▶ 0:31:09Chair Risch: I would be remiss if I didn't recognize the tragedy that happened here in washington, D.C., last night. I take the privilege of speaking for the ranking member and the rest of the committee in expressing our condolences to the family and loved ones of those who were lost. These kinds of things are starting-- stunning and happen so quickly and remind us how precious every single day is that we have here.
▶ 0:31:40Chair Risch: I would ask all of you to join in a moment of silence as we say a prayer and remember those who went before and especially their families. Ok, with that we will proceed to our committee business meeting script.
▶ 0:32:09Chair Risch: We have before us the nominations of elise stefanik to be U.S. ambassador to the u.n. And U.S. representative to the u.n. Security council and general assembly. Is there a motion to favorably report the nominations? Is there a second? It has been moved and seconded.
▶ 0:32:32Chair Risch: We proceeded to send these to the floor with a recommendation that they be confirmed by the floor. Is there debate? There being no debate -- >> Mr. chairman, I intend to vote for congresswoman stefanik.
▶ 0:32:54Chair Risch: I was particularly appreciated her response to my question about unfpa and her willingness to review that, because unfpa does three times more work for women and children around the world.
▶ 0:33:10Chair Risch: We do throughout bilateral relationships -- I don't agree with all of representative stefanik's positions, but I was pleased to hear her talk about her interest in supporting the work of the u.n. And trying to ensure that it operates better. I intend to support her.
▶ 0:33:31Chair Risch: Thank you very much there for the debate --is there for the debate?
▶ 0:33:39Sen. Coons: This is a close call for me. I was inclined to vote for elise stefanik for u.n. Ambassador, but I frankly as the days have unfolded have become more and more alarmed at the scope and reach of the impact of the freeze of funding for activities for usaid around the world and of said I'm not going to vote for nominees until this is reversed. And in her confirmation hearing in response to a question from senator schatz she said she supported it.
▶ 0:34:07Sen. Coons: I hope we can still work together and she will represent us well, but I will vote against her more in protest of that particular action.
▶ 0:34:14Chair Risch: Is there for debate? >> I'm going to vote for her. It is also a close call. I'm going to vote for because I told her I'm going to vote for her and my word is my bond. I do think there has been bipartisan support for helping secretary rubio to clarify the foreign aid freeze. Just so everybody understands, money is not flowing.
▶ 0:34:45Chair Risch: The secretary is saying the right things, and the implementation memo as amended is helpful. But on the ground in the places -- five days ago we were describing medicine spoiling at the dock, clinics being closed, people being furloughed.
▶ 0:35:05Chair Risch: The secretary's amended memo has not effectuated the change that we are expecting it to, and so we really just on a nonpartisan basis, on a bipartisan basis, have to keep the pressure on the state department to effectuate the secretary's policy because right now there is a ton of confusion and these are faraway places, and the original stop-work orders are being observed in some places and not in others.
▶ 0:35:34Chair Risch: The furloughs in some places are being undone and not in others. This is not some policy question anymore. It is a question of executing what the secretary is asked. I ask that we continue to put pressure on a bipartisan basis and understand the urgency of the moment. Four days ago I asked how bad is this, and they said babies dying by the weekend. This is not the kind of thing we can get back to on monday.
▶ 0:36:03Chair Risch: We all have to exert pressure and make sure the state department gets this right, and I'm talking about in the next 24 hours.
▶ 0:36:08Chair Risch: Thank you very much. I've spoken to sec. Rubio on numerous occasions, starting last week, on this subject due to input from all of you, from the media, from everyone else. This is obviously a work in progress. It was intended to underscore the fact that we are going into debt at the rate of $1 trillion. That has been underscored as a result of this.
▶ 0:36:39Chair Risch: If you think this is bad, when our debtors, and we can't pay, that is going to be really bad. It has caused everyone to take a breath and look at how we are spending money, where we are spending our money, seeing that it is done as efficiently as possible.
▶ 0:36:56Chair Risch: Admittedly there have been some inconveniences along the line, but they are continuing to work on this and I think everyone is committed -- all of us know secretary rubio well, and he is committed to make this work. Senator shaheen?
▶ 0:37:12Sen. Shaheen: Mr. chairman, I appreciate that. I think you and other members of this committee have expressed their concerns about it. But I will tell you that I resent hearing not from secretary rubio, but from other members of the administration, that the only people who care about these issues are democrats and this is a democrat vs. Republican issue. I don't happen to believe that.
▶ 0:37:39Sen. Shaheen: I've been on this committee, as have you, since I got to the united states senate. I believe that most of us are on this committee because we understand how important what we do around the world is to our own national security here. I hope that all of you on the other set of the aisle will share your concerns with the administration and point out that this is not a partisan issue.
▶ 0:38:05Sen. Shaheen: This is about what are we going to do to ensure that our influence continues around the world in the interest of our own national security. Thank you, Mr. chairman.
▶ 0:38:15Chair Risch: Thank you very much, and I agree with you, this is certainly not a partisan issue, and neither is the other side of the coin, the debt. I know you all share the same views we do, that this is the biggest challenge to national security that there is, the internal debt we are gathering at the rate of a trillion dollars every hundred days. We are in agreement that neither one of those issues are partisan issues, but we are all americans and we got to get through this.
▶ 0:38:48Sen. Merkley: Mr. chairman, I will be voting no. Concerned about the point of view the nominee expressed with regard to israel and the entire west bank. There has been such an unleashing of attacks on palestinian settlements in the west bank and this viewpoint perpetuates the cycle of war and hate and is exactly the wrong approach for us to have enduring peace and stability that will free the next generation from dealing with the same conflicts we are dealing with now.
▶ 0:39:19Sen. Merkley: Mr. chairman?
▶ 0:39:20Chair Risch: Thank you. Senator?
▶ 0:39:23Sen. Van Hollen: Thank you, Mr. chairman. I will oppose this nomination for the reasons senator coons mentioned, but also because I think Mr. vonnegut is the wrong person for this job at the united nations-- Ms. stefanik is the wrong person for the job at the united nations. She voted to terminate U.S. funding for the u.n. On one occasion she voted against funds to the united nations, on another she barely didn't vote.
▶ 0:39:50Sen. Van Hollen: Her current position, which is that she thinks the united states should fully engage with the u.n., which I agree with, seems to be a nomination eve conversion. She supports the president's decision to withdraw from the world health organization, which is going to cede that ground to china.
▶ 0:40:12Sen. Van Hollen: And I also am composing this nomination because I was very troubled, very troubled--opposing this nomination because I was very troubled, very troubled by the witness's response to questions I asked regarding the situation in the middle east that senator merkley has identified.
▶ 0:40:28Sen. Van Hollen: Her answers are way out of the mainstream of american bipartisan foreign policy for years, and will make it impossible to achieve any kind of light at the end of this dark tunnel that we find ourselves in, if she continues to hold those views. My view is she cannot be effective at the u.n. With the positions she has taken.
▶ 0:40:56Chair Risch: Further debate? There being no further debate, we will proceed with a vote. Are we satisfied with a voice vote? We want a rollcall vote? If there is no objection, voice vote. All in favor of the two nominations for Ms. stefanik, signify by saying aye. Opposed, nay. Senators wish to be recorded.
▶ 0:41:24Chair Risch: Senator van hollen, senator merkley, senator coons will be reported as noes.
▶ 0:41:31Sen. Shaheen: Mr. chairman, I've also received requests from members who wish to be recorded as no.
▶ 0:41:37Chair Risch: Without objection, those will be entered. With that, the business meeting will be adjourned, and we will proceed to our hearing on prc malign influence at home and abroad.
▶ 0:42:04Chair Risch: With that, I want to welcome our witnesses today. I want to thank you for being here today, for taking time to help us explore this important topic. This is the first policy hearing in this congress. We felt it important to focus on the greatest long-term threat to the united states, that being china. As both a public official and private citizen, I've noticed the chinese government's malign influence grow.
▶ 0:42:33Chair Risch: Their political gains and military aggression has only increased over the years chinese come to his party has worked diligently to bring china to what it is today, and it did it the old-fashioned way. Chinese officials bribed, stole, cheated at every opportunity to ensure that china comes out on top. And we let them do it virtually uninhibited. This has to stop. All of us agreed that the threat of chinese influence on western society is very real and needs to be addressed.
▶ 0:43:02Chair Risch: The same chinese government that commits genocide against its ethic minorities and dramatically presses god-given freedoms of its people also attempts to influence america. As we speak, they are working to undermine our national security, our economy, and our values. It is doing the same to our allies. This isn't just wrong, but most of all, it is dangerous. Chinese influence expands industries from government to academia, research laboratories to farms and factory floors.
▶ 0:43:31Chair Risch: No matter where the chinese government is determined to use our people and institutions to achieve china's political, economic, and military objectives. China interferes in elections around the world including the united states full its goods lobbying lies to enforce dominance. It moves the state and city officials to pro china policies in an effort to pressure the federal government. It is no secret that the chinese government conduct espionage on american soil. But china goes far beyond this.
▶ 0:44:04Chair Risch: China siphons american technology and intellectual property from companies it partners with, repurposing it for their own economic benefit and riding on the back of american ingenuity. China pumps money into american universities and think tanks of attempting to secure access to sensitive military technology. Despite these threats, the previous administration just renewed a science and technology agreement that actually encourages the very collaboration that could provide china with more access.
▶ 0:44:33Chair Risch: Abroad, our allies faced similar problems often on a larger scale. China co-opts international organizations like the u.n. And ensures they never get a chance to address the many human rights atrocities and military incursions china commits. Sadly, while the chinese government as improved and redefined its tactics over the years, U.S. diplomatic tools and laws have not kept pace to help manage these problems.
▶ 0:44:57Chair Risch: My goal today is to begin outlining what this committee can do to push back on china's political, economic, and military influence in our country and abroad. To start, I hope we can close the loopholes that allow foreign agents to lobby government officials, reform our visa process to screen those who pose an intelligence risk come and encourage our national security community to play a larger role to counter the chinese influence in american universities.
