action by NH and recipient institutions, including recovery of $21.9 million for 49 cases and coordination with the HHS office inspector general and the Department of Justice led to the recovery of an additional 17.7
▶ 0:33:10million for six cases. We have also seen a significant increase in institutional self-disclosures, reflecting stronger oversight and a growing culture of compliance across the research community. NH closely coordinates with federal partners to strengthen policies, improve information sharing, harmonize disclosure requirements where appropriate, and provide research security guidance to the research community.
▶ 0:33:36Research security is essential to protecting the integrity of the of the nation's biomedical research enterprise and ensuring that taxpayer funded research advances US interests. NH remains committed to strengthening its research security program while supporting the international scientific collaborations that continue to drive discovery, innovation, and America's leadership in biomedical research. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to your questions.
▶ 0:34:04Thank you, Dr. Valdez. Uh, I'll now recognize myself for five minutes of questions. I'd like to begin for all the witnesses with a yes or no question. Do you believe that federal research funds should be used to support research involving individuals or entities that appear on US government restricted entity lists? Dr. Kaiser?
▶ 0:34:30No, I don't. Hence, uh, we released our draft policy in that regard.
▶ 0:34:35Thank you, Mr. No, we do not. Dr. about this.
▶ 0:34:44So, so NH does follow all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements governing collaborations including any restrictions established by Congress and the executive branch. Um, that said, you know, we we are discussing this. Um, does your agency have a policy that prohibits the use of federal research funds to support research involving individuals or entities that appear on US government restricted entity lists? Dr. Kaiser,
▶ 0:35:16through our dear colleague letter, uh, we uh, communicated to the community our intent to develop such a policy along with the draft policy. uh it's draft right now because it does need to go through a public comment period because we're going to require a certification by all of the key personnel as well as by institutions once the policy comes into effect that they are not collaborating on the NSF project with a restricted entity and they're also
▶ 0:35:46not receiving funds or have an appointment with such restricted entities.
▶ 0:35:50Thank you Mr. Isaac. So let me clarify things here. So we view this as a risk factor, a high risk factor for the department in terms of making uh decisions. And so a if this uh is something that is disclosed or something that's discovered, we certainly would uh not be comfortable with that. Um but we do not have an ATA policy, you know, that we're currently reviewing a a policy to implement.
▶ 0:36:21Dr. Valdez. So we do regularly screen um our um awards to determine whether or not individuals are collaborating with um entities on a restricted list and as as Dr. Eisen mentioned or Mr. Eisen mentioned we we also consider that a risk factor um so it's something that is definitely um considered
▶ 0:36:42uh for those first of all I appreciate Dr. Kaiser your uh efforts to uh do the dear colleague and to get feedback um towards a policy. Um let me ask you this uh Mr. Eison and and Dr. Valdez. Why has your agency not implemented a policy to stop taxpayer funded research collaboration with groups?
▶ 0:37:10These groups have already been identified by the federal government as presenting national security, military, export control, sanctions, or human rights concerns. Can you I recognize you're using the term high-risisk factor, but given the fact that these are already on entity lists that the federal government has designated to be uh dangerous for the United States, why wouldn't you have a policy on that?
▶ 0:37:39I I'll go first. So, we are currently reviewing the NSF policy, right? It was just announced last week. This is something that we're studying with inside the department. Um, we have a series of mitigations that are in place that I am happy to discuss today. Uh, it's includes the science technology risk matrix for protecting critical and emerging technologies that are unclassified. We have, as I noted in my testimony, the foreign government sponsor affiliate activities order.
▶ 0:38:05These are attempts as well as many other things updates to DOE order 142.3C unclassified for national access program. The department has a longstanding layered approach to ensure that we have a managed research environment to mitigate risk posed by these types of collaborations types of
▶ 0:38:26Yeah, as I as I mentioned, this is something that we're we're definitely um discussing um particularly after seeing NSF's policy come out. um you know we agree that it it is it is a concerning um risk factor and it's something that when we do identify this um we we do take appropriate mitigation step steps to um alleviate the risk or mitigate the risk. Um so again you know something that we're discussing and absolutely see the concerns.
▶ 0:38:56Well, thank you for that and I would just say um that I appreciate the discussions are ongoing, but I do believe now is the time for action and the best way to mitigate the risk would be to develop a policy, publish the policy so that our entire uh federal government has a consistent standard uh that can be known throughout the community. So, thank you. And with that, uh, recognize the ranking member for his
▶ 0:39:27Thank you to, uh, all of you for your public service. Dr. Kaiser, the Chips and Science Act requires the NSF to maintain an office of research security with at least four full-time staff and a chief of research security. Uh, how many people were employed in that office at the end of 2024 compared to today? At the end of 2024, uh we had 10 people in the research security office.
▶ 0:39:55Uh we currently have five which does meet the requirement in chips and science. Of course, we would love to build and have more and we are in the process actually of hiring additional folks for the office. We have announcements out on the I want to say though that we consider uh research security a responsibility across the foundation and so we communicate with our research directorates that they need to have representatives focused on research security as well.
▶ 0:40:25Program officers do need to as well and they are required to take research and security training so that we all focus on these issues.
▶ 0:40:32I appreciate that. And why was it reduced from 10 to five? We had uh folks who did take the deferred resignation program uh and uh and uh early retirement uh as part of the that opportunity. That was their choice. Uh so they were not let go. They did choose to leave the foundation and so now we need to rehire.
▶ 0:40:54Do you think uh it was better when there were 10 people as opposed to five?
▶ 0:41:01Research security always benefits from having more people in the office. And that's why of course we have announcements out to build up the office even more. I do have to say though that we are in addition to focusing on numbers of uh people in the office, we're focusing on scaling up our research security analytics and harmonizing and streamlining our processes.
▶ 0:41:24and intent going forward is to have research security reviews as part of the overall merit review process so that we can integrate things in and have a good workflow so that it's less workload on the office and we're also able to assess our proposals for research security issues at scale.
▶ 0:41:45Thank you. Uh Mr. uh do you uh agree that these indirect costs which have been capped that many times those cover research security efforts at universities?
▶ 0:42:01I do not have a a position on that. I'm happy to take that back and get you an
▶ 0:42:06Does anyone on the panel have an opinion on it? the do you think in general the country could benefit from more funding on research security?
▶ 0:42:25Uh yes, I think that funding always is of course important uh in research security. We do focus quite a bit on the fact that uh this is a joint responsibility uh and the fact is that the community as well needs to take on these efforts. Now a lot of the information in research security is publicly available information.
▶ 0:42:50Uh and a lot of what is good research security are good practices overall in research. Uh and uh looking at your partnerships, looking at your collaborations carefully. Um and a lot of that doesn't require additional resources. Uh it just requires a good practice of research overall. Um, as an example,
▶ 0:43:13I want to cut you. I just have one minute. So, I just have one more question. Dr. Kzer, um, how concerned are you about this 15% reduction of PhDs in the United States?
▶ 0:43:25I think we I'm very concerned. We need to build up the US PhD workforce. And as you know, we uh funded the largest class of graduate research fellows uh this past year ever uh because we want to make sure that we build up the US PhD.
