Hearings to examine the Department's cyber force generation plan and the associated implementation plan

Defense Posture and Global ThreatsSenate Armed Services Subcommittee on Cybersecurity · 2026-01-28 · 119th Congress
The Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Cybersecurity held this hearing to examine the Department of War's cyber force generation plan, known as Cyber Command 2.0, and its associated implementation plan. Begins at 0:17:59
Transcript
Highlights

Title

Pentagon's Cyber Command 2.0 plan to overhaul cyber force training and talent

Purpose

The Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Cybersecurity held this hearing to examine the Department of War's cyber force generation plan, known as Cyber Command 2.0, and its associated implementation plan. Witnesses from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy and U.S. Cyber Command testified on efforts to overhaul recruiting, training, retention, and talent management for military cyber forces amid growing threats from China, Russia, and Iran. The hearing also touched on debates over a standalone Cyber Force, AI integration into cyber operations, and use of National Guard and Reserve cyber talent. Begins at0:17:59

Who spoke

Sen. Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Ranking Member0:17:59: Warned the new National Defense Strategy mentions cyber in only three places despite persistent, constant probing by adversaries0:18:56; later asked Gen. Hartman about building fully qualified cyber operators0:59:27 and pressed on security automation tools and AI for real-time network defense1:12:21, and asked what legislative help the Department needs, including a possible civilian cyber reserve1:22:121:24:34.

Chair Mike Rounds (R-SD)0:21:55: Opened by framing Cyber Command 2.0 as the most significant reorganization of U.S. Cyber Command since its inception 15 years ago0:22:51; questioned witnesses on maturing the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy role0:41:37, the case for a separate Cyber Force0:54:38, civilian workforce and Guard participation0:58:01, the Venezuela operation's cyber role1:04:19, and university cyber talent pipelines like Dakota State University1:18:23.

Ms. Sutton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy0:42:55: Said her office's role is to integrate cyber across all policy discussions rather than treat it as a "stovepipe"0:43:13; explained the Advanced Cyber Training and Education Center is not intended to be brick-and-mortar but will source best-of-breed training from industry and academia0:50:18; said Cyber Command 2.0 and a separate Cyber Force are distinct debates, with the talent model designed to be organization-agnostic0:55:00; said no new authorities are currently needed beyond implementing existing ones1:22:50.

Lt. Gen. William Hartman, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command0:30:23: Said Cyber Command didn't gain real budget control until 2024 despite 2017 authorities, and Cyber Command 2.0 will hold services to a "1000-level" training standard0:45:21; said he is "not opposed" to a joint cyber service academy but does not want to divorce cyber capability from the services0:52:51; confirmed Chinese actors have been found "living off the land" inside U.S. telecommunications and critical infrastructure networks1:17:58; described plans for a cyber aptitude test at recruiting stations and an in-service recruiting pilot to pull talent into cyber roles1:09:12.

Brig. Gen. Messer, Joint Staff0:37:38: Said cyber demand across the joint force is rising faster than the force can scale, requiring prioritization and risk elsewhere0:39:03; described a new "non-kinetic effect cell" on the Joint Staff built ahead of and during the Venezuela operation to integrate cyber into planning and execution1:05:441:06:08; said targeted recruiting under Cyber Command 2.0 will help find "good guy hacker" talent1:08:54.

Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY)0:44:36: Pressed Hartman on why Cyber Command 2.0 amounts to a "fundamental reimagining" rather than tinkering with authorities Cyber Command has held since 20170:45:06; challenged Sutton on how her office will keep services from "steamrolling" Cyber Command on career management0:46:42; asked about the national security risk of China's reported approval of H200 chip imports to ByteDance, Alibaba, and Tencent0:48:32; repeatedly pressed all witnesses on why the Department won't establish a dedicated cyber academy, noting the Advanced Cyber Training and Education Center isn't fully operational until Q3 FY20310:49:140:50:10.

Key moments

Sen. Rosen noted the newly released National Defense Strategy mentions cyber in only three places, questioning the administration's prioritization of the domain0:18:56.

Hartman revealed Cyber Command was granted enhanced budget authority in 2023 but did not actually receive control of that funding until 2024 due to unresolved issues0:45:21.

Sutton confirmed 97 tasks across 26 lines of effort make up the Cyber Command 2.0 implementation plan she will oversee0:28:07.

Gillibrand and Hartman disagreed on the need for a dedicated cyber academy: Gillibrand argued a decade of relying on existing service training hasn't worked and salaries can't compete with private-sector pay of $400,000–$600,0000:52:02; Hartman said he supports the idea in principle but does not want to separate cyber capability from the military services0:52:51.

Hartman confirmed Chinese state actors have been found operating inside U.S. telecommunications systems and critical infrastructure using "living off the land" techniques that mimic legitimate network traffic1:17:311:17:58.

Gillibrand asked about China's reported approval of H200 AI chip imports to ByteDance, Alibaba, and Tencent, all linked to the Chinese military; Hartman said he had not studied the question and would follow up0:48:570:49:10.

Sutton and Hartman said the Cyber Command 2.0 debate is separate from — and should not be conflated with — ongoing calls for a standalone Cyber Force, calling the talent model deliberately agnostic to organizational structure0:55:000:56:42.

Rounds pressed for public detail on the cyber dimension of the Venezuela operation; Messer declined to discuss specifics but described a new Joint Staff "non-kinetic effect cell" developed over the prior six months to integrate cyber into operational planning1:05:231:06:08.

Rosen highlighted her provision from the FY25 NDAA elevating cyber defense to a subordinate unified command, and Hartman confirmed AI and automation are "100%" part of Cyber Command 2.0's defensive plan, including pilots aimed at detecting Chinese living-off-the-land intrusions1:12:471:15:121:15:28.

Sen. Rosen proposed a "civilian cyber reserve" to tap private-sector talent for special missions; Hartman called it "a great idea"1:24:341:24:37.

Metadata

CommitteeSenate Armed Services Subcommittee on Cybersecurity
Chamber / CongressSenate · 119th Congress
Date2026-01-28
TypeMeeting
Witnesses
(none listed in event metadata)
Videosenate-isvp
Transcript183 caption blocks · 10,148 words · 1:26:47 runtime
EventCongress.gov 337928