▶ 0:45:25Chair Risch: This work will take a whole-o f-government approach, but in large part will be spearheaded by secretary rubio. I know secretary rubio will use the state is more than just a diplomatic mouthpiece, as has been the case. I know he will operate the state government as the united states government's expert agency on fighting foreign influence and incorporate countering chinese influence into every aspect of its mission.
▶ 0:45:51Chair Risch: The chinese will use every trick they can come up with to undermine america and other freedom-loving nations. Working together across the aisle and across branches of government and with our allies across oceans, america has and always will beat our authoritarian aggressors. I have no doubt that we will continue to do so. With that, I will yield to senator shaheen.
▶ 0:46:12Sen. Shaheen: Thank you, Mr. chairman, and welcome to each of our witnesses. Thank you all for being here today. I certainly thank chairman -- I think chairman risch has made important points I agree with.
▶ 0:46:29Sen. Shaheen: We have worked together on the ccp's malign activities in the past, activities like supporting taiwan and lithuania that we work together on in the face of beijing's economic coercion, protecting user data from being captured by the ccp on tiktok. I think these concerns, as are so many of the concerns about china, very bipartisan. Just last week in our hearing senators from both sides of the aisle highlighted the danger posed by china's efforts at the united nations.
▶ 0:47:00Sen. Shaheen: Today china is targeting and exploiting open societies with every tool that they have. They leverage corrupt investments over decision-makers in africa and latin america. They have tried to buy off politicians in australia and new zealand to undermine democratic elections. They control strategic ports in places like sri lanka. And they conduct covert espionage against american industries from advanced science to aerospace to ai.
▶ 0:47:30Sen. Shaheen: Given the stakes, I hope each of you today will share recommendations that we can take as policymakers. Something that I really wanted to zero in on is the growing cooperation between beijing and moscow. At the summit here in washington last year, nato labeled china a decisive enabler of russia's war in ukraine. But as we have seen, this partnership goes both ways.
▶ 0:47:58Sen. Shaheen: Russia has a lot to teach china when it comes to disinformation campaigns. Even before the invasion of ukraine, russia's ministry of digital development communication mass media was partnering with china's national radio and television administration. So when russia published lies about biolabs in ukraine, "the global times," a chinese communist party outlet, picked up the story.
▶ 0:48:25Sen. Shaheen: Last year we sought russia and china working together to spread disinformation and destabilize the solomon islands. "the global times" amplified stories from the russian state-controlled media agency sputnik, saying the U.S. was seeking -- I'm quoting here, "a democratic transition by violent means in the solomon islands." before our diplomats could refute the allegations, the waters had already been muddied to beijing's and moscow's benefit.
▶ 0:48:55Sen. Shaheen: Chinese leaders had made shaping global and public opinion priority. They have brought up entire foreign media companies located outside china to promote probation propaganda around the world -- pro-beijing propaganda around the world. They have targeted fact-based journalists with "the new yorker," "the economist," "the new york times," "the guardian," and others, and they have gone after female reporters of asian t after female reporters of asian dissent with threats.
▶ 0:49:28Sen. Shaheen: According to "the new york times," they not only attacked a writer living outside philadelphia who criticized xi jinping, they also posted sexually explicit and threatening comments against his teenage daughter. Beijing has used these tactics on its on population at home and it has refined them for export abroad. Taken together, these malign actions are a threat to the united states. And our efforts sadly in the information space have not been very effective.
▶ 0:49:57Sen. Shaheen: The foreign malign influence and are made strides against china and russia in their attempts to undermine U.S. presidential elections, but congress's failure to extend the global engagement center last year I believe was a serious setback for the state department's ability to counter disinformation and propaganda. China is spending billions of dollars to amplify russian propaganda, and we need more tools like the global engagement center, not fewer.
▶ 0:50:27Sen. Shaheen: Of course, as former ambassador to china nick burns said when I met with him recently on his way home from his ambassadorship, when it comes to how the U.S. response to china, the devil is in the details.
▶ 0:50:43Sen. Shaheen: I am deeply concerned by the administration's stop-work order and foreign aid freeze, actions that cannot only lead to human suffering and danger our national security, they undermine america's credibility and they give an opening to countries like china and russia who are very happy to fill the void that we leave. So I look forward to hearing from each of you today on how we should think about tackling this complex problem.
▶ 0:51:10Sen. Shaheen: How can we best defend our transparent, democratic nation from china's malign influence? How do we position the united states for future that benefits all americans? Thank you, Mr. chairman.
▶ 0:51:24Chair Risch: Thank you, senator shaheen. We will now proceed to our bonuses we are good -- witnesses we are going to hear from today could co. Let me say, first of all, that the issue, as we just heard, is not a partisan issue. As far as the problem is concerned, we are in agreement. We are verrilli distinguished panel today and we worked together on a bipartisan basis to put this panel together.
▶ 0:51:51Chair Risch: We are going to hear from some people who are very schooled on this issue and it will be helpful to us and the american people. We will take them one at a time. I will start with Mr. peter mattis, president of the jamestown foundation. He is the leading expert on the chinese communist party and its united front system and has previously worked on these issues in the senate, the house and rep representatives -- the house of representatives, the intelligence community, and elsewhere. Mr. mattis, the floor is yours.
▶ 0:52:17Mr. Mattis: Thank you, chairman risch, thank you, senator shaheen, and all the other distinct senators who are here for drawing attention to this important issue, because awareness and expertise are the key factors in being able to respond and protect this country and other democracies and other countries that are standing up to protect their sovereignty and standing. The chinese communist party's influence activity can loosely be formed under the umbrella of united front work.
▶ 0:52:45Mr. Mattis: These can be described best as efforts to monitor, control, and mobilize individuals, institutions, platforms, other civil society organizations outside the ccp to work on the party's behalf. To put this into kind of contact for you, it would be that if you guys maintained your campaign infrastructure in your state and then kept putting a committee into every company and every elks club, every school, every university, every research institute, national lab if it's
▶ 0:53:16Mr. Mattis: There, that would be like what united front work is. It keeps moving out to make the institutions serve the party's political purpose. Describing it in that context should make it clear why this is not something where we should describe interference or influence, but this is actually a tool that is pernicious and undermining the very functioning of institutions. United front is also a way of looking at politics.
▶ 0:53:42Mr. Mattis: It's a very clear-cut deletion by the party of who are our enemies, who are our friends, and how do we mobilize those friends, how do we recruit neutrals to isolate our enemies and make them ineffective. It is also a huge policy bureaucracy. Sometimes people say there is the united front work department. Which one, the central one? The 31 provincial ones? The 300 municipal once? The thousands of county level ones?
▶ 0:54:11Mr. Mattis: The ones in the china academy of sciences? Which ones are we referring to? This is a system that engages hundreds of thousands of people very directly inside the party, on the fringes of the body, and it keeps extending outward. The ccp's united front -- sees the united front as a tool to achieve its objectives of national rejuvenation, and that can broadly be defined as one comprehensive modernization, the second, unification.
▶ 0:54:42Mr. Mattis: We think of this in taiwan, hong kong, but it is really a political, economic, cultural, and social unification. It is not just having control, it is putting everything together. The primary targets of united front work are those individuals and institutions and bond funds that really make democracy work. They are social groups, media, universities, local and national political leaders, companies. Anything that can be leveraged by the party will be leveraged. What is the harm?
▶ 0:55:14Mr. Mattis: The first is that in some cases, when an organization is taken over by the party, our own citizens lose their voice, speaking to their own elected representatives and their own government, because you cannot possibly meet every one of your constituents. You rely on these groups to tell you what is going on in your state, district if you are in the house.
▶ 0:55:36Mr. Mattis: But if that community organization leader is someone who is speaking for the party, you might think you are hearing from someone who is represent 500 people or 1000 people, but it is someone representing the ccp rather than their fellow americans. You can go down the list of things -- the distortion of marketplace ideas, the loss of technologies, as Mr. stoff for cover, the facilitation of intelligence operations.
▶ 0:56:02Mr. Mattis: Pushing back requires insider information of institutions and organizations that are being affected, and that person needs awareness. They need something like a hearing today or other types of information, whether it is rfa reporting abroad, any other form of cash sake, -- say, a report on safeco and other organizations to say, wait a minute, there is a problem here, and I can go out and find external expertise. Which is the next piece, you need external expertise.
▶ 0:56:33Mr. Mattis: One of the ways the united states is very different from the ccp's we support people trying to stand up for their own rights, for their own countries, for their own sovereignty. The party makes people do their own bidding, that of the ccp and not for the benefit of their citizens. Lastly, you need political power.
▶ 0:56:50Mr. Mattis: As when I worked with the senator cruz's staff in 2018 to keep the ccp out of university of texas, austin, it took somebody on the inside, somebody without that expertise, and someone willing to draw attention to it and say there are political consequences. In terms of recommendations, anything that improves transparency, making things more accessible, making sure there was a quarterly update, that is searchable, would be beneficial.
▶ 0:57:20Mr. Mattis: The chinese on the -- the focus on the chinese malign influence fund, rather than just repurchasing funds from existing programs. What are ways to incentivize actions within executive departments, such as department of state, so that we are asking the state department to report when authorities are not used, rather than trying to avoid the congressional reporting environment? Thank you very much.
▶ 0:57:46Chair Risch: Thank you very much, Mr. mattis. Who will turn to Mr. jeffrey stoff. He is the founder for the center for research security and integrity. He spent two decades in government focused on risks to the security and integrity of research from adversarial or authoritarian nations. He now advises academia, governments, and businesses on these matters. Mr. stoff, the floor is yours.
▶ 0:58:10Mr. Stoff: Chairman risch, ranking member shaheen, the stingless members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on this quickly important topic. Now that I no longer worker in the government, I can speak candidly on the p.r.c.'s method to exploit our innovation ecosystem and the failures within government and academia to address this problem. Over the last 15 years of study china's research ecosystem and how the 20 exploits innovation.
▶ 0:58:38Mr. Stoff: I work with federal agencies that fund scientific research as well as law enforcement and intelligence component. That has exposed me to a range of deficiencies and failures of the U.S. government, which were a source of my frustration and the reason I resigned from federal service in 2021. Today, neither academia nor governments of liberal democracies have sufficiently adapted to a contradictory reality.