▶ 0:43:44Why do you think there is this decline?
▶ 0:43:47I don't I you I'm not an expert of course in the decline or in the numbers of US PhDs in this country. Um I'm sure it's a very complex issue. We'd be happy to take that back and get you more information. I appreciate it. Appreciate all the witnesses.
▶ 0:44:05Thank you very much. Uh, Representative Le Hood.
▶ 0:44:08Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our witnesses for your valuable testimonies here today. And [clears throat] I want to start off. I I think over the course of this committee since its existence as a special committee has shown and highlighted that the CCP plays by a different set of rules and standards than every other industrialized country in the world.
▶ 0:44:32And China has demonstrated through IP theft, forced technology transfers, coercive trade tactics, funding of S so ses, um that they'll exploit any tool at its disposal to undermine our national security and and steal our intellectual And I I also serve on our House Intelligence Committee and I believe it's existential that we win the strategic competition against the CCP when it comes to AI, quantum,
▶ 0:45:03and obviously advanced uh chip But brain power and intellectual knowhow uh is at the center of this competition and obviously that starts with our worldclass academic and researched institutions in the United States.
▶ 0:45:19Um, as you may know, last year this the this Congress with the work of this committee passed legislation, the Coins Act, that created targeted restrictions for outbound US investments that would fund military or advanced technology capabilities of our foreign adversaries, including the CCP. And this committee recognized the national security threat posed by those outbound investments.
▶ 0:45:44Um, and in order to fortify our national security, I believe the US needs uh full transparency and visibility into the vulnerabilities of these investments. And that includes investments in federally funded research. And we need to have a unified federal agency approach to ensure US capital and knowhow in sensitive technologies and dual use applications are not further seated to our foreign adversaries.
▶ 0:46:12Um, in my home state, uh, we have the Argon National Lab that is located in Lamont, Illinois. And from quantum computing to advanced energy technologies, the work at Argon is fundamental to America's research now and for the future and the development of that ecosystem. And we count on many worldclass academic institutions including Northwestern University and the University of Illinois as partners with that.
▶ 0:46:40My my question um to you Mr. Isan is um can can you talk about the current DOE guidance in place that provides Argon and the other national labs and these universities with effective mitigation plans to protect uh from theft in federally funded research.
▶ 0:47:02Thank you for that question. So the department has a managed research environment. What that entails is we have built on a multi-deade approach to physical security, cyber controls, export controls, and added things with this new adversarial approach to S&T acquisition as I mentioned in my testimony to protect things that traditionally did not have traditional protections.
▶ 0:47:28The S&T risk matrix is something that we built back in 2009 2019 during the president's first term. We sat down with the chief research officers of the national laboratories, explained to them that certain countries were making investments in certain critical emerging technologies, certain countries were using illicit as well as listenit techniques to acquire that technology. And three, they were having success in making progression in those topics.
▶ 0:47:57And so we challenged them to develop a list of research areas that have a red, yellow, green categorization. red areas being the topics that have the national security or economic security implications if there are breakthroughs and then in turn to restrict the access to country foreign nationals. So this is a tool that we use across the complex.
▶ 0:48:21Uh we also have as I mentioned earlier uh our foreign foreign government sponsor affiliate activities. So we have a layered approach for conflict of interests, conflict of commitment and a prohibition for talent program participation in particular applying to China and the country's risk. I need I should note that the department was the first agency to come out with a public definition and prohibition in 2019 for talent program participation.
▶ 0:48:52Uh so it has been a very positive risk mitigation. So all these policies and tools uh that have been incorporated into the contracts for the Mino contractors as manager of national labs this is the type of guidance we provide to them. We of course have counter intelligence offices that provide support to all the national laboratories. I think that's something to stress here. DOE is unique and that we are a member of the IC and we have intel as well as counterintel that support the department's mission for protection. Thank you.
▶ 0:49:22Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Representative Krishna
▶ 0:49:28Thank you, Mr. Chair. Research security is obviously a national priority, but unfortunately research is insecure not just because of external threats, but because of internal ones due to unprecedented cuts posing, I think an existential threat to our research. Dr. Kaiser. According to NSF's own website, NSF grants have helped make breakthroughs in science from smartphones to lasic eye surgery.
▶ 0:49:56But as we found on your website, when President Trump returned to office, he proposed to cut, according to your website, almost 60% of NSF's funding for FY26. That's what it says on your website, right?
▶ 0:50:11Yes, that's correct.
▶ 0:50:13And Dr. Valdez, NIH has made breakthroughs breakthroughs in science related to Alzheimer's, uh, cancer, and other diseases. And yet, according to NIH's website, President Trump proposed a 40% cut. That's from your website. That's what it says right here. Right.
▶ 0:50:34And Mr. Eisen, same story at DOE. In fact, according to DOE's own website this year, Trump wants a 20% cut at the very lab that Darren Leood just mentioned, Argon Lab in my home state of Illinois, down to $754 million. That's what it says here, right?
▶ 0:50:52I agree that it is what it says. Yes.
▶ 0:50:55And while President Trump wants to cut funding, China is investing. This spring, OECD showed that China has topped the US in R&D spend. We're killing the very research that we're attempting to protect and that's wrong. I want to transition to my next topic. Unfortunately, these cuts are part of a larger effort against science which has real life impacts. Dr.
▶ 0:51:25Valdez, I see that your posttock training was an immunology, right?
▶ 0:51:30So, let's consider vaccines and their importance. Secretary Kennedy has repeatedly cast doubt on vaccine safety and efficacy. And last year, the periodical science reported that NIH ended over 30 grants on vaccine usage.
▶ 0:51:47And now, according to the UCLA Health Periodical reported here, lower vaccination rates caused measles to reach a 30-year high, and measles is soaring again in 2026. That's what UCLA is reporting, right?
▶ 0:52:04Next, let's take screworm. Forbes reported that last year Doge ended a USID project dedicated to eradicating New World screworm, a flesh-eating parasite that threatens livestock. And now over 180,000 animals and 2,000 humans across the Americas have contracted this deadly disease, screworm. It's reached the US and as we can see here, the CDC actually activated an emergency response center.
▶ 0:52:34Isn't that what it says, Dr. Valdez?
▶ 0:52:37Yes, that's what it says.
▶ 0:52:38Next, let's take Ebola. Last year, The Periodical Science reported that Trump closed a network of NIH centers for research in emerging infectious diseases like Ebola. The stop work order called the research quote unsafe for Americans and not a good use of taxpayer funding close quote.
▶ 0:53:00And now the New York Times reports that a US citizen tested positive for Ebola in Congo as the outbreak continues to spread. That's what we see reported here, Dr. Valdez.
▶ 0:53:13That's right.
▶ 0:53:14Research security is important, but health security is paramount and these cuts are literally killing us right now. Let me turn to my final topic. Um, here's a picture of Ardom Patapian.
▶ 0:53:31Ardom moved to the US as a teenager, worked dominoes at night, attended the University of California, and in 2021 after a long career of uh, distinguished research, won the Nobel Prize for discovering how humans sense touch. But Trump froze Ardum's NIH grant to research new pain treatments within hours of Ardum posting about these cuts.
