AICybersecurity threats facing drinking water and wastewater systems

Committee Organizing for 119th CongressSenate Environment and Public Works · March 4, 2026 · 119th Congress
The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee held this hearing to examine the cybersecurity challenges facing the roughly 170,000 drinking water and wastewater utilities across the country, and to identify ways the federal government, states, and universities could help utilities—especially small and rural systems—improve their defenses. Begins at ▶ 0:15:45
Transcript
Highlights

Title

Cybersecurity threats facing drinking water and wastewater systems

Purpose

The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee held this hearing to examine the cybersecurity challenges facing the roughly 170,000 drinking water and wastewater utilities across the country, and to identify ways the federal government, states, and universities could help utilities—especially small and rural systems—improve their defenses. Witnesses from Marshall University's Institute for Cybersecurity, the National Rural Water Association, and the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies testified on workforce shortages, funding gaps, and possible models such as circuit-rider technical assistance and a NERC-style risk organization. Begins at▶ 0:15:45

Who spoke

• Chair Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV)▶ 0:15:45: Opened by noting cyberattacks from Iran, China, and Russia targeting the nation's roughly 170,000 water and wastewater utilities▶ 0:17:09, cited a 2024 EPA finding that some systems shared single logins or never disabled ex-employees' access▶ 0:18:59, and warned against a "one-size-fits-all" mandate that would burden smaller systems▶ 0:19:32; later questioned witnesses on circuit riders▶ 0:45:12, workforce apprenticeships▶ 0:49:53, and closed by calling for better federal data on the number and location of attacks▶ 1:34:48.

• Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), Ranking Member▶ 0:21:17: Said Chinese hackers have breached small municipal water systems in Texas, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts since 2023, and Rhode Island facilities suffered at least six attacks in six years costing hundreds of thousands of dollars▶ 0:22:50; noted an EPA survey found less than 25% of wastewater utilities perform annual cyber risk assessments▶ 0:23:23; said the Trump administration has forced out cybersecurity experts and cut funding▶ 0:23:55; raised a past idea to mandate carve-out cyber insurance as a market-based spur for defenses▶ 0:54:20; and later stressed that nation-state and criminal cyberattacks are not clearly separable, since Russia subsidizes ransomware groups operating from places like Moldova and Lithuania▶ 1:30:54.

• Dr. Simonton, Marshall University Institute for Cybersecurity▶ 0:26:28: Said over 75% of West Virginia's several hundred community water systems serve fewer than 3,300 people, often with one or two operators handling everything▶ 0:27:23; described common vulnerabilities including flat networks, default PLC credentials, and legacy equipment▶ 0:27:48; cited Marshall's work training 14 National Guard units later deployed on real-world missions▶ 0:29:11 and developing stackable cybersecurity credentials for working operators▶ 0:30:30; recommended a circuit-rider style program modeled on USDA technical assistance▶ 0:31:03.

• Mr. Oderman (Odermann), National Rural Water Association / North Dakota Rural Water [0:32:36 as introduced by Sen. Cramer; first speaks 0:34:00]: Said North Dakota's rural water association has 282 members serving 92% of the state▶ 0:34:17; said cybersecurity is "a question of capacity" not indifference▶ 0:35:59 and offered five principles including leading with assistance not enforcement and funding any mandate▶ 0:37:45; said attempted attacks on rural water systems occur "probably daily"▶ 1:13:22 and that ransomware is more prevalent than nation-state attacks, which tend to lie in wait and exfiltrate data▶ 1:19:27.

• Mr. Dewhirst, Fairfax Water / Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies▶ 0:39:31: Said about 14% of systems reported at least one cyber incident in the most recent quarter, up from 11.5% a year earlier▶ 0:40:50; proposed a NERC-modeled water risk organization working with EPA▶ 0:43:32; said WaterISAC has no comparable counterpart and funding plus staff time remain the primary barriers to utilities accessing cybersecurity services▶ 1:27:02.

• Sen. Kevin Cramer (R-ND)▶ 0:32:28: Introduced Mr. Oderman and highlighted his rural water background▶ 0:32:56; later pressed witnesses on the value of "assistance not enforcement" versus insurance-driven market regulation▶ 0:56:18 and asked for best practices on interagency collaboration▶ 0:58:15.