▶ 0:59:03Mr. Stoff: One of the most significant dispense in the global scientific enterprise is our greatest adversary, and oppressive regime that seeks to displace the U.S. technologically and militarily and reserve the communist party's interest.
▶ 0:59:20Mr. Stoff: It is past time to have candid and uncomfortable conversations about the current state of how the p.r.c.'s unfettered access to our research ecosystem and its malign influence activities have profound effects on a national and economic security and the corrupting and corrosive effects that are enabled by the negligence of U.S. partners. U.S. universities are run like businesses, with the primary objective of generating revenue. Academia's incentives are often not aligned with U.S. national security and economic interests.
▶ 0:59:47Mr. Stoff: Systemic noncompliance on federal research grants and its willingness to accept and fail to report p.r.c. Sources of funding often run counter to the values of transparency and integrity that academia espouses. My written testimony shows examples of academia's widespread disregard for security or ethical concerns. I provide low estimates, 27,000 articles published just in the past five years involving collaboration between U.S.
▶ 1:00:15Mr. Stoff: Institutions and medical entities, weapons design and production facilities, state owned enterprises that support the pla, he defense research universities, and entities that develop and deploy mass surveillance technologies enabling human rights abuses. Much of this research is funded by federal agencies, private foundations, and corporate sponsors, with few restrictions or regulatory oversight. The U.S.
▶ 1:00:41Mr. Stoff: Government has done little to deter academia from failing to comply with federal research grant rules such as failing to disclose p.r.c. Money and support, which sometimes appear to be an attempt to discuss contracted research for the p.r.c. As unrestricted gifts. This combined with p.r.c. Programs that task and incentivize U.S.
▶ 1:01:00Mr. Stoff: Faculty members to bypass merit-based hiring decisions, conduct research projects at the p.r.c.'s behest, and a swath of other malign activities create corrosive secondary effects as well. These include a vicious cycle of inequity in the system, smaller schools that are being honest but deny federal funding, have smaller budgets and fewer resources to hire phd students, attract top talent, etc., which makes them less competitive on future grant proposals.
▶ 1:01:27Mr. Stoff: This translates to fewer opportunities domestically and an erosion of stem talent pipelines. Compounding these problems are addressed failures by the fbi's near-exclusive a focus on criminal investigations as a hammer looking for a nail that fails to protect earlier stages of the research ecosystem, as well as the intelligence community's failure to adapt to post-cold war realities and the asymmetric threats posed by china, which only seldom involve espionage activities.
▶ 1:01:55Mr. Stoff: The scale and scope of china's predations in our research ecosystem are largely unknown, making it impossible to determine the level of influence the p.r.c. Exerts over U.S. research that overwhelmingly benefits china. My testimony discusses issues that go beyond the jurisdiction of this committee. My america mentation c2 close regulatory gaps --my recommendations c2 close regulatory gaps and have the state department play a much larger role in these areas to ensure that real costs are imposed on the p.r.c.
▶ 1:02:24Mr. Stoff: When it violates commonly accepted norms and values of scientific research. To effectively counter the p.r.c.'s malign influence, we must find the courage to break down silos and develop new paradigms for cooperation among and between federal agencies, legislative committees, and our key allies and partners around the world. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
▶ 1:02:44Chair Risch: Thank you very much. We will now hear from Dr. melanie hart. She is the senior director of the global china hub at the atlantic council. Immediately prior she served at the department of state and played a central role on U.S. responses to chinese economic coercion as well as a strategy and international engagement on semiconductors. Dr. hart, before is yours.
▶ 1:03:07Ms. Hart: Senator risch, ranking member shaheen, distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. The U.S. and china are engaged in systemic opposition. It is a competition over which model prevails, the U.S. model of political and economic element, or china's. If china prevails, the U.S. and the world will be less free, less prosperous, and less safe. Beijing is deploying a range of tactics to achieve its objectives.
▶ 1:03:38Ms. Hart: Some constitute traditional diplomacy. Some constitute malign influence. The state department must be empowered to fight on both fronts. I would like to make five key points. First, showing up in the traditional diplomatic arena is foundational to america's success. Our diplomats must be resourced to show up and pull every lever to advance U.S. national interests. When they do, they win.
▶ 1:04:06Ms. Hart: In 2020, china help 4 of the 15 leadership roles across the u.n. Specialized agencies. Today beijing is down to just one. The department made those positions a priority starting with the international telecommunication union. The department identified and ran compelling candidates and launched a whole-of-department effort to rally the votes needed to win. Diplomacy works.
▶ 1:04:34Ms. Hart: Second, when combating malign influence, transparency is our superpower and beijing's kryptonite. Beijing knows the china model is deeply flawed. That is why beijing resorts to malign influence. It relies on information control to hide the costs associated with the china option and coercion to force others to where those costs.-- bear those costs.
▶ 1:05:01Ms. Hart: Examples include engaging in widespread graft to sway influence in beijing's favor, filing libel suits against p.r.c. Critics to silence them, engaging in economic coercion and disinformation and electoral interference. Boosting transparency should always be step one when combating malign influence. These tactics are covert by design. Exposure often neutralizes them.
▶ 1:05:29Ms. Hart: Third, the global information space is active battlefield impacts every arena of U.S.-china competition. Patient engages in information warfare.--beijing engages in information warfare. It seeks to control information at home and abroad and use that control to advance its objectives at america's expense. The now-shuttered state department global engagement center was the primary usf mechanism -- U.S.
▶ 1:05:51Ms. Hart: Mechanism for combating china's information warfare, enabling washington to broadcast its own messages to the global public, sharing our vision and exposing the truth about china's. Gec was not just a government megaphone. It provided grants to third-party researchers around the world, empowering an entire global army of counter-malign influence warriors to combat ccp disinformation.
▶ 1:06:19Ms. Hart: Tha is whyt the chinese foreign ministry has reverted to gec -- reverted to gec as washington's command center of perception warfare. I urge congress to reauthorize the global engagement center, keeping these counter influence warriors off the battlefield boosts beijing at america's expense. Fourth, economic coercion requires active defense. During the biden administration, the department launched an internal unit to provide support to nations facing chinese economic coercion.
▶ 1:06:51Ms. Hart: That effort was wildly successful. So much so that it near his capacity due to the number of nations coming in for assistance. At present there is no single state department fte or office with authorization and appropriations to counter chinese economic coercion. I urge congress to provide dedicated resources for this effort.
▶ 1:07:15Ms. Hart: Fifth and finally, I would be remiss in my duty to this committee if I did not raise the current foreign assistance freeze, which is hobbling america's ability to compete with china and every domain. Over one billion in foreign military financing for taiwan, frozen. Ndi and iri are shutting down global operations. Human rights organizations, frozen.
▶ 1:07:43Ms. Hart: Washington has effectively abandoned the hong kong pro-democracy movement. I understand the need to maximize strategic focus in foreign aid. I applied secretary rubio's steps to -- applaud secretary rubio's steps to lift some restrictions. But this broad freeze hobbles america at a moment when we are in the battle of the century. It is a massive gift to beijing.
▶ 1:08:07Ms. Hart: The longer it goes on, the harder it will be to regain the ground we are already losing today, tomorrow, and this week. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today also look forward to your questions.
▶ 1:08:19Chair Risch: Thank you, Dr. hart. We will now hear from Dr. jennifer lind, an associate professor of government at dartmouth college. She also is a faculty associate at harvard university and the author of a forthcoming book on the rise of china, the future of great power competition. Dr. lind, the floor is yours.
▶ 1:08:43Ms. Lind: Thank you, chairman risch. Chairman, ranking member shaheen, distinction members of the committee, thank you for having me here today. What I would like to talk about is china's malign influence operations and influence operations more broadly. Let me talk about what these operations are and what makes them malign. Although all countries seek to build their influence through a range of policies that we call public diplomacy, malign influence operations are a very different matter.
▶ 1:09:15Ms. Lind: The ccp conducts extensive influence operations that are malign both in terms of goals and methods. Such operations seek to bolster authoritarianism, discredit mcgregor governance -- democratic governance, reshape global norms in china's influence, and silence chinese could explore the proxy organizations obscured ties to the ccp --proxy organizations obscured ties to the ccp while they by media companies and think tanks.
▶ 1:09:46Ms. Lind: Chinese agents coerce american citizens into promoting beijing's interest by threatening their family back in china. China's influence operations are threatening because their goals run counter to U.S. interests and because of the covert and illegal methods on which they rely. Furthermore, they are threatening because they are massive in scope. They are run through a huge government bureaucracy consisting of numerous different agencies at all levels of society.
▶ 1:10:16Ms. Lind: The budget for these operations is said to exceed the budget of china's ministry of foreign affairs. This is not geopolitics as usual. This is an unusually aggressive and well-funded effort. Now, how to the U.S. respond to these malign operations? In my written statement I introduced a framework for thinking about U.S. policy.
▶ 1:10:39Ms. Lind: Its goal is not only to defend the united states from hostile chinese to rein in its activities, and thus to establish some rules of the road to stabilize our strategic competition. The first step towards creating those rules is for U.S. leaders to identify which of china's activities are regrettable but normal great power competition.
▶ 1:11:04Ms. Lind: For example, although we don't like it, and although we should maintain as good a defense as possible, we can probably tolerate cyber attacks, pro-ccp fake accounts on social media. But the second category of activities is different. These are the policies or behaviors that U.S. leaders decide are intolerable.
▶ 1:11:29Ms. Lind: Such activities might include election interference, objections, and operation -- abductions, and operations that course american citizens. Step one is to distinguish between regrettable but tolerable operations vs. Intolerable ones. Step two is to develop a toolkit that we are willing to use to shape chinese behavior, actions that the ccp would view as intolerable. The U.S.
▶ 1:11:54Ms. Lind: Government would convey privately to beijing that ifi t -- if it violated the bounds of acceptable activities, we would respond in kind. That is, we would cross some of beijing's redlines. This is not an escalation. It is how great powers establish the rules of the game. Beijing's bright red lines, the absolutely intolerables, relate to china's domestic stability. Specific policies would have to be figure out at the classified level.
▶ 1:12:24Ms. Lind: Once again, the quiet is not going to play defense, but to make -- the core idea is to not only play defense, but make the ccp filled the cost of its aggression and encourage it to moderate its behavior. This sounds delicate and dangerous and hard, and it is actually harder.