▶ 0:53:57China offered to move his lab to quote any city, any university he wanted with guaranteed funding for 20 years. Luckily, Ardom said no. Dr. Kaiser, China wants our talent. And you've previously testified in the science and technology committee that China is actively reaching out to researchers to recruit them, right?
▶ 0:54:17Yes, that's correct. A poll from the periodical Nature pointed out that 75% of US scientists are considering leaving the US. Look, Trump's cuts are driving away talent. Trump's cuts are making us less healthy. Trump's cuts are leaving us with nothing left to steal. Research needs to be secure. But if there's no research left to steal, what's the point? Thank you, and I yield back.
▶ 0:54:43Thank you, Representative Hinson.
▶ 0:54:45Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, good morning to our witnesses. Thank you for coming to testify about a a very important topic to Ians. Um, it's no secret that our academic institutions have become susceptible to influence from malign actors and that the CCP is leading the charge to take advantage of our schools and our tax dollars to going to those institutions. So, I think it should be concerning to all of us that they have found ways to manipulate that and undermine our values, our way of life and our safety.
▶ 0:55:14Um and I would like to focus today on Department of Energy uh which is truly the heart of our country's basic and physical research and will be of course leading um the the next frontier for energy availability and security. Um back home in Iowa we are very blessed to have the Ames National Laboratory uh conducting research into rare earth minerals, critical minerals, magnetics and so much more.
▶ 0:55:37um they regularly partner with our institutions including Iowa State University, allowing our students to have those hands-on um experiences in an advanced lab setting. And it was just last summer we welcomed Secretary Wright uh for a tour of the Ames laboratory to see up close that work that will help to change the future of our energy needs for years to come. So um Mr. My question is for you today.
▶ 0:55:59Um, I'm sure you can agree that uh securing our nation's energy needs from both a supply perspective and a safety perspective is a top priority and that includes of course recognizing where some shortfalls exist on the security side. Um, it should be a top priority there given how the CCP has been able to access some of our premier institutions.
▶ 0:56:18But um I want to address how federally funded research like what is happening at the AS National Lab could be at risk of abuse from serious actors from within the CCP especially with those um possibly linked to the Chinese military um and their web of state sponsored organizations.
▶ 0:56:34So can you talk a little bit to how Department of Energy really triages uh the risks of foreign instit foreign um influence at the institutions and then what review systems do you have in place to make sure those federal grants are vetted properly during that review process?
▶ 0:56:52Great. Thank you for that question. So the way that the department approaches research security is essentially in two buckets funding buckets. We of course fund the national laboratories. We also fund financial assistance and consequently we have different risk communications attached to each of those. So for as I've mentioned earlier the department's approach for the national labs is using physical security our counter intelligence presence export controls.
▶ 0:57:21There is a vetting process that has been uh enhanced over the years. Uh I should note that the vetting uh requirement was congressionally passed in 2000 attached to an NDAA uh specifically identifying certain sensitive country foreign nationals as being required prior to access.
▶ 0:57:40Do you think we need to do more there now knowing what we know now about their their influence and their efforts to in in inter intervene here?
▶ 0:57:49That's a great question. So we recognize and studying some of my oral testimony coming from a counter intelligence background our collaboration with the office intelligence and counter intelligence within a department as policy recommenders as well as policy decisionmakers is is exceptionally important. We rec recognize the evolving threat and correspondently we adjust our policies to mitigate that threat.
▶ 0:58:14For instance, and there's a lot to cover here, for the foreign talent recruitment program prohibition back in 2019, we evolved our policy based upon discussions with inside the department that that did not cover enough, right? So, we expanded the scope to include all these other types of activities uh in kind support, Chinese scholarship council, uh offers of future employment as restricted activities that have to go all the way to the secretary for approval for laboratory employees.
▶ 0:58:43So the bar is very very high in terms of our vetting system that we have in place. We have piloted a new risk management framework that the department uh initiated in March of this year and now we have fully implemented across the complex that applies a tiered vetting pro approach. We have included additional requirements under the foreign national um classified foreign national access order.
▶ 0:59:08So there's additional information foreign nationals have to provide which in turn allow our counter intelligence professionals in the field to be able to make better assessments and better advice and recommendation. And lastly on foreign national access but again there's much to cover. We have an escalation clause that is now included as a requirement for the laboratories. And what that means is that our local counter intelligence officers will make a recommendation to laboratory leadership.
▶ 0:59:35If it is high risk as the criteria I can we can discuss uh would indicate then I through counter [clears throat] intelligence has the opportunity the authority to escalate and ultimately it's under secretary for science or an NSA or the client offices that has to make those determinations.
▶ 0:59:54So a lot of that expertise and I know I'm out of time Mr. a lot of that expertise is happening on the local level and I saw you shaking your head too. So I'm assuming you're in agreement on many of these policies and um look forward to working with both of you to make sure you have what you need to um keep these bad actors out and make sure again we're we're able to do what we need to be competitive. So thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
▶ 1:00:13Thank you, Representative Caster.
▶ 1:00:15Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses for being here and all that you do to protect our uh scientific enterprise. Research security is an important issue and there is no doubt that the Chinese Communist Party uh is always trying to exploit our o the openness of our research ecosystem and uh steal our cutting edge research.
▶ 1:00:36But I am very concerned that what is happening here self-inflicted by the current administration is doing much more harm than than the outside security uh threat. Um I am so proud of American scientists and researchers. They have kept us and our whole research and scientific enterprise uh the crown jewel among nations across the globe and that has served us very well.
▶ 1:01:06It they are our greatest asset uh in the strategic competition with China. Uh but right now what we've been experiencing over the past year and a half are very significant budget and staffing cuts that undermine important research security that help us guard against the CCP but undermining our entire scientific research enterprise.
▶ 1:01:33Um it is it is shocking that now China is in the lead when it comes to R&D uh That's not acceptable in the United States of America. The tr and the Trump administration now has canled or frozen more than 7800 research grants here at home slashing billions of dollars in critical research funding. U Dr. Dr. Valdez, NIH is the crown jewel.
▶ 1:02:02Uh folks are proud of it. Everything, every dollar we invest, we get multiples back on treatments and cures. Medical research in America saves lives. It saves money. U thousands of professionals have been forced out of the National Institutes of Health and halfway through the fiscal year, the NIH has only spent about 15% of the 38 billion it has for grants and contracts.
▶ 1:02:28I hear it at home for my academic institutions, my um cancer research center of researchers having to leave because they're they don't have any certainty in their grants. The delay has led to the suspension of research projects and of ended careers. Now, do you anticipate that NIH will be able to fully execute its scientific research funding this fiscal year?
▶ 1:02:56Yes, definitely. grants management staff are working um very hard at the moment to get that to get those funds out. So it is
▶ 1:03:04even with only 15% being distributed so
▶ 1:03:08Yes, that is the plan and we definitely are working hard to do that.
▶ 1:03:12Dr. Kaiser, just a few months ago, the Trump administration dismissed all 22 members of the National Science Board. that is the governing body for uh the National Science Foundation that that advises Congress and the president on science and engineering. It helps guide the budget.