• Sen. Lisa Blunt Rochester (D-DE) [0:21:07 recognized; first speaks 1:01:48]: Cited reports that hackers who breach water systems can alter chemical levels or plant "software bombs"▶ 1:02:01; noted the EPA cybersecurity grant program has never been funded near its authorized $50 million and expires in FY2026▶ 1:04:11; touted her bipartisan Water Infrastructure and Sustainability Act to reauthorize it▶ 1:04:37.

• Sen. Pete Ricketts (R-NE)▶ 1:07:12: Said nearly 100 drinking water systems serving 26.6 million people had critical or high-risk vulnerabilities including open internet portals and default passwords▶ 1:08:04; asked about advantages of migrating to cloud-based systems▶ 1:09:02 and about documentation on attack sources▶ 1:10:56.

• Sen. Jon Husted (R-OH)▶ 1:12:34: Asked how common cyberattacks on rural water systems are▶ 1:12:54 and pressed on the role of human error versus technical failures▶ 1:14:26; noted most attacks originate from North Korea, Iran, Russia, and China, not Ukraine or Israel▶ 1:17:44.

• Sen. Adam Schiff (D-CA)▶ 1:18:09: Described his own bill to give EPA more tools for water cybersecurity without raising water bills▶ 1:18:29; asked how prevalent ransomware attacks are given reluctance to report them▶ 1:19:05 and whether attacks reflect opportunistic targeting versus deliberate selection▶ 1:21:54.

• Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA)▶ 1:24:58: Highlighted his Water Intelligence Security and Cyber Threat Protection Act and Boston Water and Sewer's 2024 ransomware attack, which WaterISAC helped navigate▶ 1:25:33; recounted the 2010 Stuxnet-driven push to mandate electric-grid cybersecurity that passed the House but died in the Senate after utility lobbying▶ 1:28:48; argued "vision without funding is a hallucination"▶ 1:27:19.

Key moments

• EPA identified water systems using a single shared login for all employees and failing to disable former employees' access, per a 2024 review cited by Chair Capito▶ 0:18:59.

• Whitehouse cited at least six cyberattacks on Rhode Island municipal facilities over six years, and Chinese hackers breaching small municipal systems in Texas, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts since 2023▶ 0:22:50.

• An EPA survey found fewer than 25% of wastewater utilities perform annual cyber risk assessments▶ 0:23:23.

• Dr. Simonton said over 75% of West Virginia's community water systems serve fewer than 3,300 people, often run by just one or two operators handling treatment, distribution, and cybersecurity alike▶ 0:27:23.

• Dewhirst reported roughly 14% of systems had at least one cyber incident last quarter, up from 11.5% the same period a year prior▶ 0:40:50.

• Ricketts cited nearly 100 drinking water systems serving 26.6 million people found with critical or high-risk vulnerabilities such as open internet portals and default passwords▶ 1:08:04.

• Blunt Rochester noted the EPA cybersecurity grant program, authorized at $50 million, has never been funded near that level and is set to expire in FY2026▶ 1:04:11.

• Markey recounted the Stuxnet-era push to mandate electric-utility cybersecurity, which passed the House unanimously but died repeatedly in the Senate after utility lobbying against the cost▶ 1:28:48▶ 1:29:45.

• Odermann said attempted attacks on rural water systems occur "probably daily," ranging from phishing to port scans▶ 1:13:22, and that a small handful of ransomware attacks have been reported to Dewhirst's clearinghouse in the past year▶ 1:21:28.

• Husted noted that, per his research, most attacks originate from North Korea, Iran, Russia, and China—not Ukraine or Israel▶ 1:17:44; Whitehouse separately argued the line between nation-state attacks and Russia-subsidized criminal ransomware groups is not clear▶ 1:30:54.

Metadata

Official titleBusiness meeting to consider the nomination of the nomination of Douglas Weaver, of Maryland, to be a Member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; to be immediately followed by a hearing to examine a discussion draft of an original bill entitled, "the Toxic Substances Control Act Fee Reauthorization and Improvement Act of 2026."
CommitteeSenate Environment and Public Works
Chamber / CongressSenate · 119th Congress
DateMarch 4, 2026
TypeMeeting
Witnesses
(none listed in event metadata)
Videosenate-isvp
Transcript216 caption blocks · 9,186 words · 1:35:55 runtime
EventCongress.gov 338028