▶ 1:12:42Ms. Lind: Let me conclude by noting that not only do we have to manage this challenging strategic competition with beijing, but in that competition lurk potential dangers to the rights of millions of americans, chinese-americans in particular. Our adversary is already at this early stage and in peacetime coercing good americans to work against their country on its behalf.
▶ 1:13:09Ms. Lind: As we formulate our responses to chinese malign influence operations, U.S. leaders should think about previous situations such as world war ii, japanese internment, and cold war mccarthyism, and think about when our institutions protected are people vs. Fail them. In other words, U.S. leadership should think not only about this important strategic interaction with beijing, but whether our policies and that interaction uphold our values. Thank you very much.
▶ 1:13:37Chair Risch: Thank you. First of all, I want to commend the panel. We get panels through here all the time, but this is probably as good a presentation we have had on an issue in a long, long time. Part of this whole problem is the fact that convincing america and different segments of america how dangerous the situation this is.
▶ 1:14:02Chair Risch: One of the ones I've been focused on over the years and have been somewhat successful but not completely successful is to get a better handle on what colleges and universities are doing. Colleges and universities, as all of you know, are really a target-rich place for the chinese.
▶ 1:14:22Chair Risch: They show up with money, and as was pointed out here, colleges and universities respond to money, whether it is from their donors or from the chinese showing up with money. Most americans are shocked to hear that we have hundreds of thousands, hundreds of thousands of chinese students studying in the united states with only a tiny fraction of U.S. students studying in china. There is a huge difference.
▶ 1:14:49Chair Risch: Chinese students here are not studying ancient greek history. They are here with the stem's and national security issues in every thing else. And each and every one of them whether they like it or not is an agent of the chinese communist party. When they go back, we all know they get debriefed, any information they have garnered in the united states becomes the property of the chinese communist party.
▶ 1:15:14Chair Risch: We have seen example after example of the chinese showing up at a university and coming up with millions of dollars and they get a chair, an endowed chair, an entire institution within the institution focused on what they want to have focused on.
▶ 1:15:34Chair Risch: I guess a question I have for all of you is -- first of all, admittedly universities have an entirely different view than we who work in the national security lane do on this. When you sit down and talk with them, they believe -- and a lot of them I think are very sincere in their belief -- that, oh, in academia we are altogether, this is one big world, we should
▶ 1:16:05Chair Risch: All use the knowledge and shared with each other regardless of national security implications, whether it is designing computer chips or designing factories that manufacture arms. Give me some thoughts -- how do we bring the universities on board to have a better understanding, number one, of how dangerous china is, and number two, how they are exploiting us even without our knowledge and a lot of instances in taking what we have?
▶ 1:16:36Chair Risch: Mr. mattis, let's start with you.
▶ 1:16:38Mr. Mattis: Well, one thing I can tell you is that 10 years ago this was a completely different problem than it is today. There are actually resources, there are companies t, there are more experts, there are journalists, there are plenty of places universities can go. A dearth of expertise or lack of information is no longer the problem they once faced.
▶ 1:17:01Mr. Mattis: The second, as I think my friend jeff has said, the grand reporting requirements from the federal government actually have to be rigorously pursued and adhered to. We would consider it corruption if it were a defense contractor or others that were not providing incorrect reporting requirements -- the correct reporting requirements. Because as I think you have heard from every single witness, the problem here is the corruption of rules and corruption of the process.
▶ 1:17:31Mr. Mattis: As long as that process is clear and has record, -- rigor, it will provide the basic level of protection. The other piece that is there is to go back into your home states and talk to public universities and engage them and ask, what have you done with compliance, what do you do about these things. Because I know from my time on capitol hill that those conversations actually did bear fruit and they did --
▶ 1:17:57Chair Risch: That's a good suggestion. Mr. stoff?
▶ 1:18:00Mr. Stoff: Thank you for the question. A lot of it, I agree, a lot of it has to do with raising the level of understanding and awareness. And one of the challenges is that we are not just the U.S. government needs to share a lot more information on the kind of investigations -- for example, the oig's do a lot of interesting things at the civil and administrative levels that are not simply public record, because they are not a criminal indictment.
▶ 1:18:30Mr. Stoff: That is not a bad thing. What happens is the universities are not seeing and not really incentivized to see what is happening on their campuses and the type of malign influence and the way china can come in and diver and influence the research going on. There is information the government has that needs to do a much better job sharing that.
▶ 1:18:53Mr. Stoff: It also needs to be much more scholarship on the topic itself where we demonstrate activities, behaviors that china exerts that is fundamentally against the principles and values of academic freedom, transparency, reciprocity, and integrity, which is core to what universities talk about is their mission.
▶ 1:19:18Mr. Stoff: There needs to be a lot more effort looking at where and how this is being done to show this is affecting us all, including on your campus, so that we take more collective action.
▶ 1:19:28Ms. Hart: Thank you. I endorse the comments that have come before and I would like to add one point. We need a scalpel for this, not a sledgehammer. It is in U.S. natural interest to keep the student pipeline open. We are in a pitched battle for global texan premises. -- tech supremacy. For decades beijing stole our ip. That's still the best engineers.
▶ 1:19:51Ms. Hart: Chinese engineers develop to the deepseek ai model that surprised to the world this week. We would be better if they were working in the U.S. and for U.S. companies. Those student exchanges are a way that we can siphon off some of beijing's top talent. So we want to make sure that for the students that are here, for the researchers that we want, that they feel they are safe in the united states, they understand how to follow the rules, and they feel the civil rights will be protected.
▶ 1:20:22Ms. Hart: We can beat beijing and making chinese scientists say.
▶ 1:20:25Chair Risch: Thank you, Dr. hart.there is a flaw in your suggestion -- when a student comes over here, they've got to go back. If they don't go back, there is family there, and we know what the chinese government does to families. They do it across the oceans and they do it even here in the united states. That's a great idea.
▶ 1:20:46Chair Risch: The problem is we are dealing with a malign institution here, we are not dealing with people like americans who say, oh, yeah, you are free to move and do whatever you want to do. It will take it out on families could we have all heard stories of that. But your thoughts are well taken that it would be good if we could reverse the tables. I'm not so sure we can do it in the same manner. My time is up. Dr.
▶ 1:21:13Chair Risch: Lind, we will get to you -- we are going to do a five-minute round. Senator shaheen.
▶ 1:21:22Sen. Shaheen: Thank you all. Let -- let me give a special shout-out to Dr. lind from dartmouth college and new hampshire. Had to get that in.
▶ 1:21:37Chair Risch: Look at the time. [laughter]
▶ 1:21:40Sen. Shaheen: Senator rubio, secretary rubio now, introduced a bill in july of the last session that would've required secretary of state to work with the ukrainian government to establish a mechanism for reviewing p.r.c. Investment in ukraine.
▶ 1:21:56Sen. Shaheen: Now, sadly, one of the results of this foreign assistance frees is that it is cutting off some essential services to ukraine at a time when we know not only is russia looking at how they can undermine ukraine, but the prc is starting to invest there. If our goal is to prevent ukraine from accepting the p.r.c.
▶ 1:22:24Sen. Shaheen: Investment, how is cutting off our assistance moving us towards that goal? Are there incentives for beijing to play productive role in trying to get to peace talks in that conflict? The president has raised that as a potential role for the p.r.c. Do we think that is likely? Dr. lind?
▶ 1:22:44Ms. Lind: Thank you for your question. On the broader issue of pausing U.S. foreign aid, I agreed with the sentiments that we have heard today so far that talk about foreign aid is a really important arrow in the quiver of U.S.
▶ 1:23:04Ms. Lind: National security, along with other tools, such as diplomacy, military assistance, and so on. Ideally we would want to be using all of our different tools in a coordinated fashion to achieve our objectives.
▶ 1:23:25Ms. Lind: For that reason it is understandable if the administration wants to take a short pause and assess are we using the right tools and the right way, should we be using some tools more than others, and so on.
▶ 1:23:38Ms. Lind: But we shouldn't be taking this important arrow out of our quiver, and we should recognize the many areas across the globe -- talked about medicines going to waste on ports, talked about perhaps the politics of this leading to babies dying. There is a such direct things to think about here.
▶ 1:24:07Ms. Lind: Because of that, it's really important that we remember there's development assistance that this affects and there is strategic realms that we may not have appreciated how consequential this would be, such as the conflict in ukraine, for example.
▶ 1:24:25Sen. Shaheen: So do we think -- is there any incentive for the p.r.c. To help move negotiations around the were in ukraine? Does anybody on the panel think that there is a way that will encourage them to do that? Mr. mattis?
▶ 1:24:40Mr. Mattis: As president of the jamestown foundation, I oversee a large network of analysts that are not just covering china, but focus on russia as well. It's hard to see that the p.r.c. Has played any kind of useful role, and even there position in peace talks is not mutual, is reinforcing -- is not neutral, it is reinforcing russia's positions.
▶ 1:25:05Mr. Mattis: I can't help but think that at best getting them to neutrality would require a lot of pressure and threats to their system that we could still apply, the question is whether or not we would want to escalate in that way. Barring some massive change, beijing is not neutral. Anything there, they will bring pressure on ukraine to get ukraine to surrender.
▶ 1:25:24Sen. Shaheen: Thank you. Dr. hart, as you pointed out in your comments and I referenced in my opening statement, the prc spends over a billion dollars a year in promoting their messaging. The state-backed media outlets are found in every major hotel in the world. Chinese firms purchase local media outlets. And yet we are woefully behind. You mentioned the global engagement center. Also appropriations for U.S.
▶ 1:25:57Sen. Shaheen: Agency, global media entities and networks including radio free asia, voice of america, radio free europe. Those have declined by almost 12% in real terms over the past decade. As we all know, america has a better story to tell, but we need to be a lot better at telling it. What should we think about other than those two arenas in terms of competing with china on their propaganda campaign?
▶ 1:26:26Ms. Hart: I will make two points. China is spending over a billion dollars and getting its message out to the world. That is very difficult to combat directly. But one brilliant element of the former global engagement center is a provided grants to third parties in the united states and in other agencies to empower ngos around the world to do their own investigations and their own exposure of what beijing was actually up to. It was a massive force multiplier.