▶ 1:03:31That group helps provide continuity on long-term research Uh what is the justification for just sending an email to these public servants that are guiding our scientific the National Science Board uh is appointed and serves at the discretion of the president. Uh and so I respect respectfully defer that question given that they are presidentially appointed.
▶ 1:03:57They they're appointed for six years staggered terms to ensure that kind of continuity and independence. But what this does it it it truly undermines America's leadership in science. It disrupts grant approvals. Uh it slows research progress. And if you were going to say China, what would you do to sabotage America's scientific uh leadership in the world? I think that would be one of the things at the top of the list. Same same uh Mr. at the our national laboratories.
▶ 1:04:28They again are the crown jewel, the envy of the world when it comes to to research and innovation and in energy. Um, how does how do you justify substantial budget and scientific and personnel cuts to our national laboratories at a time that we are trying, we're in this strategic competition with the Chinese Communist
▶ 1:04:55I'll have to defer that question. I'm here to testify about the PRC targeting national laboratories and financial.
▶ 1:05:02I understand it. It was more of a rhetorical question, but but the the call is coming from inside the house, that horror movie. Um, yes, we need to ensure that research security is funded adequately, but gosh, we need to make we need to keep the United States of America preeminent in the world when it comes to scientific research in health, in energy, all across the board. And right now, this administration is taking a hatchet to our leadership, and that's not acceptable.
▶ 1:05:32I yield back my time.
▶ 1:05:34Thank you, Representative New House.
▶ 1:05:37Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, appreciate everybody being here to discuss this very important topic. And I got to tell you, I'm more concerned now than I was before the hearing started. Uh, not pointing fingers at just any anybody in particular on the panel or administration. What we are witnessing has been going on for a long long time.
▶ 1:05:57And um I have a couple basic questions I'd like like you to if you can answer it could become could could be under the heading we don't know what we don't know but basically what have we lost what kind of stuff have is now out of our hands it shouldn't be anybody know is that a too long a list to ask to respond in five minutes
▶ 1:06:20I think it it's very challenging in the areas of fundamental research because sir most of The challenges we face are the theft of the knowhow itself, right? And also the the unethical recruitment of the people. Uh we've heard about people who have departed this country and have gone to the PRC uh top talent.
▶ 1:06:45We've uh seen many cases where the the valuable gold ideas of our folks are being taken by those in adversarial countries. And this is why we have to focus diligently and as you've heard, we all are on focusing on safeguarding our system. What we don't want to do, however, is close our system down.
▶ 1:07:10No, I agree with that and I appreciate uh the sentiment there. Um but but I hope I can agree with you at the end of my questions in reference to Chairman Molinar's uh ask especially to to to you Mr. and Dr.
▶ 1:07:28Valdez in in reference to the NSF policy that coordinated with the Department of War restricting the research collaboration with entities that are um on our list of bad actors. What I'm looking for is a is a clear commitment on the part of your agencies that yes, absolutely we're working toward that because we want we want to close this door.
▶ 1:07:53We want to make sure that that we are not losing this the not only the individuals but the information the research uh results. So can I hear that that strong commitment from both of you? So, as as I noted earlier, the policy that NSF and their dear colleague letter came out last week.
▶ 1:08:17We are currently reviewing it and we understand what's been identified there and happy to work with you and this committee um over the coming months. Thank you. And I'll say we we clearly understand the risks and you know this is something that you know I myself can't say you know we're doing this tomorrow but again it's something that we're discussing um seriously because you know completely understand the risks um it's something that in the meantime we we are mitigating
▶ 1:08:48um where we can.
▶ 1:08:50So I still don't hear that maybe the the words that matter on the paper. Yes. But you're committed to the goal. Is that is that fair to say?
▶ 1:08:58We are committed to the goal.
▶ 1:09:01Mr. is that
▶ 1:09:03we are absolutely committed to the goal of managing risk. And this is the way that we've done this is through things like the S&T risk matrix, talent program prohibitions, and a series of mitigations on the financial assistance side, which I'm happy to elaborate on.
▶ 1:09:17Well, you guys are obviously steeped in this stuff much more than we are, but I'm just looking for that. A lot of people are listening to this. We we invest a lot of money into these programs and we want to make sure that we protect them as strongly as we possibly can. So I'm my district is home to the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory which very proud of. Um a lot of it research projects are conducted there. Um Mr.
▶ 1:09:43I want to I want to understand how DOE's research security strategies provide those safeguards we've been talking about but still uh remain flexible uh for potential widescale um adoption or commercialization. So we're it's a really tough thing to balance but could you elaborate on that? I know you talked about it some.
▶ 1:10:11Absolutely. That's that's a great question. So as I mentioned earlier, we have these various mitigations across the complex. S&T risk matrix, talent program prohibition, vetting, enhanced vetting for for national access, right? So we and I think all three of us would agree need to strike the right balance from protecting as well as pro promoting. Uh so the office of technology commercialization with inside of department of energy is responsible for initiatives to promote commercialization of technologies.
▶ 1:10:40So when areas have reached that high level of technology readiness level, that's when we would move forward with those. But again, we have to be cognizant that it is a balancing act. We want to promote commercialization, benefit US interests, as well as protect what's
▶ 1:10:56I appreciate that. Well, five minutes goes by quickly. I'd love to continue talking to you guys about this, but thank you for being here, Mr. Chairman.
▶ 1:11:03Thank you. And I do want to alert the members. We will have a little bit of time for follow-up questions if it uh of interest. And Representative Tuda,
▶ 1:11:13thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you all for being here today. A really quick yes or no question for all of you. Um do you support bans in general based strictly on nationality, not on affiliation, not on risk, but just nationality? Yes or
▶ 1:11:28No, not at all.
▶ 1:11:31We do not. However, Congress has passed with the
▶ 1:11:36uh NDAA uh 25 section 312112 prohibits country foreign nationals
▶ 1:11:43in the weapons laboratories and so I want to be very clear that there is congressionally mandated we will execute aggression and then um citizenship is one factor in terms of evaluating risk
▶ 1:11:53just based on that yes I'm I'm assuming it's a yes but I'm hearing from you Mr. horizon that we have precedent, legislative president.
▶ 1:12:01We have a legislative president that has directed the department to do this and it is a risk factor.
▶ 1:12:04Thank you, Dr. Valdez.
▶ 1:12:06Right. We wouldn't No, we don't we don't support the restriction.
▶ 1:12:10Thank you. You know, I I just asked this question because we've had a lot of discussion today about how our national labs are are the crown jewel. I heard it referred to and it's not just the physical labs that make it the crown jewel, make it the tip of the spear in terms of leading research domestically, but especially globally. It's the people that sit inside of it.
▶ 1:12:29And I think we can all agree that while we have a lot of home pride right now, especially celebrating our 250th birthday, the very best and the brightest, aren't necessarily just US born and bred as well. We want to make sure literally that we take all of the vetting processes Mr. Eisen that she said is in place, very rigorous access is not guaranteed, but the very best researchers are sitting in those labs.