▶ 1:26:57Ms. Hart: It enabled the united states to leverage forces around the world to combat tiny disinformation. That third-party element is critical. I would add one other point, our online spaces. Unfortunately, we are seeing quite a bit of disinformation in social media and in other online spaces, which again that the U.S. government can be a bit slow in tackling those spaces. But there are third-party agencies that are great at it.
▶ 1:27:24Ms. Hart: The atlantic council has a digital forensic research lab, for example, which is actively tracking chinese and russian disinformation in U.S. and other social-media domains. We a lot to empower not just the U.S. government but every ally in the field.
▶ 1:27:40Chair Risch: Senator ricketts?
▶ 1:27:43Sen. Ricketts: Thank you to our panelists for being here today. Communist china is the single biggest external existential threat we have to our nation. I believe you all were making the case for that, that this needs to be what we focus on, and we have not been focusing on it.
▶ 1:28:04Sen. Ricketts: During his confirmation hearing, secretary rubio warned that "if we stay on the road we are on right now, in less than 10 years virtually everything that matters to us in life will depend on whether communist china will allow us to have it or not." folks, right now we are facing that first real test of whether or not we are willing to get off the road we are on that is allowed communist china to take advantage of the world's system and seeks to -- a country that
▶ 1:28:36Sen. Ricketts: Seeks to displace us. That test is tiktok. This app is just not another social-media platform, it is one of the apps that communist china uses in its web of diplomacy to push its propaganda, spy on americans, and control the narrative of why they think they are better than we are. That is why we passed with bipartisan support a law that required bytedance to sell within 270 days.
▶ 1:29:05Sen. Ricketts: The supreme court, by the way, upheld that law unanimously. The supreme court upheld that law unanimously. Now you are seeing tiktok removed from app stores. Not only can new users not download it, but you can't get updates.
▶ 1:29:30Sen. Ricketts: As long as communist china governed bytedance controls the gap, it will be a tool for the communist party of china to exercise malign influence in the united states. Tiktok has 170 million users. 52% of them get their news from there. Over 88 million americans rely on the app.
▶ 1:29:55Sen. Ricketts: After october 7 we saw 50 times more downloads or views that were pro-hamas pro-palestine than pro-israel despite polls showing americans overwhelmingly supported israel. Talk about controlling the narrative. China suppresses the information on there.
▶ 1:30:14Sen. Ricketts: For example, I have seen different studies that show if you compare tiktok and instagram , there is 80 times more mentions of tiananmen square on instagram versus tiktok and one hundred 80 times more mentions of the hong kong protests on instagram versus tiktok. 400 times more content talking about communist china being responsible for covid on instagram compared to tiktok.
▶ 1:30:41Sen. Ricketts: And when it comes to uighurs about 10 times more information on instagram versus tiktok. That is part of how they are shaping the narrative. We see this in other applications as well. Obviously, with the announcement of rednote. And Dr. hart just talked about deepseek as well peer china is lining up the next apps to control our fate.
▶ 1:31:09Sen. Ricketts: We don't allow foreign adversaries to own our tv or radio station. You are limited to 20% of direct foreign ownership in a tv or radio station. We do not have such laws for streaming services. That is one of the things we can perhaps take up. So, these applications are where people are getting news in america. We have lost a lot in tv and radio stations but not for applications like tiktok. Mr.
▶ 1:31:34Sen. Ricketts: Mattis how relevant are these apps to communist china is a strategy to control the narrative, to be in competition with us, to undermine us?
▶ 1:31:46Mr. Mattis: One of the points I alluded to in my statement and that melanie has spoken about says this is not just narrative on a narrative but a competition for the platforms, the pipes that allow narratives to move in to be pushed out. If you go back 40 years to the soviet disinformation effort to say that the united states with harvesting organs from babies in latin america or was the source of aids as a biological weapon in africa.
▶ 1:32:17Mr. Mattis: Those were things that took years and years of effort. Now those stories can be disseminated to 170 million people essentially enter -- instantly. This is the biggest change. I think we have to keep our eyes focused on what those platforms are so they can be free-flowing. So they are not distorted. For me, it is easy to understand the privacy issue of some of these apps. But it is the ability to distort the message people here that is the most important.
▶ 1:32:46Mr. Mattis: Everything we have learned about cognitive psychology, the way we take in information, the way our biases become anchored, the more you are closed off or sucked in to a particular information source, the easier it is to plan something that will stick. We have to keep our eyes. I focused less on the narratives themselves and much more on the group sent platforms. First, the medium. Then, the message.
▶ 1:33:13Sen. Mccormick: What should we do about rednote and deepseek and other platforms like that?
▶ 1:33:18Mr. Mattis: You have to adopt the same approach applied to tiktok. That it is easier sort of removed from the control or it is no longer available in app stores.
▶ 1:33:31Chair Risch: Senator schatz.
▶ 1:33:35Sen. Paul: -- Sen. schatz: this is an excellent group to inform us. Mr. mattis I want to start with the philippines, one of our closest allies. We have economic assistance arrangements. We have a life-saving support we provide. And of course we have a security partnership that has at generations. If you were a senior ccp official how would you review this frees any foreign aid coming from the united states?
▶ 1:34:06Sen. Paul: -- freeze in foreign aid coming from the united states?
▶ 1:34:11Mr. Mattis: Frankly, I would be looking to exploit the opportunity. Over the years political fluctuations in the philippines offered those opportunities disrupting the relationship, disrupting partnership. Anything from brecheen's perspective -- beijing's perspective, I would be doing everything I can to exploit chaos in the U.S./philippines relationship.
▶ 1:34:40Sen. Schatz: What would that look like?
▶ 1:34:41Mr. Mattis: There are traditional tools like corruption. I would also be looking to mobilize groups to lobby politicians to say, look, the U.S. is an unreliable ally. You need to move in this other direction. I would be looking to create pressure about escalation risks if the philippines chooses to defend itself.
▶ 1:35:07Sen. Schatz: Do you think this moment is particularly important? It seems to me, tactically, if I were a senior ccp official I would be mobilizing this week to be making moves that are specific to the opportunity presented this week, not just as a general proposition in terms of power and competition in the asia-pacific region but specifically to seize this opportunity of us looking like an unreliable partner. Is that fair to say?
▶ 1:35:36Mr. Mattis: When I look at the ccp, I was alluding to a long-term set of ambitions and clarity. We may be talking about this more. It does not mean that 10 years ago we did not know or we did not see things. We just were not looking. There are always opportunities to exploit.
▶ 1:35:56Sen. Schatz: Papua new guinea has a lot of natural resources. But it is at risk for becoming a foothold for prc military expansion. It has the highest hiv incidence in the pacific, and it's rising. It has a lot of unexplored ordinance. The department of defense last year signed a deal with port hornsby.
▶ 1:36:18Sen. Schatz: It seems to me that the philippines is one question we have of the bible -- of the bilateral relationships that spans generations and is sturdy, still solid even when we have a president that is an unreliable partner. But in places like png, where, to use the domestic equivalent, they are sort of swing states.
▶ 1:36:45Sen. Schatz: They are open for business to being aligned with china, being aligned with the united states, to playing both sides against the middle. I am particularly concerned about smaller countries for whom withholding of economic or military or life-saving support is not something they can weather. I am wondering if you can talk about png in particular?
▶ 1:37:07Mr. Mattis: I don't know specifically about this. I think it is the secretary's job to determine how the priorities go. We cannot be everything to every country. I would hope there is some systematic view. Where do we prioritize? What is important? Where can we intervene effectively? Where does intervention simply poor bad money after bad money?
▶ 1:37:34Sen. Schatz: Ms. hart do you want to comment briefly on the opportunity we are presenting to the ccp and I don't mean generally. I mean this week.
▶ 1:37:43Ms. Hart: We basically gave beijing a blank check and need cap to the united states and the entire pro-democracy movement. Talk about the png and their need for medicines. There is a clear pattern. In the covid crisis beijing forced nations around the world to carry out its political edicts in exchange for covered vaccines. I have no doubt beijing is already showing up in capitals where the U.S.
▶ 1:38:10Ms. Hart: Is pulling back and saying here is your hiv medicine and here are three things you need to do for me today to get it.
▶ 1:38:18Sen. Schatz: Thank you.
▶ 1:38:23Chair Risch: Senator mccormick.
▶ 1:38:23Sen. Mccormick: Thank you, Mr. chairman. What a great sobering panel. Mr. stoff I want to talk about the ccp ip theft and research security. I ran the commerce department export controls about 20 years ago. Even then, there were warning signs of the ccp's infiltration. I remember giving a speech that talked about 90% of chinese software being stolen or acquired, mostly from the united states.
▶ 1:38:51Sen. Mccormick: Here we are two decades later and the risk seems more extreme and pervasive than ever. When it comes to the ccp theft of U.S. resources and ip, where are we most vulnerable? Our research -- our research technologies for sensitive dual use technologies in particular keeping up?
▶ 1:39:13Mr. Stoff: Thank you for the question, senator. First, we need to understand and frame the current regulatory landscape we operate in. Where we are most vulnerable is in fundamental research demands as defined by national security decision directive 189. As you probably know, senator, export controls largely do not apply in any case to any academic research that is designated as fundamental.
▶ 1:39:44Mr. Stoff: That means, outside of a couple appropriations restrictions that have been put in place, there really is not any restriction of any kind. This allows, basically, -- and this was sent out by design -- but it has become a much bigger problem. I think the problem you are raising goes beyond how we traditionally defined ad view ip theft. At least, the way our legal statutes are designed.
▶ 1:40:14Mr. Stoff: 1831 and 1832 the criminal code had very specific requirements to prove it is theft. Most of the time a lot of what is happening in academia, because of the open nature of our system, it is not actually theft of the way our statutes define it. As such, the entire early stage of our research innovation ecosystem is basically rifle for complete penetration, influence, and a divergence of all the technology and research for china's benefit.
▶ 1:40:44Mr. Stoff: As was pointed out earlier, when china comes in with lots of money, this is irresistible. The combination of those two things make it very difficult for U.S. policy to affect change because originally, by design, there is enough regulatory oversight to do anything about it. My recommendations, my written testimony.