▶ 1:12:54I asked this question because there is a proposed NDA amendment uh that could come up this year um in the house that would prohibit Chinese nationals from physical access to our national labs. And I would like to ask you what would the impact on research conducted in our national labs be if this were to pass? What kind of research projects would this have impacted?
▶ 1:13:19uh Chinese researchers make up not a nominal or minimal amount of researchers that are sitting in our national labs that need access physical access to our labs. So if this NDA amendment were to pass, what would what would the impact be on research um here in this in the United So I can't comment on any specific legislation but I would say that I think it's very important as a first principle that the department has been congressionally
▶ 1:13:49mandated to execute missions and fundamental research applied topics as well as national security topics. This is what Congress has directed us to do. uh we operate um at an environment of risk and we have tools as I've mentioned earlier with the S&T risk matrix our risk management framework to mitigate that risk. We operate in a an environment of risk and we have processes procedures to uh mitigate it.
▶ 1:14:20Anyone else want to take a stab at this? We focus on behaviors and actions uh when we when we look at assessments of risk uh and uh so we look at all of our grants and uh look at the risks across the board and have those pulled out. Uh so uh so I think that's really important that we equally apply our risk uh assessment across the board
▶ 1:14:48and likewise our focus is on behaviors um not citizenship necessity or um at all. So want to make that clear. So, if I'm hearing you all, if we arbitrarily apply simply a nationality test, no other risk factors that are already embedded in many of the rigorous protocols that exist, it sounds like you will not be able to potentially meet your congressional mandate to be able to conduct critical research in areas that are being done at
▶ 1:15:18the national labs. Could you agree to that? you would lose researchers potentially. Again, simply based not on risk, not any kind of affiliation, but simply nationality. Yes or no, you'll lose researchers, critical researchers that have been leading projects.
▶ 1:15:32You can't say which ones because that's a, you know, you could probably provide that later, but will we not be cutting you off at the knees in terms of meeting these congressional mandates to do research in important I'll say that that definitely would restrict um the number of individuals that can participate in the research.
▶ 1:15:51I do have to say a big focus of the National Science Foundation however is making sure that we promote the US workforce as well and STEM uh workforce here. Uh so it has to be a both. Um it has to be that we of course have uh we promote uh those who choose to stay in the United States as well as make sure that we have that organic US workforce promoted. I 100% agree.
▶ 1:16:15But I think we also know that a significant amount of those who do their doctoral research work from other countries, India and China do in fact stay on beyond five and 10 years and contribute meaningful long-term research for the benefit of the United States. So to exclude them again would be not making sure that the best and brightest are sitting in our crown jewels. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
▶ 1:16:36Thank you. Uh Representative Suazi.
▶ 1:16:40Mr. Chairman, thank you so much. I want to apologize for being in and out of the meeting. I have a ways and means markup right now to the witnesses all so I Uh let me just tell you a couple things about me before I ask my questions. Number one is I'm really concerned about China and the Chinese Communist Party and their malign activities and they're trying to steal uh intellectual property from us. They're cheating on a regular basis.
▶ 1:17:02I'm I like I think most of the members of this committee are very concerned about the Chinese Communist Party and their efforts to try and steal information from us on a regular basis. I'm also uh in my district am home to the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratories and the Feinstein Institute. Uh I'm very close by to the Brook Haven National Labs. Uh I'm very concerned about the cuts that have taken place in this administration uh to a lot of research.
▶ 1:17:30I'm concerned in learning in this hearing about the cuts that have been made to the security personnel in each of your different departments as well as general research uh uh grants. I'm concerned about the politicization of the granting of grants by political appointees as opposed to uh career folks. Uh I'm also a first generation American.
▶ 1:17:54My father was born in Italy and faced tremendous discrimination after serving in World War II and going to Harvard Law School. He couldn't get a job at a law firm because nobody liked the Italians after World War II because they had teamed up with the Germans during World War II and he faced tremendous discrimination. Went on to live a great American success story. So with all those things in mind, I want to ask a couple of you a couple questions. Dr.
▶ 1:18:19Kaiser, are you concerned about the cuts to the National Science I I have to say we're in a process now of building a and to me it is beyond first of all we are very appreciative of the appropriation that NSF has received from Congress but what we need to focus on is how we spend our funding.
▶ 1:18:41Are you a career person?
▶ 1:18:43I am a career person.
▶ 1:18:44Are you concerned about the cuts that have taken place to NSF already?
▶ 1:18:47We have to build and we have to focus on
▶ 1:18:50So you're not upset about the cuts that have already taken place? I um you know my personal feelings are not what I'm here to talk about. I'm here to talk about how we do good.
▶ 1:18:59Mr. Are you concerned about the cuts that have taken place?
▶ 1:19:03The department will execute the president's budget. Miss Dr. Valdez, are you concerned about the cuts?
▶ 1:19:09Well, I I need to clarify one thing is that you know my team research security, we have not experienced cuts ourselves, but I understand there are cuts elsewhere. Um but again, I I I don't have any comment.
▶ 1:19:19So your commit your security team is whole right now. That's right.
▶ 1:19:23And how about your security team, Mr. Is it is it whole or are you trying to build it?
▶ 1:19:29We have a very robust research security process as well as team. We have an office intelligence and counter
▶ 1:19:35Has it been cut or is it the same as it's always been?
▶ 1:19:37And we are always looking to enhance the capabilities. It is adequately supporting the risk management framework that we have.
▶ 1:19:45So was it cut at all or not?
▶ 1:19:48Was the security team cut? There were no
▶ 1:19:52there were no cuts that I'm aware of. There are
▶ 1:19:55same numbers same number of people it's been for the past let's say three or four years.
▶ 1:20:00I I think that there so yes individuals have left uh that have worked in research security.
▶ 1:20:07Have they been replaced?
▶ 1:20:10Uh I am not aware. I'll have to take that back for you.
▶ 1:20:12Okay. And Dr. Kaiser, I heard you speak earlier about how you had 10 people. You went down to five and you're going to try and hire more people back.
▶ 1:20:17Yes, sir. I'm concerned about the fact that energy and and uh NIH have not uh developed a policy yet also as the chairman was pointing out earlier regarding uh security policy and entities that have been identified already. And that's something that can't wait. I mean that's that's like hair on fire. We got to get moving on this stuff. That's not like we're in discussions. There's got to be a goal set and a date set and say we're going to have a policy regarding this soon. And I know that you don't do that yourselves. You have to listen to higher-ups.
▶ 1:20:47But I mean we should be advocating as I think the chairman is that these policies be set up as quickly as possible. So we have to try and stop these malign influences from having access to our data. The my concern is we have to balance that with at the same time that there are a lot of Chinese Americans or there are Chinese nationals that have come to school in America or research in America that are very important to our institutions and we can't allow the the concern we have with the Chinese Communist Party uh to discriminate against people.
▶ 1:21:17We heard the balance between our security concerns and our civil rights concerns. That's a very tough thing to do and it's important that we try to work together Democrats and Republicans, professionals, career people and political people to find that balance. But that's why we need these policies to be developed and done so now.
▶ 1:21:34uh because we all I think Democrats and Republicans each of you as professionals want to protect the security of the United States of America and not give an unfair un toward advantage to our adversaries the Chinese Communist Party while at the same time not discouraging people who are brilliant scientists from working here in the United States of America. So I want to thank all of you for your uh professionalism and for your devotion to our country. We appreciate it very much and I yield back.
▶ 1:22:04Thank you. Now we're going to have a second round for those who have additional questions and I'd like to begin. Uh Mr. during our DOE research security investigation. The committee received concerning allegations regarding DOE's Office of Research Technology and Economic Security RTES.
▶ 1:22:25specifically that RTES practice is always to get to a yes on vetting awards, not to conduct vetting on national lab scientists who are covered and that some program offices have pressured analysts to downgrade the assessed risk of research collaborations with China to avoid imposing safeguards.
▶ 1:22:50Mr., Can you state unequivocally whether or not these allegations are true? So, thank you for that question. So, since these allegations have been raised to this to us by the committee, uh our office of general counsel has been leading an investigation. So, that investigation is incomplete. But we take those allegations very serious. It would be unacceptable if those allegations end up being true.
▶ 1:23:17and we will look forward to getting back in this committee uh through the appropriate channels at the conclusion of that investigation.
▶ 1:23:23Thank you. Uh Dr. Kaiser, NSF manages and funds with the tune of $65 million the secure center to strengthen research security across the US research enterprise. Yet, several universities participating in the Secure Center have been identified in our committee's investigations involving high-risk research collaborations with Chinese military entities or US government entity listed institutions.
▶ 1:23:53Should American taxpayers trust institutions with research security failures to establish and promote research security standards? We appreciate the information that this committee uh and that your team provided to us. When we received the information, we immediately went to the awardees uh and asked them to respond, specifically respond to what was in there.
▶ 1:24:20We reviewed the responses and although we did not see violations of terms and conditions, we are very open to additional information that this committee is bringing forward and we will look into those. Now, part of the reason why we did our new policy that we introduced is for the very reasons that the committee has expressed concerns about uh that we do need to address uh these concerning collaborations with restricted entities by being very clear across
▶ 1:24:51the board to institutions about what is prohibited on NSF funding and what is not. And so I I'm very confident on this uh on this policy going forward to address the concerns that you
▶ 1:25:06Thank you. Dr. Valdez, does the NIH consider the national security implications of proposed research and research collaborations when conducting pre-awward due diligence and proposal We do we we have a very robust system to look at risks um during all the whole life cycle of the awards.
▶ 1:25:28Um and you know we we as I mentioned we have a decision matrix that's posted online where we look at factors including you know foreign affiliation, foreign funding um talent programs, talent recruitment programs and when we identify concerns we go to the institutions. Now, if those if we learn more and there's appears to be an egregious concern, there may be some, you know, civil concerns or or criminal concerns, we will raise that to our office of the inspector general.
▶ 1:25:56Um, and if there's a national security concerns, we can raise those to the HHS office of national security. So, we we do because we're a funding agency, we do rely on our agency partners to be able to um assist us when it comes to the national security concerns. And just a follow-up question, uh, Dr.
▶ 1:26:15Valdez, biomedical research is one of China's strategic priorities, and the CCP has made significant investments to acquire foreign biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and genomics. What specific steps has NIH taken to protect federally funded biomedical research from foreign exploitation, and where do you believe additional authorities or resources are needed? Right.
▶ 1:26:43So, so we have taken um steps to protect the controlled access data. So, human data um when there's now a restriction individuals that are located um in institutions in China or other foreign countries of concerns can no longer access that data. Um human biopecimens cannot be um shared with or sent to um organizations in China or associated with China. So we we we we definitely um take these take this very seriously.
▶ 1:27:12Um and we look forward to hearing other thoughts on you know what else we can do. But I but I think you know we we we we do conduct um due diligence um on on all awards as they're going through as as they're being conducted. So um we hope that that is is um we'll catch any type of concerns. But like I said, we do work closely with our other offices and our inter agency partners um when there's national security concerns.
▶ 1:27:40Thank you very much. Representative
▶ 1:27:43Thank you, Mr. Chair. [clears throat] I just wanted to follow up on uh Representative Swis's line of questioning. I think what he was getting at was not just cuts but overall attrition. How many people, how many employees have you lost in the past 18 plus months right now?
▶ 1:27:59[clears throat] And I think as it was mentioned earlier on the dis the NSF workforce fell by about 30.3% NIH lost about a thousand employees with a potential additional 1,200 um anticipating leaving as well and the department of energy lost more than 2600 employees as well. Um so I do think the fundamental question is you've got this accelerating rate of attrition um a chilling effect almost that I see happening right now.
▶ 1:28:26In addition to that, you have proposed budget cuts to the office of the inspector general, the chief research security strategy and policy office millions of dollars which will reduce your capacity to follow up on, you know, the the claims made by this committee for you to actually investigate.
▶ 1:28:45Do you feel you have the workforce right now to both respond to this committee to be able to keep that same rig rigor in terms of protocols to keep our research safe and meet the missions and congressional research mandates that we you have been given as a result of all of these staff losses that we have seen over the last 18 We have a robust hiring plan at NSF and uh as acting chief of staff I know this well because I every day
▶ 1:29:15uh receive uh the proposed hires the names of the candidates uh to approve and uh we're hiring we're hiring up we're focusing quite a bit on early career staff we're focusing on research security staff but I guess the question for me Dr. Kaiser is I appreciate that. I'm glad that you're hiring up, but you're already still at a delta. You've lost a considerable amount of people. Do you think you're again I'd rather us be adding, not subtracting, not even trying to get back to ground and level where we were.
▶ 1:29:46Do you feel fundamentally, I don't want to run out of time here, that a result of the kinds of actions you all have seen, proposed budget cuts, whether Congress was able to fill that hole that the administration was proposing or not, the dozing that we saw, the restrictions on research, the freezing of funding, all of these things, do you feel you can overcome what has been a massive chilling effect on research? And how long is it going to take us to dig ourselves out of this hole?
▶ 1:30:11I fear that generationally we have lost researchers and individuals willing to commit themselves to the United States and to our national labs as a result of the actions that we have seen. We're we are building and we're focusing on uh funding uh good science uh that is selected through our merit review process.
▶ 1:30:34Just yesterday, we re we announced several new research innovation engines and um these are exciting projects that are focused on fundamental research across the region. So, we're building an exciting ecosystem and we're continuing to do that. Anyone else want to weigh in on this? If not, I I would just say, you know, I'll yield back my time chair.
▶ 1:30:59I appreciate that you're building, but honestly, you're still filling a hole, a giant hole that was left as a result of the exodus, the mass exodus of research we have seen from all three of your institutions. We're going to have to do it faster. And quite frankly, the kinds of xenophobic nationalist policies that we are seeing right now are not going to help us get the very best and brightest and help you build versus just fill back what you've lost. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield
▶ 1:31:22Thank you, Representative Nun.
▶ 1:31:26thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. you have remained laser focused on this issue uh with the China Select Committee and my colleagues on both sides of the aisle identifying the bipartisan nature of this. I want to thank the National Science Foundation for awarding Iowa and Nebraska the rural stamina biio manufacturing engineering grant. This brings $ 160 million of investment into biio manufacturing and agricultural innovation over the next decade into the entire region.