▶ 1:41:11Mr. Stoff: I think we need to apply some of the restrictions in our export control regimes. The energy list of the I.s. Has, the ofac lists, those are already established. The U.S. government determined there are a number of entities, research institutions and companies that conduct research that are a threat to our national security. You need to put restrictions in place if you're dealing with those entities.
▶ 1:41:39Mr. Stoff: Harming our export control regime with our -- harmonizing our export control regime with our ecosystem will help.
▶ 1:41:48Sen. Mccormick: In december the biden administration signed a five-year extension of the U.S. and china science and technology agreement. Was this a good idea? Is it part of the big gap in our regulatory framework you are referring to?
▶ 1:42:02Mr. Stoff: To be honest, senator, are not familiar enough with the details of that agreement to a pine on whether it --oppine on whether it is effective or not. But the sense I get is that policy, how the u -- government interacts with grantmaking agencies, etc., the things I recommend I do not think would have any bearing or effect on this larger government science and technology agreement.
▶ 1:42:30Mr. Stoff: All of the things I recommend would not necessarily conflict with that agreement.
▶ 1:42:36Sen. Mccormick: We saw announcements this week around deepseek, r1. It does the proliferation of open source ai models advanced pcc efforts to shape public discourse in the U.S. and how can this public source approach enable future influence operations?
▶ 1:42:57Mr. Mattis: Very quickly. I think there are two dangers of platforms like this. Coming out of the prc. The first is, it is a data collection effort. The more people interact with these systems, the more that is brought in.
▶ 1:43:15Mr. Mattis: This goes back to back and software, conference equipment, many other areas where you can see the prc putting things astride of the pipes and platforms that allow them to benefit the flow of information. That is one piece.
▶ 1:43:33Mr. Mattis: The second is the more those models are trained on an international set of data the more you can see things like the effectiveness of automated disinformation systems, the propaganda systems we have seen the prc use. The better those are the harder it is to deal with, the harder it is to recognize. The harder it is to shut off.
▶ 1:43:57Chair Risch: Senator coons yielded to senator kaine.
▶ 1:43:58Sen. Kaine: Thank you for being here. My -- I am interested in all of this topic, particularly, chinese influence in the americas. I have maintained, during my now 12 plus years here under presidents of both parties and under senates controlled by both parties, that we do not spend enough time or attention in the military space through south com or in the foreign assistance space we are focusing
▶ 1:44:29Sen. Kaine: Enough in the americas and china sees that as a huge opportunity. My other colleagues who travel in the americas sees that all the time. Investments in panama, offers of 5g systems to nations like costa rica, we have appropriately warned allies in the region about the dangers of these. We usually hear the same thing. Yeah, we understand, but do you have anything on the table for us?
▶ 1:44:56Sen. Kaine: What we tend to say then, is we kind of, diplomatically stumble over our tongues because we don't really invest. I am very nervous about a recent statement of president trump's reported last week. "we don't need latin america." and then the foreign aid pause last week that did not just affect programs in latin america. It affected them everywhere.
▶ 1:45:22Sen. Kaine: Even sitting those things aside and talk about what you are seeing in terms of chinese influence in the americas and how worried we ought to be about it?
▶ 1:45:31Ms. Hart: The americas is currently our primary battleground with beijing. China sees our weaknesses there. They see an opening. They are showing up across the hemisphere. The recent port opened in peru is a perfect example. When we show up we win. One example.
▶ 1:45:48Ms. Hart: I would like to thank congress and this committee for authorizing and appropriating the chips act that included $500 million for the state department to show up in latin america and elsewhere and partner with nations to support U.S.-based semiconductor manufacturing.
▶ 1:46:08Sen. Mccormick: There is a chips plant in costa rica that closed, relocated to china, and is now back up and running in costa rica. The chips portion of the chips act that involved incentives for allied nations to produce a chips nearshore, if not on shore , was a factor in that decision.
▶ 1:46:27Ms. Hart: That was a factor in costa rica saying no to huawei and going with western alternatives. Because you cannot be a chips recipient and have huawei as your 5g provider. I am confident this committee would rule as such. I would be remiss in my duty if I did not add it there is a substantial amount of counter prc maligned influence activities across the hemisphere .
▶ 1:46:58Sen. Mccormick: Dr. lind.
▶ 1:47:00Dr. Lind: It is a really important question. Vital to remind us of how vital the latin american region is and will be in the coming years. We are in a superpower competition. We remember the last superpower competition we were in. The number of times the U.S. was engaged in various activities in latin america. Think about the cuban missile crisis.
▶ 1:47:29Dr. Lind: Just the fact that we are in a superpower competition again should qs to be thinking that -- cue us to be thinking latin america and south america will play a much larger role. China in particular is already, from its perspective, it sees the united states as very much operating in its backyard. We have bases there. We have strong alliances. We have U.S. military flowing throughout the region. And so on.
▶ 1:48:00Dr. Lind: China has it the perception it wants to push the U.S. out. A very keen way to do that, very cover way to do that, is to start pressuring us in our backyard as, indeed, it is already doing.
▶ 1:48:16Sen. Kaine: What is the chinese assessment of our response? They are pushing in our backyard but to me it does not look like we are responding in a forceful way. Is that how china sees it?
▶ 1:48:31Dr. Lind: I cannot tell you how china sees it, unfortunately. But I think that when china looks at our efforts, it sees both a very powerful adversary that is capable and technologically advanced and an adversary that has tremendous assets around the globe and tremendous goodwill across the globe. And in the region that we are talking about in many ways. China sees that. It also sees vulnerabilities.
▶ 1:49:00Dr. Lind: The vulnerabilities, many of which, we have been pointing out today. The vulnerability of the pause in foreign aid, for example, --. >> or refusal to confirm ambassadors in the region.
▶ 1:49:19Chair Risch: Senator scott.
▶ 1:49:22Sen. Kaine: -- Sen. scott: let me continue what senator kaine was talking about. I am from florida. What goes on in latin america is a big deal. A lot of people in my state came from latin america and are following what is going on there. For sure, the last four years, but quite a while the U.S. has put a lot of effort into what is going on in latin america. We have seen that whether it is russia, china, even around -- iran they have actions down there.
▶ 1:49:51Sen. Kaine: It has been frustrating to get the administrations to really focus on what is going on in latin america. Hopefully the next four years with marco rubio as the secretary of state and michael walsh, who it's from florida and cares about national security, as advisor, we will see a change. I do not believe china is our friend. I believe the government of china has clearly decided to be our enemy. They want to destroy our way of life. I think we need to wake up. It will be too late. Mr.
▶ 1:50:19Sen. Kaine: Mattis in 2021 you wrote a piece explaining communist china's long-term strategy and ambition. Four years since, have -- has your opinion changed on xi jinping's rejuvenation of the chinese nation?
▶ 1:50:36Mr. Mattis: If anything, my appreciation for the clarity and long-term thinking of the ccp and its focus on these objectives has gotten sharper than I put in that piece.
▶ 1:50:47Sen. Scott: Do you think the ambitions are regional or global?
▶ 1:50:49Mr. Mattis: Global. They have always been global. You look at the way mao launched the great leap forward. He was not talking about the prc becoming the asia's largest steel producer but the world's largest steel producer. You can see from every leader, from the beginning of the ccp to the president -- to the present I have always seen themselves this way.
▶ 1:51:18Sen. Scott: The ccp invested heavily in military capability to challenge the U.S. added indo pacific in the opportunity to go to the philippines last year to see what they are doing in the shoals down there. How should the united states respond to these developments to preserve the upper -- ability to operate in this region?
▶ 1:51:35Mr. Mattis: Ultimately, this is a place where the tyranny of geography and time requires us to work with allies and partners. It requires us to make a greater investment under the number of platforms, ships, planes, and drones that are able to operate over those large geographical distances.
▶ 1:51:53Sen. Scott: There has been a lot written that china does not have the ability to execute. So, don't take them seriously because they are not very good at what they attempt to try to do. Has it that hurt us? Do you think there is a thought process out there that they cannot do what they are trying to do?
▶ 1:52:11Mr. Mattis: We have a logical fallacy in the way we analyze the prc. We use what we think their capabilities are today to dismiss their ambitions for tomorrow. In 1993 with a new strategic military guidelines work set up talking about fighting precision warfare in an information rich environment and being able to exploit that it looked like a science where the plm was. Nobody is laughing now about where that is.
▶ 1:52:40Mr. Mattis: What I find troubling is when you look at the analysis, the shortcomings of the pla, we are quoting them talking about themselves. I do not like that the pla is a self-conscious, self-aware actor that is seeing its problems and trying to fix them. They are talking about some of these problems in a way that we don't actually know their level of capability. To take an analogy. Say we are talking about a gymnast.
▶ 1:53:04Mr. Mattis: Every gymnast has some trouble with sticking the landing grid the different -- difference between sticking the landing with a 13-year-old and an olympian medalist is completely different. But it would still show up as trouble sticking the landing. We do not know where the pla's actual capability with some of these things are.
▶ 1:53:26Sen. Scott: Do you buy chinese products and services and you think americans should, Dr. lind?
▶ 1:53:31Dr. Lind: I think everything I am wearing and carrying is probably from china and that is the case for many people here.
▶ 1:53:40Sen. Scott: Do try not to?
▶ 1:53:40Dr. Lind: Not consciously.
▶ 1:53:43Sen. Scott: Ms. hart.
▶ 1:53:46Ms. Hart: I have young kids. I pay a lot of attention to where things are made and what the quantity us. We tend to buy more from the U.S.. Unfortunately that means we pay more as well.
▶ 1:53:58Sen. Scott: Mr. stoff:
▶ 1:54:01Sen. Scott: Mr. stoff.
▶ 1:54:01Mr. Stoff: I make great pains to try to avoid when I can but it is quite a big challenge.
▶ 1:54:08Sen. Scott: Mr. mattis:
▶ 1:54:12Sen. Scott: Mr. mattis.
▶ 1:54:12Mr. Mattis: I am in the same situation as Ms. hart. I think it is important. You should not care more about where coffee comes from then wear a t-shirt comes from.
▶ 1:54:26Sen. Coons: Thank you, chairman, and all four witnesses. I apologize for my lateness in arriving. There is a confirmation going on in another committee. I am particularly concerned about the possible expansion of china's influence both at home and abroad added -- as a result of a freeze on our foreign assistance and the weight is being implemented, its cascading effect.
▶ 1:54:52Sen. Coons: There is nothing china wants to do more than limit the reach of our global influence, than reinforce the impression we are an unreliable partner with country throughout the world, particularly in the global south. My concern is we broke -- put our security and diplomatic interests in danger with an abrupt halt.
▶ 1:55:23Sen. Coons: Ms. hart you referenced in response to senator kaine the importance of showing up in the chips act, a bill that came out of the committee that president trump signed into law that helped create the development finance corporation has received robust funding and support from both president trump and president biden. I hope that will be part of our efforts to engage in infrastructure and showing our influence.
▶ 1:55:47Sen. Coons: In the previous decade the belt and initiative spent more than a trillion dollars on infrastructure projects to try to buy influence and curry favor for the prc. This suspension of our aid so broadly implemented actually will not save money because the cost of shutting down and restarting programs often exceeds the cost of a careful review then pivoting to more effective delivery. And it may not be temporary.
▶ 1:56:14Sen. Coons: For many small contactors and organizations many run by foreign nationals they won't be around in 90 days. I want to ask a few quick questions, if I could. Ms. hart how do you think the prc would view this pause in our foreign assistance and what impact do you think it would have for our pro-democracy work, both the iri the international republican institute and the national republican institute have a 90 days on spending that
▶ 1:56:44Sen. Coons: Would require them to lay off their employees and contractors and cease all activity?
▶ 1:56:50Ms. Hart: Beijing views this as a blank check to take the space we are vacating to pursue their interests at america's expense. Frankly, this kneecaps the global human rights and pro-democracy movement that frontline rights defenders in pro-democracy groups are closing their doors. Ndi and iri is shutting down globally. The U.S.
▶ 1:57:19Ms. Hart: Effectively abandoned the hong kong pro-democracy unit as ngos supporting that unit have all ground to a halt. We put a blindfold over the global apparatus we use to track beijing rights abuses and hold them accountable. This is a blank check and I am sure beijing will cash it.
▶ 1:57:38Sen. Coons: One of the impacts of the domestic funding freeze was to put in question research, domestic research, medical research, research by tens of thousands of doctors and scientists across the U.S.. It has been temporarily paused but may come back. What is the impact in terms of our credibility domestically and globally do have an across-the-board pause in federal funding for research?
▶ 1:57:59Mr. Stoff: To ecker -- to echo Ms. hart's comments whatever we do thing like that that provides more opportunity for china to come in. It is already a problem in terms of chinese money and influence in our research ecosystem that is not really systematically tracked or understood at all.
▶ 1:58:22Mr. Stoff: So, if we are stopping this effort, it does give china a lot more opportunity to come in and maybe to message around the world, to our allies and partners, china has the money. China can support this rnd. May be the U.S. is not as serious about this now. There can be secondary effects we need to carefully consider.
▶ 1:58:46Sen. Coons: I appreciate secretary rubio reinterpreting the of initial guidance so it is broader. The actual impact on the ground in terms of its impact on the who is being laid off, what is being shut down is broad.
▶ 1:59:03Sen. Coons: An organization like freedom house that has long enjoyed bipartisan support on the front lines advocating for human rights and democracy shuts its doors, the iri and ndi shut their doors I think china advances and we received.
▶ 1:59:19Sen. Barrasso: Mr. mattis:
▶ 1:59:23Sen. Barrasso: Mr. mattis I want to talk about undersea cables. It is happening around the world. The threats, the sabotage. On january 3 of taiwan's coast guard intercepted a hong kong owned freighter after damage to an international undersea cable was reported. Taiwan alleges that the chinese vessel cut the fiber-optic cable by dragging its anchor across the seabed. This is not an isolated incident.
▶ 1:59:49Sen. Barrasso: According to taiwan's national security bureau over the last three years there have been seven or eight of these undersea cable disruptions. Most of the incidents can be held to the responsibility of vessels from china. And we are seeing it in the balkans, nato, friends and allies. Thought to be related to russian activity in that area.
▶ 2:00:10Sen. Barrasso: While cable damage is not uncommon heightened geopolitical tensions raise suspicions of sabotage and that is what I believe it is. What is china hoping to accomplish with these efforts?
▶ 2:00:22Mr. Mattis: If we are able to lay responsibility at beijing's door and that they were probably cooperating with moscow on some of these operations, we should understand these, right now, as trying to test the response time of different actors to see what they can do. How long does it take to become repaired? In some sense, I think this is an area where we should be looking at, what is the state of the undersea cable industry? Who repairs? Who maintains?
▶ 2:00:53Mr. Mattis: Who can lay the cable? What is the structure of those companies? This is probably an area to keep the prc out. With taiwan specifically it is, can they isolate taiwan? Can they cut it off from the rest of the world? Can they create an information blockade so taiwan can function, can't interact?
▶ 2:01:14Sen. Lee: Detect, respond, repair. Isn't there something technologically that can help us do that more actively, more quickly? How can countries better protect undersea's communication infrastructure from potential sabotage?
▶ 2:01:27Mr. Mattis: I'm not sure the technological's -- what the technological solution is. This operates in a legal lacuna. You can see in the baltic, countries were having trouble figuring out the justification to seize and search a vessel that had clearly done something. /Sen. lee: what would be the role of international organizations investigating or trying to prevent these incidents?
▶ 2:01:52Mr. Mattis: It is a country level investigation. In international cooperation. To the extent there is an international organization that has a rule, they should be involved. It is important for us to understand that such an investigation only works when that organization has the integrity of its own processes.
▶ 2:02:12Mr. Mattis: I think everybody here can give you an example of an international organization where they have not escaped -- international organization that has not kept that integrity and it led to problems.
▶ 2:02:26Sen. Lee: Ip protection. Some of our nations strategic advantages come from our innovation, technology, research, and development. In 2019 american intellectual property was valued at nearly $8 trillion. China I believe poses a serious threat to our businesses and academic institutions. The chinese communist party consistently steals intellectual property, patents other data. 2018, chinese intellectual property theft was estimated to cost our economy over $600 billion.
▶ 2:03:00Sen. Lee: Per year. There's no telling how much of the numbers have gone up since then. Is there leverage in the U.S. to deter that threat?
▶ 2:03:05Mr. Mattis: One of the most powerful tools we have is to deny the prc a market. In some cases that they are stealing the intellectual property, turning around, driving U.S. companies and other companies out of business. Then they are able to sell it. This is one of the key features that they need access to in our world. It allows them to have this capacity. The sure knowledge that they can sell products from ill-gotten methods on the U.S. market, on the european market, and elsewhere.
▶ 2:03:37Sen. Lee: Are there things we can do better at home to safeguard our intellectual property?
▶ 2:03:41Mr. Mattis: There are many things. As Mr. stoff alluded to we have whole categories of research that are not covered. We do not necessarily regardless -- rigorously enforced some of the reporting and guidelines that are there. We do not necessarily require, for example, security trading awareness for people involved in potentially sensitive projects. We could go down a very very long list of potential options.
▶ 2:04:13Sen. Lee: Can you talk about any recent actions by china? What we have seen in their use of tactics against taiwan, they have taught us about china's capabilities and objectives we may not have known?
▶ 2:04:25Mr. Mattis: When you look at the military exercises launched around taiwan you see an ability to operate more ships and more planes with less of an elite off time -- less of a leadoff time, reducing our warning time when we think of the geographically -- geography of east asia. We have much more to go.
▶ 2:04:47Mr. Mattis: Second is the national security bureau and the ministry of justice investigation bureau made a number of arrests recently exposing networks of ccp agents that are actually there to stir up trouble to be in place for sabotage. In some cases, to instigate. This is something that has been there. But as they are making arrests, this is a change in the scope and scale of that problem inside taiwan.
▶ 2:05:18Sen. Shaheen: I want to point out the only U.S. company that makes undersea cables is subcom in new hampshire and I bet they would be happy to come brief us on some of the challenges Mr. mattis identified and how they would encourage us to respond to those. I am happy to help arrange that.
▶ 2:05:40Chair Risch: Senator barrasso pointed out a new problem with china. We never heard of undersea cables being disrupted. Now all of a sudden, one right after the other. The figure always goes back to moscow and china combining to do it. Somebody will be held accountable somewhere. >> thank you, Mr. chairman. Thank you all for your testimony.
▶ 2:06:03Chair Risch: I think you are hearing a common theme, at least from this side of the dais that the trump administrations freeze on security assistance and many other forms of assistance is a gift to beijing. I have been listening to c-span.
▶ 2:06:22Chair Risch: I think it's fair to say we would agree that if we want to compete with the prc for influence, we need to make sure countries have a clear alternative based on our values and competitive advantage as a nation. You cannot to be with nothing. We have to be a reliable partner.
▶ 2:06:44Chair Risch: But this freeze, and we don't know how long it will last, is already sending a terrible message to our partners around the world who are standing up for their country's sovereignty. Against china's influence campaign. These are civil society partners.
▶ 2:07:08Chair Risch: It has also been noted that putting a hold and it disrupting our security assistance sends a terrible message to our partners , whether they are taiwan, vietnam, indonesia, the philippines, pacific island nations, others in the east indo pacific region.
▶ 2:07:26Chair Risch: These countries rely on that ongoing support and cutting it off without notice, without a clear idea of what it will resume, clearly puts us falling into china's hands. Then there are human rights defenders people have talked about. We know about the prc transnational repression of dissidents and how it has expanded reaching dozens of countries.
▶ 2:07:55Chair Risch: Both the state department and aig provide urgent human rights assistance to human rights defenders. There is the assistance of the trump administration withdrawing from the world health organization, a space where china will be happy to fill the void. And we are hearing about this purge over U.S.aid where dozens and dozens of civil servants who have qualifications in these areas are being summarily sent home, sometimes with pay.
▶ 2:08:28Chair Risch: Contractors without pay. I guess my question is, as I listen to the testimony so far, Ms. hart, and I know that senator schatz asked a version of this question. But if you are president xi are you looking to exploit this moment? What would you be doing to exploit the moment?