▶ 1:31:52With NSF's investment, Iowa is turning federal funded research into world-class results. Your leadership in this is huge. And we're bringing breakthrough uh technologies from our top tier research labs and universities straight to our factory floors to our advanced manufacturing and strengthening our rural workforce, ensuring that the future of America's bio uh innovation is happening not only in America, but right in the heartland of this country.
▶ 1:32:17Iowa and particularly Iowa State has been a leader in this space bringing together partnership across state lines with over 70 public private partners including both the University of Iowa deary community college many of our startups and venture capital the list goes on this is a story of success being led by our team here we're very very thankful on this front I also want to take caution here because as you'll also note we're going to point to some of the ongoing challenges and gaps in this space and while we want to grow it here we also want to make sure that it's maintained here look we saw saw this firsthand
▶ 1:32:48in a Monsanto case that took place in my state. Both myself and my colleague, uh, Representative Henson here know that the Chinese actively target the type of development that's happening in the United States. Just miles up the road from my house, we had a Chinese national come and steal seed corn right out of the ground to take it back to China to replicate steel. And this is in 2011 when you could still steal corn right out of the ground. Now you can just go on a computer and take that intellectual property theft.
▶ 1:33:18This threat has only grown more sophisticated since that time. In just the last two years, federal agents have foiled two separate plots by CCP agents to smuggle pathogens, including fungus, the FBI and the Department of Justice called a potential aggro terrorism weapon into research labs, including in the chairman's own home state. When the CCP steals from our fields, threatens our food supply, they threaten our national security. And they're finding more and more endemic ways to do that.
▶ 1:33:45That's why I introduced this year's Plant Act to put up common sense guardrails to aggressively hold bad actors accountable who exploit regulatory loopholes and commit agro terrorism right here on US soil with maximum penalties for anyone linked to adversaries like the Chinese Communist Party. And the CCP is aggressively targeting American technologies at every stage, whether it's in private research or whether it's in our university labs.
▶ 1:34:08This means research security cannot stop at the university gates or end the moment a federal grant is awarded. So, Dr. Kaiser, I'd like to speak with you. It's no secret that our innovation pipeline includes every sector as we just highlighted here. Many breakthroughs generated by NSF initiatives like rural stamina can be designed to scale and commercialized through our private industries.
▶ 1:34:30Do you believe the current research security efforts at NSF sufficiently protect the taxpayers's innovation as they transition out of the university labs and onto the open
▶ 1:34:40Thank you for mentioning that and we're very excited about rural stamina as well. Well, it's one of the research innovation engines that we uh that we celebrated yesterday and I'm glad that you mentioned it and the research security efforts because built in to the research innovation engines program as well as our programs that are more on the cusp of innovation and commercialization. We've built in research security efforts. We do research security assessments of those proposals.
▶ 1:35:09We do our due diligence and we focus on that. We also do it for our small business innovation research program and STR program. Uh and uh we have focused uh a large con cadre of contractors specifically on that space because of our concerns. It's growing because a lot of uh university academics as you know are starting businesses. That's right.
▶ 1:35:33And uh that's a good thing. It's very exciting. But there's also an increased research security risk that we have to focus on.
▶ 1:35:39Dr. Kaiser could not agree with you more. Thank you for being a resource to our hometowns on this, our innovators and our universities. Look, 20 years in counter intelligence, and we know there are 40,000 shell companies operating here with direct ties to the CCP. The very fact that they could be in the supply chain and stealing our best technology is something we collectively on both sides of the aisle, I think, have a responsibility to fight. You're helping lead that charge. I want to thank you personally. With that, I yield the remainder of my time to the chair.
▶ 1:36:03Thank you very much, Representative
▶ 1:36:07Thank you, uh, Mr. Chairman. And I want to directly follow up on my colleague from Iowa's line of questioning around intellectual property. So, thank you uh Representative Nun for setting this up for me. Um because he did mention, you know, the stealing of the seed directly out of the the cornfields of Iowa near Bond Durant um in Pole County. The same thing happened in Daert and Tama County um in my congressional district. The Chinese businessman was conspiring to steal those seeds directly from the farm.
▶ 1:36:30And so we know um when you talk about intellectual property, Ians know that firsthand how far China will go literally digging in our fields to steal um to dominate the global market. So um a se a sector and biotech are equally as important as uh many of the critical research projects that your agencies are handling and um I want everyone [clears throat] listening to know that we are committed to helping to protect our research and the intellectual property from the CCP. Um so Dr. Dr.
▶ 1:36:56Kaiser, I want to follow up on on my first line of questioning because I I saw you were both in agreement on some of the um the uh blocks that need to exist and the and the checks and balances that need to exist um to make sure we're vetting people property while still making sure we're not closing things down. You said we don't want to completely shut everything off, right? We want some open uh collaboration there um as well. So, um, thank you for your efforts to protect NSF there, but can you speak to, um, and kind of wanted to follow up on my first question about is there more that Congress needs to do here?
▶ 1:37:26Uh, you have, uh, policies in place to make sure that these protections are being executed, but do we need to be doing more uh, to proactively give you the tools to properly bet things? One of the big areas uh that that we are focusing quite a bit on and I think would be very helpful is uh we need increased uh um authorities for information sharing among our agencies.
▶ 1:37:48Uh many times we NSF will see an issue um with a particular research project that involves particular researchers and we're limited in sharing that information and those concerns with other agencies.
▶ 1:38:02Um, as an example, uh, I just we just did some due diligence on, um, NSF ocean infrastructure proposals, and we found several that had ties to restricted entities, and these are in areas such as deep sea mineral extraction, underwater positioning and navigation, sealoor cables. As you can imagine, these are areas that are vital to our national security and when we find issues, we need to be able to share those with our fellow agencies.
▶ 1:38:31So that type of thing and that type of structure to be able to share information would be very helpful.
▶ 1:38:36Yeah. Well, I mean, if you look at prohibited entities lists as they stand right now, those should match, right? You want to make sure that every single malign actor is being recognized by every single government agency. So, one hand needs to know what the other hand's doing. I think that's also important from a taxpayer protection. um perspective because you think about us utilizing those resources effectively. Um we can avoid duplicative efforts if you are able to to talk more. So um would be excited to work with your office and with you directly on what more we can do there.
▶ 1:39:06Um what about state and local partners? I mean obviously we talk about Iowa State University collaborating with Department of Energy. Um is there more that we need to do on authorities so that you can have those same conversations with uh those partners as well? So I think one gap that I have noticed over the years is a lack of clearances for security clearances available for university employees.
▶ 1:39:34I think sometimes and perhaps more than sometimes it's important for university professionals as well as other types of decision makers to have the opportunity to receive classified briefings so that they are fully informed of the threat and understanding why we might make recommendations or various types of mitigations.
▶ 1:39:54Um, and I don't think it necessarily needs to be expansive in terms of how many people have those clearances, but I do think that there needs to be a process where those types of things are facilitated a little bit more easily.