▶ 2:08:53Chair Risch: Do you agree that what we have seen is really an unforced error and gift to president xi and in the prc?
▶ 2:09:02Ms. Hart: Absolutely. I want to acknowledge and thank secretary rubio for the measures he has taken thus far. I would like to see that extended to other programs particularly the counter china programs. This across-the-board freeze kneecapped america in global competition with china.
▶ 2:09:24Ms. Hart: We talked about how this silences and blindfolds human rights watch is giving beijing a blank check to commit human rights abuses and fueling -- including forced labor abuses. We talked about the taiwan military financing freeze that gives beijing a blank check to ramp up coercion around taiwan. Cyber assistance is frozen. We are giving beijing a blank check to commit cyber attacks against our partner nations.
▶ 2:09:53Ms. Hart: State cdp, the cyberspace digital connectivity and related technology funds provide rapid foreign assistance to small countries being targeted with chinese and russian cyber attacks. That is turned off. Beijing has a golden opportunity to go after networks.
▶ 2:10:09Ms. Hart: Another one that has not been mentioned thus far is, with dfc over the past few years, finally chipping in in outbidding chinese companies, even chinese state owned enterprises in global infrastructure projects including ports and telecom infrastructure. That is where we want to put beijing on the back foot. But dfc is impacted by the freeze. Xm may not be directly impacted but any company has to look at U.S. financing vehicles.
▶ 2:10:38Ms. Hart: Any country has to look at xm and dfc and question how reliable they are. It not only kneecaps us in human rights and taiwan, resisting cyber attacks, it undercuts our ability to outbid beijing in ports and telecom infrastructure.
▶ 2:10:59Sen. Van Hollen: I appreciate that. There have been a lot of discussions with secretary rubio who was supported unanimously in the senate. There has been some clarification on the humanitarian aid that it is not just limited to emergency food assistance. But, the rest of the freeze is still in place. You have already described the really terrible consequences. I hope we get into this sort of self forced error, our own goal here and get back on track. Thank you, Mr. chairman.
▶ 2:11:38Sen. Van Hollen: >> before I begin my remarks it is important to me to lay down some foundational principles I believe all of us operate on. I will tell you personally I have great respect for the chinese people. The chinese culture. The chinese history. I want to make sure none of this this morning is about any of that, but rather, a dictatorship that is as hard on their own people as they are on other people. Let me jump in.
▶ 2:12:04Sen. Van Hollen: Today I introduced a bill aimed at increasing pressure on chinese -- the way they address the theft of rip. Id theft is one of the top issues I hear about in my district. Small business to big businesses, across the top. It is estimated we lose about $600 billion annually to this. Mr. mattis to what extent is china's ip thef explicitly backed by the government as a state-sponsored initiative?
▶ 2:12:36Sen. Van Hollen: Is it actively pursued by the government as a strategy or does the government somebody turn a blind eye as long as it targets americans?
▶ 2:12:43Mr. Mattis: It is a policy backed both by the party in the state and the party and state organizations are both involved in actively organizing people to conduct that theft in creating, for example, one of the latest innovation, overseas centers to fund partnerships, a constantly morphing problem. We cut off one avenue and another pops up.
▶ 2:13:11Mr. Mattis: They are a creative and prolific adversary in terms of finding the holes and trying to keep things going especially when they can exploit countries that might not care as much about the protection of U.S. intellectual property. >> if I might I want to speak to my ccp handlers. I know you are listening. I know you try to read my emails. I know you try to read my texts.
▶ 2:13:42Mr. Mattis: I know you try to influence me in my home state and my staff in washington, D.C.. I have a word for you. It'sworld, especially in hong kg and taiwan.
▶ 2:14:05Mr. Mattis: Describe what subnational influence operations are and the influence that targets people within a state. How much of a goal is it to influence state and local government? And how much is to influence federal?
▶ 2:14:22Mr. Mattis: The question of whether it is to influence the federal government as well as state and local is, yes. How many people in this chamber and in the senate at large began their careers as town council members, state legislators? There is a natural progression, a natural career path people hold.
▶ 2:14:46Mr. Mattis: You look at the attempt that was widely reported by a house member in the bay area for the chinese consulate -- of the bay area. The chinese consulate was targeting a number of chinese -- of politicians in that area. In your home state of utah they have looked for ways to connect to the prc and shape government decisions.
▶ 2:15:12Mr. Mattis: One of the other things you can see there is it can be regulatory. Some states require a change in their laws to require institute. That has occurred. You can see it in terms of trying to push government procurement so prc products from huawei from lenovo, rather than others that might be safer, are put into government.
▶ 2:15:39Mr. Mattis: I think that anything you can describe or have heard reported as being directed at a national government has been directed at a state and local. The biggest difference is they lack access to the staff resources, and often, the knowledge to be able to push back effectively. Though I think your state has the most robust private sector in trying to identify and push back on this.
▶ 2:16:04Sen. Curtis: I want to end where I began and double down on this. My goal is we have a strong, productive relationship with china. We do not need to be at odds. But it has to be a relationship that is equal. They cannot steal our intellectual property. You cannot take advantage of our businesses. And then expect us to have the type of relationship we need to have for not just us, for them, and for the entire world. Thank you over for this hearing. I yield my time.
▶ 2:16:35Chair Risch: Senator rosen.
▶ 2:16:37Sen. Rosen: Thank you for joining us today. With this administration's disastrous decision to freeze almost all foreign assistance we all know this hearing is a critical opportunity for us to highlight not just china's harmful influence but also the opening this freeze gives to the prc to expand its foothold around the world as many of my colleagues have already spoken about.
▶ 2:17:05Sen. Rosen: We would be naive to think desperate countries will not turn to china to fill the gaps that our assistance has left behind. My first question is about prc investment in the middle east. In recent years, china has deepened ties with the middle east.
▶ 2:17:24Sen. Rosen: The prc spent billions on products in the region from infrastructure initiatives like high-speed rail linking the gulf cooperation council countries, desalinization, solar plants, port modernization projects. Meanwhile, the current administrations warrant assistance freeze that already has broad reaching impacts throughout the middle east threatens to leave a vacuum that the prc can exploit for crit -- for further influence and this critical region.
▶ 2:17:54Sen. Rosen: Dr. lind what are the practical implications, practical effects of chinese investment in the middle east? Specifically I want to hear more about how the prc might leverage its economic ties to advance its regional interest?
▶ 2:18:13Dr. Lind: Thank you for this great question. It's peer from the chinese activities in the middle east you have described, that we can see in china and its behavior there as well as other areas of the world, it does have global aims. It recognizes that this is an essential region for energy, for energy security, for influence. China wants influence within that key region.
▶ 2:18:42Dr. Lind: Its actions tell us that pretty clearly. The other thing, getting to the practical implications of this, obviously, this is leading the united states know we need to be engaged in this region. If we want to maintain the influence we have had. And also, on the theme of today's hearing, I think that this is a region where we particularly see a risk of china's support for global authoritarianism.
▶ 2:19:15Dr. Lind: China is probably the world leader in what we talk about as technologies of authoritarian repression. This is one realm in which it practices tremendous influence around the world. In this region in particular, there is so much demand for what china is selling. By that I don't mean just chinese technologies.
▶ 2:19:42Dr. Lind: I mean, certainly chinese firms and also chinese government influence. Chinese government partnerships. These are relationships that it seems to be sort of pushing on an open door between like-minded societies in many ways that some of these governments have an interest in acquiring technologies and methods and expertise in repression and china holds that expertise in
▶ 2:20:16Dr. Lind: Technologies and so on. These are among the biggest practical implications of its involvement there.
▶ 2:20:21Sen. Rosen: We have a lot of threats from china, countering the threat of opioids and other types of competition. I want to move on to something in my last moment with a nevada connection, the lithium competition. Given the dual use potential economic importance of lithium ion batteries, securing a reliable lithium supply is a national security imperative.
▶ 2:20:46Sen. Rosen: Nevada is poised to be a global leader at issue home to the highest lithium reserves in the united states. I am concerned chinese battery exporters, they may think about other ways we can influence us. We all like our phones on people know about lithium from that. It deliberately lowering the price of lithium-ion batteries to undercut U.S. and allied manufacturers is a tactic the prc has employed in the past.
▶ 2:21:11Sen. Rosen: Can you talk to us about how we can weather this unfair practice and ultimately win the lithium-ion battery race with china?
▶ 2:21:18Ms. Hart: Sure. Where we have sectors that lithium can -- beijing controls global supply chains we are working hard to get alternatives in -- online like in nevada. That is step one. Step two, I imagine we will need something like a buyers club for these critical products where the U.S. and key allies and partners agreed to buy from each other, recognizing we will not cut each other off.
▶ 2:21:46Ms. Hart: Otherwise, if we have a completely open market, china will do what china has done before, dump product on the market to put these really important alternatives out of business. Getting them online is step one. Step two, we will have to have some multilateral arrangements or buyers club to incentivize companies to buy from nevada instead of beijing.
▶ 2:22:08Sen. Rosen: Is it a good idea for the department of energy and department of commerce to continue to fund the lithium loop in nevada as a tech hub to help us fight china?
▶ 2:22:18Ms. Hart: I think our national security may depend on it.
▶ 2:22:22Chair Risch: I want to thank our panel. Dr. lind as we close you hit on a point that deserves underscoring, between our cultures, talking about the technology for really controlling populations. There is a real difference between autocracies and democracies. Here, we in the united states, and other democracies, we, the people, want to control a government.
▶ 2:22:53Chair Risch: Those autocracies are the exact opposite. They have a government that wants to control their people. It's a very, very different view of life. From the time you get up in the morning until the time you go to bed at night. That is the world we live in. We will have to figure out how we continue to live in a world where we have such differences in our view of the importance of an individual human being. With that, thank you for the panel. It has been a great panel.
▶ 2:23:23Chair Risch: We heara a lot of them over the years. We have as good of expertise here as I have seen with any issue. Thank you for participating. I will leave the record open for 24 hours to submit questions. Take the opportunity to include answers to those in the record. With that, any final thoughts? With that, the hearing is adjourned.