▶ 1:40:07Yeah. Well, and certainly understanding a full context of why they're working on something um, and those immediate threats and how important time is of the essence, right? We understand time is money. So, um, did you have anything to add, Dr. Valdez Valdez, to that?
▶ 1:40:20And I agree with both of them. Um I I'll mention that I do appreciate um Congress raising this issue. So I think the more that that this issue is raised with the community, people understand, you know, what the problems are and what the concerns are, I think is important. So appreciate it. Thank you.
▶ 1:40:34All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
▶ 1:40:36Thank you, Representative New House.
▶ 1:40:38Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you all for being here with us. Appreciate it very much. Uh let me start with you, Dr. Valdez. Um, it's my understanding that the NRA NIH has uh issued roughly 8,600 fewer awards than the average in fiscal years 21 through 24. Um, this is about 21% decline in in uh awards and a 13% uh decline and in obligated funding.
▶ 1:41:08Um, as you can imagine, it's impacted a lot of universities such as Washington State University in my own district um who are currently waiting uh many proposals uh that are pending. Um first of all, NAH has made a lot of progress implementing implementing disclosure requirements and foreign support reporting, conflict of interest oversight and security safeguards and research. All of which is much appreciated and thank you very much for putting those in.
▶ 1:41:37But uh I'd like to understand your insight as to why institutions are still experiencing delays and to follow up on that, what's the plan to reduce the backlog that's growing of pending proposals uh while still maintaining a rigorous research integrity standard?
▶ 1:42:00Yeah, thank you for the question. Um, you know, we have put regarding the research integrity and and risk screening, we have put systems in place that make um those security risk screens um faster for for the grants management staff. And I will say the plan is to get the money out and to get the funds out. Um the staff are working incredibly hard um right now to to get that done.
▶ 1:42:21And so we we absolutely understand the concerns and um we we do plan to get all get all the proposals out and get the funds out that we um that we that we should by the end of the fiscal year. So that's something ongoing. Um and you know we do have a lot of focus on research integrity.
▶ 1:42:40You know each of the funding institutes has their own research integrity officer and so when there are concerns identified um those are brought to our my attention in the central office of office of external research um and we do a lot of you know training as well. So I think I think the staff you know program officials who are reviewing um the the uh potential awards um are very very knowledgeable and so they bring concerns to us um as well.
▶ 1:43:06So I think you know having the staff understand what red flags um to look for is is important um and and having again the resources and the systems that we have in place is helpful as well as far as identifying the risks. So but we do understand and we do hope to get we plan to get the money out by the end of this school year.
▶ 1:43:25Thank you. I appreciate that. Uh Dr. Kaiser, if I could ask you a question. you in your testimony you discussed the NSF's role on JCOR's research security subcommittee and underscored the value of collaboration between the NSF the DOE and the NIH uh so let me ask you in your opinion at present does the federal government have sufficient oversight to coordinate research security across
▶ 1:43:56agencies or do information silos create gaps that could allow broader risk patterns and repeat offenders to perhaps go undetected.
▶ 1:44:08We work really closely together and uh we were talking before we've been working for years together and so we've built these relationships among our agencies and we do work very closely with the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy as well as OM on these issues. Um I think the the big challenge as is as I mentioned before limits and authorities on information sharing uh that we do need to overcome.
▶ 1:44:36The other big challenge is something that Jeremy also mentioned is that we have very close relationships with the intelligence community and with law enforcement. However, some of the information is classified and um we work in an unclassified setting and so we're limited in the uh type of information in some cases that we could provide out to the research community itself when we see issues in cases. So increased clearances is one way to deal with that.
▶ 1:45:06Thinking about ways we could work with the intelligence community to declassify some of the information so that we can provide more out is another way to deal with this with with this issue. Um [snorts] and I think a third thing is we're we're still in a process of culture change with the community. Um this is significant culture change. Uh labs are open places. Uh and again we don't want to close them down.
▶ 1:45:30Uh but the the putting safeguards in place has to be an all of government effort uh to work with the community on that culture
▶ 1:45:40Good. Thank you very much. Perfect timing. I appreciate again all of you being here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Representative Nun.
▶ 1:45:49Well, Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to engage on a couple of additional items here. Dr. Kaiser, we've talked about this and you highlighted in your written testimony that we can't just play defense in this space when it comes to what the Chinese Communist Party is aiming to do to US tech here. Um, we also have to out innovate. Something that all three of you, I want to compliment you from energy to NIH to certainly what NSF is doing to stay ahead of our adversary in the space. One of these things we're working on is expanding the AI voice.
▶ 1:46:18Uh, specifically, we've got a bill, it's called the artificial intelligence voices act, and does exactly that by expanding NSF's current role in our innovative programs around AI to invest resources into building the domestic talent we have, particularly in underresourced.
▶ 1:46:34And I'll say in rural parts, which is most of America, outside of Silicon Valley, this is a really important part of our opportunity to be able to compete with a nearper adversary like China, is that we're using all of the resources available to us, all the talent that's right here in America. Um, I'd like to ask you, do you agree that initiatives like this to really be able to cultivate artificial intelligence across the country, including in rural America, for our students, is essential for strengthening America's domestic workforce? And can this help us win the
▶ 1:47:04Well, I can't comment on pending legislation. I can say, of course, that,
▶ 1:47:10you know, we need to provide uh knowledge and information on how to use AI and cultivate that AI workforce across this country. It's an essential part of what NSF focuses on. It's our bread and butter, as you know, is workforce development. We're working with the Genesis mission on this.
▶ 1:47:31we have the national AI research resource NAR and um we are working on an effort called AI ready America for this very reason. So thank you very much for bringing that up.
▶ 1:47:42Thank you Dr. Kaiser. Mr. Eisen, I want to speak to you too if we're going to win the artificial intelligence race with any country but particularly with China who has you know built a mega data center about every six weeks. It seems like there's a lot of energy consumption that's going to be required for this. Now the Chinese will use anything to power these whether it's dirty coal, whether it's fossil fuels, whether it's any energy resource they can create.
▶ 1:48:07The US has to be much more intelligent about how we not only provide the power grid for an artificial intelligence uh network, but also how we keep those data centers going. Can you talk to us about what we're doing to be competitive in the space and not allow China to just dominate us, not just by the data centers themselves, but by the energy consumption that's going to be required without driving up all of our energy bill at the end of the day as well? Thank you for that question.
▶ 1:48:36My expertise is on PRC targeting of the S&T ecosystem in the United States. So I'm here to talk discuss those and the mitigations that we have in place. I'm happy to take that question back for Thank you, Mr. Chair. I think that's an important question for all of us here. In order for us to be effective both on the tech side, we've got to be able to have the resources available, particularly uh the AI, and that's only going to happen when we have the energy, the water, and to Dr. Kaiser's point, the workforce to make those systems successful.
▶ 1:49:07With that, Mr. Chair, thank you very much. I yield the rem.
▶ 1:49:09Thank you. And uh I want to also just thank our witnesses uh for your cander and uh just the straightforward approach you've had and uh questions for the record are due one week from today. And without objection, the committee hearing is adjourned.